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JONATHAN RENQUF 
A STRIKII«e CHANGE} P o l i t i c a l transforaation i n thm Hurton alnars' and 
aechanics' branches of the National Union of nineworkers, County Durhaa* 
1978-1988. 
Thesis submitted f o r the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Durham, 1989. 
ABSTRACT 
This t h e s i s examines processes of p o l i t i c a l change i n the Murton miners' 
and mechanics' branches of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) between 
1978 and 198S. During t h i s period both branches swung from the r i g h t of the 
NUM's p o l i t i c a l spectrum to the l e f t . 
Recent debates i n human geography - and the s o c i a l sciences more generally 
- have drawn a t t e n t i o n to the importance of place i n analysing so c i a l 
developments. However, a review of the l i t e r a t u r e reveals a s u r p r i s i n g lack 
o f d e t a i l e d s t u d i e s undertaken at the l o c a l l e v e l . 
I n order to understand the c o n s t r a i n t s under which events at a lo c a l l e v e l 
take place, i t i s necessary to place them i n context. The coal industry i s 
th e r e f o r e located at the centre of a complex set of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s between c a p i t a l , labour and the s t a t e known as the "post war 
settlement" <PWS). As economic c r i s i s deepened i n the 1970's, the PWS came 
under a t t a c k . 
I n the coal i n d u s t r y t h i s led to the progressive d e s t a b i l i s a t i o n of a 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c "indulgency p a t t e r n " which had b u i l t up i n the post war 
years. At Murton, t h i s d e s t a b i l i s a t i o n created the room f o r l e f t wing 
a c t i v i s t s t o b u i l d support i n miners' and mechanics' branches. However, 
t h e i r impact was unevenly d i s t r i b u t e d among the workforce because miners 
from d i f f e r e n t backgrounds were a f f e c t e d i n d i f f e r e n t ways by the c r i s i s i n 
the i n d u s t r y . Cleavages of age and residence led to s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s 
i n miners' and mechanics' understanding of the c r i s i s f a c i n g the in d u s t r y . 
This t h e s i s examines the i n t e r a c t i o n between l o c a l union branch leadership, 
the changing s i t u a t i o n i n the coal i n d u s t r y , and d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n the 
workforce during three d i s t i n c t periods: from 1978 u n t i l the eve of the 
198^^/5 s t r i k e ; the s t r i k e i t s e l f ; and the period since the s t r i k e u n t i l the 
end of 1988. 
A STRIKING CHANGES P o l i t i c a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i n t h e Murton 
m i n e r s ' and mschanics' branches o f t h e N a t i o n a l Union o f 
Mineworkersy County Durham* 1978-1788. 
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1.1 PREFACE 
l . l . i THE MAIN QUESTIONS 
T h i s t h e s i s i s about p r o c e s s e s of p o l i t i c a l change i n two branches^ of the 
N a t i o n a l Union of Mineworkers (NUM) at Murton c o l l i e r y i n the Durham 
c o a l f i e l d over the p e r i o d 1978-1988. 
During t h i s period, both branches were transformed from b a s t i o n s of the 
union's r i g h t wing to strongholds of the l e f t . T h i s dramatic s h i f t occurred 
d u r i n g a p e r i o d of unprecedented upheaval i n the c o a l i n d u s t r y , i n c l u d i n g -
i n 1984/5 - the longest major i n d u s t r i a l d i s p u t e i n i t s h i s t o r y . I t was 
a l s o a time of change and reassessment f o r the organised working c l a s s i n 
B r i t a i n g e n e r a l l y . The pace and s c a l e of s o c i a l development over the l a s t 
t e n y e a r s has spawned an enormous l i t e r a t u r e a n a l y s i n g the extent and 
meaning of these changes f o r s o c i e t y i n general, and f o r "the l e f t " i n 
p a r t i c u l a r . These changes, and the debate they have generated, form the 
context f o r t h i s study of the Murton branches. 
Although the p e r i o d s i n c e Mrs Thatcher's e l e c t i o n i n 1979 has seen a s e r i e s 
of d e f e a t s f o r the working c l a s s , i t has a l s o been a p e r i o d c h a r a c t e r i s e d 
by a c c e l e r a t i n g s o c i a l d i v i s i o n s and i n t e n s e c l a s s c o n f l i c t . S u c c e s s i v e 
Thatcher government's have been marked by an ambitious d r i v e not j u s t to 
r e s t r u c t u r e the B r i t i s h economy, but to a l t e r the v e r y notion of c l a s s as 
i t had become c r y s t a l l i s e d i n the network of s o c i a l r e g u l a t i o n s which 
guided postwar B r i t i s h s o c i e t y . Underlying t h i s d r i v e was an atteitf>t to 
r e s o l v e the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s generated by the "post war settlement" (PWS) and 
c r e a t e a new s e t of c o n d i t i o n s favourable f o r c a p i t a l i s t accumulation i n 
B r i t a i n . 
I n e v i t a b l y t h i s s t r a t e g y posed an enormous c h a l l e n g e to t r a d e union 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s . For rank and f i l e t r a d e u n i o n i s t s the questions i t posed 
^The miners and mechanics branches. The NUM i n Durham i s s p l i t 
i n t o t h r e e s e c t i o n s based on d i v i s i o n s i n work t a s k s ; the n u m e r i c a l l y 
dominant miners, the mechanics ( s k i l l e d craftsmen) and the t i n y enginemens 
s e c t i o n . Only the f i r s t two are considered i n t h i s t h e s i s (see chapter 
f o u r ) . 
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were f r e q u e n t l y even sharper. How should they respond to a t t a c k s on t h e i r 
l i v i n g standards and t h e i r jobs? Was there any point i n r e s i s t i n g a t a l l ? 
C o a l miners f a c e d these c h a l l e n g e s i n the e a r l y 1980's, as the National 
C o a l Board (NCB) began to apply a " T h a t c h e r i t e " programme to the in d u s t r y . 
Because of i t s s t a t u s as a symbol of the PWS, the c o a l i n d u s t r y provides an 
i d e a l s i t e f o r a study i n the changing p o l i t i c s of trade unionism. However 
f o r workers, q u e s t i o n s of s t r a t e g y a r e never answered i n the a b s t r a c t , and 
t h i s t h e s i s t h e r e f o r e examines how miners at one North E a s t e r n p i t 
responded to the NCB's attempts to r e s t r u c t u r e the i n d u s t r y . I n p a r t i c u l a r , 
i t looks a t the changes i n union branch p o l i t i c s which accompanied the 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the i n d u s t r y from 1978-1988. 
These then a r e the p r i n c i p l e questions approached i n t h i s t h e s i s : 
What was the nature of the p o l i t i c a l changes i n the Murton branches between 
1978 and 1988, and how d i d they d i f f e r between the two branches? 
What was the r e l a t i o n s h i p of these changes to broader s t r u g g l e s w i t h i n the 
UIM and the labour movement, and to the r i s e of Thatcherism? 
To what extent were the changes observed i n Murton determined by these 
o u t s i d e p r e s s u r e s , and to what extent were they the r e s u l t of 
p l a c e - s p e c i f i c f a c t o r s , i n c l u d i n g the e x e r c i s e of human agency? 
1 . 1 . i i ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
The changes observed a t Murton over the t e n year p e r i o d of t h i s study 
emerged from a coir^lex i n t e r a c t i o n of s o c i a l , economic and p o l i t i c a l 
p r o c e s s e s , o perating a t s c a l e s from the i n d i v i d u a l to the g l o b a l . Although 
Murton i s only a v i l l a g e community of about 10000 people, i t s apparent 
i s o l a t i o n i s i l l u s o r y . As p a r t of the UK c o a l i n d u s t r y , Murton c o l l i e r y i s 
i n t e g r a t e d i n t o a n a t i o n a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l system of energy production. 
As p a r t of a n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r y , Murton i s swept i n t o the o r b i t of s t a t e 
i n f l u e n c e . And through i t s t r a d e union branches, Murton's miners are l i n k e d 
t o a r e g i o n a l and n a t i o n a l working c l a s s movement r i c h i n t r a d i t i o n , 
r e s o u r c e s and s t r u g g l e . A l l th e s e elements need to be i n t e g r a t e d i n order 
t o b u i l d up an understanding of events a t Murton. 
Fundamentally, t h i s t h e s i s i s about s t r u g g l e . I t i s about the way t h a t 
workers respond to, and t r y and shape the f o r c e s a f f e c t i n g t h e i r l i v e s . 
Nowhere was t h i s s t r u g g l e more apparent than during the miners' year long 
s t r i k e i n 1984/5. The s t r i k e i s the p i v o t a l event of t h i s t h e s i s , because 
i t was t h i s c o n f l i c t which p r e c i p i t a t e d the dramatic p o l i t i c a l s h i f t s 
w i t h i n the Murton branches. Yet i t i s a l s o a profoundly misunderstood 
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event. Chapter one begins with a s e l e c t i v e review of the l i t e r a t u r e on the 
s t r i k e , which shows t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the n a t i o n a l conduct of 
t h e s t r i k e , and the l o c a l l e v e l which generated and s u s t a i n e d i t has b a r e l y 
been touched upon. T h i s f a i l u r e to i n t e r p e n e t r a t e the l o c a l with higher 
s c a l e s of a n a l y s i s exposes the gap which t h i s t h e s i s attempts to bridge. I n 
other words, e x p l a i n i n g the dynamics of p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n at a n a t i o n a l 
l e v e l r e q u i r e s d e t a i l e d study of p r o c e s s e s of p o l i t i c a l change at the l o c a l 
l e v e l . 
T h i s focus on the l o c a l c u t s a c r o s s the debate i n the s o c i a l s c i e n c e s over 
the importance of " p l a c e " i n understanding the development of contemporary 
c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y . I t i s a debate engaged i n the second h a l f of chapter 
one. I argue t h a t w h i l s t the s p e c i f i c i t i e s of d i f f e r e n t p l a c e s are c l e a r l y 
iit^sortant i n conprehending the way i n which high l e v e l changes w i t h i n 
c a p i t a l i s m are a c t u a l l y experienced i n p a r t i c u l a r l o c a l i t i e s , most 
p u b l i s h e d r e s e a r c h has f a i l e d t o move beyond the r e g i o n a l s c a l e . T h i s focus 
misses out on the enormously coit^lex and o f t e n c o n t r a d i c t o r y ways i n which 
r e g i o n a l and n a t i o n a l events are c o n s t r u c t e d a t the l o c a l l e v e l . 
Chapter two widens the debate to c o n s i d e r recent exair^sles of s t r u g g l e s 
a g a i n s t r e s t r u c t u r i n g to provide a context f o r the changes a f f e c t i n g the 
miners. Comparisons of a n t i - s t e e l c l o s u r e cairpaigns i n the 1970's/80's with 
the Upper Clyde S h i p b u i l d e r s work-in i n 1971 i l l u s t r a t e the need to 
c o n s i d e r the r o l e of l o c a l union l e a d e r s h i p , and the p o l i t i c a l - e c o n o m i c 
context f o r each s t r u g g l e . The s t a t e i s h e a v i l y itr ^ s l i c a t e d i n determining 
t h i s l a t t e r aspect, so the second h a l f of chapter two a l s o a s s e s s e s the 
s t a t e ' s s t r a t e g y f o r r e s t r u c t u r i n g the B r i t i s h economy and s o c i e t y over the 
p e r i o d of study. The c o a l i n d u s t r y i s l o c a t e d a t the c e n t r e of a postwar 
s o c i a l democratic consensus which i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d a p a r t i c u l a r balance of 
c l a s s f o r c e s . Economic r e c e s s i o n pushed the consensus i n t o c r i s i s , and 
j e o p a r d i s e d the p o s i t i o n of the c o a l i n d u s t r y and the miners. 
S i n c e t h i s t h e s i s i s about p r o c e s s e s of p o l i t i c a l change w i t h i n two trade 
union branches, i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o examine some of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of 
t r a d e union o r g a n i s a t i o n i n c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t i e s , i n order to i d e n t i f y the 
t e n s i o n s and c o n t r a d i c t i o n s which emerge from the unstable n e g o t i a t i o n of 
i n t e r e s t between management and labour. I n a d d i t i o n , unions c o n s t i t u t e the 
main focus of p o l i t i c a l agency over the p e r i o d of t h i s study. Because they 
o r g a n i s e workers along the contours of c a p i t a l i s t o r g a n i s a t i o n , unions 
r e f l e c t and c r e a t e a s e p a r a t i o n between p o l i t i c a l and economic aspects of 
workers s t r u g g l e . T h i s s t r u c t u r a l tendency towards economism provokes a 
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d r i f t towards s e c t i o n a l s t r u g g l e over wages and c o n d i t i o n s , which d i v i d e s 
workers and d e f l e c t s them from wider p o l i t i c a l c h a l l e n g e s t o c a p i t a l i s m . 
However, t h i s tendency towards s e c t i o n a l i s m and economism can be 
undermined, p a r t i c u l a r l y when economic c r i s i s provokes management or the 
s t a t e to a t t a c k p a r t i c u l a r i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d settlements between c a p i t a l 
and labour. The e f f e c t s of t h e s e d e s t a b i l i s a t i o n s are unpredictable, and 
o f f e r the p o t e n t i a l f o r the r e u n i f i c a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l and economic aspects 
of workers s t r u g g l e s . They can a l s o undermine the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of trade 
union l e a d e r s h i p s (at a l l l e v e l s ) which tends to develop as a consequence 
of the s e p a r a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l and economic elements of s t r u g g l e . I n t h i s 
context s t r i k e s a re analysed, to explore the d e s t a b i l i s i n g e f f e c t s which 
can emerge from these extreme ruptures with the everyday compromises of 
labour a c t i v i t y . Management a t t a c k s on e s t a b l i s h e d "indulgency p a t t e r n s " 
a r e i d e n t i f i e d as s i g n i f i c a n t d e s t a b i l i s i n g f a c t o r s , and some case s t u d i e s 
reviewed to a s s e s s d i f f e r i n g outcomes from these d e s t a b i l i s a t i o n s . F i n a l l y , 
t h r e e l o c a l case s t u d i e s of the p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n unions 
generated by the h i s t o r i c a l experience of c l a s s r e l a t i o n s i n d i f f e r e n t 
i n d u s t r i e s are explored, t o e s t a b l i s h the enormous complexity inherent i n 
l o c a l c a p i t a l - l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s . 
Chapter four then b r i n g s the arguments of the f i r s t t h r e e chapters together 
i n a b r i e f h i s t o r i c a l study of the B r i t i s h c o a l i n d u s t r y . T h i s provides an 
e s s e n t i a l framework i n which t o l o c a t e Murton, and understand the context 
i n which p o l i t i c a l changes t h e r e were l o c a t e d . I n p a r t i c u l a r , the c r i s i s i n 
t h e c o a l i n d u s t r y i n the l a t e 1970's i s examined, and shown to provide a 
s p a t i a l l y uneven d e s t a b i l i s i n g e f f e c t on management-labour r e l a t i o n s . 
Although the miners were i n s u l a t e d from the worst e f f e c t s of economic 
c r i s i s i n the 1970's by the "Plan f o r Coal", the p r o t e c t i o n i t o f f e r e d was 
only s h o r t term. With the e l e c t i o n of a Conservative government i n 1979 
committed to r e - e s t a b l i s h i n g the r u l e of the market and fundamentally 
a l t e r i n g the balance of power between c a p i t a l and labour, the NUM would 
have to e i t h e r submit to the d r a s t i c r e o r g a n i s a t i o n of the i n d u s t r y , or 
engage i n open c o n f l i c t w i t h the NCB, and u l t i m a t e l y the s t a t e . 
The i n t r o d u c t i o n of an a r e a i n c e n t i v e scheme i n 1978 i n c r e a s e d d i v i s i o n s 
w i t h i n the workforce, and was p a r t of wider s t r a t e g y to prepare the ground 
f o r the d e f e a t of the NX3M. The union moved l e f t as the complacency 
generated by the P l a n f o r Coal d i s s o l v e d i n a new round of p i t c l o s u r e s . I n 
Durham - a t r a d i t i o n a l r i g h t wing stronghold - both the miners and 
mechanics unions saw s i g n i f i c a n t l e f t w a r d movement. 
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Chapter f i v e p i c k s up t h i s l e f t w a r d d r i f t , and an a l y s e s the way i n which 
changes i n the i n d u s t r y were experienced and understood i n the miners and 
mechanics branches i n the p e r i o d from 1978 to 1984. The p e r i o d was 
dominated by four f a c t o r s which d e s t a b i l i s e d e x i s t i n g management-union 
r e l a t i o n s , namely; the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the i n c e n t i v e scheme, the i n f l u x of 
t r a v e l l e r s from c l o s e d p i t s , the changing age coiqsosition of the workforce, 
and the re-emergence of p i t c l o s u r e s i n an e r a of high unen^sloyment. I n the 
miners' branch, r i g h t wing c o n t r o l f a l t e r e d as t r a v e l l e r s and other l e f t 
wing a c t i v i s t s b u i l t on r i s i n g d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h i n the workforce. Within 
the s m a l l e r mechanics' branch, the formerly r i g h t wing l e a d e r s h i p moved 
d e c i s i v e l y l e f t as a c t i v i s t s b u i l t campaigns around the i s s u e s generated by 
management s t r a t e g i e s . Chapter s i x looks a t the miners' s t r i k e of 1984/5 
i t s e l f , c o n c e n t r a t i n g on the d i v i s i o n s between d i f f e r e n t s e c t i o n s of the 
workforce. These d i v i s i o n s a r e r e l a t e d to the d e s t a b i l i s a t i o n of the 
p r e - s t r i k e p e r iod, and the cleavages of age and residence i d e n t i f i e d i n 
ch a p t e r f i v e . During the s t r i k e , the l e f t a c h i e v e d a shaky dominance i n the 
miners' branch, and c o n s o l i d a t e d i t s hold i n the mechanics. Young miners 
emerged as a new p o l i t i c a l f o r c e , i n the miners' branch p a r t i c u l a r l y . They 
dominated the p i c k e t i n g operation, and r e j e c t e d the post war p o l i t i c s of 
compromise. However, a much s m a l l e r group of o l d e r p i c k e t s became involved 
p r e c i s e l y to defend the post war coit^iromise, and t h e r e was t e n s i o n between 
t h e s e two groups. 
A s m a l l group of a n t i - s t r i k e diehards are i d e n t i f i e d , s p l i t between an 
i s o l a t e d number of t r a v e l l e r s and a r e l a t i v e l y coherent group based i n 
Murton. Redundancy payments are i d e n t i f i e d as a key f a c t o r i n i n c r e a s i n g 
d i v i s i o n s i n the workforce based on age, and t h e r e f o r e weakening c o l l e c t i v e 
s o l i d a r i t y . The same f a c t o r was iit^sortant i n weakening r e s o l v e i n the 
b i g g e s t group of s t r i k e r s - the non a c t i v e m a j o r i t y . G e n e r a l l y they 
supported the aims of the s t r i k e , and whether or not they returned to work 
was r e l a t e d to s p e c i f i c p e r s o n a l and s o c i a l f a c t o r s , r a t h e r than 
fundamental o p p o s i t i o n t o the s t r i k e s p r i n c i p l e s . At Murton only about 300 
s t r i k e r s went back to work - mostly i n the l a s t two weeks. 
Chapter seven f o l l o w s the process of p o l i t i c a l change i n t o the post s t r i k e 
p e r i od, showing how the l e f t was able to c o n s o l i d a t e i t s g r i p on both 
miners and mechanics branches.- Management's r e a s s e r t i o n of "the r i g h t to 
manage", and the demoralised s t a t e of the union p l a c e d formidable 
c o n s t r a i n t s on a c t i v i s t s a t Murton. N e v e r t h e l e s s , they were helped by the 
massive post s t r i k e hemorrhaging of manpower which removed many old, r i g h t 
wing miners, r e p l a c i n g them with younger, more b e l l i g e r e n t t r a v e l l e r s . But 
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managements' hard l i n e undermined the relevance of the union branch 
committees to t h e i r members, and i t took hard cair^saigning to r e - e s t a b l i s h 
confidence i n the union. Indeed, branch l e a d e r s h i p i s i d e n t i f i e d as the 
c r u c i a l f a c t o r i n determining the p o l i t i c a l c h a r a c t e r of NUM branches i n 
the Durham area i n the p o s t - s t r i k e p e r i o d . 
F i n a l l y , chapter e i g h t draws together the t h e s i s c onclusions, and 
s p e c u l a t e s on t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the debate i n the B r i t i s h l e f t over 
f u t u r e s t r a t e g y . I n p a r t i c u l a r , I review the r e l a t i o n s h i p between broad 
s o c i a l changes s i n c e the war, and the d i r e c t i o n of p o l i t i c a l change i n the 
two branches of the NUM a t Murton. The d i f f e r e n t i a l impact of the post war 
settlement on d i f f e r e n t s e c t i o n s of the workforce i s a c r u c i a l explanatory 
f a c t o r i n the p o l i t i c a l changes experienced a t Murton. But a l s o v i t a l was 
the a c t i o n of conscious agents through the union i n shaping a c o l l e c t i v e 
s t r a t e g y , and campaigning f o r s p e c i f i c p o l i c i e s . These questions of 
s t r a t e g y a r e now p a r t of a widening debate w i t h i n the labour movement over 
the most appropriate response to the p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e which has been 
c r e a t e d over the l a s t t e n y e a r s (and which was symbolised by the defeat of 
the miners' s t r i k e ) . I n the f i n a l s e c t i o n of my c o n c l u s i o n I t h e r e f o r e 
engage the debate over "new r e a l i s m " (a debate which miners a t Murton have 
p l a y e d an a c t i v e r o l e i n ) , and argue t h a t new r e a l i s t arguments evade the 
d e c i s i v e question of s t a t e power which the miners' post war experience 
suggests i s c e n t r a l to any p r o j e c t w i t h i n the labour movement. 
I n the second volume of the t h e s i s , I i n c l u d e t e n appendices which 
supplement the m a t e r i a l presented i n volume one. Appendix one e x p l a i n s the 
r e s e a r c h s t r a t e g y u n d e r l y i n g the t h e s i s , c o n c e n t r a t i n g on the p r a c t i c a l 
problems which were posed by my r e s e a r c h . Subsequent appendices o f f e r more 
d e t a i l e d information backing up or adding to arguments e s t a b l i s h e d 
throughout the main body of the t h e s i s . 
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1.2: SETTING THE SCENE: PUBLISHED ACCOUNTS OF THE STRIKE. 
"On 4 J u l y 1983 Arthur S c a r g i l l d e c l a r e d war... I t was 
another nine months before b a t t l e commenced: but 
S c a r g i l l l e f t n e i t h e r the prime m i n i s t e r , nor me, i n 
any doubt t h a t day of h i s i n t e n t i o n s . His army of 
'storm t r o o p e r s ' was ready to b r i n g the government to 
i t s knees i f i t dared stand i n h i s way." (MacGregor, 
1986; 11) 
"The most h e r o i c s t r i k e t h a t the B r i t i s h working c l a s s 
has seen f o r decades ended on March 5th 1985. The year 
long miners s t r i k e , the longest major i n d u s t r i a l b a t t l e 
i n B r i t i s h h i s t o r y , has changed the p o l i t i c a l 
c o nsciousness of hundreds of thousands of people. The 
courage and determination of the s t r i k i n g miners, t h e i r 
f a m i l i e s and communities w i l l have a l a s t i n g iitqpact on 
the working c l a s s s t r u g g l e i n B r i t a i n i n the years 
ahead." (Reed and Adamson, 1985; 1) 
These quotes - from the f i r s t page of each book - i n d i c a t e the po l e m i c a l 
extremes of the debate which the 1984/5 c o a l s t r i k e has generated. They 
a l s o emphasise the point made by Winterton i n h i s con c i s e review of the 
l i t e r a t u r e on the s t r i k e : 
"The g r e a t e s t problem which anyone r e s e a r c h i n g the 
s t r i k e must acknowledge i s t h a t t h e r e i s no s i n g l e 
' c o r r e c t v e r s i o n ' of such a complex phenomenon. 
I n e v i t a b l y no account of the s t r i k e can p o s s i b l y be 
i m p a r t i a l - i f nothing e l s e the s t r i k e e f f e c t i v e l y 
p o l a r i s e d s o c i e t y i n t o ' f o r ' and 'a g a i n s t ' the miners." 
(Winterton, 1987) 
Given t h e s e q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , what j u s t i f i c a t i o n can I o f f e r f o r a t h e s i s 
which p i v o t s on t h i s emotional event? Perhaps the c l e a r e s t answer to t h i s 
q u e s t i o n emerges from a b r i e f examination of the more s i g n i f i c a n t accounts 
2 
pviblished so f a r on the s t r i k e . Such an examination points towards a 
s i g n i f i c a n t gap i n r e s e a r c h on the s t r i k e , which t h i s study bridges. I n 
p a r t i c u l a r , the absence of d e t a i l e d r e s e a r c h a t the l o c a l l e v e l s e v e r e l y 
cort^iromises d i s c u s s i o n on the p o l i t i c a l i i t ^ o r t a n c e of the dispute. 
2 
I n t h i s review I concentrate on l i t e r a t u r e which has attempted 
t o provide an overview on the s t r i k e as a whole. I s s u e s such as p o l i c i n g 
and women's involvement have generated many seperate p x i b l i c a t i o n s . For the 
former see F i n e and M i l l a r ( e d s ) , 1985; C o u l t e r e t a l , 1984; Scraton and 
Thomas (e d s ) , 1985. For the l a t t e r see the g e n e r a l reviews by Stead, 1987 
and Seddon (ed), 1986; and f o r an i n depth study, Beaton, 1985). For a 
g e n e r a l b i b l i o g r a p h y on the s t r i k e (now a b i t dated) see Green, 1985. 
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P u b l i s h e d accounts on the s t r i k e can be d i v i d e d i n t o four c a t e g o r i e s : 
" i n s i d e r " accounts, " l e f t i s t " a n a l y s e s , j o u r n a l i s t i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , and 
academic s t u d i e s ^ . Each a r e considered i n t u r n . 
1. 2 . i "INSIDER" ACCOUNTS: THE THIN TORY LINE. 
S u r p r i s i n g l y few books have looked a t the s t r i k e from a nakedly h o s t i l e 
s t a n c e . The two most s i g n i f i c a n t - although d i f f e r i n g i n s t y l e and content 
- convey a s i m i l a r message (MacGregor, 1986: Ottey, 1985). For both, the 
s t r i k e was undemocratic because i t was c a l l e d without a b a l l o t . They c l a i m 
i t was s u s t a i n e d by i n t i m i d a t i o n and v i o l e n c e . Arthur S c a r g i l l was using 
the miners to t r y and d e f e a t the e l e c t e d government of the day, and h i s 
t a c t i c s must not be allowed to succeed. 
Ottey i s l e s s s t r i d e n t than MacGregor, but h i s h o s t i l i t y to the s t r i k e i s 
c l e a r . 
" I was shunned by men I once regarded as my f r i e n d s . I 
was l a b e l l e d a 'scab' and t h e r e were c a l l s f o r my 
r e s i g n a t i o n . But I knew t h a t the s t r i k e was wrong. I t 
was undemocratic. (Ottey, 1985; 2) 
But Ottey's argxunent i s weakened by h i s f a i l u r e t o address the c r i s i s i n 
the c o a l i n d u s t r y i n the 1980's, or what the union's response to i t should 
have been. More autobiography than a n a l y s i s , Ottey's account o f f e r s some 
u s e f u l i n s i g h t s i n t o r i g h t wing t h i n k i n g i n the NUM, but h i s obsession with 
i n t i m i d a t i o n overwhelms any attempt to get to g r i p s with a r e a l 
understanding of the s t r i k e . 
No-one could accuse I a n MacGregor of a l a c k of s t r i d e n c y - h i s p a r t ghosted 
account reaches f o r the d i z z y h e i g h t s of h y s t e r i a on more than one 
o c c a s i o n . The language i s s t r i d e n t , the message r e l e n t l e s s . Take t h i s 
c o n t r i b u t i o n to the debate on p i c k e t i n g : 
You didn't have to be a miner to j o i n up. Sensing 
anarchy and chaos, the whole ragtag mob of the m i l i t a n t 
l e f t was soon on the bandwaggon. They were quick to see 
i f f o r what i t was: a chance to coerce and perhaps 
b r i n g down the government. For them i t was c l a s s 
warfare... Right a c r o s s the c e n t r a l c o a l f i e l d the 
p i c k e t s ' numbers were s w e l l e d by hundreds who had 
Jonathan and Ruth Winterton's exhaustive account of the s t r i k e 
i n Y o r k s h i r e (1989) was p u b l i s h e d too l a t e f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n t h i s 
t h e s i s . The promised volume of a r e a based c o n t r i b u t i o n s e d i t e d by Hywel 
F r a n c i s and Gareth Rees appears to have sunk under the weight of post 
s t r i k e disagreements. 
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nothing to do with the di s p u t e beyond wanting to cause 
f u r t h e r t r o u b l e . A s i n i s t e r mob of almost-uniformed 
a n a r c h i s t s - l e d by .a woman [no l e s s ! ] - appeared a t 
one stage and caused a great d e a l of damage i n 
Y o r k s h i r e . " (MacGregor, 1986; 199) 
No matter t h a t the s t o r y of "almost-uniformed a n a r c h i s t s " was a media 
c r e a t e d myth (see Douglass, 1985; 24-26). Behind the r h e t o r i c l a y a 
thorough and c o n s i s t e n t account of the s t r i k e . 
I n MacGregor's view, the s t r i k e was nece s s a r y to beat the NUM because of 
the need to o f f s e t d e c l i n i n g p r o f i t a b i l i t y by i n t e n s i v e c a p i t a l i s a t i o n of 
the i n d u s t r y . S i n c e t h i s would i n e v i t a b l y l e a d t o redundancies and re q u i r e 
abandonment of many t r a d i t i o n a l p r a c t i c e s i n the in d u s t r y , the union would 
have t o submit to the shake-up. I f i t didn't - and i n Arthur S c a r g i l l i t 
had a l e a d e r whose p r e t e n s i o n s extended f a r beyond mere r e s i s t a n c e - then 
i t would have to be f o r c e d i n t o l i n e . I n the meantime, Shangri La was j u s t 
around the corner f o r those miners who wanted to s t i c k around f o r the new 
e r a of c a p i t a l i n t e n s i v e , high p r o d u c t i v i t y , high wage c o a l mining. 
I n h a b i t i n g a r u t h l e s s c a p i t a l i s t world, MacGregor giv e s a c l e a r i n s i g h t 
i n t o the f o r c e s t h a t the NUM took on. Not j u s t the fo r c e s of the s t a t e -
though t h e s e a r e documented w e l l enough - but the economic f o r c e s which 
c o n t i n u a l l y r e v o l u t i o n i s e c a p i t a l i s t production ( d i s c u s s e d i n more length 
i n chapter 4 ) . However, MacGregor's a n a l y s i s of the s t r i k e i t s e l f (as 
opposed to the f o r c e s which l a y the o b j e c t i v e b a s i s f o r c o n f l i c t ) 
d e l i b e r a t e l y ignores the processes which s u s t a i n e d thousands of people i n 
s t r u g g l e f o r a year. I n the vanguard of a Tory o f f e n s i v e to r e - e s t a b l i s h 
the r u l e of the market, MacGregor v i l i f i e s any opposition to h i s values as 
based on c o e r c i o n and i r r a t i o n a l i t y . T h i s t h e s i s demonstrates - by an 
i n t e n s i v e study of one p i t - t h a t the a c t u a l processes were enormously 
complicated, d e f y i n g MacGregor's one-dimensional treatment. 
1 . 2 . i i LESSONS FROM THE LEFT? 
Most l e f t wing f a c t i o n s i n B r i t a i n have produced t h e i r v e r s i o n of the 
s t r i k e . U n f o r t u n a t e l y most are w r i t t e n t o j u s t i f y entrenched i d e o l o g i c a l 
p o s i t i o n s , r a t h e r than to open up genuine debate on i s s u e s the s t r i k e 
r a i s e d f o r s o c i a l i s t s . I t seems the s t r i k e was a coxaplex enough phenomena 
f o r e v e r y p o l i t i c a l group to f i n d evidence to support t h e i r t h e o r i e s . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e s e accounts do b e n e f i t from t h e i r author's c l o s e n e s s to 
miners' a c t i v i s t s , and t h e i r c l o s e day to day involvement i n , and 
commitment to, the s t r i k e . 
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Foremost among the accounts from the l e f t i s the S o c i a l i s t Workers P a r t y ' s 
(SWP) book ( C a l l i n i c o s and Simons, 1985). C o n s i d e r i n g the speed with which 
i t was put together, i t i s a thorough and w e l l argued p u b l i c a t i o n , d e s p i t e 
some notable e r r o r s of f a c t - f o r example T e e s s i d e ' s i n t e g r a t e d i r o n and 
s t e e l works i s m y s t e r i o u s l y m i s s i n g from the d i s c u s s i o n on s t e e l ( i b i d , 
85) . However, w h i l s t i t i s g e n e r a l l y w e l l researched, SWP theory allows 
only one c o n c l u s i o n to be drawn i n a n a l y s i n g the s t r i k e . I t was betrayed by 
a r o t t e n bureaucracy, both i n the labour and trade union movement 
g e n e r a l l y , and a l s o i n the NUM. 
Perhaps t h e i r most famous c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t with d e c i s i v e l e a d e r s h i p , 
t h e r e was a moment when the Orgreave p i c k e t of June 18th 1984 could have 
been won ( i b i d . 111) . But l i k e the r e s t of t h e i r a n a l y s i s , t h i s c o n c l u s i o n 
i s too s i m p l i s t i c t o be c r e d i b l e . C a l l i n i c o s and Simons don't address the 
q u e s t i o n of why the v a s t m a j o r i t y of NUM members never went p i c k e t i n g . 
D i v i s i o n s between areas a r e e x p l a i n e d almost e n t i r e l y i n terms of a 
" f a i l u r e of l e a d e r s h i p " . The c o r r p l e x i t i e s of the s i t u a t i o n i n each area, 
each p i t , and each community are g l o s s e d over. 
Never noted f o r t h e i r s u b t l e t y , the Revolutionary Communist Group's (RCG) 
book i s based on fundamentalist m a t e r i a l i s m (Reed and Adamson, 1985). (As 
such i t i s a powerful a n t i d o t e to the SWP's voluntarism!) I t c o n s i s t s of a 
c o l l e c t i o n of r e p o r t s from the groups paper ("Fight Racism, F i g h t 
I m p e r i a l i s m " ) , augmented by an i n t r o d u c t o r y chapter, and s e v e r a l a d d i t i o n a l 
review a r t i c l e s . The burden of t h e i r argument i s t h a t the s p l i t i n the NUM 
was not only fundamental, but a l s o n e c e s s a r y ( i b i d , 2) . T h i s was because 
the NCB had d e l i b e r a t e l y c r e a t e d a p r i v i l e g e d e l i t e of miners (concentrated 
i n high p r o d u c t i v i t y , high investment p i t s ) v i a the i n c e n t i v e scheme (see 
chapter 4) . The s t r i k e f a i l e d not because of a s i i c ^ s l i s t i c d i v i s i o n between 
the rank and f i l e and the bureaucracy. I n r e a l i t y the s p l i t 
"goes down deeper i n t o the ranks of the working c l a s s . 
Key workers, dockers, power and s t e e l workers, l o r r y 
d r i v e r s and s e c t i o n s of miners themselves - on the 
whole the b e t t e r p a i d i n more secure jobs - were 
scabbing on the miners' s t r i k e . " ( i b i d , 8) 
S o c i a l i s t v i c t o r y t h e r e f o r e depends on the defeat of p r i v i l e g e d s e c t i o n s of 
the working c l a s s (defined almost t a u t o l o g i c a l l y as those who r e f u s e to 
f i g h t ) , as w e l l d e f e a t of the r u l i n g c l a s s . 
R e a l i t y d e f i e d such s i m p l i s t i c m a t e r i a l i s m . Many of the h i g h e s t p a i d miners 
were a t the most m i l i t a n t p i t s i n Y o r k s h i r e . Earnings d i f f e r e n t i a l s were 
o f t e n as high w i t h i n a p i t as between d i f f e r e n t a r e a s . Furthermore, w h i l s t 
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p o l i t i c i s a t i o n of a c t i v i s t s was undoubtedly a v i t a l gain from the s t r i k e , 
t h e RCG - i n common wi t h the SWP and the Revolutionary Communist P a r t y -
exaggerate the e x t ent to which a c t i v i s t s absorbed t h e i r message. I n short 
t h e r e f o r e , w h i l s t the RCG have an acute understanding of the power of the 
B r i t i s h s t a t e , and the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the miners s t r i k e and other 
s t r u g g l e s a g a i n s t the B r i t i s h s t a t e (eg I r e l a n d ) , they add l i t t l e to an 
a n a l y s i s of d i v i s i o n s and development w i t h i n the miners. By c e l e b r a t i n g 
d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n the miners (and working c l a s s ) , the RCG miss the processes 
which l e d o r d i n a r y men and women to respond i n s t a r t l i n g l y d i f f e r e n t ways 
to s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n s . 
F i n a l l y , the R e v o l u t i o n a r y Communist P a r t y (RCP) i s s u e d a short pamphlet 
o f f e r i n g t h e i r v e r d i c t on the s t r i k e (Freeman, 1985). L i k e the SWP's book, 
s t r i d e n t c r i e s of " s e l l out" pepper t h e i r a n a l y s i s . S c a r g i l l i s h e a v i l y 
c r i t i c i s e d , f o r example f o r h i s f a i l u r e to cair^saign among the rank and f i l e 
a t the s t a r t of the s t r i k e . However, the RCP d i s c u s s e s c r i t i c i s m s and 
t a c t i c s i n a vacuum. P r e s s u r e s on the NUM l e a d e r s h i p are not d i s c u s s e d , so 
t h e i r a c t i o n s are p resented out of context. T h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y so i n 
t h e i r a n a l y s i s of the end of the s t r i k e , where S c a r g i l l i s slammed f o r 
s e l l i n g out. Nowhere i s t h e r e an acknowledgement th a t by t h i s time the 
s t r i k e was a l l but beaten. 
Freeman argues t h a t i f o n l y the UUM l e a d e r s h i p had cair^aigned on an openly 
c l a s s b a s i s , then miners i n Nottingham, and workers elsewhere, would have 
supported the s t r i k e ( i b i d , 37) . L i t t l e evidence i s advanced to support 
t h i s o p t i m i s t i c a s s e r t i o n . So by f a i l i n g to root out the r e a l a t t i t u d e s of 
the rank and f i l e , and t h e i r b a s i s i n a c o i r p l i c a t e d and s p a t i a l l y s p e c i f i c 
h i s t o r y , the RCP reduce t h e i r argument to an a l l embracing f a i l u r e of 
l e a d e r s h i p . 
A l l t h e accounts from the r e v o l u t i o n a r y l e f t l a c k a sense of p e r s p e c t i v e . 
By c o n c e n t r a t i n g on the two m i n o r i t y l a y e r s of committed a c t i v i s t s and 
a n t i - s t r i k e d ie-hards, they ignore the d i v e r s i t y between and w i t h i n regions 
which was one of the s t r i k e s d e c i s i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . This f a u l t i s 
syn^stomatic of a one-dimensional approach to the p o l i t i c i s a t i o n process 
which has s c a n t r e g a r d f o r the h i s t o r i c a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n s embedded i n the 
e x p e r i e n c e s of so many miners. 
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1 . 2 . i i i JOURNALISTIC ACCOUNTS: OBJECTIVITY IN THE SERVICE OF THE STATE? 
Three important books have s e t out to o f f e r comprehensive i n v e s t i g a t i v e 
accounts of the s t r i k e (Adeney and Lloyd, 1986: Goodman, 1985: Wilsher et 
a l , 1985) . S i n c e they are a l l w r i t t e n by j o u r n a l i s t s i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g 
t h a t they share an important j o u r n a l i s t i c t r a i t : they f a i l to e x p l a i n t h e i r 
assumptions. Indeed, to a g r e a t e r or l e s s e r extent they indulge an i l l u s i o n 
t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e to i n v e s t i g a t e p o l i t i c a l phenomena i m p a r t i a l l y , and 
without " b i a s " . I n h i s i n t r o d u c t i o n to the I n s i g h t Team's book, Andrew 
N e i l l ( e d i t o r of the Sunday Times) c l a i m s : 
" I n c l a s s i c I n s i g h t s t y l e [ t h i s book] merely r e l a t e s , 
d i s p a s s i o n a t e l y and ii t 5 > a r t i a l l y , the i n s i d e s t o r y of a 
c a t a c l y s m i c b a t t l e whose outcome w i l l a f f e c t t h i s 
country f o r y e a r s t o come." (Wilsher e t a l , 1985, x i ) 
But a l l t h r e e books are as value laden as I a n MacGregor's or the SWP's 
accounts. The d i f f e r e n c e i s t h a t the j o u r n a l i s t s assumptions l i e hidden 
w i t h i n the everyday "commonsense" of c a p i t a l i s t v a l u e s . 
Goodman's account o f f e r s more sympathy to the miners than the other two 
books (1985) . His view i s t h a t r e g a r d l e s s of the need f o r strong p o l i c i n g 
i n - f o r example - Nottinghamshire, nothing j u s t i f i e d "the abandonment of 
c i v i l l i b e r t i e s to the e x t e n t t h a t they were di s r e g a r d e d when i t came to 
the s t a t e ' s f i g h t a g a i n s t the miners" (1985; 133). Alone among the 
j o u r n a l i s t s , Goodman s q u a r e l y blames the government f o r c r e a t i n g the 
c o n f l i c t ( i b i d , 204). And he understands the p a s s i o n a t e commitment born of 
a profound f e a r of the f u t u r e , which the s t r i k e generated i n hundreds of 
p i t v i l l a g e s ( i b i d , 16) . But i n common wi t h other j o u r n a l i s t i c accounts, 
Goodman o f f e r s only l i m i t e d i n s i g h t s i n t o the conplex d r i v i n g f o r c e s behind 
the s t r i k e . And h i s l a c k of awareness of the fundamental i s s u e s of the 
s t r i k e comes through i n h i s c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of the NACODS d e a l as a 
"missed opportunity" f o r the NUM (154)^. 
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On September 29th 1984 members of the p i t deputies union NACODS 
(National A s s o c i a t i o n of C o l l i e r y Overmen, Deputies and S h o t f i r e r s ) voted 
by an overwhelming m a j o r i t y to go on s t r i k e . The b a l l o t vote p r e c i p i t a t e d 
i n t e n s i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s , which r e s u l t e d i n the threatened NACODS s t r i k e 
being c a l l e d o f f a month l a t e r , f o l l o w i n g the c r e a t i o n of an "Independant 
Review Body" to a c t as a f i n a l c o u rt of appeal over p i t c l o s u r e s . The NUM 
r e j e c t e d t h i s s ettlement because the IRB would only produce non-binding 
recommendations. I n common with some other commentators, Goodman regards 
t h i s d e a l as the b e s t chance the NUM had t o s e t t l e the dispute favourably. 
However, when the NCB c l o s e d Bates c o l l i e r y i n Northumberland i n February 
1985, d e s p i t e an IRB recommendation to keep i t open, the NUM's r e j e c t i o n of 
(Footnote Continued) 
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The I n s i g h t Team's book amounts t o a f a i r l y conventional h i s t o r y of the 
s t r i k e , which would be f a m i l i a r and acceptable to those who accepted - f o r 
example - the BBC news p r e s e n t a t i o n of the dis p u t e . Hence i t i s c r i t i c a l of 
the d e c i s i o n not t o have a b a l l o t (p 56); p l a c e s the burden of g u i l t on the 
miners f o r p i c k e t l i n e v i o l e n c e (see f o r j u s t one exarrple p 99); and 
endorses the assessment t h a t the s t r i k e was a b a t t l e between the f o r c e s of 
r e v o l u t i o n and democracy (266). T h i s l a t t e r p o s i t i o n i s a l s o adopted by 
Adeney and Lloyd, i n a book which has been heralded by many as the most 
a u t h o r i t a t i v e account of the s t r i k e so f a r (see f o r exair^le, McKibbin, 
1986; Heery, 1987). 
From the s t a r t , Adeney and L l o y d attempt t o r a i s e t h e i r book to a higher 
plane than the other two. They begin: 
"The job of t h i s book i s not to g i v e a c h r o n o l o g i c a l 
account of the mineworkers' s t r i k e of March 1984 to 
March 1985: o t h e r s have done t h a t . I t i s r a t h e r to 
understand i t . " (1986; 1) 
Sadly, the r e s u l t does more to m y s t i f y the causes and development of the 
s t r i k e than i l l u m i n a t e them. T h e i r t h e s i s i s based on the p e r s o n a l i t i e s of 
key a c t o r s - e s p e c i a l l y S c a r g i l l and MacGregor - and t h e i r i r r e c o n c i l a b l e 
o p p o s i tion. But 
"the argiiment would be more convincing ( i f l e s s 
popular) presented as i r r e c o n c i l a b l e c o n f l i c t , over 
which the l e a d e r s , as products r a t h e r than causes of 
t h i s , c ould not compromise without acknowledging t h e i r 
s i d e ' s d e f e a t . " (Winterton, 1987; emphasis i n o r i g i n a l ) 
Samuel has shown (1986; 2-4) t h a t t h i s k i n d of co n s p i r a c y theory, and the 
c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of s t r i k e l e a d e r s as " f o l k d e v i l s " , has been t y p i c a l of 
s t r i k e reportage throughout t h i s century. 
Howell's (1987) c r i t i q u e shows how Adeney and L l o y d b u i l d t h e i r account on 
sloppy c o n c e p t u a l i s a t i o n and "dubious i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s " (402). These 
problems stem from an un s t a t e d but p e r v a s i v e t h e o r e t i c a l framework. By 
f a i l i n g t o analyse the r e a l and massive support which S c a r g i l l r e c e i v e d i n 
the e a r l y 80's i n any terms other than a p e r s o n a l i t y c u l t , they f a t a l l y 
p r i v i l e g e the i n d i v i d u a l as an explanatory f a c t o r . They f a i l to root the 
c o n f l i c t i n the wider s o c i a l f o r c e s which helped determine i t s development. 
T h e i r d i s c u s s i o n of the s t r i k e i t s e l f - i n common with other j o u r n a l i s t i c 
accounts - f a i l s t o r e l a t e the a c t i o n s of miners, and the d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n 
(Footnote Continued) 
the NACODS settlement as a cosmetic e x e r c i s e appeared j u s t i f i e d ( F e i c k e r t , 
1986). 
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t h e i r ranks, t o h i s t o r i c a l and r e g i o n a l v a r i a t i o n s i n experience and 
c u l t u r e (a theme taken up by Rees, 1985). 
Without a theory acknowledging the m a t e r i a l b a s i s f o r c o n f l i c t then the 
s t r i k e i n e v i t a b l y comes t o be seen i n terms of i n d i v i d u a l s or groups 
manoeuvring to d e f e a t each other. The h i s t o r i c a l development of the c r i s i s 
i n the c o a l i n d u s t r y , and i t s v a r y i n g s p a t i a l iitpact must be i n t e g r a l to an 
understanding of the d i s p u t e . Recognition of the d e l i b e r a t e s t r a t e g i e s of 
the s t a t e and the NCB to d i v i d e the working c l a s s and the miners must a l s o 
be a fundamental p a r t of any explanation, both of the o v e r a l l development 
of the s t r i k e , and of developments a t a r e g i o n a l and l o c a l l e v e l . Blaming 
i t a l l on the l a c k of a b a l l o t , or the b e l l i g e r e n c e of the two p r i n c i p l e 
p r o t a g o n i s t s simply obscures the the r e a l i s s u e s r a i s e d by the s t r i k e . 
None of the t h r e e j o u r n a l i s t i c accounts s e t out to provide d e t a i l e d 
p i t - b a s e d s t u d i e s of the s t r i k e . However, t h e i r a n a l y s e s are a l l weaker f o r 
the absence of r e s e a r c h of t h i s k i n d to draw upon, because they tend 
towards r e g i o n a l and n a t i o n a l g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s which f a i l to r e v e a l the 
v a r i e t y of l o c a l f a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g the course and conduct of the s t r i k e . 
They a l s o f a i l to a p p r e c i a t e the nature of the f o r c e s t h a t generated an 
i n e v i t a b l e c o n f l i c t i n the i n d u s t r y . Without an assessment of the conplex 
and s p a t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d f o r c e s moving through the c o a l f i e l d s before 
and during the s t r i k e , c o r t ^ l i c a t e d p o l i t i c a l developments tend i n e v i t a b l y 
t o be reduced to the c h a r i s m a t i c i n t e r v e n t i o n of a s i n g l e f i g u r e . 
1.2.iv ACADEMIC ACCOUNTS: EMPHASISING PLACE 
S e v e r a l academic a n a l y s e s have begun the process of e x p l o r i n g s p a t i a l 
a s p e c t s of the s t r i k e . Of these, Rees has perhaps come c l o s e s t to 
a r t i c u l a t i n g a r e s e a r c h agenda (1985; see a l s o Sunleys, 1986 and Rees, 
1986). Rees's focus i s r e g i o n a l . V a r i a t i o n s i n t h e " c a r e e r s " of each region 
during the s t r i k e need to be l o c a t e d i n : the h i s t o r i c a l development of the 
c o a l i n d u s t r y i n each a r e a ; the recoitjsosed c l a s s s t r u c t u r e of the c o a l f i e l d 
regions; and the a c t i v e s t r a t e g i e s of agents such as the area NUM. By 
examining the r e l a t i o n s h i p between these t h r e e dimensions, i t i s p o s s i b l e 
to s p e c i f y "the p r o c e s s e s by which c l a s s and other p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n s 
a c t u a l l y come about" (Rees, 1985; 390). 
Undoiabtedly d i f f e r e n c e s i n the s t r i k e p r o f i l e of the NUM areas were 
c o n s i d e r a b l e , and e x p l a i n i n g t h e s e d i f f e r e n c e s w i l l throw l i g h t on some of 
the key p o l i t i c a l and t h e o r e t i c a l i s s u e s r a i s e d by the s t r i k e . But i f the 
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aim i s to understand why and how people move i n t o s t r u g g l e , and what 
determines the course of t h a t s t r u g g l e , then t h e r e i s a danger t h a t 
r e g i o n a l g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s w i l l obscure some of the most i n ^ o r t a n t processes. 
Taking the Durham c o a l f i e l d as an exait5>le, any a t t e n ^ t a t r e g i o n a l 
g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s must cope with a remarkable d i v e r s i t y between the 11 p i t s 
on s t r i k e i n 1984/5^ (see map 1) . At one extreme th e r e were Horden and 
S a c r i s t o n , with j u s t one or two miners back a t work, even a t the end of the 
s t r i k e . At another extreme t h e r e was Wearmouth, with c l o s e on 80% back by 
the end. I n the middle t h e r e were Westoe and Dawdon with about 25% back. 
D i v e r s i t y on t h i s s c a l e i s a l s o apparent i n Y o r k s h i r e (see Winterton and 
Winterton, 1989) and Scotland. 
Q u i c k l y i t becomes apparent t h a t w h i l s t the region might be the appropriate 
l e v e l of a n a l y s i s i n South Wales (and maybe Nottinghamshire), elsewhere 
s e n s i t i v i t y to the enormous v a r i a t i o n s w i t h i n regions must be maintained. 
T h i s i s not to argue t h a t a n a l y s i s a t the r e g i o n a l l e v e l i s i n v a l i d . On the 
c o n t r a r y , the r e g i o n a l context i s s t i l l fundamental to understanding the 
way the s t r i k e developed. But r e g i o n a l a n a l y s i s must s p e c i f y the processes 
by which developments w i t h i n each region worked to c r e a t e d i v e r s i t y as w e l l 
as s i m i l a r i t y . Perhaps what needs e x p l a i n i n g i n South Wales i s j u s t why 
r e g i o n a l i d e n t i t y transcended l o c a l v a r i a t i o n s c r e a t e d by r e s t r u c t u r i n g of 
the economic and s o c i a l f a b r i c of the region. 
Without doubt the c o l l e c t i o n e d i t e d by Samuel e t a l (1986) goes f u r t h e s t i n 
g i v i n g e x p r e s s i o n to the s t r i k e s l o c a l base. I t uses the words of miners, 
t h e i r wives and supporters to b u i l d up a montage of images and i i r p r e s s i o n s 
of the s t r i k e . I t i s an e c l e c t i c volume, c o n t a i n i n g a wide v a r i e t y of 
v o i c e s - but t h e r e i s a pronounced focus on the c e n t r a l c o a l f i e l d , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y South Y o r k s h i r e . I n the main, the e d i t o r s simply present t h e i r 
m a t e r i a l , o f f e r i n g only an i n t r o d u c t i o n by way of e d i t o r i a l comment 
(Samuel, 1986). However, t h i s i n t r o d u c t i o n i s s i g n i f i c a n t , s i n c e i t o f f e r s 
a sharp a n a l y s i s of the i s s u e s behind the s t r i k e . I n p a r t i c u l a r , Samuel 
d i r e c t s a t t e n t i o n towards the l o c a l focus of the s t r i k e . He c i t e s four key 
Murton, Eppleton, Horden, S a c r i s t o n , Easington, Seaham, Vane 
Teirpest, Dawdon, Westoe, Herrington, Wearmouth. I have not considered the 
two NCB workshops i n Durham which were a l s o on s t r i k e (Tursdale and 
P h i l a d e l p h i a ) as t h e s e en^loyed mechanics only, and enjoyed a labour 
t r a d i t i o n s l i g h t l y s e p a r a t e to t h a t i n the p i t s . 
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concepts which h e l p e x p l a i n the dispute: l o y a l t y to the union, k i n s h i p , 
demography and community. Leadership i s seen as the product of cort^lex and 
c o n t r a d i c t o r y f o r c e s , not as p a r t of a m a c h i a v e l l i a n p l o t by d i c t a t o r i a l 
l e a d e r s . A l l of t h e s e i d e a s are explored i n l a t e r chapters. 
But perhaps the most i n t e r e s t i n g f e a t u r e of Samuel's account i s h i s use of 
the coit^lementary notions of " v i l l a g e r a d i c a l i s m " , and " r a d i c a l 
c onservatism". With both of these, Samuel focuses on the overwhelmingly 
l o c a l nature of the d i s p u t e . I n profound opposition to most s t r i k e 
accounts, he r e j e c t s the notion of c e n t r a l i s e d c o n t r o l by the union. 
V i l l a g e r a d i c a l i s m ert^hasises i n s t e a d the myriad ways i n which i n i t i a t i v e s 
from the communities dominated the conduct of the s t r i k e . " R a d i c a l 
c o n s e r v a t i s m " on the other hand expresses the underlying philosophy of the 
s t r i k e . I t was a d e f e n s i v e a c t i o n - a l a s t d i t c h atteir^st to preserve jobs, 
communities and a way of l i f e . 
"Beneath th e r h e t o r i c of ' v i c t o r y ' - the 'death or 
g l o r y ' p e r o r a t i o n s a t the p u b l i c r a l l i e s - they were 
engaged i n a desperate b a t t l e f o r s u r v i v a l , and 
bewildered t h a t a cause so obviously j u s t and demands 
so e s s e n t i a l l y modest should b r i n g down on them the 
organised might of the s t a t e . " ( i b i d , 23) 
And y e t , unmistakably the s t r i k e was a challenge too. Although the demands 
were ap p a r e n t l y d e f e n s i v e and " c o n s e r v a t i v e " , they challenged the " r i g h t s " 
of management and u l t i m a t e l y the s t a t e to d e f i n e the f u t u r e of the 
i n d u s t r y , and the way t h a t f u t u r e would be decided. 
However, f o r the most p a r t Scimuel's focus i s on the u p l i f t i n g elements of 
the s t r i k e , and t h i s c o n c e n t r a t i o n misses many of the d i v i s i o n s between 
miners. His concepts are u n i v e r s a l - he does not d i s t i n g u i s h the 
d i f f e r e n t i a l e f f e c t s of elements such as " r a d i c a l conservatism" and 
" v i l l a g e r a d i c a l i s m " on miners l i v i n g i n d i f f e r e n t p l a c e s , or miners of 
d i f f e r e n t ages. By not drawing out the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s inherent i n the 
miners s i t u a t i o n , he f a i l s to show how f o r example, s i m i l a r i d e o l o g i e s 
generated d i f f e r i n g responses from miners i n s i m i l a r communities. 
Some community based s t u d i e s have begun the t a s k of r e l a t i n g the v a r y i n g 
and o f t e n c o n t r a d i c t o r y experiences of the s t r i k e a t l o c a l l e v e l . Parker's 
(1986) c o l l e c t i o n of i n t e r v i e w s with s t r i k e p a r t i c i p a n t s a t " R e d h i l l " 
(Horden) i n County Durham, o f f e r s a p a r t i c u l a r l y g r i t t y and e c l e c t i c range 
of v o i c e s . However, Pa r k e r ' s r e f u s a l to comment on h i s i n t e r v i e w s leads to 
a l a c k of context, which i n t u r n makes i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of h i s m a t e r i a l very 
d i f f i c u l t . The volume on T h u r c r o f t i n Y o r k s h i r e (The people of Thurcroft, 
Chapter 1 (16) 
1986) b u i l d s up an absorbing p i c t u r e of what the s t r i k e meant i n one p i t 
v i l l a g e . 
Yet only two s t u d i e s have e x p l i c i t l y t r i e d to analyse p o l i t i c a l 
developments a t p a r t i c u l a r NUM branches (Rigg, 1987; C l i f f , 1986). Rigg's 
paper s e t s out to t e s t A l l e n ' s (1981) argument t h a t " m i l i t a n c y i s 
determined by the miners' l e v e l of consciousness which i n p a r t i s c r e a t e d 
by the campaigning undertaken by l e f t - w i n g a c t i v i s t s i n the Union" (Rigg, 
1987, 191) . Comparisons of two s i m i l a r c o l l i e r i e s , one "moderate", the 
other " m i l i t a n t " , were used to t e s t t h r e e d i f f e r e n t hypotheses about the 
s i g n i f i c a n c e of d i f f e r e n c e s i n branch l e a d e r s h i p . I t was found t h a t t h e r e 
was no s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e between the two i n terms of t h e i r commitment 
t o democratic procedures and t h e i r knowledge of the c o n c i l i a t i o n scheme, 
but the m i l i t a n t c o l l i e r y had a f a r more c l a s s conscious l e a d e r s h i p . On 
t h i s b a s i s Rigg argued t h a t the q u a l i t y of branch l e a d e r s h i p was an 
important determinant of m i l i t a n c y i n the B r i t i s h mining i n d u s t r y . 
W h i l s t t h i s t h e s i s to an extent supports Rigg's conclusion, s e r i o u s 
r e s e r v a t i o n s must be expressed about h i s r e s e a r c h . Leadership i s viewed i n 
a s t a t i c and one dimensional manner - f o r example, no account i s taken of 
changes i n the workforce over time, or of the i n t e r - a c t i o n between 
d i f f e r e n t management regimes and union s t r a t e g y (see C l i f f , 1986). 
Furthermore, Rigg . adopts a h i g h l y flawed methodology. To t e s t h i s 
hypothesis t h a t branch l e a d e r s h i p i s the c r u c i a l determinant i n 
e s t a b l i s h i n g l e v e l s of m i l i t a n c y i n the branch, he chooses a number of 
i n d i c e s i n d i c a t i v e of the " q u a l i t y " of branch l e a d e r s , and f u r t h e r , 
examines the l e v e l of "democracy" present i n each branch. However, f o r the 
purposes of e x p l a i n i n g d i f f e r i n g l e v e l s of m i l i t a n c y , t h i s methodology i s 
i n a p p r o p r i a t e . 
To begin with, Rigg i s i n c o r r e c t to a s s e r t t h a t branch l e a d e r s h i p was the 
only s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e between the p i t s . I t i s c l e a r f o r exait5>le t h a t 
the two p i t s were l o c a t e d i n d i f f e r e n t NUM areas (probably Nottingham and 
Y o r k s h i r e ) , and t h e r e f o r e had v a s t l y d i f f e r e n t t r a d i t i o n s , coupled with 
v e r y d i f f e r e n t a r e a l e a d e r s h i p s . Secondly, simply e s t a b l i s h i n g c o r r e l a t i o n s 
between v a r i o u s i n d i c e s cannot t e l l us anything about the a c t u a l p rocesses 
which c r e a t e , s u s t a i n or undermine m i l i t a n c y (or any other p o l i t i c a l 
phenomena) . For example, the c o e x i s t e n c e of a m i l i t a n t branch and a 
m i l i t a n t branch l e a d e r s h i p does not i d e n t i f y the d i r e c t i o n of c a u s a l i t y 
between them. Nor does i t r u l e out the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t m i l i t a n c y was due 
to some other t h i r d f a c t o r . I n s h o r t , f o r the purposes of e x p l a i n i n g the 
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development and i n h i b i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l consciousness, Rigg's paper says 
l i t t l e of any v a l u e . 
I n c o n t r a s t , C l i f f ' s b r i e f paper begins the d i f f i c u l t process of a n a l y s i n g 
the s p e c i f i c l o c a l f a c t o r s which a f f e c t e d p o l i t i c a l development a t 
d i f f e r e n t c o l l i e r i e s (1986). By con^saring two S t a f f o r d s h i r e p i t s 
r e l a t i v e l y m i l i t a n t Hem Heath and moderate Florence - C l i f f i d e n t i f i e s 
a g g r e s s i v e management and more e f f e c t i v e branch l e a d e r s h i p as the two 
reasons why Hem Heath was more supportive of the s t r i k e than nearby 
F l o r e n c e . Although only fragmentary, h i s comments show how the 
p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s of management-labour r e l a t i o n s , and r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n the 
union branches, were c r u c i a l i n a f f e c t i n g the workforces commitment to the 
union. 
1.2.V CONCLUSIONS 
The s t r i k e i s the p i v o t a l event of t h i s t h e s i s . Yet i t i s c l e a r from t h i s 
review of the s t r i k e l i t e r a t u r e t h a t the absence of d e t a i l e d r e s e a r c h 
concerning p o l i t i c a l developments a t the l o c a l s c a l e l e aves s e r i o u s gaps i n 
our understanding of the d i s p u t e . Some academic s t u d i e s have begun to 
o r i e n t a t e r e s e a r c h i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n , but as y e t with scant r e s u l t s . Yet an 
understanding of the s t r i k e - as w e l l as a wider understanding of s h i f t s i n 
workers' consciousness - c l e a r l y c a l l s f o r the i n t e r p e n e t r a t i o n of 
d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of a n a l y s i s . I n p a r t i c u l a r , t h i s review demonstrates the 
need f o r a h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s of changing branch p o l i t i c s w i t h i n the 
union. 
I t i s perhaps s u r p r i s i n g , given the p u b l i c p r o f i l e of the s t r i k e , t h a t 
t h e r e i s so l i t t l e p u b l i s h e d evidence based on d e t a i l e d r e s e a r c h a t the 
l o c a l l e v e l . There i s however a more ge n e r a l p a u c i t y of r e s e a r c h r e l a t i n g 
to NUM branch p o l i t i c s ^ . Most r e c e n t r e s e a r c h on the NUM has concentrated 
on a r e g i o n a l s c a l e (see T a y l o r , 1984; Garside, 1971; G r i f f i n , 1962; 
F r a n c i s and Smith, 1980; Waller, 1983). T h i s r e l u c t a n c e to explore the 
^ K r i e g e r ' s (1983) study of the d i f f e r e n t i a l in^sacts of the 1966 
N a t i o n a l Power Loading Agreement (NPLA) i n Durham and Nottinghamshire i s 
one e x c e p t i o n . The powerful a n a l y s i s by Dennis e t a l of the p i t v i l l a g e of 
"Ashton" i s another. An enormous l i t e r a t u r e has b u i l t up around the h i s t o r y 
and nature of l i f e i n mining communities (see f o r exan^Jle Douglass, 1972; 
Williamson, 1982; Wade, 1984; and f o r a n a l y s i s , Lockwood, 1966; K e r r and 
S i e g e l , 1954; and Bulmer, 1975). 
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l o c a l l e v e l i s m i r r o r e d i n s t u d i e s of other i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r s (chapters 
two and t h r e e review some iit^sortant exceptions) . As a consequence, there i s 
a g e n e r a l l a c k of knowledge about pr o c e s s e s of p o l i t i c a l change a t a l o c a l 
l e v e l . 
T h i s e r t ^ i r i c a l gap has o c c u r r e d d e s p i t e recent e f f o r t s to i n t e g r a t e space 
w i t h the study of s o c i a l p r o c e s s e s . However, as the f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n 
shows, f o r a l l the t h e o r e t i c a l hot a i r , t h e r e have been few atten^Jts to 
t r a n s l a t e t h i s concern i n t o e f f e c t i v e r e s e a r c h s t r a t e g i e s . 
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1.3: CLASS AND PLACE 
1 . 3 . i PRELIMINARY COMMENTS 
Underlying the r e s e a r c h agenda s e t out i n 1.1 above, i s a c e n t r a l concern 
w i t h c l a s s ^ . Although the s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between c a p i t a l and 
labour i s the d r i v i n g f o r c e behind c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t i e s , some f u r t h e r 
mediating concepts a r e n e c e s s a r y i n moving from high l e v e l movements i n the 
c a p i t a l i s t space economy, to the r o l e and s i g n i f i c a n c e of workers l i v i n g 
and working i n p a r t i c u l a r communities i n the Durham c o a l f i e l d . The most 
r e l e v a n t l i t e r a t u r e concerns the debate on " l o c a l i t y " and the s i g n i f i c a n c e 
of "place", which sprang up i n the 1 9 8 0 's c r e a t i n g (and to some extent 
r e f l e c t i n g ) a s i g n i f i c a n t c r o s s - f e r t i l i s a t i o n of i d e a s between geography, 
marxism and s o c i o l o g y . T h i s debate o f f e r e d the chance to i n t e g r a t e m a r x i s t 
i n s i g h t s on the f o r c e s shaping s o c i e t y with the a c t i v e r o l e of "place" i n 
shaping and adapting the way i n which those f o r c e s came to be experienced 
and understood by people. 
l . S . i i SEARCHING FOR A SPACE FOR PLACE 
The t h e o r e t i c a l convergence between c e r t a i n branches of geographic and 
m a r x i s t thought i n the 1 9 8 0 's has f r e q u e n t l y been remarked upon (Jackson, 
1986; 1987; Massey, 1984). E s s e n t i a l l y t h i s convergence stemmed from 
Geographer's i n c r e a s i n g concern with s o c i a l p r o cesses, and Marxists 
r e c o g n i t i o n of the s p a t i a l i t y inherent i n many s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s . I t was no 
longer enough f o r M a r x i s t s (and many other s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s ) to t a l k about 
i n d u s t r i a l r e s t r u c t u r i n g , c l a s s recorqsosition and a n t i - c l o s u r e cair^Jaigns, 
without r e c o g n i s i n g the s p a t i a l i t y i n herent i n such notions. A b s t r a c t c l a s s 
f o r c e s may generate p r e s s u r e s f o r change, but the way i n which they 
manifest themselves depended on n a t i o n a l and l o c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . I n 
C l a s s i s d e f i n e d here as being based on a r e l a t i o n s h i p of 
e x p l o i t a t i o n between c a p i t a l i s t s and workers (Marx and Engels, 1968; T h r i f t 
and W i lliams, 1987). T h i s simple, a b s t r a c t model i s mediated by the 
coit5>lexity of c l a s s r e l a t i o n s as they appear i n concrete s o c i a l formations 
( f o r B r i t a i n see f o r exaitple Westergaard and R e s l e r , 1975; Newby e t a l 
1988; and more g e n e r a l l y Wright, 1978; 1985; Abercrombie and Urry, 1983) . 
Within d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l formations, c l a s s does not determine a l l a s p e c t s of 
s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l l i f e . Indeed, c l a s s e s themselves are c o n s t a n t l y being 
formed and reformed ( T h r i f t and W i l l i a m s , 1987, 7; Przeworski, 1977; see 
a l s o chapter 2 ), t h e i r r e l a t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e a matter of c o n t i n u a l 
s t r u g g l e . 
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other words, as c o n s i d e r a t i o n moves from Marx's a b s t r a c t two c l a s s model to 
the complex a r t i c u l a t i o n of c l a s s f o r c e s with concrete s o c i a l formations, 
p l a c e moves i n t o focus as a c e n t r a l concept. Likewise, more "orthodox" 
Human Geographer's began t o teit^jer t h e i r f r e q u e n t l y f e t i s h i s t i c concern 
with space w i t h a (somewhat belated) i n t e r e s t i n the s o c i a l processes 
underpinning the c r e a t i o n of "place". 
But what a re the s i g n i f i c a n c e of "place", "space" and " l o c a l i t y " i n t h i s 
context? And of what r e l e v a n c e i s t h i s debate f o r t h i s t h e s i s ? As Smith 
pointed out (1987) , the move i n t o " l o c a l i t y " s t u d i e s i n the 1980's 
r e f l e c t e d a s e r i o u s attentat to avoid the p i t f a l l s of iit^senetrably a b s t r a c t 
t h e o r i s i n g on the one hand, and vacuous e i r ^ i r i c i s m on the other. " L o c a l i t y " 
was a new t h e o r e t i c a l concept, charged with the t a s k of marrying two 
p r e v i o u s l y s e p a r a t e t r a d i t i o n s w i t h i n s o c i a l s c i e n c e : t h e o r e t i c a l marxism 
on the one hand, and e n p i r i c i s t case s t u d i e s on the other. Within Marxism, 
the aim was to move away from the exc e s s e s of the a n t i - s p a t i a l b a c k l a s h of 
the 1970's, and begin to i n t e g r a t e p l a c e as a c o n s t i t u t i v e element i n 
s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s (Massey, 1 9 8 4 ) . 
L o c a l i t y r e c e i v e d a t t e n t i o n as c a p i t a l s i n c r e a s i n g m o b i l i t y (due 
p a r t i c u l a r l y t o developments i n communications and t r a n s p o r t technology) 
enhanced the s i g n i f i c a n c e of l o c a l d i f f e r e n c e s - e s p e c i a l l y i n the labour 
market - f o r l o c a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n making (Urry, 1981; see a l s o Storper and 
Walker, 1983). T h i s was expected to undermine n a t i o n a l c l a s s formations, as 
workers were f o r c e d to or g a n i s e l o c a l l y i n non-class based a l l i a n c e s to 
defend and promote t h e i r l o c a l i t y , i n competition with other areas. 
However, i t i s not a t a l l c l e a r t h a t l o c a l o r g a n i s a t i o n means th a t c l a s s i s 
no longer the appropriate b a s i s f o r p o l i t i c a l m o b i l i s a t i o n at the l o c a l 
l e v e l ( H a r r i s , 1983). Indeed the miners' s t r i k e provides c l e a r evidence of 
the m o b i l i s i n g power of defending l o c a l i t y along e x p l i c i t l y c l a s s l i n e s . 
The miners' s t r i k e a l s o p o i n t s to the c e n t r a l r o l e of the s t a t e i n 
s t i m u l a t i n g d i v i s i o n s between l o c a l i t i e s . C e r t a i n l y with regard to t h i s 
t h e s i s t h e s t a t e p l a y e d a f a r g r e a t e r r o l e i n enhancing and d e f i n i n g the 
importance of p l a c e than d i d p r i v a t e c a p i t a l (see chapter two) . 
Much of the work on p l a c e has tended towards the a b s t r a c t (see T h r i f t , 
1983; Gregory, 1978; Giddens, 1984 and c o n t r i b u t i o n s to Gregory and Urry, 
1985). There i s a s u r p r i s i n g p a u c i t y of p u b l i s h e d work p u t t i n g theory i n t o 
p r a c t i c e . Where a t t e n t i o n has s h i f t e d t o the concrete, there has been a 
co n c e n t r a t i o n on the r e g i o n a l s c a l e , with attempts to e x p l a i n economic and 
p o l i t i c a l development b u i l d i n g i n space along with c l a s s f a c t o r s (Cooke, 
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1982; 1985; Hudson and Sadler, 1986; Hudson, 1989). Whilst these 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s y i e l d inqsortant i n s i g h t s , they are l i m i t e d because - l a c k i n g 
deeper evidence - they make assumptions and g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s about l o c a l 
p r a c t i c e s and b e l i e f s which a f f e c t developments at a r e g i o n a l s c a l e . 
E x c e p t i o n s can be found ( f o r example, Mark-Lawson e t a l , 1985), but i n 
g e n e r a l the dynamic n e g o t i a t i o n of s t r u g g l e a t the l o c a l l e v e l - so 
important i n d e f i n i n g r e g i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s - goes unremarked. 
D e s p i t e attempts t o p e n e t r a t e the sub-regional l e v e l , l o c a l i t y s t u d i e s have 
i n g e n e r a l assumed a d i s t i n c t l y "top down" approach. Researchers seem to 
have headed i n t o t h e i r t a r g e t l o c a l i t y , and dived s t r a i g h t f o r the 
g 
r e a s s u r i n g c e r t a i n t y of o f f i c i a l data, of one type or another . Hence, data 
c o l l e c t i o n has focused on o f f i c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , f o r example, the s t a t e or 
the coit^any. The conception of change which has emerged from these s t u d i e s 
has r e f l e c t e d the d e f i n i t i o n s , the assumptions and the scope of these 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s . By f o c u s i n g on " o f f i c i a l " data, t h i s r e s e a r c h makes no 
headway with one of the key p r e t e n s i o n s of l o c a l i t y s t u d i e s ; namely the way 
i n which people make sense of and a f f e c t the changes observed i n t h e i r 
l o c a l i t y . Therefore paying more than l i p s e r v i c e to the idea of the working 
c l a s s as a c t i v e agents i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n of space (and i n the c l a s s 
s t r u g g l e ) , r e q u i r e s beginning the examination from below, with workers, 
t h e i r o r g a n i s a t i o n s , t h e i r f a m i l i e s and t h e i r communities. I n doing so more 
profound comments about th e extent to which the working c l a s s i s formed and 
reformed, not j u s t by the s t r a t e g i e s of c a p i t a l , but a l s o by the a c t i o n s 
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and b e l i e f s of workers themselves, can be made . And i t a l s o p o s s i b l e to 
begin t o address the extent to which " p l a c e s " are able to i n f l u e n c e s o c i a l 
p r o c e s s e s . 
Research which begins " a t the bottom" i n t h i s way o f f e r s u n p a r a l l e l l e d 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o both observe and t e s t s o c i a l i s t p r a c t i c e (Beauregard, 
1988) . As such, i t i s a l s o an e s s e n t i a l p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r any atteii55t to 
The Economic and S o c i a l Research C o u n c i l ' s (ESRC) "Changing 
Urban and Regional System" (CURS) r e s e a r c h i n i t i a t i v e appears to have 
f a l l e n i n t o t h i s t r a p . See f o r exair^sle Smith (1987), Cooke (1987), 
Beauregard (1988). 
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T h i s t a s k was eased c o n s i d e r a b l y i n the case of t h i s r e s e a r c h by 
t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n of e x i s t i n g r e s e a r c h concerned with the r e s t r u c t u r i n g 
p r o c e s s e s w i t h i n the B r i t i s h c o a l i n d u s t r y . T h i s meant t h a t more time was 
a v a i l a b l e t o concentrate on workers s t r a t e g i e s and i d e a s than would 
n o n n a l l y be the c a s e . 
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i n t e g r a t e human agency i n t o an understanding of the c o n s t r u c t i o n of p l a c e . 
N e i t h e r i s t h i s merely an academic concern - f o r s o c i a l i s t s i t o f f e r s the 
opportunity to examine the d i a l e c t i c of c l a s s s t r u g g l e a t the s c a l e at 
which i t i s experienced, and r e l a t e t h i s to h i g h e r l e v e l changes w i t h i n the 
c a p i t a l i s t space economy. 
Understanding the r o l e of human agency i s one of the key ambitions of the 
new Human Geography. And y e t s u r p r i s i n g l y l i t t l e work has a c t u a l l y s t u d i e d 
t h e c o m p l e x i t i e s of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between s t r u c t u r e , agency, c l a s s and 
p l a c e i n concrete case s t u d i e s . One attempt was Cooke's (1985) account of 
c l a s s p r a c t i c e s p r e v a l e n t i n South Wales; t h e i r s i g n i f i c a n c e i n 
c o n s t i t u t i n g the region; and how these p l a c e s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n 
t u r n i n f l u e n c e d the development of c l a s s r e l a t i o n s . I n a s e n s i t i v e 
a n a l y s i s , he emphasised the in^jortance of working c l a s s agency through 
i n s t i t u t i o n s such as t r a d e unions and t h e i r r e l a t e d e d u c a t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s . 
S i m i l a r l y , Massey's work h i g h l i g h t i n g the development of d i s t i n c t i v e 
s p a t i a l s t r u c t u r e s a r i s i n g from s u c c e s s i v e "rounds" of c a p i t a l i s t 
investment or d i s i n v e s t m e n t d i r e c t e d a t t e n t i o n to the c a u s a t i v e r o l e of 
r e g i o n a l c l a s s p r a c t i c e s (1984). And y e t g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s i n both s t u d i e s 
concentrated on the r e g i o n a l l e v e l , when the r e i s ample evidence t h a t f i n e r 
g r a i n e d r e s e a r c h i s needed to understand the complex r o l e of working c l a s s 
agency i n a f f e c t i n g development w i t h i n l o c a l i t i e s . 
C e n t r a l t o t h i s p r o j e c t i s the need to understand working c l a s s r e s i s t a n c e 
and s t r u g g l e . To do t h i s i t i s necessary to problematise the extent to 
which i n s t i t u t i o n s a c c u r a t e l y r e f l e c t the experiences, a t t i t u d e s and 
p r a c t i c e of people a t the l e v e l of l o c a l i t y . What i s being suggested here 
i s the need to disaggregate the region, and recon^sose i t from the l e v e l of 
everday experience. Studying s t r u g g l e w i t h i n regions i s e s s e n t i a l f o r an 
understanding of change a t the r e g i o n a l l e v e l ; without s t r u g g l e t h e r e i s no 
p o s s i b i l i t y of o v e r t u r n i n g e s t a b l i s h e d l e a d e r s h i p , c h a l l e n g i n g s t r a t e g y and 
g e n e r a t i n g change. C l a s s r e s i s t a n c e i s o f t e n not l o c a t e d i n the f i r s t 
i n s t a n c e at a r e g i o n a l l e v e l , and indeed the f i r s t p a r t of t h i s chapter has 
e s t a b l i s h e d the c e n t r a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of l o c a l i n i t i a t i v e s both i n the 
background to and conduct of the 1984/5 c o a l d i s p u t e . I t i s the ways i n 
which l o c a l c l a s s p r a c t i c e s help c o n s t r u c t r e g i o n a l and n a t i o n a l c l a s s 
s t r u g g l e s which t h i s t h e s i s addresses. 
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1.4: CONCLUSION. 
T h i s chapter has had t h r e e o b j e c t i v e s . F i r s t , I s e t out my p r i n c i p l e 
r e s e a r c h q u e s t i o n s . These were c e n t r e d around the processes of p o l i t i c a l 
change i n two branches of the NUM a t Murton between 1978 and 1988. I n 
p a r t i c u l a r , they were concerned with the nature of these p o l i t i c a l changes, 
the f o r c e s p r o p e l l i n g t h e s e changes, the r e l a t i o n s h i p of these s t r u g g l e s to 
the wider p o l i t i c a l context, and the r e l a t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e of agency i n 
d i r e c t i n g them. 
Secondly, I reviewed some of the major p u b l i s h e d m a t e r i a l on the 1984/5 
miners' s t r i k e . I n many ways the s t r i k e i s the p i v o t a l event i n t h i s t h e s i s 
- the event which p r e c i p i t a t e d Murton's dramatic p o l i t i c a l s h i f t . Reviewing 
the l i t e r a t u r e focused a t t e n t i o n on the l a c k of r e s e a r c h based on the 
dynamics of p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n a t the l o c a l l e v e l . I n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e r e was a 
f a i l u r e t o e x p l a i n the h i g h l y s p a t i a l l y s p e c i f i c development of the s t r i k e . 
T h i s s p a t i a l s p e c i f i c i t y needs to be r e l a t e d to the h i s t o r i c a l development 
of the i n d u s t r y , and to r e g i o n a l and sub-regional v a r i a t i o n s i n c l a s s 
p r a c t i c e s . 
To a m p l i f y these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , p a r t t h r e e s i t u a t e d these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s 
w i t h i n r e c e n t r e s e a r c h i n and around Human Geography. Although t h e r e has 
been much t a l k about the need to i n t e g r a t e space i n t o c l a s s a n a l y s e s , most 
has been a t the t h e o r e t i c a l l e v e l . Where c l a s s p r a c t i c e s have been taken 
s e r i o u s l y as c o n s t i t u t i v e of l o c a l i t i e s , the r e g i o n a l s c a l e has i n v a r i a b l y 
been adopted. T h i s has l e d n a t u r a l l y to a focus on r e g i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s as 
the b e s t e x p r e s s i o n of c l a s s a c t i o n , but t h i s has the e f f e c t of obscuring 
t h e p r o c e s s e s which c r e a t e and s u s t a i n working c l a s s a c t i o n . I t t h e r e f o r e 
a l s o obscures the impact of c l a s s agency, s i n c e i t reduces agency to the 
app a r e n t l y uncontested p o l i c i e s pursued by o r g a n i s a t i o n s . 
Chapter two p i c k s up from t h i s p o i n t by examining the l i t e r a t u r e on recent 
working c l a s s s t r u g g l e s , t a k i n g as a s t a r t i n g p o i n t recent a n t i - c l o s u r e 
campaigns ou t s i d e the c o a l i n d u s t r y . 
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CHAPTER TWO: ANTI-CLOSURE CAMPAIGNS AND THE DISINTEGRATING POST WAR 
SETTLEMENT. 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter one e s t a b l i s h e d a r e s e a r c h agenda f o r t h i s t h e s i s , and suggested 
the need f o r f u r t h e r r e s e a r c h on the l o c a l dynamics of p o l i t i c a l change. 
Chapter two s t a r t s by examining some exan ^ l e s of s t r u g g l e s s i m i l a r to t h a t 
f a c e d by t h e miners from the l a t e 1970 's. I n p a r t i c u l a r , i t examines 
can^jaign to save t h e Upper Clyde S h i p b u i l d e r s (UCS) i n the e a r l y 1970 's and 
coR^ares t h i s w i t h the c a s e of s t e e l workers r e s i s t a n c e to c l o s u r e s i n the 
l a t e 1 9 7 0 '3 and e a r l y 1 9 8 0 's. Research on both of these caiqsaigns has 
touched upon some of the key i s s u e s i d e n t i f i e d i n chapter one; notably the 
iirportance of " p l a c e " , and the r o l e of t r a d e union l e a d e r s h i p i n a f f e c t i n g 
the conduct and outcome of the s t r u g g l e s . 
There a r e t h r e e f u r t h e r reasons f o r choosing these two exanples. I n the 
f i r s t p l a c e , miners a r e i n many ways comparable to s h i p b u i l d e r s and s t e e l 
workers. They have tended t o l i v e i n i s o l a t e d , s i n g l e c l a s s communities, 
dominated by strong t r a d i t i o n s of union s o l i d a r i t y (Lockwood, 1966). There 
ar e t h e r e f o r e some c o n s t a n t s when i t comes to comparing c l a s s s t r u g g l e s 
based i n t h e s e commianities. Secondly, l i k e the miners, s h i p b u i l d e r s and 
s t e e l workers f a c e d a c r i s i s of o v e r - c a p a c i t y which l e d to determined 
s t r a t e g i e s by management t o break up the workforces' u n i t y , and break the 
power of organised labour as a prelude to economic r e s t r u c t u r i n g . I n a l l 
c a s e s , the annoxincements of c l o s u r e or c a p a c i t y rundowns were preceded by 
p e r i o d s of d e s t a b i l i s a t i o n and i n c r e a s i n g c r i s i s . 
T h i r d l y , the s u c c e s s of the UCS work-in and the f a i l u r e to r e s i s t BSC's 
c a p a c i t y rundowns s t a n d t o some extent as paradigms f o r t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e 
p e r i o d s . I n the e a r l y 1970 's, the consensus commitment to f u l l eir^jloyment 
enabled mass m o b i l i s a t i o n behind a cair^jaign to p r o t e c t jobs. By the e a r l y 
1 9 8 0 's the s t a t e had abandoned commitment to f u l l err^jloyment, and l a r g e l y 
succeeded i n pushing i t s "TINA" (There I s No A l t e r n a t i v e ) argument i n t o the 
p u b l i c c o n s c i o u s n e s s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t was s t i l l a contested ideology -
nowhere more so than i n t h e miners' s t r i k e i n 1984 /5 . 
These con5>arisons h i g h l i g h t the r o l e of the s t a t e as a p r i n c i p l e p l a y e r , 
both i n a f f e c t i n g the course of s t r u g g l e s over i n d u s t r i a l c l o s u r e , and i n 
determining the t e r r a i n over which they were fought. The r e s t of the 
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chapter t h e r e f o r e e x p l o r e s s t a t e s t r a t e g y i n the 1970's and 1980's. I n 
p a r t i c u l a r , i t fo c u s e s on the breakdown of the post-war settlement (PWS) i n 
B r i t a i n . T h i s i s s i g n i f i c a n t because the i n t e r l o c k i n g web of r e l a t i o n s 
between labour, c a p i t a l and the s t a t e i n the post-war pe r i o d were both 
d e c i s i v e l y a f f e c t e d by, and a t the same time r e f l e c t e d i n , the p a r t i c u l a r 
settlement over the c o a l i n d u s t r y . Miners' s t r u g g l e s i n the 1980's, i n 
Murton and elsewhere, were i n e x t r i c a b l y l i n k e d to the p o l i t i c s which 
emerged around the PWS. 
The s e c t i o n on the s t a t e t h e r e f o r e f a l l s n a t u r a l l y i n t o t h r e e p a r t s . I n the 
f i r s t , the PWS i s de s c r i b e d , along with the p r e s s u r e s t h a t gave r i s e to i t , 
the p a r t i c u l a r r o l e of the c o a l i n d u s t r y w i t h i n i t , and the e f f e c t s of t h i s 
c l a s s compromise on working c l a s s s t r u g g l e . Secondly, the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s 
w i t h i n the PWS are explored, showing i t s d i s i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o c r i s i s . 
F i n a l l y , the T h a t c h e r i t e programme t o destroy the PWS and a t t e n ^ t to 
r e p l a c e i t with a new settlement between c a p i t a l and labour i s examined. 
Only by understanding how the p o l i t i c s of the o l d (the PWS) were 
i n t e r p e n e t r a t e d with a new s t r a t e g y by c a p i t a l and the s t a t e can the miners 
s t r u g g l e s throughout the 1980's be understood. 
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2.1 ANTI-CLOSURE CAMPAIGNS: LESSONS FROM THE PAST? 
C a p i t a l i s m provokes c o n f l i c t between workers and en^loyers i n three 
d i f f e r e n t but r e l a t e d dimensions. These a r e over.wages (the share of the 
product a c c r u i n g to the producers); over the " f r o n t i e r of c o n t r o l " 
(Goodrich, 1975); and over job l o s s (see Offe and Wiesenthal, 1980, 82; see 
a l s o Hyman, 1987, 102 f o r the f i r s t two). I n p r a c t i c e , although c o n f l i c t 
may focus on one dimension, i t i s r a r e f o r the other two to be unrelated'^. 
I n t h i s s e c t i o n t h e r e f o r e , although the focus i s o s t e n s i b l y on c o n f l i c t 
over job l o s s , i n r e a l i t y i t a l s o i n v o l v e d s t r u g g l e over c o n t r o l , and 
through t h i s over pay. 
Arguably, c o n f l i c t over job l o s s provides the most fundamental challenge to 
c a p i t a l , because i t c h a l l e n g e s the very e x i s t e n c e of the working c l a s s . Yet 
a n t i - c l o s u r e campaigns e x h i b i t b i g d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e i r l e v e l of 
m o b i l i s a t i o n and i n t h e i r outcomes. These d i f f e r e n c e s are i l l u s t r a t e d by 
con ^ a r i n g the 1971/2 carcpaign to save UCS (Upper Clyde S h i p b u i l d e r s ) from 
c l o s u r e with attempts to prevent s t e e l c l o s u r e s i n the l a t e 1970's and 
e a r l y 1980's. Research on both cases has drawn out the irt^sortance of union 
s t r a t e g y (agency) , w h i l s t a t the same time eityhasising the c o n s t r a i n t s 
provided by h i s t o r i c a l c o n d i t i o n s . This t e n s i o n - which i s so evident i n 
stu d y i n g p o l i t i c a l development i n the Murton NUM - needs to be analysed i f 
the s t r u g g l e s of Murton miners i n the 1970's and 1980's are to be l o c a t e d 
i n a wider framework of working c l a s s a c t i o n . 
2 . 1 . i UCS AND THE STATE "U" TURN 
I t i s only 18 y e a r s s i n c e the UCS work-in played a key r o l e i n f o r c i n g 
Edward Heath's C o n s e r v a t i v e government i n t o a p o l i t i c a l l y damaging p o l i c y 
"U" t u r n . Compared to the 1980's, t h i s campaign a g a i n s t job l o s s i n s p i r e d a 
mass m o b i l i s a t i o n of the working c l a s s , f o r c e d the s t a t e onto the 
de f e n s i v e , and won - a t l e a s t i n the short term - s i g n i f i c a n t concessions 
( F o s t e r and Woolfson, 1986; see a l s o Thompson and Hart, 1972; M c G i l l , 1972; 
Murray, 1972) . Why was t h i s campaign so d i f f e r e n t t o the l i m i t e d . 
L a t e r c h a p t e r s show how a t Murton c o l l i e r y i n i t i a l c o n f l i c t over 
wages merged i n t o a g e n e r a l s t r u g g l e over the f r o n t i e r of c o n t r o l , which 
f i n a l l y exploded i n the 1984/5 s t r i k e i n t o a c o n f l i c t over job l o s s . Even 
a f t e r t h e s t r i k e , s t r u g g l e continued i n a l l t h r e e dimension. 
Chapter 2 (28) 
unambitious and g e n e r a l l y u n s u c c e s s f u l attempts to r e s i s t mass redundancy 
i n the 1980's? 
When Edward Heath's C o n s e r v a t i v e government decided i n June 1971 to refuse 
t o " b a i l out" Upper Clyde S h i p b u i l d e r s , i t was p a r t of a determined attempt 
t o break with the post war consensus which had dominated B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s 
f o r 25 y e a r s . Yet a f t e r almost a year of s t r u g g l e , the government was i n 
r e t r e a t , f o r c e d to r e t u r n to 1960's s t y l e c l a s s corrpromise as the 
a p p a r e n t l y unavoidable p r i c e of d e f u s i n g working c l a s s u n i t y (Foster and 
Woolfson, 1986) . Not only d i d the UCS work-in f o r c e a r e t r e a t on the 
immediate i s s u e of y a r d c l o s u r e s , but i t a l s o spurred on working c l a s s 
r e s i s t a n c e to the a n t i - l a b o u r stance of the Tory government. J u s t at the 
moment when r e s i s t a n c e to the I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s Act was weakening, the 
g r i t t y determination of the C l y d e s i d e workers and communities f i r e d the 
imagination of workers a c r o s s S c o t l a n d and the r e s t of B r i t a i n , providing 
an i n s p i r a t i o n a l focus f o r the g a t h e r i n g campaign a g a i n s t r i s i n g 
uneit^loyment. 
I n t h e i r wide ranging account of the work-in, F o s t e r and Woolfson p l a c e 
g r e a t emphasis on the importance of the w i l y and committed shop steward 
l e a d e r s h i p i n the yards, whose a b i l i t i e s condensed the experiences and 
knowledge of generations of s t r u g g l e on "Red C l y d e s i d e " . Through the 
determination and a b i l i t y of t h i s shop steward l e a d e r s h i p , the workers were 
a b l e t o s e i z e and keep the i n i t i a t i v e f o r most of the f i f t e e n month 
s t r u g g l e . Strong l o c a l and r e g i o n a l l i n k s were e s t a b l i s h e d by the stewards, 
b u i l d i n g mass rank and f i l e support f o r t h e i r s t r u g g l e . T h i s concentration 
on l o c a l t r a d e union l e a d e r s h i p i s h i g h l y s i g n i f i c a n t . I t allows F o s t e r and 
Woolfson to i n v e s t i g a t e i n depth the r e l a t i o n s h i p between workers i n 
s t r u g g l e and the development of consciousness, w h i l s t s i t u a t i n g these 
changes w i t h i n an understanding of the h i s t o r i c a l and contertporary l i m i t s 
posed by developments i n the sphere of production. Although not developed 
e x p l i c i t l y , the authors b u i l d up a s o p h i s t i c a t e d notion of "place", 
understood as the h i s t o r i c a l l y grounded nature and experience of s o c i a l 
r e l a t i o n s (not j u s t c l a s s r e l a t i o n s ) working through a p a r t i c u l a r p h y s i c a l 
space. 
T h i s h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e i s i i t ^ o r t a n t , because i t shows t h a t at the time 
of the work-in the balance of f o r c e s favoured workers f a r more than they 
d i d when the s t e e l workers t r i e d to prevent c l o s u r e s seven years l a t e r . 
Compared to the 1980's, working c l a s s o r g a n i s a t i o n s were confident and 
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d e f e n s i v e l y powerful (Dickson and Judge, 1987). There were s t i l l strong 
elements of consensus w i t h i n c i v i l s o c i e t y , which l e d to concern over the 
d e l i b e r a t e r i s e i n unerrployment which Heath was engineering. The s t a t e was 
consequently f a r more c i r c u m s c r i b e d i n i t s p o s s i b l e s t r a t e g i e s than was the 
case ten years l a t e r . Trade union l e a d e r s h i p was able to e x p l o i t t h i s 
s t rength, but i t i s c l e a r t h a t the course of s t r u g g l e depended on the 
p a r t i c u l a r balance of f o r c e s as w e l l as on the s t r a t e g i e s of conscious 
agents. 
2 . 1 . i i THE LESSONS FROM STEEL 
When the announcement was made, i n December 1979, t h a t Consett s t e e l works 
was to c l o s e with the l o s s of a l l 3700 jobs, i t provoked an u n s u c c e s s f u l 
nine month a n t i - c l o s u r e ca i i ^ a i g n . The campaign f a i l e d because i t became 
s i d e t r a c k e d i n t o an i r r e l e v a n t argument about the p r o f i t a b i l i t y or 
otherwise of the p l a n t (Sadler, 1985). And yet, on the face of i t , massive 
redundancy i n an e s s e n t i a l l y s i n g l e i n d u s t r y town provided the p e r f e c t 
background to mass m o b i l i s a t i o n and p o l i t i c i s a t i o n of workers and t h e i r 
community, of the type experienced a t the UCS work-in ei g h t years e a r l i e r . 
Why d i d the Consett campaign subside with b a r e l y a whimper? Was i t s f a i l u r e 
i n e v i t a b l e , given the h o s t i l e economic c l i m a t e of the l a t e 1970's? Or was 
the outcome contingent, a unique product of p a r t i c u l a r circumstances and 
d e c i s i o n s which need not have taken t h e i r eventual path? 
Hudson and S a d l e r have i n v e s t i g a t e d i n depth the circumstances surrounding 
a n t i - s t e e l c l o s u r e cair^^aigns i n the 1970's and 80's (see Sadler, 1985; 
Hudson and Sadler, 1986; Hudson and Sadler, 1983; Robinson and Sadler, 
1985). T h e i r work provides an important background to t h i s t h e s i s , because 
i t attempts to r e l a t e the p o l i t i c s of c l a s s and p l a c e , t a k i n g s e r i o u s l y the 
p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s of the d i f f e r e n t campaigns which emerged i n d i f f e r e n t 
p l a c e s a t d i f f e r e n t times. There are a l s o strong reasons f o r comparing 
p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n between c o a l and s t e e l workers: they both i n v o l v e s i n g l e 
i n d u s t r y , s i n g l e c l a s s communities, r e l a t i v e l y i s o l a t e d , and h i g h l y male 
dominated. Many authors have remarked on the high l e v e l s of s o l i d a r i t y and 
p r o p e n s i t y to s t r i k e generated by such c o n d i t i o n s (Kerr and S i e g e l , 1954; 
Lockwood, 196G). 
What emerges as c e n t r a l to Hudson and S a d l e r ' s a n a l y s i s i s the d e b i l i t a t i n g 
and d i v i s i v e e f f e c t of b a s i n g a n t i - c l o s u r e canpaigns on narrowly conceived 
atteitpts to defend a p a r t i c u l a r p l a c e , r a t h e r than c h a l l e n g i n g the l o g i c 
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which d e f i n e d any comnumity(3) as s u r p l u s to requirements. However, the 
ques t i o n then emerges as to why such l i m i t e d cainpaigns appear so seductive 
t o people f a c e d w i t h c a t a s t r o p h i c works c l o s u r e . 
F o r Hudson and S a d l e r , the r e c e s s i o n and the f a i l u r e of s t a t e sponsored 
r e - i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n p o l i c i e s have been the background to a s i t u a t i o n where 
p l a c e s p e c i f i c cair^jaigns appear to the workers i n v o l v e d to be the "only 
f e a s i b l e s o l u t i o n " to the t h r e a t of mass redundancies (Hudson and Sadler, 
1986). 
"Accepting the coit?>etitive e t h i c of c a p i t a l i s m i n t h i s 
way as a l e g i t i m a t e t e r r a i n , and f i g h t i n g on a 
t e r r i t o r i a l l y d e f i n e d b a s i s w i t h i n i t , r a t h e r than 
posing broader questions as to why r e s t r u c t u r i n g i s 
regarded as e i t h e r n e c e s s a r y or j u s t i f i e d given i t s 
e x t e n s i v e s o c i a l c o s t s , has the p r e c i s e ( a l b e i t 
unintended) ef£ect of reproducing the b a s i c s t r u c t u r a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p of c a p i t a l i s m . " (Hudson and Sadler, 1986, 
179) 
But how d i d t h i s s t r a t e g y emerge as the "only f e a s i b l e s o l u t i o n " ? A f t e r 
a l l , Hudson and S a d l e r acknowledge t h a t c l o s u r e d e c i s i o n s have g e n e r a l l y 
been regarded as " t r a n s p a r e n t l y p o l i t i c a l " , i n much the same way as the 
s t a t e d e c i s i o n t o r e f u s e to b a i l out UCS i n 1971 was. Answering t h i s 
q u e s t i o n i n v o l v e s d e l v i n g deeper i n t o the s p e c i f i c circumstances 
surrounding each campaign. 
At Consett, a d i v i d e d union s t r u c t u r e devoid of r a d i c a l t r a d i t i o n s was 
f a c e d w i t h the p e r c e i v e d need to u n i t e the workforce around the canpaign. 
Faced w i t h a n a t i o n a l union l e a d e r s h i p h o s t i l e to g e n e r a l i s i n g the 
ca s ^ a i g n , the only a v a i l a b l e option seamed to be to appeal to the lowest 
common denominator, which was to argue t h a t B S C s s t a t e d reason f o r c l o s u r e 
- the p l a n t s u n p r o f i t a b i l i t y - was i n v a l i d . Once t h i s was decided, BSC 
co u l d comfortably o u t f l a n k opposition, secure i n the knowledge t h a t the 
unions were b a r k i n g up the wrong t r e e . BSC'S r e a l reason f o r c l o s i n g 
Consett was corporate o v e r - c a p a c i t y ( S a d l e r , 1985). 
Arguing on grounds of p r o f i t a b i l i t y e f f e c t i v e l y i s o l a t e d Consett from other 
BSC p l a n t s , because the i n p l i c a t i o n of Consett's s u c c e s s was t h a t a 
d i f f e r e n t p l a n t would have to c l o s e t o achieve the r e q u i r e d c a p a c i t y 
r e d u c t i o n s . The t a c t i c a l s o hindered attempts to b u i l d l o c a l l i n k a g e s with 
o t h e r a n t i c l o s u r e campaigns, s i n c e i t o f f e r e d no common ground with 
workers engaging i n s i m i l a r s t r u g g l e s elsewhere. 
"[A]n a n t i - c l o s u r e argument on p r o f i t a b i l i t y terms 
i s o l a t e d the campaign from broader support e i t h e r 
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w i t h i n the North E a s t or from workers at other p l a n t s 
w i t h i n BSC. By r e i n f o r c i n g and r e p l i c a t i n g the c l a i m 
f o r d e c i s i o n s to be made only w i t h i n the context of one 
p l a n t , the cait^saign f a i l e d to consider the broader 
i s s u e s i n a f a s h i o n which would have i n v i t e d support 
from other sources than j u s t s t e e l workers a t Consett." 
(Sadler, 1985, 157) 
At R a v e n s c r a i g i n S c o t l a n d however, an a n t i - c l o s u r e cart^saign developed i n 
1982/3 which proved - t e i t p o r a r i l y a t l e a s t - s u c c e s s f u l . According to 
S a d l e r , i t was s u c c e s s f u l because of the c r o s s c l a s s a l l i a n c e s which were 
c o n s t r u c t e d to defend the p l a n t . These a l l i a n c e s were i n t u r n based on the 
d i s t i n c t i v e a b i l i t y to appeal to the n a t i o n a l question. 
[T]he R a v e n s c r a i g cartpaign focused on broader s o c i a l 
i s s u e s , i n p a r t i c u l a r the degree of linkage between 
s t e e l and other i n d u s t r i e s i n Scotland, thereby 
a c t i v e l y encouraging broader support w i t h i n the region. 
P r o f i t a b i l i t y was not an i s s u e , f o r e s t a l l i n g l i k e l y 
a c t i v e o p p o s i t i o n from workers a t other s t e e l p l a n t s i n 
p u r s u i t of t h e i r own short-term i n t e r e s t s . At the same 
time the degree of support f o r Ravenscraig, drawing on 
and r e i n f o r c i n g a r e s e r v o i r of longer term S c o t t i s h 
i d e n t i t y , f o r c e d the BSC d e c i s i o n to be seen as a 
p u r e l y p o l i t i c a l r a t h e r than narrowly economic one. As 
p a r t of the complex s e r i e s of checks and balances 
w i t h i n the B r i t i s h s t a t e , i n p a r t i c u l a r the p e r c e i v e d 
need to maintain a degree of support from a l l regions, 
c l o s u r e of R a v e n s c r a i g was seen t o be p o l i t i c a l l y 
unacceptable by Government. (Sadler, 1985, 171-2) 
Success i n t h i s case depended on very s p e c i f i c s p a t i a l and teitporal 
c i rcumstances - i n p a r t i c u l a r the s t a t e s ' p e r c e i v e d need to maintain 
p o l i t i c a l l e g i t i m a c y i n Scotland. 
I n c o n t r a s t to Ravenscraig, when a r e g i o n a l campaign threatened to emerge 
i n South Wales over u n p a r a l l e l l e d planned reductions i n the s t e e l labour 
f o r c e (contained w i t h i n the BSC's 1980/81 Business P r o p o s a l ) , the Trades 
Union Congress (TUC) and I r o n and S t e e l Trades Confederation (ISTC) 
a c t i v e l y sought to prevent the emergence of a r e g i o n a l cajqpaign which would 
have questioned the g e n e r a l ethos of mass redundancies (Morgan, 1983). T h i s 
wasn't s i n g l y due to a remote and c o n p l i a n t labour l e a d e r s h i p ; i t drew 
s t r e n g t h too from s e c t i o n s of the workforce who "pleaded" with the union 
not to t r y and u n i v e r s a l i s e the anti-redundancy campaign ( i b i d ) . 
Furthermore, the union was s e v e r e l y weakened by the f a i l u r e of the 1980 pay 
s t r i k e . 
I n Prance however, a n t i s t e e l c l o s u r e cairpaigns i n the l a t e 1970's became 
g e n e r a l i s e d i n t o a wider c h a l l e n g e to the government of the day. I n the 
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L o r r a i n e region, massive job l o s s e s provoked formidable p r o t e s t a c t i o n , 
i n c l u d i n g "the most s e r i o u s break-dovm i n p u b l i c order i n France s i n c e May 
1968" (Sadler, 1985, 212). Because the s t a t e was h e a v i l y i n ^ l i c a t e d i n the 
job l o s s e s (through de f a c t o n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the i n d u s t r y ) , because the 
French unions ( e s p e c i a l l y the Communist CGT) had a t r a d i t i o n of c h a l l e n g i n g 
s t r a t e g i c economic d e c i s i o n making, and because the opposition p a r t i e s 
(which h i s t o r i c a l l y were committed to s o c i a l i s m - see G a l l i e , 1983) were 
able to use the opportunity to broaden the campaign i n t o a p r e - e l e c t i o n 
a t t a c k on the government's d e f l a t i o n a r y handling of the economy, the s t e e l 
workers b a t t l e was r a p i d l y p o l i t i c i s e d . U l t i m a t e l y i t was a s i g n i f i c a n t 
f a c t o r i n the e l e c t i o n of a s o c i a l i s t government. 
However, t h i s government was no l e s s able to prevent the d e c l i n e of the 
s t e e l i n d u s t r y than i t s predecessor had been. P r o t e s t s were d i s s i p a t e d by 
the s t a t e ' s e x p l o i t a t i o n of d i v i s i o n s between the Communist and S o c i a l i s t 
unions. Massive redundancy payments and r e - i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n measures drove 
wedges between p r o t e s t i n g workers, defusing the c r i s i s , although at 
c o n s i d e r a b l e f i s c a l c o s t . 
" [ B ] i t by b i t , during the f i v e months of exhausting 
n e g o t i a t i o n s , the p r o t e s t o r s were bought o f f u n t i l only 
a few i s o l a t e d pockets of d i s s e n t remain." ( F i n a n c i a l 
Times, 13 March 1980: quoted i n Sadler, 1985; 213) 
What then do these examples say about the reasons f o r the success or 
f a i l u r e of a n t i - c l o s u r e can^aigns? 
The key l e s s o n drawn by Hudson and Sadler was t h a t an unintended 
consequence of many campaigns a g a i n s t c l o s u r e was t o r e i n f o r c e the wage 
r e l a t i o n as the b a s i s f o r s o c i e t y . I n L o r r a i n e , atteitpts to defend the 
l o c a l i t y foundered as the s t a t e used d i f f e r e n t i a l redundancy and 
r e - i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n packages to s p l i t the workforce. Opposition was 
c h a n n e l l e d i n t o p o l i t i c a l o pposition to the government, but the new 
government was operating w i t h i n the same c a p i t a l i s t framework, and was 
i n e f f e c t i v e i n preventing f u r t h e r job l o s s e s . I n Consett, the campaign 
i t s e l f d i v i d e d the working c l a s s , s i n c e i t was based on narrowly s e c t a r i a n 
i n t e r e s t s . P r o f i t a b i l i t y might have been p o s s i b l e f o r Consett, but the 
p r i c e would have been c l o s u r e elsewhere - hence the Consett workforce was 
i s o l a t e d . Only i n Scotland, a t Ravenscraig, was c l o s u r e prevented. T h i s was 
a contingent suc c e s s , dependant not so much on the i n t r i n s i c m e r i t s of the 
cairupaign - although i t undoubtedly was w e l l organised - but because of the 
need to maintain p o l i t i c a l l e g i t i m a c y . The success was contingent because a 
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changed balance of c l a s s f o r c e s may render keeping Ravenscraig open 
i r r e l e v a n t f o r t h e s e aims. 
Two i s s u e s are r a i s e d by t h i s review of a n t i - s t e e l c l o s u r e caitpaigns. 
F i r s t , i t i s c l e a r t h a t the s t a t e has played a p i v o t a l r o l e i n a l l three 
c a s e s (see s e c t i o n 2.2 below) . Secondly, very l i t t l e has been s a i d about 
the way i n which the d i f f e r e n t anti-redundancy s t r a t e g i e s emerged. These 
two i s s u e s need to be examined i n t u r n . S t a r t i n g with the second, although 
t h e r e i s a wealth of m a t e r i a l e x p l o r i n g the t w i s t s and turns of d i f f e r e n t 
campaigns, and what the e f f e c t s of v a r i o u s d e c i s i o n s were, the processes 
which generated d i f f e r e n t s t r a t e g i e s are l a r g e l y consigned to a "black 
box". Why, f o r example, were t h e r e such strong p r e s s u r e s from the Consett 
workforce to adopt a "lowest common denominator" cait^aign, coirpared to 
R a v e n s c r a i g where c r o s s c l a s s a l l i a n c e s were favoured? Did the d i f f e r e n t 
campaigns both emerge from the rank and f i l e , or were they l a r g e l y the 
product of union l e a d e r s h i p s (McNulty, 1987)? I t i s c l e a r t h a t there i s a 
major a r e a needing e x p l o r a t i o n here - the p rocesses generating d i f f e r e n t 
s t r a t e g i e s , d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of m i l i t a n c y , d i f f e r e n t types of l e a d e r s h i p 
have not been i n v e s t i g a t e d . They are taken up i n the f o llowing chapters 
about Murton, where the p rocesses generating s t r u g g l e are i n v e s t i g a t e d i n 
d e t a i l . 
Secondly, s t a t e s t r a t e g y with regard to the s t e e l i n d u s t r y bears c l o s e r 
a n a l y s i s , given the s i m i l a r i t y i n many important r e s p e c t s with the t a c t i c s 
deployed i n the c o a l i n d u s t r y a few years l a t e r . With the s t a t e committed 
to s l a s h i n g i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the economy and reducing the power of organised 
labour, the development of p a r t i c u l a r s t r a t e g i e s with regard to the 
n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s forms the background to c o n f l i c t i n the c o a l 
i n d u s t r y . T h i s i s a p o i n t developed i n p a r t 2.2 of t h i s chapter. 
Throughout the examples d i s c u s s e d here, the r o l e of the s t a t e emerges as 
c e n t r a l . I n the f i r s t p l a c e t h i s c e n t r a l i t y d e r i v e d from s t a t e ownership 
( c o a l and s t e e l ) or heavy s t a t e involvement ( s h i p b u i l d i n g ) . I n the second 
p l a c e , i t r e l a t e s t o the s t a t e r o l e as guarantor of the wider mesh of 
i n t e r l o c k i n g c l a s s r e l a t i o n s i n the post war settlement. T h i r d l y , the s t a t e 
has p l a y e d the key r o l e i n l e a d i n g a t t e n ^ t s to reorganise c a p i t a l - l a b o u r 
r e l a t i o n s i n B r i t a i n . R e s t r u c t u r i n g i n s h i p b u i l d i n g , s t e e l and c o a l was 
r e l a t e d to t h i s s t r a t e g y . I n the f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n the s t a t e i s considered, 
i n order to provide a t h e o r e t i c a l and h i s t o r i c a l underpinning f o r the 
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s t r u g g l e s which took p l a c e i n the UK c o a l i n d u s t r y from 1978, which i n t u r n 
provides the context w i t h i n which developments at Murton occurred. 
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2.2 STATE STRATEGY^ AND THE DECLINE OF THE POST WAR SETTLEMENT 
A key f a c t o r i n the way a n t i - c l o s u r e caitpaigns developed from the 1970's 
was the c l o s e involvement of the s t a t e i n many of the worst a f f e c t e d 
i n d u s t r i e s , u s u a l l y (although not always) d i r e c t l y through n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n . 
T h i s meant t h a t c l o s u r e d e c i s i o n s were p o l i t i c i s e d to a h i t h e r t o 
unprecedented degree. Furthermore, c l o s u r e o f t e n took p l a c e i n already 
r e l a t i v e l y deprived l o c a l i t i e s , which had a t t r a c t e d q u i t e considerable 
s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the post war decades. Indeed, the absence of 
r e s i s t a n c e to c l o s u r e s i n the 1950's and 60's owed much to the s t a t e 
commitment (however weak i n p r a c t i c e ) to r e g i o n a l development i n the 
r e g i o n s (Hudson, 1986). I n other words, people i n these l o c a l i t i e s expected 
the s t a t e to i n t e r v e n e on t h e i r b e h a l f . When - under d r a s t i c a l l y changed 
p o l i t i c a l economic c o n d i t i o n s - the post war settlement (PWS) which had 
s a n c t i o n e d i n t e r v e n t i o n broke down, the s t a t e f a c e d p o t e n t i a l l e g i t i m a t i o n 
c r i s e s i n the a f f e c t e d regions. 
Heightened s t r u g g l e over major works c l o s u r e s i n o l d i n d u s t r i a l regions 
used to a high s t a t e subsidy was an unintended consequence of the 
i n c o r p o r a t i o n s t r a t e g y pursued by the B r i t i s h s t a t e i n the post war e r a 
(Jessop, 1980) . I t was an outcome of attempting to defuse c l a s s s t r u g g l e by 
n e g o t i a t i o n with the peak r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of labour. The s t r a t e g y f a i l e d 
because i t i n t e r n a l i s e d the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s between labour and c a p i t a l 
w i t h i n the s t a t e i t s e l f . However, i n c o r p o r a t i o n a l s o helped d i s o r g a n i s e the 
working c l a s s response to the c r i s i s , because labourism - the dominant form 
of the compromise i n the a f f e c t e d l o c a l i t i e s - accepted the b a s i c l o g i c and 
i m p e r a t i v e s of c a p i t a l i s t accumulation. I n e f f e c t , a l l working c l a s s 
i n s t i t u t i o n s were l e f t to f i g h t f o r during a r e c e s s i o n , having accepted the 
b a s i c r i g h t of c a p i t a l t o manage i t s e l f p r o f i t a b l y , was a s t r a t e g y to 
i n c r e a s e p r o f i t a b i l i t y (which could only be at the workers expense), which 
even i f s u c c e s s f u l , i m p l i e d t h a t somewhere e l s e l e s s p r o f i t a b l e ( e i t h e r i n 
the same e n t e r p r i s e or not) would have to b i t e the b u l l e t . 
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T h i s s e c t i o n focuses on the p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l development of 
the post-war s t a t e i n B r i t a i n . For a more a b s t r a c t and t h e o r e t i c a l 
d i s c u s s i o n on g e n e r a l t h e o r i e s of the c a p i t a l i s t s t a t e , see the reviews by 
Jessop, 1977; 1982; F r a n k e l , 1979; Held and K r i e g e r , 1984; Held, 1983. See 
a l s o Poulantzas, 1976; 1978; L a c l a u , 1975; Miliband, 1969; Offe, 1984; 
Holloway and P i c c i o t t i ( e d s ) , 1978. 
Chapter 2 (36) 
D e s p i t e the incoirporation of the peak r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of labour, workers 
f r e q u e n t l y fought on a broader f r o n t than t h e i r l e a d e r s , as the UCS work-in 
(among others) amply demonstrates. But by the 1980's the s t a t e was c l e a r l y 
r e a s s e r t i n g i t s a u t h o r i t y . Turning the t a b l e s was not a matter of accident 
however. The s t a t e modernising s t r a t e g y emerged over a period of at l e a s t 
f i f t e e n y e a r s . The f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n s analyse the development of 
T h a t c h e r i t e s t r a t e g y , l o c a t i n g i t s roots i n the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s which were 
i n t e r n a l i s e d i n the PWS. 
2 . 2 . i THE POST WAR SETTLEMENT (PWS) IN BRITAIN 
I t i s easy i n r e t r o s p e c t to overeit^shasise the coherence of the PWS (Jessop 
e t _ a l , 1984) . But what i t c e r t a i n l y d i d mean was "a general movement i n 
favour of c l a s s c o l l a b o r a t i o n and s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the i n t e r e s t s of 
economic growth and improved s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s f o r the whole people" 
(Jessop, 1980, 28; see a l s o Crouch, 1982). I n t h i s underlying p r i n c i p l e l a y 
the degree of c o n t i n u i t y between Conservative and Labour a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s 
u n t i l the 1970's. 
Up u n t i l the l a t e 1960's, post war UK governments ( o s t e n s i b l y at l e a s t ) 
pursued " f u l l employment" p o l i c i e s . Keynesian demand management was 
a p p l i e d , with v a r y i n g s u c c e s s , to ensure n a t i o n a l unemployment never rose 
above a low s i n g l e f i g u r e percentage r a t e . T h i s d i d not prevent r e g i o n a l 
unemployment r i s i n g s i g n i f i c a n t l y above n a t i o n a l norms, but i t d i d ensure 
t h a t p r o t e s t was manageable, with the a p p l i c a t i o n of r e g i o n a l a i d o f f e r e d 
as a p a l l i a t i v e f o r deprived areas (Hudson, 1985). These consensus p o l i c i e s 
grew out of prewar experiences, when ad hoc i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the economy 
g r a d u a l l y i n c r e a s e d (Dickson and Judge, 1987). They were con s o l i d a t e d 
during the war i t s e l f , when the the labour movement was accepted i n t o the 
s t a t e as an equal p a r t n e r (Panitch, 1976) . T h i s had the e f f e c t of 
i n e x t r i c a b l y l i n k i n g the war e f f o r t to the goal of post-war r e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
(Gamble, 1985, 100-103) . 
The government's commitment to job c r e a t i o n i n the regions was maintained 
through a modernisation s t r a t e g y which was supposed to r e c o n s t r u c t the 
employment base of deprived regions around modern manufacturing (Hudson, 
1983). D e s p i t e the weaknesses of the s t a t e measures i n p r a c t i c e , they were 
l a r g e l y s u c c e s s f u l i n b u t t r e s s i n g a consensus ideology f o r the f u t u r e of 
regions such as the North E a s t (see Carney, Hudson and Lewis, 1977) . 
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N a t i o n a l i s a t i o n was a key aspect of the consensus, both r e g i o n a l l y and 
n a t i o n a l l y . 
N a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the c o a l i n d u s t r y symbolised the PWS (Beynon and 
McMylor, 1985). Miners hoped t h a t i t would s i g n a l the end of b r u t a l 
e x p l o i t a t i o n by the c o a l owners, and usher i n a new e r a of planned 
production f o r the common good. The NUM was reorganised to play a key 
p a r t n e r s h i p r o l e with the NCB - union nominees s a t on i n d u s t r y committees, 
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and t h e r e was frequent movement from NUM ranks i n t o "the Board" . Yet the 
terms of n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n - accepted by the Labour and Conservative P a r t i e s , 
and by the NUM's l e a d e r s h i p - i i r ^ s l i e d t h a t n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n was aimed at 
s o c i a l i s i n g the c o s t s of production of b a s i c raw m a t e r i a l s i n the i n t e r e s t s 
of m a i n t a i n i n g i n d u s t r i a l c o i t p e t i t i v e n e s s , r a t h e r than beginning the 
t r a n s i t i o n to s o c i a l i s m (see Carney, 1980; Hudson, 1986; and Appendix 2 ) . 
There was t h e r e f o r e a fundamental d i f f e r e n c e i n understanding between 
miners and the s t a t e as to what n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n meant, and t h i s 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n had important i r t ^ l i c a t i o n s f o r the development of NUM 
p o l i t i c s i n the f o l l o w i n g y e a r s . 
D e s p i t e B r i t a i n ' s r a p i d post-war recovery ( a s s i s t e d by the r e l a t i v e l y 
l i m i t e d wartime d e s t r u c t i o n of i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , and a i d from the USA) by the 
mid 1950's i t was apparent t h a t other c o u n t r i e s s i m i l a r i n s i z e and 
r e s o u r c e s were beginning to outperform the B r i t i s h economy. Although 
Keynesianism was adopted i n B r i t a i n , the a c t u a l l e v e l of s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n 
i n the economy was low. E s s e n t i a l l y i t depended on macro s c a l e 
manipulations to b r i n g demand i n t o l i n e with the productive l e v e l of the 
economy (Gamble, 1985, 115-116). As the f a i l u r e of t h i s s t r a t e g y became 
apparent, c a l l s i n c r e a s e d f o r more d i r e c t , supply s i d e i n t e r v e n t i o n and 
s y s t e m a t i c planning. N a t i o n a l l y , w i t h i n the f u l l en^loyment framework, a 
range of p o l i c i e s were t r i e d i n attentats to modernise the economy, and 
improve i t s r e l a t i v e l y s l u g g i s h performance. However, these tended to be 
r e a c t i v e or i n t e r m i t t e n t i n nature (see Dickson and Judge, 1987). Micro 
s c a l e planning was c o n s i s t e n t l y thwarted by the subservience of economic 
plan n i n g to the p r i o r i t i e s of the f i n a n c e s e c t o r , as embodied i n the Bank 
of England ( i b i d , 1987). 
I n Durham, where Sam Watson u t t e r l y dominated the area union, 
s e v e r a l key NCB employees a t area l e v e l were Watson's personal nominees 
( i n t e r v i e w , ex NCB c o l l i e r y personnel manager). 
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2 . 2 . i i THE PWS IN CRISIS 
Although the PWS d e l i v e r e d g e n e r a l l y r i s i n g l i v i n g standards throughout the 
1950's and 60's, i t could not r e s o l v e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s inherent i n the 
c a p i t a l - l a b o u r r e l a t i o n . I n s t e a d , a p a r t i c u l a r balance of c l a s s f o r c e s 
became i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d , i n t e r n a l i s i n g the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s w i t h i n the s t a t e 
i t s e l f . For example, d e s p i t e i n c o r p o r a t i n g both the Labour Part y and the 
tr a d e union b u r e a u c r a c i e s , the PWS f a i l e d to sn u f f out c o n f l i c t a t the 
p o i n t o f production. Indeed, d u r i n g a p e r i o d of f u l l en^Jloyment, i t boosted 
the d e f e n s i v e a b i l i t y of w e l l organised workers to r e s i s t encroachments 
along the " f r o n t i e r of c o n t r o l " (Goodrich, 1975). Also, i n c o n s o l i d a t i n g a 
commitment (over a generation) to r i s i n g l i v i n g standards, i t r a i s e d 
working c l a s s e x p e c t a t i o n s to the point where r e s i s t a n c e to a t t a c k s on 
l i v i n g standards would i n e v i t a b l y be i n t e n s i f i e d . And more fundamentally, 
i t f a i l e d t o r e s o l v e the long term r e l a t i v e d e c l i n e i n the B r i t i s h economy. 
T h i s d e c l i n e continued to preoccupy s u c c e s s i v e government's, both Labour 
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and C o n s e r v a t i v e . By the l a t e 1960's, the co n d i t i o n s f o r the success of 
the PWS - namely a continuing i n c r e a s e i n r e a l wages which d i d not thre a t e n 
accumulation - were a l r e a d y being undermined (Jessop, 1980). 
The g e n e r a l f a i l u r e of atteitpts a t planning and d i r e c t i n d u s t r i a l 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the 1960's i n c r e a s e d the pr e s s u r e on the s t a t e to secure 
improved c o n d i t i o n s f o r accumulation i n other ways, l e a d i n g to atteit^Jts to 
develop c o r p o r a t i s t s t r u c t u r e s (see Panitch, 1981, 24 f o r a d e f i n i t i o n of 
corporatism) . I n p a r t t h i s was a response to the B r i t i s h "problem" of 
workers m i l i t a n c y a t the point of production. By i n c o r p o r a t i n g the trade 
union and Labour l e a d e r s h i p , the PWS encouraged the b u r e a u c r a t i s a t i o n of 
workers o r g a n i s a t i o n s , s e p a r a t i n g them more c l e a r l y from t h e i r members (see 
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Many arguments have been advanced to account f o r t h i s d e c l i n e 
(see f o r example; Nairn, 1982; Gamble, 1985; Jessop, 1980; Dickson and 
Judge, 1987) , I t sprang from the h i s t o r i c a l s e p a r a t i o n of finance c a p i t a l 
from B r i t i s h manufacturing, and the dominance of the former (through the 
agency of the Bank of England) i n p o l i c y formation. Also important was the 
determination ( r e l a t e d t o the i n t e r e s t s of f i n a n c e c a p i t a l ) to maintain 
B r i t a i n ' s i n t e r n a t i o n a l r o l e , i n c l u d i n g the r o l e of s t e r l i n g as a major 
world currency. These commitments s e v e r e l y r e s t r i c t e d investment a t home, 
and i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s e d B r i t i s h c a p i t a l to an extent second only to the USA 
(Dickson and Judge, 1987, 10-12) . T h i s i n t u r n weakened the commitment of 
the dominant f r a c t i o n s of B r i t i s h c a p i t a l to t h e i r country of o r i g i n . 
Chapter 2 (39) 
chapter t h r e e ) . As the p r i c e of admission i n t o the s t a t e s t r u c t u r e , unions 
were expected to d i s c i p l i n e and c o n t r o l t h e i r members. 
"Trade union involvement has been promoted l e s s to 
obtain t e c h n i c a l information and d e t a i l e d advice than 
to s e c u r e a c t i v e support or a t l e a s t p a s s i v e 
acquiescence i n measures intended to f a c i l i t a t e 
accumulation." (Jessop, 1980, 48) 
But the PWS c o u l d not l e g i s l a t e away c o n f l i c t a t the point of production, 
and the strong workplace o r g a n i s a t i o n of many workers i n t e n s i f i e d as 
acquiescence a t the head of t h e movement provoked m i l i t a n c y on the shop 
f l o o r , l e a d i n g among other t h i n g s to the problem of "wages d r i f t " (Donovan, 
1968) . 
Corporatism f a i l e d because the trade union bureaucracy could not d e l i v e r 
the r e q u i r e d l e v e l of i n t e r n a l d i s c i p l i n e , and because c a p i t a l too l a c k e d 
s u f f i c i e n t l y powerful peak o r g a n i s a t i o n s (Jessop, 1980; Jessop e t _ _ a l , 
1984). Government's n e v e r t h e l e s s p e r s i s t e d with c o r p o r a t i s t experiments. I n 
1969 Barbara C a s t l e introduced the Labour government's " I n Place of S t r i f e " 
White Paper, as an atteitpt to strengthen union l e a d e r s h i p s and reduce the 
power of u n o f f i c i a l workplace o r g a n i s a t i o n . The Donovan Report on 
i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s had i d e n t i f i e d the l a t t e r as a s e r i o u s b a r r i e r to 
accommodative i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , and consequently recommended the 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n of shop steward movements (Donovan, 1968; Coates and 
Topham, 1988). However, union rank and f i l e r e s i s t a n c e e v e n t u a l l y defeated 
both " I n P l a c e of S t r i f e " , and the Conservative government's subsequent 
f r o n t a l a s s a u l t on union power - the 1971 I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s Act. 
The e a r l y 1970's were a p e r i o d of i n t e n s e c l a s s s t r u g g l e , as the long post 
war wave of expansion broke up, plunging most of the advanced c a p i t a l i s t 
economies i n t o r e c e s s i o n (Mandel, 1980; see a l s o footnote 6 below). I n 
B r i t a i n , Prime M i n i s t e r Heath's attempts to break with the post war 
consensus were thwarted as working c l a s s r e s i s t a n c e to h i s a t t a c k s b u i l t up 
(see s e c t i o n 2 . 1 . i i above). Heath was f o r c e d i n t o a s i g n i f i c a n t p o l i c y "U" 
t u r n when unemployment climbed past the p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y c r i t i c a l one 
m i l l i o n mark. Heath's t a r n i s h e d government was r e p l a c e d i n 1974 (following 
the NUM's second s u c c e s s f u l s t r i k e over wages - see chapter four) by the 
Wilson a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , which atterrpted once more to rework the post-war 
themes of c l a s s compromise. 
Labour's s t r a t e g y was encapsulated i n the " S o c i a l Contract". T h i s agreement 
between the TUC and the government was based on the l a t t e r agreeing to 
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l e g i s l a t e s o c i a l b e n e f i t s f o r the working c l a s s as a whole, i n r e t u r n f o r 
v o l u n t a r y wage r e s t r a i n t on the p a r t of the unions. I t was hoped th a t as 
workers on the shop f l o o r saw and experienced i n c r e a s i n g s o c i a l b e n e f i t s , 
then t h e i r wage demands would moderate a c c o r d i n g l y (Coates, 1980, 60). At 
the same time as the S o c i a l Contract was negotiated, t r i p a r t i t e d i s c u s s i o n s 
between the government, the NCB and the NUM y i e l d e d the "Plan f o r Coal" 
agreement (see chapter 4 ) . Once again t h e r e f o r e , the c o a l i n d u s t r y 
symbolised the peak of s o c i a l democratic planning. The miners' i n t e r e s t s 
were f u r t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d , with the s t a t e a c t i n g as guarantor of the 
s e t t l e m e n t . 
However, by the mid-1970's the economic cond i t i o n s necessary f o r the 
continued operation of the PWS were crumbling (Coates, 1980). B r i t i s h 
i n d u s t r y ' s uncompetitiveness was i n c r e a s i n g , and " n e i t h e r c a p i t a l nor 
labour, whether a c t i n g alone or together, could a c c o i q j l i s h the necessary 
r e s t r u c t u r i n g of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s to f a c i l i t a t e accumulation" (Jessop, 
1980, 4 7 ) . E s s e n t i a l l y , the economic c r i s i s was manifested as a c r i s i s of 
c o n t r o l , because the d e f e n s i v e strength of labour, b u i l t up during the PWS 
l e d to r e s i s t a n c e to r e s t r u c t u r i n g p o l i c i e s (Holloway, 1987). For c a p i t a l 
and the s t a t e , the whole b a s i s of managerial a u t h o r i t y was under t h r e a t . I n 
many i n d u s t r i e s , the shop steward movement had b u i l t up a c o n s i d e r a b l e veto 
power over the i n t r o d u c t i o n of new technology and new working arrangements. 
Competitive p r e s s u r e s f o r c e d an a s s a u l t on union power. 
Faced with a f i n a n c i a l c r i s i s ( p r e c i p i t a t e d by the i n ^ o s i t i o n of loan 
c o n d i t i o n s by the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund i n 1976), the Labour 
government began to pursue a u s t e r i t y measures. With the working c l a s s s t i l l 
r e l a t i v e l y strong, the r e s u l t was c o n f l i c t , as low p a i d p u b l i c s e c t o r 
workers fought to defend t h e i r l i v i n g standards. At about the same time, 
the f i r s t sporadic attempts to r e d e f i n e the power r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
c a p i t a l and labour which had been i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d i n the PWS were a l s o 
i n i t i a t e d by the Labour government. The S o c i a l Contract d i s s o l v e d i n t o a 
s e r i e s of running b a t t l e s between workers and the s t a t e . 
On the i n d u s t r i a l f r o n t , the s t a t e began t o t r y and l e a d the r e s t r u c t u r i n g 
process, attempting to r e s o l v e the c r i s i s of c o n t r o l by u s i n g the s e c t o r s 
under i t s d i r e c t c o n t r o l . B r i t i s h Leyland (BL) was the f i r s t b i g t a r g e t , 
and s e r v e s as a metaphor f o r the changes about to occur i n the wider 
economy. But the " c o r r e c t " management s t r a t e g y was not obvious, and i t s 
e f f e c t s could not be p r e d i c t e d with any degree of c e r t a i n t y by the s t a t e . 
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I n i t i a l l y , management a t BL atteitpted to incorporate the steward 
l e a d e r s h i p , to gain t h e i r a c t i v e cooperation with the modernisation 
s t r a t e g y (the s o - c a l l e d "Ryder P l a n " ) . Although p a r t i a l l y s u c c e s s f u l i n 
beginning the i n t r o d u c t i o n of some new working p r a c t i c e s , the Ryder Plan 
was i n s u f f i c i e n t to d e c i s i v e l y r e a s s e r t managerial a u t h o r i t y . The concept 
of "mutuality" (under which the i n t r o d u c t i o n of any new technology or 
working p r a c t i c e s f i r s t had to be d i s c u s s e d with the stewards) undermined 
managerial a u t h o r i t y . I t was a t t h i s point ( i n 1977) t h a t the Labour 
government approved the appointment of Michael Edwardes as Chairman of the 
BL Board (Holloway, 1987). 
Edwardes' a g g r e s s i v e r e a s s e r t i o n of management a u t h o r i t y - i n c l u d i n g the 
s a c k i n g of the Longbridge convenor, Derek "Red Robbo" Robinson - culminated 
i n the u n i l a t e r a l t e r m i n a t i o n of mutuality. Edwardes won the showdown with 
the stewards, f o r m a l l y ended mutuality, and e f f e c t i v e l y destroyed the 
steward l e a d e r s h i p , r e a s s e r t i n g management a u t h o r i t y to impose new working 
p r a c t i c e s . The key word i n these new arrangements was " f l e x i b i l i t y " . 
" F l e x i b i l i t y means e s s e n t i a l l y the removal of b a r r i e r s 
to management's r i g h t to t e l l the workers what to do, 
where to do i t and a t what speed." (Holloway, 1987, 
150) 
Edwardes su c c e s s b u i l t on the d i s c r e d i t i n g of the stewards, following t h e i r 
d e c i s i o n t o cooperate with the Ryder Plan . 
Holloway p o i n t s out the s i m i l a r i t y between the c r i s i s of c o n t r o l f a c i n g 
i n d i v i d u a l companies l i k e BL and the a u t h o r i t y c r i s i s simultaneously f a c i n g 
the s t a t e . "Keynesianism" was the s t a t e s e q u i v a l e n t of mutuality. I t was a 
t r a d e o f f whereby the organised working c l a s s secured an irtportant r o l e i n 
the determination of wages and co n d i t i o n s , i n r e t u r n f o r accepting 
c a p i t a l ' s domination. C a p i t a l ' s descent i n t o c r i s i s meant t h a t the o l d 
p a t t e r n of domination and compromise now c o n s t i t u t e d a block to the 
r e s o l u t i o n of c r i s i s . S u c c e s s f u l l y r e s o l u t i o n of the problem was by no 
means i n e v i t a b l e . The f i r s t atterr^sts - I n P l a c e of S t r i f e , and the 
I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s Act - both f a i l e d . The s t a t e ' s equivalent of the Ryder 
P l a n was the S o c i a l Contract - the f u l l i n c o r p o r a t i o n of the trade union 
l e a d e r s h i p . T h i s too was only p a r t i a l l y s u c c e s s f u l , and i n p a r t i c u l a r 
f a i l e d t o d e c i s i v e l y r e - e s t a b l i s h the a u t h o r i t y of the s t a t e . The t a s k was 
taken up by the new Con s e r v a t i v e government. 
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2 . 2 . i i i THATCHERISM AND THE REASSERTION OF CONTROL 
The experience of the e a r l y 1970's - when organised labour was able to 
s u c c e s s f u l l y defend i t s i n t e r e s t s i n s e v e r a l key confrontations with the 
s t a t e - problematised the extent of the s t a t e ' s a u t h o r i t y (Foster and 
Woolfson, 1986) . Events such as the f r e e i n g of the P e n t o n v i l l e f i v e i n 
1971, the UCS climbdown, and the 1972 and 1974 miners' s t r i k e s e x p l i c i t l y 
r e v e a l e d the l i m i t s to s t a t e power. I n s t e a d of i n c o r p o r a t i o n leading to the 
r e g u l a t i o n of rank and f i l e s t r u g g l e by the unions, i n a period of 
r e c e s s i o n n a t i o n a l labour l e a d e r s were themselves f o r c e d to adopt m i l i t a n t 
p o s i t i o n s to maintain t h e i r c r e d i b i l i t y with t h e i r members. I n s t i t u t i o n a l 
r e c o g n i t i o n of the l e g i t i m a c y of workers i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n the framework of 
t h e PWS c l e a r l y c i r c u m s c r i b e d the boundaries of s t a t e a c t i o n . 
To cope with t h i s s i t u a t i o n , the s t a t e began to take measures to boost i t s 
o p e r a t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t y to r e s i s t p u b l i c p r o t e s t . For exaitple, the C i v i l 
C o ntingencies U n i t (CCU) was c r e a t e d to d e a l with c i v i l unrest and major 
s t r i k e s , and the p o l i c e began to reorganise so t h a t they would never again 
be beaten as they were during the 1972 miners' s t r i k e a t S a l t l e y Gate (see 
J e f f e r y and Hennessy, 1983, f o r a d e t a i l e d assessment of the changes w i t h i n 
the s t a t e ) . W h i l s t out of government. Conservative ideologues began 
for m u l a t i n g d e t a i l e d s t r a t e g i e s and t a c t i c s f o r the r e s t r u c t u r i n g of 
c a p i t a l - l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s i n the UK, i n an atteicpt to c r e a t e a "strong 
s t a t e " , and e s t a b l i s h a new p a t t e r n of domination (see Gamble, 1985; Jessop 
e t _ _ a l , 1988) . 
T h e i r f i r s t a t t e n t i o n s turned towards the need to boost s t a t e power, to 
ensure t h a t the s t a t e could win confrontations with organised labour 
( J e f f e r y and Hennessy, 1983). They prepared a b l u e p r i n t to guide 
implementation - the infamous R i d l e y Report (The Economist, 27-5-78) . I n i t 
t h e s t e e l i n d u s t r y was s i n g l e d out as r e p r e s e n t i n g the i d e a l t e s t i n g ground 
f o r the new Tory s t r a t e g y (Morgan, 1983, 189). H i s t o r i c a l l y accommodative 
labour r e l a t i o n s and a supine t r a d e union l e a d e r s h i p could be r e l i e d on to 
weaken r e s i s t a n c e . Furthermore,. 
" [ t ] h e r e can be no doubt t h a t the c o r r e c t perception of 
the s t e e l i n d u s t r y as one where the work for c e i s 
p a r t i c u l a r l y fragmented by i n t e r - u n i o n , i n t e r - r e g i o n a l , 
and i n t e r - p l a n t r i v a l r i e s was a c r u c i a l f a c t o r i n i t s 
being chosen by the government as the preinier example 
on which f i r s t to p r a c t i c e i t s v a r i o u s economic 
d o c t r i n e s . (Hudson, 1986, 19) 
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When they achieved power they sharpened the weapon of redundancy payments, 
r e a l i s i n g the p o w e r f u l l y d i v i s i v e e f f e c t they had on workers f a c i n g 
c l o s u r e . As Morgan commented with r e s p e c t to a n t i - s t e e l c l o s u r e cait^saigns, 
the l a c k of labour l e a d e r s h i p i n opposing c l o s u r e s meant t h a t "without any 
a l t e r n a t i v e r e f e r e n c e , steelwor'kers were f o r c i b l y obliged to minimize t h e i r 
l o s s e s through the i n d i v i d u a l i s t ' s o l u t i o n ' of redundancy payments" 
(Morgan, 1983, 193). I n an annex to the Report, the authors p r e d i c t e d t h a t 
the b i g g e s t c h a l l e n g e to the government would come from the miners, and 
they suggested a range of measures to defeat such a challenge (see chapter 
f o u r ) . 
Simultaneous with the f r o n t a l a s s a u l t on organised labour came a l e g a l and 
i d e o l o g i c a l campaign a g a i n s t the PWS (see f o r exangsle Beynon and McMylor, 
1985). J u s t how f a r r e a c h i n g a rupture with the past Thatcherism a s p i r e d to 
be can be gauged by the extent of the debate which i t has generated^. But 
from the point of view of t h i s t h e s i s , the most s i g n i f i c a n t developments 
were th e c l e a r break with the post war commitment to f u l l en^sloyment, the 
a s s a u l t on union power, and the a t t a c k on s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the 
economy. I d e o l o g i c a l a s p e c t s were subordinate to t h i s general strategy, 
which aimed to fundamentally a l t e r the balance of power between c a p i t a l and 
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labour i n B r i t a i n , and so e s t a b l i s h a new p a t t e r n of c l a s s domination . 
C o n s e r v a t i v e s t r a t e g y followed these paths r e l e n t l e s s l y . Uneitployment was 
allowed (indeed encouraged) to r i s e to h i t h e r t o unprecedented l e v e l s . 
On the l e f t t h i s has focused around the p o l i t i c a l / i d e o l o g i c a l 
uniqueness of Thatcherism. See f o r example; H a l l and Jacques (eds), 1983; 
Jessop e t a l , 1988; H a l l , 1988; A t k i n s , 1986; K r i e g e r , 1986; Gamble, 1988. 
For a g e n e r a l b i b l i o g r a p h y on Thatcherism, see Jessop e t a l , 1988, 195-207. 
^Considerable d i s p u t e surrounds the causes of the c r i s i s , and the 
extent to which c a p i t a l i s m i s undergoing or has undergone a s h i f t from a 
" f o r d i s t " to "post f o r d i s t " regime of accumulation. For the " r e g u l a t i o n 
sc h o o l " , the c r i s i s was caused by consvutption f a l l i n g out of l i n e with 
production. T h i s was the s t a r t i n g point f o r a d r i v e by c a p i t a l to develop a 
new "regime of accumulation", r e p l a c i n g the F o r d i s t a t t e n ^ t to coordinate 
mass production with consumption with a " p o s t f o r d i s t " d r i v e to a regime of 
" f l e x i b l e accumulation", f o r which t h e r e i s some evidence i n B r i t a i n (see 
f o r example, A g l i e t t a , 1979; Schoenberger, 1988; Leborgne and L i e p i t z , 
1988; Harvey, 1987; Cooke, 1988; Scott, 1988). T h i s view has been 
c r i t i c i s e d by C l a r k e (1988) , who claims t h a t the c r i s i s d e r i v e d from the 
i n h e r e n t tendency towards overaccumulation w i t h i n the c a p i t a l i s t system, 
and the s t a t e s t r a t e g y to cope with i t d i d not represent a s h i f t towards a 
new accumulation s t r a t e g y (see a l s o Tomaney, 1989; G e r t l e r , 1988; P o l l e r t , 
1988) . 
Chapter 2 (44) 
Manufacturing i n d u s t r y was exposed to f i e r c e d e f l a t i o n a r y pressures, which 
hastened the UK economy i n t o r e c e s s i o n a year ahead of i t s con^ietitors 
(Jessop e t a l , 1984, 48) . The s c a l e of c o n t r a c t i o n was awesome (Beynon, 
1987) . Between 1979 and 1982 manufacturing employment f e l l by 20% (Dickson 
and Judge, 1987, 28), unemployment doubled to t h r e e m i l l i o n , and i n 1982 
alone t h e r e were 12000 coitpany l i q u i d a t i o n s (Gamble, 1985, 194) . 
No l e s s than t h r e e major rounds of trade union l e g i s l a t i o n were enacted to 
withdraw immunities from union a c t i o n , and c l o s e l y regulate union's 
i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s (see appendix seven). These processes helped separate 
union b u r e a u c r a c i e s from t h e i r members by ensuring t h a t the s t a t e 
i n c r e a s i n g l y d e f i n e d the l e g i t i m a t e boundaries of union a c t i v i t y before 
t h e i r members, as i n the USA ( G i l h a r d u c c i , 1986; see a l s o chapter eight) . 
I n p a r t i c u l a r , the 1980 Ert^loyment Act removing immunities from unions 
engaged i n "secondary" a c t i o n e f f e c t i v e l y outlawed c l a s s conscious trade 
unions ( i b i d ; Scraton, 1985). T h i s was combined with an o r c h e s t r a t e d "moral 
p a n i c " ( H a l l e t a l , 1978) a g a i n s t the " i n t i m i d a t i o n " p r a c t i c e d by p i c k e t s , 
which c r e a t e d a c l i m a t e to j u s t i f y r e p r e s s i v e p o l i c i n g (Scraton, 1985). For 
the new r i g h t t h e r e f o r e , 
"trade unions are v o l u n t a r y a s s o c i a t i o n s which have a 
l e g i t i m a t e purpose i n providing insurance and welfare 
f o r t h e i r members. When, however, they seek to 
i n t e r f e r e i n c o n t r a c t s i n the labour market, and to 
i n f l u e n c e the a t t i t u d e s and behaviour of employees at 
work, they cease to be voluntary a s s o c i a t i o n s and 
become c o e r c i v e groups and p r i v a t e monopolies." 
(Gamble, 1985, 149) 
I n order to cope with these b a r r i e r s to the operation of the f r e e market, a 
s t r o n g s t a t e was n e c e s s a r y to curb the e x e r c i s e of union power. 
F i n a l l y , s t a t e withdrawal from i n d u s t r i a l i n t e r v e n t i o n was a fundamental 
p a r t of C o n s e r v a t i v e ideology. State disengagement from i n d u s t r y was 
n e c e s s a r y i n order to expose i n d u s t r y to the u n d i s t o r t e d operation of the 
market, wherein l a y t r u e economic s a l v a t i o n . The market r e f e r r e d to was the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l market, which B r i t i s h i n d u s t r y was f o r c i b l y exposed to 
(Dickson and Judge, 1987). S u b s i d i e s were removed, and r e g i o n a l p o l i c y 
pruned d r a m a t i c a l l y i n the d r i v e to remove economic " d i s t o r t i o n s " . The 
government's 
" s t r a t e g y has been s u c c e s s f u l i n g a i n i n g a widespread 
acceptance t h a t the market, not governments, c a r r i e s 
the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r employment. The r e c e s s i o n and 
unemployment have of t e n been presented as " a c t s of 
God", as world f o r c e s beyond the c o n t r o l of 
government... Importantly, at the l e v e l of p u b l i c 
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p e r c e p t i o n s and ideology, Thatcherism has s u c c e s s f u l l y 
a t t a i n e d the goal of l i n k i n g e x t e r n a l and i n t e r n a l 
p o l i c y - of l i n k i n g the operation of the domestic 
labour market to the v a g a r i e s of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
t r a d i n g markets." ( i b i d , 25-26) 
The o v e r a l l e f f e c t of the s t r a t e g y has been summed up w e l l by C l a r k e (1988, 
86) . 
"The p a s t decade has not so much seen a r e s t r u c t u r i n g 
of the regime of accumulation, based on the development 
of n e o - f o r d i s t forms of production, as a s u s t a i n e d 
o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t the working c l a s s , aimed p r i i n a r i l y a t 
the d e s t r u c t i o n of the i n s t i t u t i o n a l forms of the 
Keynesian w e l f a r e s t a t e which underlay the a b i l i t y of 
the organised working c l a s s t o r e a l i s e a consvurption 
norm based on a g e n e r a l i s e d e x p e c t a t i o n of r i s i n g 
l i v i n g standards... While Keynesianism was the 
i d e o l o g i c a l e x p r e s s i o n of the a t t e n ^ t of c a p i t a l and 
the s t a t e to respond t o the g e n e r a l i s e d a s p i r a t i o n s of 
the working c l a s s i n the post-war boom, n e o - l i b e r a l i s m 
i s the i d e o l o g i c a l e x p r e s s i o n of the subordination of 
working c l a s s a s p i r a t i o n s to the v a l o r i s a t i o n of 
c a p i t a l . " 
Much of the change pioneered by Thatcherism sin^sly gave eit^jloyers more 
power to i n c r e a s e the r a t e of e x p l o i t a t i o n of t h e i r workforces (Tomaney, 
1989) . 
Indeed, Thatcherism e l e v a t e d the p o l i t i c s of f e a r to the s t a t u s of an 
economic planning p r i n c i p l e . I t was f e a r of unen^loyment and f e a r of 
poverty more than i d e o l o g i c a l commitment to Thatcherism which cowed workers 
i n t o submission (Beynon, 1983; 1987). Yet t h i s submission a l s o had 
i d e o l o g i c a l e f f e c t s , because i t served to l e g i t i m a t e the Conservative 
"common sense" t h a t t h e r e was no a l t e r n a t i v e t o the market. R e s t r u c t u r i n g 
c o u l d not be r e s i s t e d (Dickson and Judge, 1986) . But f o r a l l the r h e t o r i c , 
the C o n s e r v a t i v e government moved r e l a t i v e l y c a u t i o u s l y i n i t s dealings 
w i t h powerful unions, avoiding major s e t p i e c e confrontations u n t i l the 
miners' s t r i k e i t s e l f . The n a t i o n a l i s e d c o a l i n d u s t r y stood as the 
q u i n t e s s e n t i a l example of s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n and p r o t e c t i o n , and the NUM as 
a symbol of the power of organised labour, so defeat of the union would 
both s y m b o l i c a l l y rupture the l i n k with the PWS, and at the same time 
d e c i s i v e l y s h i f t the balance of power a g a i n s t t r a d e unions (see chapter 
four) . 
I m p l i c i t i n Conservative s t r a t e g y t h e r e f o r e was an attempt to transform the 
experience of c l a s s i n B r i t a i n . The PWS had i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d a s e t of 
r e l a t i o n s between the c l a s s e s , c r y s t a l l i s i n g i n t o the s t a t e form a 
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p a r t i c u l a r balance of c l a s s f o r c e s . T h i s settlement e f f e c t i v e l y reproduced 
a shared understanding of c l a s s , and i n the process l e g i t i m a t e d a s e t of 
e x p e c t a t i o n s which a l l s i d e s - the s t a t e , c a p i t a l and labour - p a r t i c i p a t e d 
i n . For the new r i g h t C o n s e r v a t i v e s , t h a t settlement was anathema. The 
working c l a s s should no longer be conceived of as a corporate body (or 
b o d i e s ) , but i n s t e a d should be conceived of as a mass of i n d i v i d u a l s 
d e f i n e d as much by consumption' standards as by t h e i r p l a c e i n production. 
C o l l e c t i v i s m would be r e p l a c e d with i n d i v i d u a l i s m . 
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2.3 CONCLUSIONS 
I n the f i r s t p a r t of t h i s chapter I coir^sared major working c l a s s s t r u g g l e s 
a g a i n s t c l o s u r e i n the s t e e l i n d u s t r y i n the l a t e 1970's/early 1980's with 
the UCS work-in on C l y d e s i d e i n 1971. Research on a n t i - s t e e l c l o s u r e 
campaigns has h i g h l i g h t e d the s i g n i f i c a n c e of p l a c e i n a f f e c t i n g the 
d i r e c t i o n t h a t s t r u g g l e s took. Caii:5>aigns narrowly based on defending a 
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a l i t y - as at Consett f o r exan^le - tended to be i s o l a t e d and 
i n e f f e c t i v e . However, i t i s i i r ^ o r t a n t to ask the question as to why some 
cait^Jaigns o f f e r only a l i m i t e d challenge to corporate r e s t r u c t u r i n g , 
whereas others pose a more g e n e r a l i s e d challenge (as i n the case of the UCS 
work-in). 
Comparisons between the two a n t i - c l o s u r e caitpaigns suggested t h a t two 
f a c t o r s were c r u c i a l i n determining the course of these s t r u g g l e s . They 
were the a c t i v e s t r a t e g i e s of conscious agents - i n p a r t i c u l a r l o c a l trade 
union l e a d e r s - and the p o l i t i c a l - e c o n o m i c context w i t h i n which the 
s t r u g g l e s were fought out. I n the case of campaigns ag a i n s t BSC's corporate 
r e s t r u c t u r i n g , the l o o s e l y organised union (the ISTC) re f u s e d to g e n e r a l i s e 
campaigns beyond the p l a n t s concerned. At Ravenscraig, where a ten^Jorarily 
s u c c e s s f u l campaign d i d develop, i t was able to b u i l d on a strong c r o s s 
c l a s s n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y , which the government y i e l d e d to i n order to 
s u s t a i n l e g i t i m a c y north of the border. At UCS the broadly r e p r e s e n t a t i v e 
shop steward l e a d e r s h i p of the work-in fought an imaginative caitpaign which 
gained wide working c l a s s support. 
But l e a d e r s h i p was c l e a r l y not the only s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r . I n p a r t i c u l a r , 
the p o l i t i c a l - e c o n o m i c context provided a context which was very d i f f e r e n t 
a t the end of the 1970's to the beginning. The second h a l f of the chapter 
t h e r e f o r e explored t h i s v a r i a b l e v i a an a n a l y s i s of the r e o r g a n i s a t i o n of 
the s t a t e i n post war B r i t a i n . T h i s r e o r g a n i s a t i o n had fundamental 
i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the c o a l i n d u s t r y , which formed a key p i l l a r i n the 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s c a r r i e d through by the post-war Labour government, and 
subsequently endorsed by l a t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s . The miners became embedded 
i n a s o c i a l democratic consensus which conceded r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f o r the 
union i n the c o r r i d o r s of power, but only i n exchange f o r adopting n a t i o n a l 
consensus. I n p r a c t i c e t h i s i n v o l v e d subordinating the miners i n t e r e s t s to 
the need f o r cheap f u e l . 
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However, the PWS moved i n t o c r i s i s i n the l a t e 1960's as r i s i n g consumption 
standards became incompatible with the growing r e c e s s i o n . I n i t i a l l y the 
working c l a s s fought s u c c e s s f u l d e f e n s i v e s t r u g g l e s , with the miners 
s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h i n the s t a t e apparatus f o l l o w i n g the 
1974 s t r i k e , and the "Plan f o r Coal". However, the Conservatives regrouped 
o u t s i d e government, and when returned to power i n 1979 pursued an 
a g g r e s s i v e s t r a t e g y to d e s t r o y union power, and r e - e s t a b l i s h the r u l e of 
the market. I n t h e i r way stood the NUM, as perhaps the d e f i n i t i v e symbol of 
the PWS. 
So f a r however, l i t t l e has been s a i d about the a c t i v e s t r a t e g i e s of labour 
f a c e d with t h e s e a t t a c k s on them. I noted e a r l i e r t h a t d i s c u s s i o n of 
a n t i - s t e e l campaigns d i d not f u l l y i n t e r r o g a t e the reasons why d i f f e r e n t 
s t r a t e g i e s emerged i n d i f f e r e n t p l a c e s . For example, why do workers accept 
and/or c r e a t e campaigns based on the l i m i t e d defence of p l a c e i n one case, 
and on a more ge n e r a l c h a l l e n g e to c a p i t a l i s t r e s t r u c t u r i n g i n another? 
There i s nothing i n e v i t a b l e about a d r i f t to l i m i t e d , fragmented, l o c a l , 
n o n - c l a s s based campaigns. Nevertheless, before i n v e s t i g a t i n g the a c t u a l 
scope f o r i n i t i a t i v e and the r o l e of p l a c e s p e c i f i c f a c t o r s i n generating 
itiiners' s t r u g g l e s i n the 1980's a t Murton, the argument must embrace the 
v e r y r e a l c o n s t r a i n t s which workers o r g a n i s i n g as workers must face. This 
t a s k i s taken up i n chapter t h r e e , which d i s c u s s e s the l i m i t a t i o n s of trade 
union a c t i o n under c a p i t a l i s m . 
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CHAPTER THREE: TRADE UNIONS IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY: 
LIMITATIONS AND POSSIBILITIES 
CHAPTER THREE: TRADE UNIONS IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY: LIMITATIONS AND 
POSSIBILITIES 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter two showed t h a t labour - when confronted with mass redundancies -
sometimes appeared to l e n d a hand i n i t s own subordination by adopting 
s t r a t e g i e s which fragmented r e s i s t a n c e r a t h e r than c o n s o l i d a t i n g i t . 
S i m i l a r l y , i t was a l s o c l e a r t h a t a t other times labour had adopted 
s t r a t e g i e s f a r more c h a l l e n g i n g to c a p i t a l and the s t a t e . However, i t had 
r a r e l y been questioned why such p o l i c i e s emerged, and why and under what 
c o n d i t i o n s they were supported by workers. As w e l l as the need f o r 
h i s t o r i c a l s e n s i t i v i t y i n e x p l a i n i n g t h e s e d i f f e r e n c e s , i t was a l s o c l e a r 
t h a t t h e r e were c e r t a i n f a c t o r s i n t e r n a l to labour o r g a n i s a t i o n which 
a f f e c t e d the c h o i c e of s t r a t e g i e s , the degree and " q u a l i t y " of working 
c l a s s m o b i l i s a t i o n , and the outcome of s t r u g g l e . 
I n t h i s chapter I look at the l i m i t s to workers' a c t i o n , and the room t h a t 
e x i s t s f o r conscious agents to challenge the imperatives of c a p i t a l i s t 
production. For workers, o r g a n i s a t i o n i s e s s e n t i a l f o r the e f f e c t i v e 
e x p r e s s i o n of agency, and t r a d e unions are the most b a s i c form of formal 
workers o r g a n i s a t i o n . As Anderson put i t (1967, 342), " [ t h e working c l a s s ] 
e x p e r i e n c e s i t s e l f as a c l a s s only through i t s c o l l e c t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s , of 
which the most elementary i s the t r a d e union." There i s a danger i n 
p u r s u i n g t h i s focus of p l a c i n g too great an eii?>hasis on the s i g n i f i c a n c e of 
t h e union as the source of workers' p o l i t i c a l consciousness. Reference i s 
t h e r e f o r e made to the wider p o l i t i c a l context, but the e f f e c t of other 
a s p e c t s of n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i s considered more f u l l y i n chapters 
two and four. 
F o r Murton miners and mechanics, t h e i r union branches were the major focus 
of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l experience and understanding. T h i s dominance was 
strengthened by the long t r a d i t i o n of NUM involvement i n most aspects of 
community l i f e , to t h a t i t performed f a r more than a r o l e as the miners 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e at work. The union's s i g n i f i c a n c e was a l s o enhanced by the 
high degree of i n t e r p e n e t r a t i o n between the NUM and the Labour Party, which 
dominated the formal p o l i t i c a l l i f e of the region during the p e r i o d of the 
PWS. C l e a r l y t h e r e f o r e to understand processes of p o l i t i c a l change i n 
Murton i t i s n e c e s s a r y to explore the c o n s t r a i n t s which unions such as the 
NUM operate under, and the i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e i r o r g a n i s a t i o n of t h e i r 
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i n s e r t i o n w i t h i n post 1945 B r i t i s h s o c i e t y as i t was examined i n the 
p r e v i o u s chapter. 
I n t h i s chapter t h e r e f o r e , I study the r e l a t i o n s h i p between workers 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s and t h e i r members. S e v e r a l key questions need to be 
approached. For example, a r e t h e i r s t r u c t u r a l l i m i t s to the challenge that 
workers o r g a n i s i n g as workers can pose to the c a p i t a l i s t system? Under what 
circi u n s t a n c e s can t r a d e unions become f u n c t i o n a l f o r c a p i t a l and the s t a t e ? 
How can the r e l a t i o n s h i p between " l e a d e r s h i p " and the "rank and f i l e " be 
understood? 
The key to understanding the r o l e of trade unions both h i s t o r i c a l l y and 
contemporarily, i s t o a p p r e c i a t e the c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n h e r e n t i n t h e i r 
e x i s t e n c e . T h i s c o n t r a d i c t i o n i s a r e f l e c t i o n of the c o n t r a d i c t o r y nature 
of the working c l a s s i t s e l f , i n both depending on c a p i t a l i s m f o r i t s 
s u r v i v a l , and y e t s u f f e r i n g continuous e x p l o i t a t i o n w i t h i n the c a p i t a l 
r e l a t i o n . However, t h i s c o n t r a d i c t i o n and the s t r u g g l e t h a t i t generates 
ensures t h a t t h e r e i s no s t a b i l i t y i n c a p i t a l - l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s . I n 
a n a l y s i n g t r a d e unions t h e r e f o r e , a h i s t o r i c a l g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s must be 
r e j e c t e d . I n s t e a d , the s p e c i f i c c o n d i t i o n s under which they a c t i n ways 
which c h a l l e n g e c a p i t a l i s m , and the circumstances under which t h e i r r o l e i s 
more l i m i t e d , or even f u n c t i o n a l f o r c a p i t a l must be i n v e s t i g a t e d . I n t h i s 
way a complex theory which acknowledges m u l t i p l e outcomes, complex 
determinacy, and b u i l d s i n the e x e r c i s e of (constrained) agency can be 
b u i l t up. 
To develop th e s e p o i n t s , t h i s chapter i s s p l i t i n t o three p a r t s . I n the 
f i r s t , I examine attertpts to provide a general explanatory framework f o r 
the o p e r a t i o n of t r a d e unions i n c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t i e s which focus on the 
l i m i t e d , economistic ambitions i i t ^ j l i e d by union's e x i s t e n c e . I n the second, 
I survey the l i t e r a t u r e on s t r i k e s , t o a s s e s s the f a c t o r s which d e s t a b i l i s e 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n unions between the bureaucracy and the rank and f i l e . 
F i n a l l y , I c o n centrate on s m a l l s c a l e a n a l y s e s of c a p i t a l - l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s , 
which show how the s t r a t e g i e s of conscious agents can push unions i n 
d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s , although s t i l l w i t h i n the broad s t r u c t u r a l framework 
e s t a b l i s h e d i n p a r t one. 
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3.1: TRADE UNIONS AND THE REPRODUCTION OF CAPITALISM. 
Two l e v e l s a t which the questions of trade union a c t i v i t y and c l a s s 
c onsciousness operate can be recognised. At the higher l e v e l , debate has 
con c e n t r a t e d on the g e n e r a l e f f e c t s of trade union a c t i v i t y on o v e r a l l 
c l a s s c onsciousness. I n other words, the focus has been on i d e n t i f y i n g the 
g e n e r a l e f f e c t s of t r a d e union o r g a n i s a t i o n on workers and c a p i t a l , and 
a s c e r t a i n i n g the l i m i t s t o t r a d e union a c t i o n . T h i s debate i s engaged i n 
t h i s s e c t i o n ( 3 . 1 ) . At the second l e v e l , a t t e n t i o n c e n t r e s on the l o c a l 
s c a l e , w i t h a n a l y s e s of p a r t i c u l a r t r a d e union branches, or p a r t i c u l a r 
h i s t o r i c a l events - f o r Bxaiaple, s t r i k e s - which e s t a b l i s h the dynamic 
pr o c e s s e s g i v i n g r i s e to mass changes i n union p o l i t i c s ( s e c t i o n s 3.2 and 
3.3 below). 
I t i s by now a commonplace t h a t t r a d e unions by themselves cannot overthrow 
the c a p i t a l i s t order. The f i r s t p a r t of t h i s s e c t i o n (3.1.i) explores the 
arguments used to j u s t i f y t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n , c o n c e n t r a t i n g on the s t r u c t u r a l 
l i m i t a t i o n s inposed on union a c t i v i t y by t h e i r o r g a n i s a t i o n a l o r i g i n s i n 
the c a p i t a l i s t d i v i s i o n of labour, and the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of union 
b u r e a u c r a c i e s which t h i s tends to produce. The consequences of t h i s are 
examined i n the f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n ( 3 . 1 . i i ) , which argues t h a t t h e o r i e s 
suggesting t h a t s e c t i o n a l i s m i s an i n e v i t a b l e product of i n c o r p o r a t i o n are 
o v e r l y d e t e r m i n i s t i c . T h i s p o s i t i o n i s e l a b o r a t e d i n the f i n a l s e c t i o n 
( 3 . 1 . i i i ) , which uses Offe and Wiesenthal's theory of opportunism to 
suggest t h a t i n s t a b i l i t y r a t h e r than s t a b i l i t y c h a r a c t e r i s e s r e l a t i o n s 
w i t h i n unions, as w e l l as r e l a t i o n s between organised labour and c a p i t a l . 
3.1.i INCORPORATION THEORY 
Although Marx h i m s e l f never o f f e r e d a comprehensive theory of t r a d e union 
a c t i v i t y , h i s fragmented comments have guided many m a r x i s t s s i n c e . Perhaps 
h i s most important r e c o g n i t i o n was t h a t unions tended towards defensive, 
economistic a c t i v i t y , when u l t i m a t e l y more ambitious working c l a s s 
o r g a n i s a t i o n was n e c e s s a r y to c h a l l e n g e the power of c a p i t a l . 
"Trades unions work w e l l as c e n t r e s of r e s i s t a n c e 
a g a i n s t the encroachments of c a p i t a l . They f a i l 
p a r t i a l l y from an i n j u d i c i o u s use of t h e i r power. They 
f a i l g e n e r a l l y from l i m i t i n g themselves to a g u e r r i l l a 
war a g a i n s t the e f f e c t s of the e x i s t i n g system, i n s t e a d 
of s i m u l t a n e o u s l y t r y i n g to change i t , i n s t e a d of u s i n g 
t h e i r o r g a n i s e d f o r c e s as a l e v e r f o r the f i n a l 
emancipation of the working c l a s s , t h a t i s to say, the 
u l t i m a t e a b o l i t i o n of the wages system." (Marx and 
Engels, 1968, 229, eirphasis added) 
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I n h i s p o l e m i c a l t r a c t "What i s to be done?", Lenin developed a more 
comprehensive theory of the e f f e c t s of trade union a c t i o n on consciousness, 
as p a r t of h i s attempt to prove the n e c e s s i t y f o r a powerful, r e v o l u t i o n a r y 
working c l a s s p a r t y capable of p r o v i d i n g d e c i s i v e l e a d e r s h i p f o r the c l a s s 
(Lenin, 1 9 8 8 ) I n i t s most fundamental form, Lenin's argument was t h a t 
workers organised i n t r a d e unions could never transcend the p o l i t i c s of 
c a p i t a l i s m . 
"The h i s t o r y of a l l c o u n t r i e s shows t h a t the working 
c l a s s , e x c l u s i v e l y by i t s own e f f o r t , i s a b l e t o 
develop only t r a d e union consciousness, i e the 
c o n v i c t i o n i t i s n e c e s s a r y to combine i n unions, f i g h t 
the employers, and s t r i v e to con^sel the government to 
pass n e c e s s a r y l a b o u r l e g i s l a t i o n , e t c . " (Lenin, 1988, 
98) 
Even e x p l i c i t l y p o l i t i c a l work by trade unions was condemned; "trade 
u n i o n i s t p o l i t i c s of the working c l a s s i s p r e c i s e l y bourgeois p o l i t i c s of 
the working c l a s s " (Lenin, 1988, 148; see a l s o Anderson, 1967). 
But what were the reasons o f f e r e d by Lenin and those who have followed him 
t o account f o r the r e l a t i v e iiqpotence of the unions? T h i s i s a c r u c i a l 
q u e s t i o n s i n c e L e n i n ' s argument c o n s t i t u t e s l i t t l e more than a f o r c e f u l 
a s s e r t i o n based on h i s h i s t o r i c a l l y s p e c i f i c observations. C u r i o u s l y 
perhaps (given the u s u a l p o l a r i t y between " L e n i n i s t " and "Gramscian" 
p e r s p e c t i v e s ) , i t was Gramsci who developed some of the most cogent 
arguments to s t i f f e n the t h e o r e t i c a l content of Lenin's polemics. 
Taking as h i s s t a r t i n g p o i n t the view t h a t under c a p i t a l i s m workers are 
o r g a n i s e d f i r s t and foremost by c a p i t a l , Gramsci argued t h a t because unions 
f o l l o w e d t h i s b a s i c p a t t e r n of o r g a n i s a t i o n they cannot escape the imprint 
of c a p i t a l i s m embedded i n t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
"Trade unionism i s e v i d e n t l y nothing but a r e f l e c t i o n 
of c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y , not a p o t e n t i a l means of 
t r a n s c e n d i n g c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y . I t organises workers, 
not as producers but as wage-earners, t h a t i s as 
c r e a t i o n s of the c a p i t a l i s t system of p r i v a t e property, 
as s e l l e r s of t h e i r labour power. Unionism u n i t e s 
workers a c c o r d i n g t o the t o o l s of t h e i r trade or the 
nature of t h e i r product, t h a t i s according to the 
contours imposed on them by the c a p i t a l i s t system." 
(Gramsci, quoted i n Hyman, 1971, 12; see Gramsci, 1977, 
110 f o r a d i f f e r e n t t r a n s l a t i o n ) 
^ S e v e r a l authors have pointed out t h a t Lenin's other works 
c o n t r i b u t e to a more bala n c e d view of t r a d e unionism - see K e l l y , 1988, 
26-34 and Hyman, 1971, 12. 
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I n other words, t r a d e unions are i n h e r e n t l y r e f o r m i s t o r g a n i s a t i o n s . 
Because of t h e i r o r i g i n s and nature, they are bound to pursue t h e i r own 
members s h o r t term economic i n t e r e s t s , r a t h e r than the i n t e r e s t s of the 
c l a s s as a whole. 
Gramsci i d e n t i f i e d two ircqportant consequences f o r t r a d e unions a r i s i n g from 
t h e i r o r i g i n s w i t h i n the c a p i t a l i s t system. I n the f i r s t p l a c e , t h e i r 
o r i g i n s imbued them wi t h an e s s e n t i a l l y c a p i t a l i s t operating ideology 
" O b j e c t i v e l y , the t r a d e union i s nothing other than a 
commercial coit^sany, of a p u r e l y c a p i t a l i s t i c type, 
which aims to secure, i n the i n t e r e s t s of the 
p r o l e t a r i a t , the maximum p r i c e f o r the commodity 
labour, and to e s t a b l i s h a monopoly over t h i s commodity 
i n the n a t i o n a l and- i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i e l d s . The trade 
union i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from c a p i t a l i s t mercentalism 
only s u b j e c t i v e l y . . . " (Gramsci, 1978, 78) 
I n o r g a n i s i n g only a s e c t i o n of ( u s u a l l y p r i v i l e g e d ) workers i n p u r s u i t of 
economic gain, they cannot organise and represent the working c l a s s as a 
c l a s s . 
Secondly, t h i s s t r u c t u r a l f u n c t i o n a l s o has i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the i n t e r n a l 
o r g a n i s a t i o n of the unions. T h e i r r o l e i n iit^iroving the immediate m a t e r i a l 
i n t e r e s t s of t h e i r members means a r e l i a n c e on seeking agreements with the 
employer. Unions achieve l e g i t i m a c y and " l e g a l i t y " , but at the cost of 
being compelled to d e l i v e r i n t e r n a l d i s c i p l i n e , and a day to day acceptance 
of the f a c t of e x p l o i t a t i o n a t the point of production. Engaging i n the 
"economic g u e r r i l l a war" has the e f f e c t of reproducing the c a p i t a l - l a b o u r 
r e l a t i o n , because i t endorses the s e p a r a t i o n of the economic s t r u g g l e f o r 
b e t t e r c o n d i t i o n s from the p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e f o r s o c i a l i s m , and i n p l i e s 
t h a t the former i s p o s s i b l e without the l a t t e r (Anderson, 1967). 
I n c r e a s i n g r e l i a n c e on c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g becomes a key f a c t o r i n the 
c r e a t i o n of a l a y e r of t r a d e union bureaucrats, s p e c i a l i s i n g i n ever more 
coitplex n e g o t i a t i o n s which r e v o l v e more and more around l e g i s l a t i o n and 
agreements w i t h the eiqployer, r a t h e r than the r e a l c o n d i t i o n s of the 
workers. Furthermore, i n s t e a d of s e e i n g these n e g o t i a t i o n and conpromise as 
a merely temporary coitpromise, "union o f f i c i a l s [come] to see i t as a more 
or l e s s permanent, normal and d e s i r a b l e s t a t e of a f f a i r s " ( K e l l y , 1988, 
57). But how do the b u r e a u c r a t s become separated from t h e i r members? 
P o s s i b l y the most enduring e x p l a n a t i o n of the conseirvatism of union 
l e a d e r s h i p i s m a t e r i a l i s t ; t h e i r earnings, perks, working c o n d i t i o n s , and 
c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h management d i s t a n c e them from t h e i r membership. But 
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unions i n which the pay of o f f i c i a l s i s l i n k e d to the pay of t h e i r members 
show no s i g n s of being more m i l i t a n t than those with open ended s a l a r i e s . 
More importantly, t h e r e i s no nece s s a r y c o r r e l a t i o n i n the working c l a s s 
g e n e r a l l y between high wages and l a c k of m i l i t a n c y , or the re v e r s e . Indeed, 
h i s t o r i c a l l y r e l a t i v e l y p r i v i l e g e d s e c t i o n s of the working c l a s s have often 
shown great m i l i t a n c y ( f o r exart5>le, some p r i n t workers) . F i n a l l y , s t r u g g l e 
can r a d i c a l i s e even w e l l - p a i d union o f f i c i a l s i n the same way i t can 
r a d i c a l i s e r e l a t i v e l y p r i v i l e g e d workers. 
A l l t h a t can be s a i d t h e r e f o r e i s t h a t t h e r e are strong s t r u c t u r a l 
t e n d e n c i e s towards the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of tr a d e unions i n t o the s e r v i c e of 
c a p i t a l i s t r e l a t i o n s . T h i s d e r i v e s from the s e p e r a t i o n of the economic and 
p o l i t i c a l a s p e c t s of workers s t r u g g l e , with unions d i v e r t e d i n t o the day to 
day b u s i n e s s of winning economic concessions f o r t h e i r members w i t h i n the 
c a p i t a l i s t system. N e v e r t h e l e s s , as s e c t i o n 3.2.i below suggests, t h i s 
s e p e r a t i o n can be d i f f i c u l t t o maintain, and workers s e c t i o n a l , economic 
b a t t l e s f r e q u e n t l y t h r e a t e n to r a i s e p o l i t i c a l questions, with i n ^ s l i c a t i o n s 
f o r union members and t h e i r l e a d e r s . 
3 . 1 . i i SECTIONALISM 
One of the most ii r p o r t a n t i i t p l i c a t i o n s of the se p e r a t i o n between the 
economic and p o l i t i c a l a s p e c t s of workers s t r u g g l e i s t h a t s e c t i o n a l i s m i s 
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an almost i n e v i t a b l e accompaniment of tr a d e union o r g a n i s a t i o n . I n an 
i n f l u e n t i a l work, Hobsbawm argued t h a t s e c t i o n a l i s m had been on the 
i n c r e a s e i n B r i t a i n s i n c e the l a s t war - c i t i n g the n a t i o n a l p a t t e r n of 
s t r i k e a c t i v i t y as a key i n d i c a t o r (1981, 12-14; see Durcan et a l , 1983, 
f o r the p a t t e r n of s t r i k e s s i n c e the war). He suggested t h a t workers began 
t o tak e a c t i o n without r e g a r d f o r i t s e f f e c t on other workers and on 
consumers - a d i s r e g a r d which he took to be a d e f i n i n g p r i n c i p l e of 
s e c t i o n a l i s m . Furthermore, most major s t r i k e s i n B r i t a i n , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n 
the r e c e n t period, were c h a r a c t e r i s e d by a coir^^lete absence of s o l i d a r i t y 
a c t i o n from other workers. 
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S e c t i o n a l i s m i s a n o t o r i o u s l y d i f f i c u l t concept to de f i n e . I n 
t h i s work I f o l l o w Gramsci, and d e f i n e s e c t i o n a l consciousness as denoting 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a common cause between workers i n the same o r g a n i s a t i o n 
of t r a d e . T h i s i n i n c o n t r a s t t o corporate consciousness - the perception 
of a common c l a s s i n t e r e s t - and hegemonic consciousness - the perception 
of the need to overthrow the e x i s t i n g c a p i t a l i s t order. (See Oilman, 1987 
f o r a d i s c u s s i o n of c l a s s consciousness.) 
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Hobsbawm's t h e s i s has been widely debated (Jacques and Mulhearn, 1981), and 
some of the c r i t i c i s m s of i t are important f o r the development of iry 
argument. For example, i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t most s t r i k e a c t i o n takes 
p l a c e on a " s e c t i o n a l " b a s i s - t h i s i s a f t e r a l l where most workers 
immediate g r i e v a n c e s a r e generated. Also, i t i s naive to argue t h a t 
s t r i k e r s have shown an i n c r e a s i n g d i s r e g a r d f o r f e l l o w workers and 
consximers. I n most economic s e c t o r s any e f f e c t i v e s t r i k e a c t i o n w i l l hurt 
workers and/or consumers. And although l a c k of s o l i d a r i t y support s e r i o u s l y 
h i n d e r s chances of su c c e s s i n s t r i k e a c t i o n , i t can be due to f a c t o r s other 
than a l a c k of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h other workers ( f o r exan^le, f e a r of 
becoming unemployed). 
More s e r i o u s i s the argument t h a t s e c t i o n a l a c t i o n (which would predominate 
no matter how workers or g a n i s e d themselves under c a p i t a l i s m ) , i n e v i t a b l y 
produces a s e c t i o n a l form of c l a s s consciousness. F e m i n i s t s have advanced 
some of the most p e r s u a s i v e c r i t i q u e s along these l i n e s , as K e l l y p o i n t s 
out. 
" S k i l l e d , male workers have been anxious to p r o t e c t 
t h e i r pay d i f f e r e n t i a l s over u n s k i l l e d (often women) 
workers, and have been h o s t i l e to the ent r y of women 
i n t o t h e i r t r a d e s . " ( K e l l y , 1988, 130) 
Th i s a t t i t u d e combines the r e a c t i o n a r y elements of c r a f t unionism with deep 
running gender d i v i s i o n s u t i l i s e d and reproduced by c a p i t a l i s m (see 
Coclcburn [1983] f o r a potent exair^sle of t h i s mixture) . C e r t a i n l y t h e r e f o r e 
t h e r e i s a tendency f o r workers organised i n unions to develop s e c t i o n a l 
c onsciousness, but t h i s simply r e f l e c t s an i n e v i t a b l e tendency w i t h i n 
c a p i t a l i s m , which would be produced by the d i v i s i o n of labour whether 
unions e x i s t e d or not. 
I n any case, none of t h i s n e c e s s a r i l y p r ecludes the development of wider 
c l a s s c o n sciousness. I t i s e n t i r e l y p o s s i b l e f o r exarrple t h a t the p u r s u i t 
of s h o r t term, " s e c t i o n a l " i n t e r e s t s might provide the spur to the 
development of a more g e n e r a l c l a s s consciousness. 
"For r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s the problem of trade union 
s e c t i o n a l i s m i s not i t s e x i s t e n c e per se, but i t s l a c k 
of a r t i c u l a t i o n w i t h corporate and hegemonic 
a s p i r a t i o n s . The problem i s not so much how to overcome 
or suppress s e c t i o n a l i s m , but how to a r t i c u l a t e 
d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of consciousness among d i f f e r e n t 
groups so t h a t l a r g e numbers of people w i l l come t o see 
th a t t h e i r own s e c t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s a r e coirpatible with, 
and indeed depend on, the promotion of s o c i a l i s m . " 
( K e l l y , 1988, 146) 
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Whether or not t h i s happens i s dependant upon a v a r i e t y of other 
i n t e r c o n n e c t i n g p r o c e s s e s such a s the a t t i t u d e of tr a d e union l e a d e r s h i p , 
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the h i s t o r i c a l context, and the s p e c i f i c m a t e r i a l s i t u a t i o n . 
I n summary t h e r e f o r e , i t i s c l e a r t h a t because workers are organised 
"according to the contours iit^iosed on them by the c a p i t a l i s t system", there 
i s a tendency f o r t h e i r a c t i o n to be s e c t i o n a l i n c h a r a c t e r . T h i s 
s e c t i o n a l i s m d e r i v e s from the economic b a s i s of trade union a c t i v i t y . 
However, t h i s does not exclude the development of corporate or hegemonic 
cons c i o u s n e s s , and hence the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t r a d e union a c t i o n might 
provoke a s i t u a t i o n i n which the b a s i s was l a i d f o r the r e u n i f i c a t i o n of 
p o l i t i c a l and economic a s p e c t s of workers s t r u g g l e . (Section 3.3.i 
in t r o d u c e s Luxemburgs theory of the "mass s t r i k e " to help e x p l a i n how the 
t r a n s i t i o n might t a k e p l a c e . ) 
S e v e r a l q u e s t i o n s then a r e s t i l l unanswered. Under what conditions might 
s e c t i o n a l , economic, d e f e n s i v e t r a d e union s t r u g g l e s provoke a more general 
q u e s t i o n i n g of the type Marx c l e a r l y regarded as e s s e n t i a l i f unions were 
u l t i m a t e l y to r e a l i s e t h e i r r a d i c a l i s i n g p o t e n t i a l ? Given t h a t unions are 
appa r e n t l y i n e v i t a b l y caught i n the t r a p of c a p i t a l i s t s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , 
what p r a c t i c a l l i m i t s does t h i s s e t f o r the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h e i r a c t i o n 
a g a i n s t c a p i t a l ? One way of approaching these (questions i s to look a t the 
i n t e r n a l dynamics of unions, and see i f any deductions can be made from 
t h i s about the c o n d i t i o n s under which unions perform d i f f e r e n t r o l e s . 
3 . 1 . i i i A THEORY OF OPPORTUNISM 
A u s e f u l framework f o r such an a n a l y s i s has been provided by Offe and 
Wiesenthal (1980) . They argue t h a t s t r u c t u r a l asymmetries i n the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between c a p i t a l and labour ( f o r example, labour's s t r u c t u r a l l y 
g r e a t e r r e l i a n c e on the w e l l being of c a p i t a l r a t h e r than v i c e v e r s a ) , have 
s i g n i f i c a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the o r g a n i s a t i o n and a c t i o n of both c l a s s e s i n 
c o l l e c t i v e groups. They suggest t h a t because c a p i t a l has a s t r u c t u r a l power 
advantage over labour, the only way labour can be s u c c e s s f u l i n c o n f l i c t 
w i t h c a p i t a l i s i f i t forges a c o l l e c t i v e i d e n t i t y based on 
non-instrumental e v a l u a t i o n of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . T h i s i s because any 
^ I t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p which I examine i n my study of 
the miners' unions i n Murton - see chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
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c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n undertaken by labour w i l l almost i n e v i t a b l e c o s t more i n 
m a t e r i a l terms than w i l l be gained by t a k i n g the a c t i o n . 
"[T]hose i n the i n f e r i o r power p o s i t i o n can i n c r e a s e 
t h e i r p o t e n t i a l f o r change only by overcoming the 
con^saratively higher c o s t s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n by 
changing the standards according t o which t h e s e c o s t s 
are s u b j e c t i v e l y estimated w i t h i n t h e i r own 
c o l l e c t i v i t y . . . No union can f u n c t i o n f o r a day i n the 
absence of some rudimentary notions h e l d by the members 
t h a t being a member i s of value i n i t s e l f , t h a t the 
i n d i v i d u a l o r g a n i s a t i o n c o s t s must not be c a l c u l a t e d i n 
a u t i l i t a r i a n manner but have to be accepted as 
n e c e s s a r y s a c r i f i c e s , and t h a t each member i s 
l e g i t i m a t e l y r e q u i r e d to p r a c t i c e s o l i d a r i t y and 
d i s c i p l i n e , and o t h e r norms of a n o n u t i l i t a r i a n kind." 
( i b i d , 79; enphasis i n o r i g i n a l ) 
Before anything e l s e t h e r e f o r e , a union must s t r u g g l e to e s t a b l i s h t h i s 
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c o l l e c t i v e i d e n t i t y , and an ideology of n o n u t i l i t a r i a n demands . For trade 
unions to be able to counter the s u p e r i o r power of c a p i t a l , i t i s e s s e n t i a l 
t h a t they base t h e i r a c t i v i t y on c r i t e r i a , which i n the short term a t 
l e a s t , a r e often non-instrumental f o r the i n d i v i d u a l s concerned. Offe and 
Wiesenthal c a l l t h i s the s t r u g g l e to e s t a b l i s h " d i a l o g i c a l " , as opposed to 
"monological" i n t e r e s t s . 
For c a p i t a l , i n t e r e s t d e f i n i t i o n i s r e l a t i v e l y unproblematic - t h e i r 
i n t e r e s t s a r e d e f i n e d monologically by the operation of the market. On the 
other hand, the problem f o r workers i s t h a t they 
"can n e i t h e r f u l l y submit to the l o g i c of the market 
( f i r s t of a l l , because what they " s e l l " on the market 
i s not a "genuine" commodity), nor can they escape from 
the market (because they are f o r c e d to p a r t i c i p a t e , f o r 
the sake of t h e i r s u b s i s t e n c e ) . Caught i n t h i s t r a p , 
workers and workers' o r g a n i s a t i o n s a r e c o n s t a n t l y 
i n v o l v e d i n the immensely complicated process of 
f i n d i n g out what t h e i r i n t e r e s t s a r e and how they can 
be pursued i n a way t h a t does not t u r n out to be 
s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y and s e l f d e f e a t i n g . " ( i b i d , 104) 
I n c o n t r a s t to c a p i t a l t h e r e f o r e , workers r e a l i n t e r e s t s are often 
obscured, and e s t a b l i s h i n g the primacy of " d i a l o g i c a l " over "monological" 
c r i t e r i a on which t o base a c t i o n i s c o n s t a n t l y problematic. 
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I t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s s t r u g g l e which the B r i t i s h s t a t e i s engaged 
i n now - an attempt to r e d e f i n e union behaviour i n i n d i v i d u a l u t i l i t a r i a n 
terms (chapter two). The miners' s t r i k e c o n s t i t u t e d an i n p o r t a n t moment i n 
t h i s b a t t l e , as the s t a t e sought to f u r t h e r undermine workers c o l l e c t i v e 
s o l i d a r i t y by encouraging a c t i o n which undermined non-instrumental 
behaviour. 
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T h i s model a l l o w s Offe and Wiesenthal to develop a t h e o r e t i c a l explanation 
of t r a d e union opportunism. They propose a f i v e stage theory of trade union 
growth and development. I n the f i r s t stage, d i a l o g i c a l c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i s 
dominant. T h i s i s the stage of the unions formation, dominated by the 
f o r g i n g of a s t r o n g c o l l e c t i v e i d e n t i t y i n the process of m i l i t a n t 
s t r u g g l e s a g a i n s t t h e eitployer (s) , I t s r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l s i z e minimises the 
c o n f l i c t between b u r e a u c r a t i s a t i o n and democracy. Problems a r i s e however at 
stage two, where monological and d i a l o g i c a l p a t t e r n s of i n t e r e s t d e f i n i t i o n 
begin t o c o n f l i c t . By now the o r g a n i s a t i o n i s s t r o n g enough to command 
r e s p e c t , and can win concessions simply because of the t h r e a t of t a k i n g 
a c t i o n . T h e i r now emerges a c o n t r a d i c t i o n f o r the union because to get the 
most out of i t s new p o s i t i o n , i t must simultaneously be able to generate a 
w i l l i n g n e s s to a c t i n i t s members, and y e t be able to c o n t r o l t h i s 
w i l l i n g n e s s to a c t . 
By f a r the most favou r a b l e r e s o l u t i o n of t h i s c o n f l i c t f o r the union i s a 
move t o stage t h r e e . 
"The s t r a t e g y l e a d i n g to stage t h r e e . . . i s one t h a t 
attempts t o make the o r g a n i s a t i o n ' s s u r v i v a l as 
independent as p o s s i b l e of the motivation, the 
s o l i d a r i t y , and the ' w i l l i n g n e s s to a c t ' of the 
members. . . The only way of doing so i s to s u b s t i t u t e 
e x t e r n a l guarantees of s u r v i v a l f o r those i n t e r n a l ones 
f o r which the union o r g a n i s a t i o n depends upon i t s 
members. Consequently, the union w i l l t r y to gain as 
much e x t e r n a l support and i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e c o g n i t i o n as 
p o s s i b l e , ( i b i d , 106-7) 
But the p r i c e of stage t h r e e i s the descent i n t o opportunism. I n seeking 
out e x t e r n a l guarantees the union bureaucracy must i n c r e a s e i t s 
independence from the membership - by f o r exaicple p r o f e s s i o n a l i s i n g and 
b u r e a u c r a t i s i n g d e c i s i o n making p r o c e s s e s . I n s t e a d of r e l y i n g on the 
u n s t a b l e t e n s i o n of power generated by the w i l l i n g n e s s to a c t of the 
membership, the l e a d e r s h i p att e i r p t s to have i t s powers l e g a l i s e d and 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d by the s t a t e . 
Opportunism i s now e n s h r i n e d i n the unions very e x i s t e n c e . 
" [ E ] x t e r n a l support can only be won i f the o r g a n i s a t i o n 
does not put i n t o q u e s t i o n the e s t a b l i s h e d p o l i t i c a l 
forms, i f i t does not r a i s e s u s p i c i o n s about i t s 
long-term g o a l s . And i t w i l l achieve r e l a t i v e i n t e r n a l 
independence from members only by eii^Jhasising 
q u a n t i t a t i v e and i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c , i n s t e a d of 
q u a l i t a t i v e , c r i t e r i a i n i t s i n t e r a c t i o n with members" 
( i b i d , 107) 
I n other words, monological c r i t e r i a dominate over the d i a l o g i c a l c r i t e r i a 
needed t o form a u n i t e d c l a s s i n t e r e s t . However, t h i s s i t u a t i o n i s 
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unstable. I n times of economic and/or p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s , the powers ceded to 
the unions come under t h r e a t (see chapter 2 ) , l e a d i n g t o stage four. And 
because the unions have s u c c e s s f u l l y withdrawn from the need to m o b i l i s e 
w i l l i n g n e s s to a c t , "the o r g a n i s a t i o n no longer has any c a p a c i t y to r e s i s t 
attempts to withdraw e x t e r n a l support" ( i b i d , 108, e n ^ h a s i s i n o r i g i n a l ) . 
I n t h i s new s i t u a t i o n , the union i s faced w i t h the t h r e a t t h a t i f i t f a i l s 
t o behave i n the manner r e q u i r e d by c a p i t a l , then i t w i l l l o s e 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l support. 
So f i n a l l y stage f i v e i s reached. The d i s a s t r o u s e f f e c t s of the 
o p p o r t u n i s t i c p o l i c i e s pursued by the l e a d e r s h i p are i n c r e a s i n g l y r e a l i s e d 
by the membership, and a new wave of m o b i l i s a t i o n i s stimulated. T h i s 
s i t u a t i o n may d i f f e r from stage one i n t h a t a more thorough going 
p o l i t i c i s a t i o n i s p o s s i b l e , as many i n s t i t u t i o n a l , p o l i t i c a l and l e g a l 
s t r u c t u r e s w i l l now be under examination and c r i t i c i s m . 
Because i t i s based on the s t r u c t u r a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n of labour - i n being 
both p a r t of, and y e t a n t a g o n i s t i c to, c a p i t a l - t h i s model captures the 
dynamism of r e l a t i o n s h i p s between organised labour, the rank and f i l e , and 
the s t a t e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t would be wrong to read i t as a s i n g l e 
p r e d i c t i o n of the p a t t e r n of development of these r e l a t i o n s h i p s . I n 
p a r t i c u l a r , i t i s important to a p p r e c i a t e t h a t although Offe and Wiesenthal 
frame t h e i r theory a h i s t o r i c a l l y , i t i s best understood as a h i s t o r i c a l 
model, r e f e r r i n g to the development of t r a d e unions i n Europe s i n c e the 
l a s t century, w i t h stage f i v e seen as one p o s s i b l e outcome of the c r i s i s of 
corporatism. I t does show however, t h a t the economism which d r i v e s unions 
i n t o c o r p o r a t i s t r e l a t i o n s can - under c e r t a i n m a t e r i a l conditions - be 
countered by p r e s s u r e from the rank and f i l e (see P a n i t c h , 1981; Anderson, 
1967) 
The c e n t r a l t e n s i o n between the problematic i n t e r e s t d e f i n i t i o n of labour, 
and the d i f f i c u l t y of c r e a t i n g and s u s t a i n i n g " d i a l o g i c a l " p r i n c i p l e s of 
c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , p r o v i d e s a u s e f u l t o o l f o r a n a l y s i n g the l a r g e s c a l e ebb 
and flow of r e l a t i o n s between c a p i t a l , labour and the s t a t e . I t shows the 
kinds of p r e s s u r e s t h a t push union bureaucrats towards the path of 
"opportunism". I t demonstrates too the k i n d of p r e s s u r e s which separate 
s e c t i o n a l economic s t r u g g l e from the wider p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t 
c a p i t a l . However the f i v e stage model d e s c r i b e d above r e p r e s e n t s only one 
p o s s i b l e , " i d e a l " , outcome of t h e s e p r e s s u r e s . Rank and f i l e p r e s s u r e can 
i n t e r r u p t the p r o g r e s s i o n of the model, as can the s t r a t e g i e s of the s t a t e . 
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Offe and Wiesenthal's s c a l e of a n a l y s i s allows l i t t l e space f o r the 
development of a c t i v e s t r a t e g i e s by workers which can place p r e s s u r e s on 
union b u r e a u c r a t s from unexpected d i r e c t i o n s . B ureaucracies cannot always 
remain a l o o f from t h e i r members, and a t times they a r e f o r c e d to move with 
the rank and f i l e i f they a r e to r e t a i n t h e i r c r e d i b i l i t y (and u l t i m a t e l y 
t h e i r j o b s ) . Offe and Wiesenthal's achievement i s to i n d i c a t e under what 
t h e o r e t i c a l c o n d i t i o n s union l e a d e r s are for c e d to be more responsive to 
t h e i r members. 
I n order to e l a b o r a t e on t h i s p o i n t , I t u r n now to consider some of the 
mechanisms by which the a c t i v i t y of ordinary workers can a f f e c t the conduct 
of t h e i r b u r e a u c r a t i c l e a d e r s h i p . To do t h i s I look a t s t r i k e s . S t r i k e s 
t a k e p l a c e when "normal" t r a d e union a c t i v i t y has f a i l e d , or broken down. 
I t i s under these c o n d i t i o n s of management-labour c o n f l i c t , t h a t the 
s e p e r a t i o n of economic s t r u g g l e by trade unions i s c a l l e d i n t o questions, 
because i n some sense a t l e a s t , a s t r i k e means the f a i l u r e of the 
b u r e a u c r a t i c method of advancing workers i n t e r e s t s . As such, s t r i k e s 
v i r t u a l l y cort^el a reworking of r e l a t i o n s between union bure a u c r a c i e s and 
t h e i r members. At the same time, they provide c o n d i t i o n s f o r dramatic 
changes i n consciousness among workers. 
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3.2 STRIKES AND CONSCIOUSNESS 
I n the p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n s I argued t h a t w h i l e unions i n s e r t i o n i n t o the 
c a p i t a l i s t system i r L a y preclude a r o l e as v e h i c l e s f o r r e v o l u t i o n , the exact 
e x t e n t and c h a r a c t e r of the c h a l l e n g e they pose to c a p i t a l and the s t a t e i s 
open. One reason f o r t h i s openness i s t h a t the s t r u c t u r a l tendency of union 
b u r e a u c r a c i e s to be i n c o r p o r a t e d w i t h i n i n s t i t u t i o n s of the s t a t e and 
c a p i t a l i s c o n t i n u a l l y m i t i g a t e d by the corrplex r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
workers and t h e i r eit^sloyers. C o n f l i c t a t the point of production ensures 
t h a t t h e r e i s no s i n g l e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t r a d e union b u r e a u c r a c i e s and 
the rank and f i l e . Leaders do not always subordinate t h e i r unions i n t e r e s t s 
to c a p i t a l , and even i f they are caught day to day i n r e l a t i o n s h i p s with 
e i i ^ l o y e r s t h a t suggest i n c o r p o r a t i o n , they are s t i l l s u b j e c t to general 
movements i n the c l a s s s t r u g g l e , which compel changes i n t h e i r a t t i t u d e s 
and a c t i o n s . (Chapter two explored t h i s p r o c e s s a t the macro s c a l e with 
r e f e r e n c e to the break-up of the PWS i n B r i t a i n . ) 
S t r i k e s c o n s t i t u t e the most obvious conscious i n t e r v e n t i o n of labour i n the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between c a p i t a l and labour. Many authors have commented on the 
e x h i l a r a t i o n and s e l f - d i s c o v e r y which workers on s t r i k e can experience (eg 
H i l l e r , 1969; Brecher, 1972). S t r i k e s are t h e r e f o r e a good p l a c e to s t a r t 
i n t e g r a t i n g the conscious a c t i o n of the rank and f i l e i n t o an understanding 
of t r a d e union development^. I begin with Luxemburg's macro s c a l e theory of 
mass s t r i k e s ( 3 . 2 . i ) , because i t atteirqpts to l i n k the breakdown of union 
i n c o r p o r a t i o n with the d i s s o l u t i o n of the s p l i t between the p o l i t i c a l and 
economic as p e c t s of workers s t r u g g l e - a process which can move out of the 
c o n t r o l of union l e a d e r s and the s t a t e . T h i s i s followed by s m a l l e r s c a l e 
examination of the way t h a t s t r i k e s can break down the consensus between 
management and labour, and i n the process transform union p o l i t i c s 
( 3 . 2 . i i ) . 
I n s e c t i o n 3.3 I expand the a n a l y s i s , with the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t although 
s t r i k e s are the most v i s i b l e e x p r e s s i o n of workers p o l i t i c a l involvement, 
day to day r e l a t i o n s a t the p o i n t of production c o n s t i t u t e the more 
For a g e n e r a l d i s c u s s i o n about s t r i k e s i n c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y , 
see Hyman, 1977; Knowles, 1982; Kornhauser e t _ _ a l , 1954; Leeson, 1973. For 
more s p e c i f i c UK based d i s c u s s i o n s , see Hain, 1986; Wigham, 1976; Durcan e t 
a l ; 1983. For s t u d i e s of p a r t i c u l a r r e c e n t s t r i k e s , see Dromey and Taylor, 
1978, Batstone e t a l , 1978, and the d i s c u s s i o n s i n chapter one p a r t 1.2 and 
t h i s chapter p a r t 3.2 above. 
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s i g n i f i c a n t s i t e of workers developing consciousness. I t i s only with t h i s 
f i n e r g r a i n e d r e s o l u t i o n t h a t a p i c t u r e of workers a c t i v e (although 
constrained) involvement i n the s t r a t e g i e s of the trade union movement can 
be b u i l t up. 
3.2.i THE MASS STRIKE 
One of the b o l d e s t t h e o r i e s of workers mass a c t i o n was developed i n the 
e a r l y y e a r s of t h i s c entury by the German r e v o l u t i o n a r y , Rosa Luxemburg. 
Her concept of the "mass s t r i k e " p l a c e d the a c t i v i t y of ordinary workers at 
the c e n t r e of a n a l y s e s of p o l i t i c a l transformation. Although her theory 
r e l a t e d to "mass s t r i k e s " - which she d e f i n e d as the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c form of 
a c t i o n of the working c l a s s during r e v o l u t i o n a r y periods - i t has a wider 
a p p l i c a b i l i t y based on her g e n e r a l comments about the way i n which s t r i k e s 
develop, and the c o n d i t i o n s under which they achieve d i f f e r e n t outcomes 
(Luxemburg, 1971) . 
D i s t i n g u i s h i n g between "normal" and " r e v o l u t i o n a r y " s i t u a t i o n s , Luxemburg 
argued t h a t during the former, c l a s s s t r u g g l e i s c h a r a c t e r i s e d by a formal 
(though f a l s e ) s e p e r a t i o n between workers p o l i t i c a l and economic a c t i v i t y . 
During "normal" per i o d s t h e r e i s an endemic tendency f o r the trade union 
bureaucracy to become entangled i n the "economic g u e r r i l l a war", to the 
extent t h a t they l o s e s i g h t of the r e a l u n i t y of the p o l i t i c a l and economic 
s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t c a p i t a l i s m . S i m i l a r l y , p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s f a l l prey to the 
i l l u s i o n t h a t they can conduct a separate, s t r u g g l e through Parliament, 
con5>lementary to the unions economic b a t t l e . "Mass s t r i k e s " t e a r through 
these d i s t i n c t i o n s , r e v e a l i n g to workers the p o l i t i c a l moments inherent i n 
every economic c o n f l i c t (Luxemburg, 1971, 78-80; K e l l y , 1988, 36). 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y however, the r a d i c a l i s i n g p o t e n t i a l of "mass s t r i k e s " d e r i v e s 
not j u s t from the mass involvement of workers, but a l s o from the a c t i o n s of 
the s t a t e . A s t r i k e wave i s transformed i n t o a "mass s t r i k e " when the s t a t e 
r e a l i s e s a c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n e x i s t s , and i n t e r v e n e s to c r u s h what u n t i l then 
had been a l a r g e l y economic a c t i o n . Workers are d r a m a t i c a l l y r a d i c a l i s e d as 
the apparent s e p a r a t i o n of p o l i t i c s and economics c o l l a p s e s beneath a 
r u t h l e s s s t a t e o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t the working c l a s s . I t i s the s t a t e ' s 
involvement t h e r e f o r e , which can transform a s o l i d corporate consciousness 
i n t o a developing hegemonic consciousness. 
T h i s theory has obvious d i f f i c u l t i e s . K e l l y p o i n t s out t h a t Luxemburg 
" c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y c o n f l a t e d the s t a t e and government". Workers locked i n 
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combat with the s t a t e might w e l l come to d e s p ise a p a r t i c u l a r government, 
but s i m i l a r d i s i l l u s i o n w i t h the s t a t e does not a u t o m a t i c a l l y follow. I n 
other words, workers under a t t a c k might develop a c o l l e c t i v e but not 
hegemonic consciousness ( K e l l y , 1988, 39). 
D e s p i t e t h i s weakness, Luxemburg's theory d e l i v e r s an iitiportant t o o l f o r 
understanding the v a r i a b l e iir^jact of s t r i k e s on consciousness. I n 
p a r t i c u l a r , " [ t ] h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s - r a i s i n g e f f e c t of s t r i k e s cannot be 
p r e d i c t e d from t h e i r content or demands alone." ( i b i d , 93). Economic c r i s i s 
can t u r n d e f e n s i v e s t r i k e s i n t o major c h a l l e n g e s to the a u t h o r i t y of the 
s t a t e and c a p i t a l . I n doing so, they can r a p i d l y r a d i c a l i s e workers (and 
sometimes t h e i r l e a d e r s ) , and c o l l a p s e the d i s t i n c t i o n between the economic 
g u e r r i l l a war and the s t r u g g l e f o r p o l i t i c a l transformation. I n short, 
d e f e n s i v e economistic a c t i o n by unions can undermine the b e l i e f i n the 
a b i l i t y of the unions to d e l i v e r economic improvement through r e f o r m i s t 
s t r u g g l e w i t h i n c a p i t a l i s m . At a mass s c a l e t h i s i s palpably a r a r e 
occurrence. Yet w h i l s t the t r a n s i t i o n to r e v o l u t i o n a r y consciousness may 
prove e l u s i v e , i t i s e q u a l l y c l e a r t h a t a t the micro s c a l e , s t r i k e s 
continue to s h a t t e r e s t a b l i s h e d p a t t e r n s of union behaviour i n many 
d i f f e r e n t ways. Some exai t ^ l e s of t h i s d e s t a b i l i s i n g e f f e c t are d i s c u s s e d 
below. 
3 . 2 . i i MICRO SCALE STRIKES 
On a s m a l l e r s c a l e s t r i k e s are j u s t one aspect of workers challenge to the 
r u l e of c a p i t a l (Hyman, 1975, 151; Lane and Roberts, 1971, 16) . They are 
i i t ^ o r t a n t because they can s h a t t e r the o f t e n c a r e f u l l y nurtured ideology 
which suggests t h a t the i n t e r e s t s of workers are c o i n c i d e n t with the 
i n t e r e s t s of the ertployer (Hyman, 1977, 153-155) . For example, i n h i s 
j u s t l y famous a n a l y s i s of a " w i l d c a t s t r i k e " i n 1950's America, Gouldner 
observed the t r a d i t i o n a l s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s of a l a r g e gypsum mining p l a n t 
d i s i n t e g r a t i n g under a new management regime (1955). He l o c a t e d the cause 
of the s t r i k e i n the break down of the o l d "indulgency p a t t e r n " , under 
which management and workers had grown used to a c e r t a i n accommodation of 
i n t e r e s t s . 
Of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t i s Gouldner's a n a l y s i s of the d i f f e r e n t views of 
management and men to the d i s p u t e . For most higher l e v e l management, the 
s t r i k e was a " s t r u g g l e f o r c o n t r o l of the p l a n t " . I n other words, they 
d e f i n e d any cortplaint from the workforce as c o n t a i n i n g the seeds of a 
fundamental c h a l l e n g e t o t h e i r a u t h o r i t y . T h i s approach was expedient 
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because i t absolved management from any need to confront the moral i s s u e s 
behind the s t r i k e , s i n c e any s o l u t i o n was j u s t i f i e d i f the i s s u e was 
m a i n t a i n i n g management's r i g h t to c o n t r o l (see chapter two). More 
i i t ^ o r t a n t l y however, i t a l s o r e f l e c t e d the tendency w i t h i n c a p i t a l i s m f o r 
any p r o f i t a b i l i t y c r i s i s t o become a c r i s i s of c o n t r o l . A u t h o r i t y r e l a t i o n s 
which were f u n c t i o n a l a t one time became major b a r r i e r s to accumulation, as 
the d r i v e f o r i n c r e a s e d p r o d u c t i v i t y demanded the d i s s o l u t i o n of 
e s t a b l i s h e d workplace r e l a t i o n s , and the " n e g o t i a t i o n " of a new " e f f o r t 
b a r g ain". 
The b u i l d up to the s t r i k e w i t n e s s e d the emergence of c o n f l i c t as t h i s 
d r i v e gathered pace. New management, the replacement of accommodative 
foremen with more a g g r e s s i v e s u p e r v i s o r s , and the i n t r o d u c t i o n of new 
machinery l e a d i n g to a l t e r a t i o n s i n l i n e speeds and work t a s k s , a l l 
c o n t r i b u t e d to the d e s t a b i l i s a t i o n of e x i s t i n g " r e l a t i o n s i n production" 
(Burawoy, 1979; 1985). As management s t r u g g l e d to e x p l o i t f u l l y the 
p o t e n t i a l p r o d u c t i v i t y b e n e f i t s of the new machinery, they i n e v i t a b l y 
d i s t u r b e d the e s t a b l i s h e d "indulgency p a t t e r n " . I n doing so, they c a r r i e d 
the r i s k of d i s t u r b i n g an e s s e n t i a l requirement f o r c a p i t a l i s t production -
the w i l l i n g n e s s of the workers to work. T h i s i s what t r a n s p i r e d , as the 
mens' r a p i d l y r i s i n g f r u s t r a t i o n s turned i n t o i s o l a t e d non-cooperation, 
before f i n a l l y a c c e l e r a t i n g i n t o a s t r i k e . 
For the men, the overwhelming f e e l i n g was t h a t the s t r i k e was wholly 
j u s t i f i e d , on moral grounds. Two d i s t i n c t views emerged w i t h i n t h i s 
p e r s p e c t i v e . The " t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s " sought the r e s t o r a t i o n of the o l d 
"indulgency p a t t e r n " . 
"For t h e s e " t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s " , the s t r i k e was an 
e x p r e s s i o n of r e s i s t a n c e a g a i n s t the prolonged and 
continued v i o l a t i o n of t h e i r o l d b e l i e f s . I n another 
r e s p e c t , i t was a demand f o r i n c r e a s i n g the 
p r e d i c t a b i l i t y w i t h which t h e i r e s t a b l i s h e d p r i v i l e g e s 
would be s a t i s f i e d ; ' t h a t i s , f o r the c e s s a t i o n of 
"broken promises". I n g r e a t e s t measure, t h e i r h o s t i l i t y 
was d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t changes which had a f f e c t e d the 
informal o r g a n i s a t i o n of the p l a n t s s o c i a l system, f o r 
i t was i n t h i s sphere t h a t t h e i r customary r i g h t s 
r e s i d e d . " (Gouldner, 1955, 62) 
On the other hand, "market men" saw the s t r i k e as an opportunity to 
p r e s s u r e management i n t o f o r m a l l y l o c a t i n g and d e f i n i n g t h e i r a u t h o r i t y , 
and i t s l i m i t s . They saw the s t r i k e as a means to extend c o n t r a c t u a l 
agreements to new a r e a s , and wanted new powers f o r the union to be f o r m a l l y 
recognised. 
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Gouldner's a n a l y s i s i s a l s o iir^sortant because i t exposes some of the 
t e n s i o n s i n i n t e r n a l union a f f a i r s which s t r i k e s o f t e n generate. Workers 
are not simply commanded by t h e i r union, and indeed, a t the p l a n t l e v e l , 
s e v e r a l competing s t r a t e g i e s can emerge from the workers, more or l e s s 
backed by competing s e c t i o n s of union l e a d e r s h i p . During t h i s p a r t i c u l a r 
s t r i k e , the o f f i c i a l l e a d e r s h i p was e f f e c t i v e l y bypassed and then re p l a c e d 
w i t h a more m i l i t a n t c l i q u e . The o f f i c i a l l e a d e r s h i p d i d not b e l i e v e the 
s t r i k e was l e g i t i m a t e , and withdrew from the scene when i t began. The 
m i l i t a n t c l i q u e chair^ioned the " t r a d i t i o n a l i s t " view, and sought to defend 
t h e i r " r i g h t s " through m i l i t a n t a c t i o n . T h i s shows how v a r y i n g 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s can emerge from the same s i t u a t i o n , even among the same 
workers^. 
The i n t e r n a l t e n s i o n s generated w i t h i n t r a d e unions by s t r i k e a c t i o n are 
emphasised by Lane and Roberts i n t h e i r d e t a i l e d report on the 1970 
P i l k i n g t o n ' s glassworks s t r i k e i n St Helens (1971). Here, the workers 
r e v o l t a g a i n s t the coit^jany q u i c k l y came to encompass an almost e q u a l l y 
p a s s i o n a t e r e v o l t a g a i n s t the union ( i b i d , 190-195), which l e d i n the end 
to an attempt t o s e t up an a l t e r n a t i v e union. There was an almost coitplete 
d i s l o c a t i o n between the union bureaucracy and the rank and f i l e l e a d e r s h i p 
(the Rank and F i l e S t r i k e Committee), as the former c o l l a b o r a t e d with 
management a g a i n s t the s t r i k e r s ( i b i d , 96-99). However, a t t i t u d e s towards 
the s t r i k e among the rank and f i l e were h i g h l y dynamic. 
"Our survey shows very c l e a r l y t h a t i t was i r t ^ o s s i b l e 
to d i v i d e a l l the s t r i k e r s i n t o opposing camps of 
supporters and opponents. There were some who had been 
c o n s i s t e n t l y opposed - 33% and some who had been 
c o n s i s t e n t supporters - 11%. But 56% had a t some stage 
changed t h e i r minds..." ( i b i d , 100) 
Although t h e r e was apparently r a r e l y , i f ever a m a j o r i t y i n support of the 
s t r i k e , i t was prolonged f o r 7 weeks. T h i s was because to be e f f e c t i v e , the 
rank and f i l e had to be org a n i s e d and m o b i l i s e d i n groups. Non-supporters 
of the s t r i k e were not organised, because they had no l e a d e r s h i p ^ . 
E f f e c t i v e a c t i o n was dependant on the a b i l i t y t o organise and l e a d d i s s e n t . 
^ I n chapter f i v e d i f f e r i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the breakdown i n 
the post war indulgency p a t t e r n a t Murton c o l l i e r y a r e r e l a t e d t o miners' 
age, and t h e i r d i f f e r e n t e x p e r i e n c e s of the PWS. 
^During the 1980's, the s t a t e began to inter v e n e much more 
s y s t e m a t i c a l l y and e f f e c t i v e l y to organise and m o b i l i s e a n t i - s t r i k e and 
a n t i - m i l i t a n t opinion among workers. T h i s process reached a new peak i n the 
(Footnote Continued) 
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The most recent d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of a s t r i k e outside the mining i n d u s t r y 
i s H a r t l e y e t a l ' s thorough account of the 1980 s t e e l s t r i k e i n South 
Y o r k s h i r e (1983). The author's p r i v i l e g e d a c c e s s to the Rotherham S t r i k e 
Committee (RSC) allowed a deep i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the behaviour, a t t i t u d e s 
and s t r a t e g i e s of the s t r i k e r s and s t r i k e o r g a n i s a t i o n . They deploy some 
u s e f u l concepts i n t h e i r a n a l y s i s , which can be t r a n s f e r r e d to the 1984/5 
c o a l s t r i k e (see chapter 6) . I n p a r t i c u l a r , they found t h a t the rank and 
f i l e - even the most a c t i v e d u r i n g the s t r i k e - had s h a r p l y c o n f l i c t i n g 
i d e o l o g i e s of p i c k e t i n g , r e f l e c t i n g v a r y i n g "boundaries of l e g i t i m a c y " . 
A c l e a r m a j o r i t y of p i c k e t s adopted an i n s t r u m e n t a l a t t i t u d e to p i c k e t i n g , 
r e g a r d i n g i t as a duty, or a job. T h e i r boundary of l e g i t i m a c y was s e t by 
c o n v e n t i o n a l notions of l e g a l i t y and non-violence. Only a minority engaged 
i n more a g g r e s s i v e p i c k e t i n g , but t h e s e were the most committed and a c t i v e 
p i c k e t s . They f e l t no p a r t i c u l a r r e s p e c t f o r the law and p o l i c e . F i n a l l y , 
t h e r e was a t i n y m i n o r i t y who expressed a " d i s t i n c t r e adiness to use 
f o r c e " . However, H a r t l e y e t a l show l i t t l e i n c l i n a t i o n to i n v e s t i g a t e the 
p o s s i b l e causes f o r these d i f f e r e n c e s , nor t h e i r p o l i t i c a l e f f e c t s (except 
i n the narrow terms of p i c k e t " s u c c e s s " or " f a i l u r e " ) ( i b i d , 65-67). 
As a t P i l k i n g t o n ' s , the iitportance of l o c a l l e a d e r s h i p i s emphasised - i n 
t h i s case r e p r e s e n t e d by the RSC. The dynamics of l o c a l l e a d e r s h i p emerge 
as c r u c i a l to the way the s t r i k e developed, and to people's experiences and 
a t t i t u d e s . And a l s o as a t P i l k i n g t o n s , n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s h i p i s pinpointed by 
most s t r i k e r s as having b e t r a y e d the s t r i k e . 
What the s e examples suggest i s the need to r e t a i n s e n s i t i v i t y to the 
p a r t i c u l a r circumstances of any s t r i k e i f i t s iirpact on union p o l i t i c s i s 
t o be understood. I n p a r t i c u l a r , the r e l a t i o n s h i p between d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s 
of the union, and the wider p o l i t i c a l - e c o n o m i c context i n which the 
s t r u g g l e i s t a k i n g p l a c e are c l e a r l y c r u c i a l to an understanding of the 
development of each d i s p u t e . I n Gouldner's exaitple, the i n t r o d u c t i o n of new 
technology persuaded management to atteitpt to break the o l d "indulgency 
p a t t e r n " , which i n t u r n c r e a t e d d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n the workforce and a change 
of branch l e a d e r s h i p . At P i l k i n g t o n s , the n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s h i p of the union 
were enmeshed i n c o r p o r a t i s t agreements, and d e s p i t e massive p r e s s u r e from 
(Footnote Continued) 
miners' s t r i k e , when o p p o s i t i o n to the s t r i k e was given unprecedented s t a t e 
and media encouragement, e f f e c t i v e l y c r e a t i n g an a l t e r n a t i v e union 
l e a d e r s h i p , and l e n d i n g c r e d i b i l i t y to anyone opposing the s t r i k e . 
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the rank and f i l e , they r e f u s e d to change t h e i r p o l i c i e s - an i n t r a n s i g e n t 
p o s i t i o n d e r i v i n g from a h i s t o r i c a l t r e n d towards i n c o r p o r a t i o n . I n the 
c a s e of the s t e e l workers, s t r i k e a c t i v i s t s f a i l e d to f o r c e a more m i l i t a n t 
l i n e on t h e i r l e a d e r s , but to an extent t h i s r e f l e c t e d d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n the 
s t r i k e r s own ranks about the extent to which m i l i t a n t a c t i o n was 
l e g i t i m a t e . 
These b a l d summaries a l l i n d i c a t e t h a t the coit^jlex h i s t o r i c a l development 
of c l a s s r e l a t i o n s a t the l o c a l l e v e l have a d i r e c t iirpact on the outcome 
of major c o n f l i c t s . The way t h a t c l a s s r e l a t i o n s have come to be understood 
over long p e r i o d s of time has a s y s t e m a t i c impact on the type of trade 
unionism t h a t develops i n d i f f e r e n t i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r s , and on the way i n 
which i t can be c h a l l e n g e d during periods of c o n f l i c t . 
What t h i s a n a l y s i s shows i s t h a t the i n ^ l i c a t i o n s of the day to day l i v e d 
e x p e r i e n c e of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s r i p p l e through the s t r u g g l e s which 
develop as p a r t i c u l a r indulgency p a t t e r n s are d e s t a b i l i s e d . I t i s the 
everyday and the mundane - c o n s o l i d a t e d i n t o e s t a b l i s h e d p a t t e r n s of custom 
and p r a c t i c e - which comes to e x e r c i s e such a d e c i s i v e i n f l u e n c e on the way 
i n which s t r u g g l e s between workers and management develop. L a t e r i n the 
t h e s i s , the impact of long e s t a b l i s h e d custom and p r a c t i c e on workers 
c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s examined i n the case of Murton NUM. I n the f i n a l s e c t i o n 
of t h i s chapter I t h e r e f o r e examine some exairples of the c o n t i n u a l 
n e g o t i a t i o n of c l a s s c o n f l i c t a t the l o c a l l e v e l o utside the c o a l i n d u s t r y . 
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3.3 CONSCIOUSNESS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL 
As the preceding s e c t i o n on the development of s t r i k e s showed, the everyday 
experience of c l a s s r e l a t i o n s e x e r c i s e s a fundamental i n f l u e n c e over the 
way i n which workers experience changes i n t h e i r e s t a b l i s h e d "indulgency 
p a t t e r n " . One way of e x p l o r i n g the s i g n i f i c a n c e of everyday experience i s 
to examine the dynamics of c l a s s s t r u g g l e and union o r g a n i s a t i o n at the 
p o i n t of production. Union i n c o r p o r a t i o n , opportunism and the l i k e are not 
simply the i n e v i t a b l e products of s t r u c t u r a l c o n s t r a i n t s w i t h i n c a p i t a l i s m . 
To an extent a t l e a s t , workers help shape and r e p l i c a t e the " s t r u c t u r a l 
c o n s t r a i n t s " i n which t h e i r o r g a n i s a t i o n s f u n c t i o n . They a l s o help produce 
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and then consent t o the forms of unionism which emerge . 
So what a f f e c t s the d i f f e r i n g outcomes from these s t r u c t u r a l c o n s t r a i n t s ? I 
explore t h e s e q u e s t i o n s through t h r e e case s t u d i e s . Using t h i s method some 
of the c o m p l e x i t i e s i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between workers' consciousness, 
t h e i r m a t e r i a l s i t u a t i o n , and union a c t i v i t y can be i n v e s t i g a t e d . At the 
same time, some important concepts emerge which are a p p l i c a b l e to the study 
of p o l i t i c a l change at Murton over the l a s t t e n y e a r s . I n a d d i t i o n , a l l 
t h r e e case s t u d i e s show the need to i n t e g r a t e an awareness of the 
s t r a t e g i e s of management w i t h the complicated s o c i a l dynamics which emerge 
on the "shopfloor", as workers seek to e x e r c i s e c o n t r o l over t h e i r working 
environment. 
3.3.i CASE STUDY 1: FACTORY CONSCIOUSNESS AT FORD. 
One of the most coit^slex and s e n s i t i v e a n a l y s e s of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
t r a d e unions, t h e i r members, and c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y i s "Working f o r Ford" 
(Beynon, 1984a). Beynon examines i n d e t a i l the r e l a t i o n s h i p between shop 
stewards and the rank and f i l e . I t i s a r e l a t i o n s h i p shot through with 
t e n s i o n . The stewards r o l e c o n t a i n s i n heightened form the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s 
of working f o r Ford, and of o r g a n i s i n g as trade u n i o n i s t s . The stewards 
v e r y e x i s t e n c e i m p l i e s acceptance of c a p i t a l i s m , and of management. Yet 
they f i g h t to defend and irrprove t h e i r members c o n d i t i o n s of eitployment, 
mounting fundamental c h a l l e n g e s to managements' " r i g h t to manage" i n the 
Q 
For s t u d i e s on t h e i n t e r n a l o peration of workplace unionism, see 
f o r example Hemingway, 1978; Boraston e t a l , 1975. 
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p r o c e s s . I n doing so, they engage i n a cortplex r e l a t i o n s h i p with t h e i r 
members, the union, and the company. 
W h i l s t the Halewood p l a n t f e a t u r e d c o n s i s t e n t l y a n t a g o n i s t i c " r e l a t i o n s i n 
production" (Burawoy, 1985), the consciousness which emerged from the war 
of a t t r i t i o n was a " f a c t o r y consciousness", only very weakly l i n k e d to 
hegemonic a s p i r a t i o n s . 
"A f a c t o r y c l a s s consciousness... understands c l a s s 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n terms of t h e i r d i r e c t m a n i f e s t a t i o n i n 
c o n f l i c t between the bosses and the workers w i t h i n the 
f a c t o r y . I t i s rooted i n the workplace where s t r u g g l e s 
are fought over the c o n t r o l of the job and the ' r i g h t s ' 
of managers and workers. I n as much as i t concerns 
i t s e l f w i t h e x p l o i t a t i o n and power i t contains 
p o l i t i c a l elements. But i t i s a p o l i t i c s of the 
f a c t o r y . " (Beynon, 1984a, 108) 
Beynon found t h a t i n g e n e r a l the stewards had a more s o p h i s t i c a t e d and 
c l a s s conscious view of t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p with management than o r d i n a r y 
workers. T h i s view grew out of t h e i r r o l e as stewards - they were not 
i n n a t e l y more a c t i v e than the membership. The stewards ideology was 
d e d i c a t e d to the p r i n c i p l e of s e r v i n g t h e i r membership. As such, they 
developed an acute s e n s i t i v i t y to the f e e l i n g s of the men they represented. 
They understood t h a t i n the gaine of b l u f f t h a t c o n s t i t u t e d most n e g o t i a t i o n 
w i t h management, they had to be a b l e to count on the mens support. Without 
t h a t support, they were nothing. 
Most of the day to day b u s i n e s s of the steward i n v o l v e d d e a l i n g with 
workers' day to day d i f f i c u l t i e s (manning, d i s c i p l i n e , e t c ) on h i s p a r t of 
t h e l i n e . But workers were a l s o motivated by the broader f a c t o r y 
environment. For exait5)le, pay, and the c o n d i t i o n s which management 
attempted t o a t t a c h t o pay d e a l s , aggravated l o c a l d i s p u t e s . Stewards 
t h e r e f o r e became i n v o l v e d i n plant-wide and n a t i o n a l union a f f a i r s . For 
example, the 1969 wages s t r i k e focused a t t e n t i o n on the r o l e of n a t i o n a l 
union o f f i c i a l s i n the N a t i o n a l J o i n t Negotiating Committee (NJNC) . These 
o f f i c i a l s - remote from the membership - accepted a pay d e a l with major 
p e n a l t y c l a u s e s f o r bad behaviour. Even when the stewards and the 
membership c l e a r l y r e j e c t e d the d e a l , the o f f i c i a l s continued to i n s i s t 
t h a t the d e a l stood. 
I n e f f e c t the 1969 s t r i k e which t h i s d i s p u t e provoked focused the workers 
r i s i n g d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the remote l e a d e r s h i p of the union. During 
"normal p e r i o d s " the n a t i o n a l o f f i c i a l s had l i t t l e involvement with the 
stewards, and d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the n a t i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n concentrated 
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on what they didn't do, r a t h e r than what they did. Now the antagonism cama 
to a head. 
"[The stewards] had been coping with 'the bureaucrats' 
f o r a long time, a n d ' t h i s s t r i k e had f o r them a l l the 
makings of a showdown. Of one t h i n g they were c e r t a i n . 
Kealey [ n a t i o n a l TGWU o f f i c e r on the Ford N a t i o n a l 
J o i n t N e g o t i a t i n g Committee] was f i n i s h e d . They wanted 
h i s job. As f a r as they were concerned he no longer 
e x i s t e d . They had a l s o had enough of the NJNC and Mark 
Young's chairmanship. T h e i r s t r i k e had make a 
r e s t r u c t u r i n g of the NJNC a l i k e l i h o o d . They intended 
to p r e s s u r e t h i s l i k e l i h o o d i n t o an i n e v i t a b i l i t y . " 
(Beynon, 1984a, 274) 
The stewards won r e p r e s e n t a t i o n on the NJNC, and secured the r e s i g n a t i o n s 
t h e y wanted. I n the f a c e of a determined rank and f i l e , represented by a 
s t r o n g shop steward movement, the n a t i o n a l union had to change. 
The s t r i k e ushered i n a new breed of union l e a d e r s , t y p i f i e d by Jack Jones 
and Moss Evans (TGWU), and Hugh Scanlon (Amalgamated Union of Engineering 
Workers - AUEW) . They r o s e to power on a t i d e of r e v o l t a g a i n s t the 
a u t h o r i t a r i a n l e a d e r s h i p of the p a s t . They spoke of "union democracy", and 
championed the shop steward movement which had produced them. And y e t , when 
i t came to the crunch i n the 1971 wages s t r i k e , the new l e a d e r s h i p " s o l d 
out" too. A f t e r nine weeks on s t r i k e , they negotiated a marginal 
improvement i n the company's o f f e r , and recommended i t to the membership by 
the then novel method of a (conpany financed) s e c r e t b a l l o t . 
At Halewood, the stewards were b i t t e r and angry. And y e t , as Beynon makes 
c l e a r , t h i s was not n e c e s s a r i l y an exaitple of top o f f i c i a l s being corrupted 
by the m a t e r i a l p r i v i l e g e s of high o f f i c e . As n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s , Jones and 
Scanlon were caught i n a genuine dilemma. A f t e r nine weeks of s t r i k e , they 
had v e r y l i m i t e d options. 
" [ T ] h e r e was no s i g n of a weakening i n the ranks of the 
Ford worker, nor of Ford's backing down. I t could go on 
f o r a v e r y long time. I n t h i s s i t u a t i o n the union 
l e a d e r has a l i m i t e d number of options. He can decide 
to sweat i t out, accept the payment of more and more 
s t r i k e pay and hope t h a t he can s e l l i t t o other 
s e c t i o n s of h i s o r g a n i s a t i o n . Or he can e s c a l a t e the 
c o n f l i c t . R a i s e the s t a k e s by drawing these other 
s e c t i o n s i n t o the s t r u g g l e . Such a c t i o n presupposes 
p r e p a r a t i o n : t h a t the other s e c t i o n s of the union's 
membership are aware of the i s s u e involved, and are 
w i l l i n g t o s t r u g g l e f o r i t . I t ' s very d i f f i c u l t to 
u n i v e r s a l i s e a s e c t i o n a l pay demand. Although trade 
unionism l a y s s t r e s s upon the u n i t y of workers, i t i s 
formed around t h e s e c t i o n a l i s m of the working c l a s s . . . 
Jack Jones and Hugh Scanlon couldn't e s c a l a t e the 
s t r u g g l e . " ( i b i d , 301) 
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There a r e elements here of the processes Offe and Wiesenthal examined 
( s e c t i o n 3 . 1 . i v ) . The union bureaucracy had become detached from i t s 
membership base as i t sought i n c r e a s i n g l y t o guarantee i t s e x i s t e n c e 
independent of the a c t i o n of i t s membership. Nevertheless, r e - e s t a b l i s h i n g 
t h e l i n k between members and bureaucracy proved problematic, r e f l e c t i n g 
some of the r e a l and powerful s t r u c t u r a l c o n s t r a i n t s analysed e a r l i e r 
( s e c t i o n 3.1). Furthermore, "Working f o r Ford" shows t h a t a high l e v e l of 
c o n f l i c t a t the p o i n t of production need not generate anything more than a 
strong " f a c t o r y consciousness", which b o l s t e r s workplace m i l i t a n c y and 
s o l i d a r i t y , but l e a v e s unchallenged (at l e a s t e x p l i c i t l y ) the s t r u c t u r a l 
p r o c e s s e s which a f f e c t workers eit^sloyment, 
3 . 3 . i i TRADE UNIONS AND CORPORATE CAPITAL: THE CASE OF "CHEMCO" 
At the " R i v e r s i d e " chemical p l a n t on the other hand, company s t r a t e g y 
rendered the development of any c o l l e c t i v e r e s i s t a n c e a t p l a n t l e v e l almost 
i m p o s s i b l e (Nichols and Beynon, 1977: see a l s o Nichols and Armstrong, 
1976). As p a r t of a major r e s t r u c t u r i n g of c a p i t a l - l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s , 
"ChemCo" intro d u c e d the NWA (New Working Arrangement) i n the l a t e 1960's. 
T h i s r epresented a new p i n n a c l e i n c a p i t a l s a t t e n p t to tame the t h r e a t 
posed by trade unionism, and was i n l i n e with the c o r p o r a t i s t t r e n d of the 
p e r i o d (see chapter two). Although ChemCo would r a t h e r have l i v e d without 
t r a d e unions, they recognised t h a t t h i s was i n ^ o s s i b l e . So they s e t about 
moulding unionism i n ways which would be f u n c t i o n a l f o r them. Faced with 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of a m i l i t a n t shop f l o o r o r g a n i s a t i o n (such as had 
developed a t Halewood, and many other major i n d u s t r i a l s i t e s i n the 
1960's), ChemCo opted f o r i n c o r p o r a t i o n . I n doing so they d e l i b e r a t e l y 
e x p l o i t e d the t e n s i o n i m p l i c i t i n trade unionism between f i g h t i n g the 
company (over wages, c o n t r o l and manpower), and the need to ensure the 
company's p r o f i t a b l e s u r v i v a l . 
With the NWA, ChemCo aimed to s p l i t i t s d e a l i n g s with the union (the TGWU) 
i n t o two separate spheres. The d e a l a b o l i s h e d a l l l o c a l pay v a r i a t i o n s , 
r e p l a c i n g i n c e n t i v e payments, bonuses e t c w i t h a n a t i o n a l l y negotiated pay 
system, based on a seven f o l d grading c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . Henceforward a l l pay 
barg a i n i n g was removed from p l a n t l e v e l t o a managed, p r e d i c t a b l e 
n e g o t i a t i o n conducted a t n a t i o n a l l e v e l . 
However, the union was not s i i r p l y r e s t r i c t e d t o t h i s n a t i o n a l r o l e . Indeed, 
a c t i v e l o c a l union r e p r e s e n t a t i o n was c e n t r a l t o the NWA s t r a t e g y (see a l s o 
Willman, 1980, 42-43 f o r evidence t h a t t h i s was p a r t of wider corporate 
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s t r a t e g y i n the 1970's to defuse opposition to workplace changes). But the 
company ensured t h a t they c o n t r o l l e d the way the union developed a t i t s 
p l a n t s . 
They i n s t i t u t e d a "check-off" system, which, w h i l s t guaranteeing 100% union 
membership, a l s o had the e f f e c t of c r e a t i n g a "paper membership". There was 
never a s t r u g g l e to e s t a b l i s h - the union a t the p l a n t s , so a c o l l e c t i v e 
i d e n t i t y was never forged. Perhaps more s i g n i f i c a n t l y , the company took a 
keen i n t e r e s t i n the e l e c t i o n of stewards. Foremen encouraged " l i k e l y 
m a t e r i a l " to stand. 
" I t i s undeniable t h a t ChemCo management e x e r c i s e d an 
important - and even determining - i n f l u e n c e over the 
way i n which the t r a d e union o r g a n i s a t i o n developed a t 
R i v e r s i d e . Of the s i x shop stewards who represented the 
men who worked on the f e r t i l i s e r p l a n t only two had 
been i n any way a c t i v e i n t r a d e unionism before they 
came on the s i t e . . . [Managers] p r i v a t e l y boast t h a t 
many of the shop stewards were t h e i r nominees." 
(Nichols and Beynon, 1977, 115) 
Behind the r h e t o r i c of cooperation and involvement t h e r e were d e f i n i t e 
l i m i t s beyond which the union c o u l d not go. To do so would r e v e a l the i r o n 
f i s t i n s i d e the v e l v e t glove. Management p r e r o g a t i v e s were maintained 
through consent whenever p o s s i b l e , but i f confronted with a ch a l l e n g e then 
management a u t h o r i t y would be inposed without h e s i t a t i o n . 
Such manipulation was f a c i l i t a t e d by the workforce c o n ^ o s i t i o n and p l a n t 
o r g a n i s a t i o n . Most of the workers came from non union backgrounds. They 
were drawn from a wide a r e a - t h e r e was no "coirpany town". At the p l a n t , 
the c o n t i n e n t a l s h i f t system and the d i s p e r s e d production s i t e s s p l i t 
workers, e n s u r i n g t h a t few eirployees ever even met t h e i r f e l l o w workers. 
Because ChemCo g e n e r a l l y brought t h e i r f i r s t experience of unionism, these 
"green" workers were moulded r e l a t i v e l y e a s i l y i n t o the d o c i l e labour f o r c e 
t h a t the NWA aimed f o r . Ne v e r t h e l e s s , they continued to harbour doubts 
about the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h e i r union r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a t the p l a n t . They 
were c r i t i c a l of the stewards c l o s e n e s s t o management - a c l o s e n e s s 
enphasised by r e g u l a r d e f e c t i o n s from stewardship to s u p e r v i s o r y grades. 
T h i s c l o s e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of stewards with management ran the r i s k of 
undermining t h e unions apparent independence, and hence i t s a b i l i t y t o 
d e l i v e r d i s c i p l i n e and compliance from the workers. 
"So i n c o r p o r a t i o n i s no s i i r ^ j l e process and the f u n c t i o n 
of management i n l a r g e c o r p o r a t i o n s l i k e ChemCo i s to 
manage the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s ; a t a l l c o s t s 'to prevent the 
system from running out of c o n t r o l ' . " ( i b i d , 130, 
emphasis i n o r i g i n a l ) 
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without a strong union capable of r e s o l v i n g grievances i n the mens favour, 
r e v o l t was expressed by i n d i v i d u a l a c t s of defiance. 
" U s u a l l y the s t r u g g l e takes p l a c e outside the union; 
and most o f t e n i t i s based upon i n d i v i d u a l responses: a 
b a t t l e of w i t s i n which management often turns a b l i n d 
eye so long as t h e job gets out. And i n t h i s t h e r e i s 
no doubt t h a t management was f o r c e d to t u r n a b l i n d 
eye... I n an irtportant way then t h i s c o v e r t anti-work 
a c t i v i t y r e p r e s e n t s the strencrth of the workers. . . But 
e q u a l l y when expressed i n t h i s form i t can be seen as 
only a muffled c h a l l e n g e to c a p i t a l . . . R e s i s t a n c e 
e s t a b l i s h e d through ' the i n d i s c i p l i n e of anti-work 
a c t i v i t i e s i s of l i m i t e d e f f e c t i v e n e s s . To go f u r t h e r -
and a l s o to c o r r e c t i t s own i n i q u i t i e s - i t has to be 
organised and d i s c i p l i n e d . " ( i b i d , 141, emphasis i n 
o r i g i n a l ) 
But i t was p r e c i s e l y t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of "organised and d i s c i p l i n e d " 
o p p o s i t i o n on the shop f l o o r t h a t the NWA was aimed a t e l i m i n a t i n g . 
The example of ChemCo demonstrates the power of c a p i t a l to c o n t r o l and 
recfulate the environment i n which workers organise. I t shows too the long 
term e f f e c t s of unions becoming t i e d i n t o the s t a t e consensus d e s c r i b e d i n 
chapter two. Management r e a l i s e d t h a t they needed to c o n t r o l both the l o c a l 
and n a t i o n a l d e a l i n g s w i t h t h e i r workforce. The enormous p r a c t i c a l 
d i f f i c u l t i e s standing i n the way of the development of an e f f e c t i v e l o c a l 
o r g a n i s a t i o n were b u t t r e s s e d by the i d e o l o g i c a l b a r r i e r s posed by the 
unions i n c o r p o r a t i o n at the top. 
3 . 3 . i i i STUDYING LOCAL LEADERSHIP IN DETAIL 
I n t h e i r d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of shop steward behaviour and b e l i e f s at a l a r g e 
motor v e h i c l e p l a n t i n the UK, Batstone e t a l focused on the problematic 
q u e s t i o n s of steward l e a d e r s h i p and a u t h o r i t y , and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p to 
the rank and f i l e (1977; 1978). U n l i k e a t ChemCo, a strong steward network 
(or "domestic o r g a n i s a t i o n " ) had developed at the p l a n t , which management 
was compelled to d e a l w i t h . Batstone e t a l i d e n t i f i e d two main types of 
steward: " l e a d e r s " and " p o p u l i s t s " . The former d i f f e r e d from the l a t t e r i n 
having a strong b e l i e f i n t r a d e union p r i n c i p l e s (as opposed t o s e c t i o n a l 
i n t e r e s t s ) , a b e l i e f i n the need f o r a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l r a t h e r than a 
d e l e g a t e r o l e , and a h i g h e r degree of i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o the shop steward 
network. Two other steward types were a l s o noted: "cowboys" - who played a 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l r o l e , but i n o p p o s i t i o n to the l e a d e r s h i p and to trade 
union p r i n c i p l e s ; and "nascent' l e a d e r s " who were sponsored by l e a d e r s but 
unable to s u s t a i n a l e a d e r s h i p r o l e ( i b i d , 1977, 32-37). 
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Other important d i s t i n c t i o n s were drawn w i t h i n the l e a d e r s h i p . A 
" q u a s i - e l i t e " of experienced and knowledgeable stewards was i d e n t i f i e d 
( i b i d , 45-53). They c o n s t i t u t e d a powerful l e a d e r s h i p group who other 
stewards, and the convenors, r e f e r r e d to, and sought advice and support 
from. A stewards p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s with h i s members, with other stewards, 
t h e q u a s i - e l i t e , and convenors was seen as c r u c i a l i n determining t h e i r 
a u t h o r i t y , and t h e i r a b i l i t y t o a c t . S i m i l a r l y , Batstone e t a l h i g h l i g h t e d 
t h e importance of " j o k e r s " i n f o s t e r i n g and r e i n f o r c i n g a s e t of norms 
( i b i d , 108) . T h i s focus i s ii r p o r t a n t i n i d e n t i f y i n g some of the processes 
by which stewards achieve and maintain t h e i r a u t h o r i t y . 
However, t h e r e i s a l s o a c r u c i a l weakness i n the argimient advanced by 
Batstone e t a l , concerning the content of the t r a d e unionism which emerges 
from the p r o c e s s e s they i d e n t i f y (Willman, 1980). Because although they use 
commitment to t r a d e union p r i n c i p l e s as one of the p r i n c i p l e d e f i n i n g 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of steward types, t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n of what t h i s meant i n 
p r a c t i c e was (perhaps understandably) d i f f u s e . Willman suggests t h a t an a i d 
t o t h i s p rocess might i n v o l v e d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between steward networks which 
have e s s e n t i a l l y been c r e a t e d by management (as i n the case of "ChemCo") , 
and those which have fought f o r t h e i r s t a t u s a g a i n s t management r e s i s t a n c e 
(as a t Halewood) ( i b i d , 43-45). However, even t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s 
problematic, s i n c e i t suggests an unwarranted leadenness to union function. 
F o r exait^jle, i t denies the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t a f o s t e r e d union s t r u c t u r e 
might over time r e j e c t i t s accommodative r o l e ( i b i d , 48-49), or 
a l t e r n a t i v e l y t h a t an independent o r g a n i s a t i o n might be incorporated by 
management s t r a t e g y . 
Studying "domestic o r g a n i s a t i o n s " t h e r e f o r e i n v o l v e s c a r e f u l l y a n a l y s i n g 
t h e "content" of the s t r a t e g i e s followed by the p r i n c i p l e agents involved. 
A l s o , t h i s content has t o be analysed i n the context of the o v e r a l l 
environment i n which i t i s i n t e g r a t e d . For exait^ile, what i s negative 
"cowboy" behaviour i n one s i t u a t i o n (undermining trade union p r i n c i p l e s ) , 
might t u r n out to be " p o s i t i v e " i n another ( c h a l l e n g i n g an incorporated 
l e a d e r s h i p ) . Furthermore, i t a l s o becomes e s s e n t i a l to r e l a t e the v a r i o u s 
s t r a t e g i e s and a c t i o n s emerging a t a l o c a l l e v e l to the wider union and 
management c l i m a t e . C l e a r l y t h e r e i s an i n t e r a c t i o n here. For exanple, 
management a t t e n p t s to defuse c l a s s s t r u g g l e v i a n a t i o n a l agreements w i t h 
t h e peak r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of l a b o u r l e d during a p e r i o d of f u l l employment 
t o encroachments on management c o n t r o l a t the l o c a l l e v e l by w e l l organised 
steward o r g a n i s a t i o n s . T h i s i n t u r n proir^ited a management o f f e n s i v e , and 
t h e emergence of new s t r a t e g i e s from labour. 
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3.3.iv CONCLUSIONS FROM THE CASE STUDIES 
These t h r e e examples of the dynamics of l o c a l union o r g a n i s a t i o n draw out 
some of the c o m p l e x i t i e s of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between workers, t h e i r union, 
and c a p i t a l . I n the case of Ford's Halewood p l a n t , c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l 
management s t i m u l a t e d the development of a r e l a t i v e l y strong shop steward 
network, dominated by a robust " f a c t o r y consciousness". I n a n a t i o n a l 
d i s p u t e t h i s steward l e a d e r s h i p - which had only l i m i t e d d e a l i n g s with the 
n a t i o n a l bureaucracy - was d r i v e n i n t o c o n f l i c t w i t h union l e a d e r s because 
of the l a t t e r ' s " s e l l out" over pay. The n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s were f o r c e d to 
r e s i g n , and were r e p l a c e d w i t h " l e f t " l e a d e r s . Yet a second s t r i k e over pay 
was a l s o ended by the new n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s h i p , over the heads of the 
stewards. And t h i s second d e a l r e f l e c t e d the genuine s t r u c t u r a l l i m i t a t i o n s 
of t r a d e unions working w i t h i n the c a p i t a l i s t system. So although the rank 
and f i l e - through t h e i r steward l e a d e r s - were abl e to f o r c e changes i n 
union l e a d e r s h i p , they c o u l d not f o r c e i t beyond the l i m i t s i m p l i e d by i t s 
o p e r a t i o n w i t h i n the c o r p o r a t i s t arrangements to which i t was t i e d . 
At ChemCo the power of c a p i t a l to c o n t r o l and r e g u l a t e the growth and 
d i r e c t i o n of t r a d e unionism was s t a r k l y i l l u s t r a t e d . With the TGWU 
i n t e g r a t e d i n t o a c o r p o r a t i s t s t r u c t u r e a t n a t i o n a l l e v e l , management 
e x e r c i s i n g a d e c i s i v e i n f l u e n c e on the development of the union a t l o c a l 
l e v e l , and formidable p r a c t i c a l b a r r i e r s i n the p l a n t to the c r e a t i o n of a 
c h a l l e n g e to management's hegemony, workers were l e f t to express t h e i r 
s t r u g g l e i n i n d i v i d u a l a c t s of d e f i a n c e . A marriage between p a r t i c u l a r 
m a t e r i a l c o n d i t i o n s and a p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l settlement at n a t i o n a l 
l e v e l combined to s h i f t the balance of power i n management's favour. 
The work of Batstone e t a l focuses on the irtportance of the q u a l i t y of 
l e a d e r s w i t h i n a steward network. I n d i v i d u a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and 
a l l e g i a n c e s can a f f e c t the development of union o r g a n i s a t i o n and s t r a t e g y . 
But - as the case of ChemCo pow e r f u l l y i n d i c a t e s - the l i m i t s to i n d i v i d u a l 
agency l i e i n the e x t e r n a l environment to which the workforce and i t s 
l e a d e r s h i p i s a r t i c u l a t e d . The content of d i f f e r e n t p o l i c i e s cannot be 
understood without r e f e r e n c e to t h i s wider context. 
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3 • 4 CONCLTTSIONS: THE LIMITS OF TRADE UNION CONSCIOUShJESS 
I n the f i r s t p a r t of t h i s chapter I reviewed some of the t h e o r i e s which 
have attempted to make gen e r a l comments about the nature of trade unions i n 
c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t i e s . Because t h e i r o r g a n i s a t i o n f o l l o w s the contours 
imposed on them by c a p i t a l i s t o r g a n i s a t i o n , and because t h e i r e x i s t e n c e 
i m p l i e s a day to day commitment t o working w i t h i n c a p i t a l i s m , unions face 
s t r o n g p r e s s u r e s t o i n c o r p o r a t i o n w i t h i n the c a p i t a l i s t system. Economism 
dominates union a f f a i r s , i m p l y i n g day to day acceptance of the wage-labour 
r e l a t i o n . I n other words, the l a y e r of bureaucrats who become e s s e n t i a l to 
the union's r o l e tend to see the f u n c t i o n i n g of the system as more 
i r t ^ o r t a n t than i t s overthrow. T h e i r own s u r v i v a l achieves a higher p r i o r i t y 
than the defence of workers c o n d i t i o n s . 
However, such developments are not i n e v i t a b l e or immutable. S e c t i o n a l i s m 
f o r example i s only a p o s s i b l e consequence of o r g a n i s i n g along the l i n e s of 
the c a p i t a l i s t d i v i s i o n of labour. S e c t i o n a l s t r u g g l e can - under c e r t a i n 
h i s t o r i c a l c o n d i t i o n s - break down the d i v i s i o n between economic and 
p o l i t i c a l a spects of working c l a s s s t r u g g l e , and t h e r e f o r e spearhead a move 
t o a "higher" l e v e l of consciousness. S i m i l a r l y , the extent to which union 
l e a d e r s are able to a c t apart from t h e i r members i s h i s t o r i c a l l y 
contingent. Offe and Wiesenthal demonstrate t h a t the d i f f i c u l t y unions have 
i n d e f i n i n g t h e i r i n t e r e s t s under c a p i t a l i s m leads to a tendency to seek 
out e x t e r n a l guarantees of r e c o g n i t i o n from the s t a t e , but they add t h a t 
economic c o n d i t i o n s l e a d sooner or l a t e r to the withdrawal of these 
e x t e r n a l guarantees. The l e a d e r s h i p s r e l a t i v e s e p e r a t i o n from t h e i r members 
i s a contingent phenomenon. 
R e l a t i o n s between c a p i t a l and labour a t the point of production are too 
u n s t a b l e f o r any s e t t l e m e n t between the two to p e r s i s t f o r long. At the 
peak of t h i s u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y stands the s t r i k e (part two of the c h a p t e r ) , 
which i n c h a l l e n g i n g r e l a t i o n s between c a p i t a l and labour a l s o i n e v i t a b l y 
c h a l l e n g e s r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n unions. T h i s process was examined f i r s t with 
r e g a r d t o "mass s t r i k e s " . T h i s d i s c u s s i o n y i e l d e d the iirportant observation 
t h a t the s e p e r a t i o n between rank and f i l e and l e a d e r s - which accorrpanies 
the s e p e r a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l and economic aspects of s t r u g g l e - can be 
s h a t t e r e d by s t r i k e s which s t a r t o f f as r e l a t i v e l y l i m i t e d , d e f e n s i v e 
a c t i o n s . I n other words, economic c r i s e s c r e a t e i n s t a b i l i t y i n 
c a p i t a l - l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s , and hence a l s o i n the i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s of 
vinions. T h i s p o i n t emerges as c r u c i a l t o itty a n a l y s i s of the c o a l i n d u s t r y 
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i n the f o l l o w i n g chapter, and to the process of p o l i t i c a l change i n Murton 
i n chapters f i v e , s i x and seven. 
To e l a b o r a t e on the e f f e c t s of s t r i k e s , some exair^sles of s t r i k e s at the 
m i c r o - s c a l e were s t u d i e d , t o draw out the ways i n which i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t 
d e s t a b i l i s e d i n t r a union r e l a t i o n s . Gouldner's meticulous a n a l y s i s of a 
w i l d c a t s t r i k e showed t h a t i t p o l a r i s e d opinion w i t h i n a workforce, and 
p o i n t e d to the d e s t a b i l i s i n g e f f e c t t h i s had on the union l e a d e r s h i p at the 
p l a n t . Gouldner a l s o h i g h l i g h t e d the s i g n i f i c a n c e of a break i n e s t a b l i s h e d 
"indlugency p a t t e r n s " i n d e s t a b i l i s i n g e x i s t i n g workplace r e l a t i o n s - a 
concept which i s a p p l i e d t o the case of Murton l a t e r i n t h i s t h e s i s . 
Lane and Robert's study of the P i l k i n g t o n g l a s s f a c t o r y dispute i n 1971 
f u r t h e r emphasised the d i s r u p t i v e e f f e c t of a s t r i k e on union p o l i t i c s . 
With rank and f i l e l e a d e r s h i p of the s t r i k e disowned by the n a t i o n a l union, 
the l o c a l o r g a n i s a t i o n went so f a r as to t r y and c r e a t e a separate n a t i o n a l 
union. And work on the 1980 s t e e l s t r i k e i n South Y o r k s h i r e showed the 
d i v i s i o n s c r e a t e d even w i t h i n a c t i v i s t s as a r e s u l t of a long p e r i o d of 
d o c i l e , accommodative union p o l i t i c s . These examples demonstrate the 
d i v i s i o n s which i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t s can r e f l e c t and c r e a t e w i t h i n union 
ranks. T h i s point i s developed i n the f o l l o w i n g chapters where p o l i t i c a l 
change i n the Murton miners' and mechanics' branches i s r e l a t e d to 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n s which emerged between d i f f e r e n t s e c t i o n s of the workforce as 
the post war "indulgency p a t t e r n " came under t h r e a t . 
The s t r i k e s t u d i e s showed the iir5>ortance of understanding how c l a s s 
r e l a t i o n s developed over time a t the l o c a l l e v e l . Union p o l i t i c s b u i l d on 
long t r a d i t i o n s , and the way i n which s t r i k e s develop c l e a r l y r e f l e c t s the 
h i s t o r i c a l experience of c l a s s c o n f l i c t as mediated by the union. Therefore 
i n the f i n a l s e c t i o n of the chapter, I reviewed t h r e e d e t a i l e d s t u d i e s of 
day to day workplace union p o l i t i c s . Ford's Halewood p l a n t r e v e a l e d the 
l i m i t a t i o n s of shop steward power i n a n a t i o n a l union s t r u c t u r e t i e d i n to 
a p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the Ford motor cort^any. Halewood was a l s o 
c h a r a c t e r i s e d by a d i s t i n c t i v e " f a c t o r y " consciousness which emerged i n 
response to the h i s t o r i c a l development of the p l a n t , and m i l i t a n t 
Merseyside t r a d i t i o n s . ChemCo's p l a n t demonstrated the power of c a p i t a l to 
c o n t r o l and r e g u l a t e the growth and development of union p o l i t i c s i n a 
g r e e n f i e l d s i t e where the union was t i e d i n to a n a t i o n a l corporate 
s t r u c t u r e . F i n a l l y , the work of Batstone e t a l on the steward network a t a 
major motor v e h i c l e p l a n t showed t h a t the p a r t i c u l a r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of 
i n d i v i d u a l l e a d e r s e x e r c i s e a d e c i s i v e i n f l u e n c e over the d i r e c t i o n of 
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union p o l i t i c s , but these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s have to r e l a t e d to the wider 
p o l i t i c a l - e c o n o m i c context i f t h e i r meaning i s to be understood. 
These case s t u d i e s provide an i n p o r t a n t context f o r nr/ r e s e a r c h on 
p o l i t i c a l development w i t h i n the Murton miners' and mechanics' branches. 
They i d e n t i f y some of the s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r s d r i v i n g the p o l i t i c a l process 
w i t h i n p a r t i c u l a r workplaces; f o r example, the r o l e of key l e a d e r s . They 
a l s o demonstrate the importance of understanding the way t h a t workplace 
r e l a t i o n s have b u i l t up over time, e s t a b l i s h i n g d i f f e r e n t "indulgency 
p a t t e r n s " which s t r u c t u r e the environment which workers s t r u g g l e s take 
p l a c e i n . T h i s i s a theme to which I r e t u r n i n chapters f i v e , s i x and 
seven, which explore the p o l i t i c a l e v o l u t i o n of the Murton miners' and 
mechanics' branches. 
Unions t h e r e f o r e operate w i t h i n s t r o n g s t r u c t u r a l c o n s t r a i n t s , but w i t h i n 
t h e s e c o n s t r a i n t s c o n t r a d i c t i o n s can b u i l d up, and erupt i n t o c o n f l i c t . The 
c o n t i n u a l e v o l u t i o n of c a p i t a l i s t development ensures t h a t no settlement 
between c a p i t a l and labour, and hence w i t h i n labour o r g a n i s a t i o n s between 
l e a d e r s and l e d , can remain s t a b l e f o r long. I n the f o l l o w i n g chapter, the 
h i s t o r y of the c o a l i n d u s t r y i s e v a l u a t e d w i t h i n t h i s framework. The PWS 
which re p r e s e n t e d a settlement between the s t a t e , c a p i t a l and labour, a l s o 
i m p l i e d a s e t of r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n the NUM. Yet these r e l a t i o n s were 
uns t a b l e , and e v e n t u a l l y b u r s t i n t o open c o n f l i c t . Studying the c o a l 
i n d u s t r y a t t h i s n a t i o n a l s c a l e i s e s s e n t i a l to understand the context 
w i t h i n which the miners and mechanics at Murton were l o c a t e d . 
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INTRODUCTION 
T h i s chapter i n t e g r a t e s the d i s c u s s i o n of e a r l i e r chapters w i t h i n a 
commentary on the background to the c r i s i s i n the B r i t i s h c o a l i n d u s t r y - a 
c r i s i s which f i n a l l y exploded i n March 1984. T h i s provides the framework i n 
which the subsequent a n a l y s i s of events a t Murton c o l l i e r y i s located. 
Chapter t h r e e showed how the p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s of a unions r e l a t i o n s with the 
employer and the s t a t e a f f e c t e d the p o l i t i c s which emerged at workplace 
l e v e l . I n t h i s c h a p t e r I look a t the d e s t a b i l i s a t i o n of e s t a b l i s h e d c l a s s 
r e l a t i o n s i n the c o a l i n d u s t r y r e l a t i o n s a t a macro s c a l e . This 
d e s t a b i l i s a t i o n i n t u r n d i s t u r b e d the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c indulgency p a t t e r n a t 
a l o c a l l e v e l , w ith u n p r e d i c t a b l e p o l i t i c a l e f f e c t s a t p i t s l i k e Murton. 
I n t h i s chapter t h e r e f o r e , the n a t i o n a l process of d e s t a b i l i s a t i o n i n the 
c o a l i n d u s t r y i s analysed, drawing on the examination of the development of 
the UK s t a t e undertaken i n chapter two. Having e s t a b l i s h e d the causes and 
d i r e c t i o n of the d e s t a b i l i s a t i o n i n the c o a l i n d u s t r y , the way i s c l e a r to 
begin e x p l o r i n g p o l i t i c a l change a t Murton c o l l i e r y , drawing out the way i n 
which conscious agency was a b l e to use the room c r e a t e d by economic 
d e s t a b i l i s a t i o n t o shape a d i s t i n c t i v e p o l i t i c a l transformation. I n order 
to d i s c u s s i n d e t a i l the development of the economic c r i s i s i n the c o a l 
i n d u s t r y , t h i s chapter c o n c e n t r a t e s on the p e r i o d s i n c e 1974. (The period 
b e f o r e t h i s i s d i s c u s s e d i n more d e t a i l i n appendix two.) 
By the end of 1974, the f u t u r e f o r the B r i t i s h c o a l i n d u s t r y , and f o r the 
miners i n i t , seemed secure. A new Labour government had conjured an 
o p t i m i s t i c consensus agreement out of n e g o t i a t i o n s with the NUM and NCB 
(the "Plan f o r Coal") - which h e l d out the prospect of a r a p i d l y expanding 
i n d u s t r y . Perhaps a t l a s t the i n d u s t r y would be b l e s s e d with the long term 
investment commitment needed t o maintain production i n t o the twenty f i r s t 
c e ntury. Ten y e a r s l a t e r , the NUM and the s t a t e stood on the brin k of 
c o n f l i c t over what was - on one l e v e l a t l e a s t - s i n g l y an attert^t by the 
union to defend the P l a n f o r Coal (PFC) . F i v e y ears a f t e r t h a t , i n 1989, 
the s i t u a t i o n had changed d r a m a t i c a l l y again, with an almost inexorable 
march underway to the once unthinkable p r i v a t i s a t i o n of the c o a l i n d u s t r y . 
Sandwiched i n t h e middle was perhaps the most e p i c s t r u g g l e by a s e c t i o n of 
the B r i t i s h working c l a s s t h i s century. 
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C l e a r l y , such dramatic events p l a y e d a c e n t r a l r o l e i n the p o l i t i c a l 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the Murton branches during the 1980's. This chapter 
e x p l o r e s the context f o r developments a t Murton by r e l a t i n g the pressures 
on the c o a l i n d u s t r y to the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of the PWS (analysed i n chapter 
two), and to the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s w i t h i n the NUM as i t faced the c o l l a p s e of 
the b a s i s f o r i t s post war i n c o r p o r a t i o n i n the B r i t i s h s t a t e . 
I approach t h i s c e n t r a l theme v i a a four p a r t s t r u c t u r e . Following a b r i e f 
review of the p e r i o d before 1974 (covered i n more d e t a i l i n appendix two) , 
I d i s c u s s the Labour government's s t r a t e g y towards the c o a l i n d u s t r y up 
u n t i l 1979. Under the Wilson/Callaghan government. Plan For Coal was 
n e g o t i a t e d , and an Area I n c e n t i v e Scheme imposed on the union. The former 
had the e f f e c t of s e p e r a t i n g the miners from the b i t t e r defensive b a t t l e s 
fought by the unions a g a i n s t the S o c i a l Contract, w h i l s t the l a t t e r had the 
e f f e c t of s p l i t t i n g the union w i t h i n i t s own ranks. I n the t h i r d s e c t i o n 
the i n d u s t r y ' s f o r t u n e s under the Conservative government are considered. 
For the T o r i e s , d e f e a t of the NUM became e s s e n t i a l as p a r t of t h e i r 
s t r a t e g y f i r s t to s h i f t the balance of power d e c i s i v e l y a g a i n s t organised 
labour, and secondly to r e i n s t a t e the market as a d e - p o l i t i c i s e d instrument 
of economic planning. I n the f i n a l s e c t i o n , the e f f e c t of the NCB's 
p o l i c i e s (based on government s t r a t e g y ) i n Durham are considered. L e f t wing 
f o r c e s were able to b u i l d support i n the wake of the d e s t a b i l i s i n g 
i n f l u e n c e of management p o l i c y . 
I n a l l s e c t i o n s I i n t e g r a t e t h r e e s t r a n d s - the a c t i o n s and p o l i c i e s of the 
NCB, t h e NUM and the s t a t e i n order to show the complex r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
between th e s e t h r e e agencies. I look a t the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s c o n s t a n t l y 
developing and s u b s i d i n g i n these r e l a t i o n s h i p s , only to evolve i n t o 
f u r t h e r c o n t r a d i c t i o n s and c o n f l i c t . I n doing so, I continue with the theme 
of e s t a b l i s h i n g the s t r u c t u r a l l i m i t a t i o n s to working c l a s s a c t i o n 
e s t a b l i s h e d i n e a r l i e r chapters. I n p a r t i c u l a r , I consider the way i n which 
the NUM's i n c o r p o r a t i o n i n t o the post war settlement (chapter two) a f f e c t e d 
the development of union p o l i t i c s . I a l s o consider how the r e l a t i o n s 
between union, management and the s t a t e were d e s t a b i l i s e d i n the 1970's, 
c r e a t i n g the space f o r p o l i t i c a l changes at a l l l e v e l s of the union. T h i s 
account w i l l t h e r e f o r e form the immediate point of r e f e r e n c e - the 
immediate framework - f o r the case m a t e r i a l on p o l i t i c a l change i n two 
branches of Murton NUM which f o l l o w s i n the next t h r e e chapters. 
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4.1: BEFORE 1974: A BRIEF RESUME^ 
When the c o a l i n d u s t r y was f i n a l l y n a t i o n a l i s e d i n 1947, i t was on terms 
v e r y favourable t o c a p i t a l . Not only was massive compensation p a i d to the 
former owners (a f i n a l t o t a l of £394 m i l l i o n - Ashworth, 1986, 28), but the 
i n d u s t r y was s e t up as a u t i l i t y to provide cheap f u e l f o r B r i t i s h c a p i t a l 
d u r i n g a time of energy shortages. The s t a t e succeeded i n i n c o r p o r a t i n g the 
NUM l e a d e r s h i p , which c o l l a b o r a t e d with the NCB i n attert^Jting to in^jose 
labour peace, and boost production (see f o r exan^sle Scott e t a l , 1963, 
21-22). N e v e r t h e l e s s , m i l i t a n c y a t the point of production - s t i m u l a t e d by 
a complex p i e c e r a t e wages system - proved i i t p o s s i b l e to c o n t r o l , and 
miners continued to comfortably dominate the n a t i o n a l league t a b l e of 
s t r i k e s (Slaughter, 1958; Dennis e t a l , 1955; S c o t t e t a l , 1963). 
A f t e r 1958 the e r a of r i s i n g demand f o r c o a l s l i d t o an abrupt end, and 
w i t h i t the ambitious investment and modernisation programme of the e a r l y 
50's. Unable t o charge the p r i c e f o r c o a l t h a t the hungry market could have 
absorbed i n a p e r i o d of f u e l shortages ( A l l e n , 1981, 104), the NCB now 
found i t s e l f saddled with s p i r a l l i n g i n t e r e s t charges on investment and 
compensation loans as the market c o n t r a c t e d (Ashworth, 1986, 277). Cheap 
o i l imports and s u b s t i t u t i o n of o i l and e l e c t r i c i t y f o r c o a l a c c e l e r a t e d 
the pace of p i t c l o s u r e s i n the 1960's ( H a l l , 1981). D e c i s i o n s taken i n the 
1950's over the t e c h n o l o g i e s appropriate f o r the i n d u s t r y added s o c i a l l y 
determined advantages to the g e o l o g i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y of the c e n t r a l 
c o a l f i e l d s ( p a r t s of Y o r k s h i r e , Nottinghamshire, the Midlands and 
L e i c e s t e r s h i r e ) , a t the expense of the p e r i p h e r a l c o a l f i e l d s (Wales, the 
North West, S c o t l a n d and the North E a s t ) (RPRU, 1979). Coal mining 
eir^loyment c o l l a p s e d i n the l a t t e r areas during the 1960's (see t a b l e s 4.1 
and 4.2 and graphs 1 to 4 ) . But with the union i n the g r i p of the r i g h t , 
t h e r e was no o r g a n i s e d o p p o s i t i o n to p i t c l o s u r e s . 
Mechanisation provided a s t r o n g stimulus f o r the NCB to r a t i o n a l i s e i t s 
a r c h a i c wages s t r u c t u r e . With production i n c r e a s i n g l y machine l e d ( r a t h e r 
than e f f o r t r e l a t e d ) , the abandonment of p i e c e r a t e s would end the constant 
d i s r u p t i o n of walkouts a t the point of production, and a l s o e l i m i n a t e 
•''This p e r i o d i s covered i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l i n appendix two. 
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"wages d r i f t " ( i n which w e l l organised and m i l i t a n t f a c e workers forced up 
l o c a l wages), without d e l e t e r i o u s l y a f f e c t i n g production. For the l e f t i n 
the NUM, a n a t i o n a l wages s t r u c t u r e was a l s o welcomed, because i t l a i d the 
m a t e r i a l b a s i s f o r u n i t y i n the union (Paynter, 1972; Rutledge, 1977). 
However, when wages were reformed with the N a t i o n a l Power Loading Agreement 
(si g n e d i n 1966) the new s t r u c t u r e appeared to d e l i v e r management's 
o b j e c t i v e . Accomodative n a t i o n a l union l e a d e r s h i p enabled the NCB to 
s t r i c t l y c o n t r o l annual wage n e g o t i a t i o n s , and l o c a l d i s p u t e s withered to a 
t i n y f r a c t i o n of pre NPLA days.-
However, rank and f i l e d i s c o n t e n t rose towards the end of the 1960's, 
i n t e r a c t i n g with the g e n e r a l i n c r e a s e i n labour unrest s t i m u l a t e d by the 
f i r s t s i g n s of an end to the post war boom (Gamble, 1985, 168; see a l s o 
c h a p t e r two, s e c t i o n 2 . 2 . i i above). From 1969 to 1972, major u n o f f i c i a l 
s t r i k e s spread throughout Y o r k s h i r e , South Wales and Scotland (Taylor, 
1984; A l l e n , 1981). When the Labour government was r e p l a c e d by an 
a g g r e s s i v e l y a n t i - u n i o n Conservative a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n 1970, the f i n a l 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l block t o o f f i c i a l , n a t i o n a l s t r i k e a c t i o n evaporated. The 
1972 s t r i k e r e p r e s e n t e d a surge i n "mass m i l i t a n c y " (Rutledge, 1977), 
s t i m u l a t e d by low wages, and c o n s o l i d a t e d by the n a t i o n a l u n i t y emerging 
from a uniform wages s t r u c t u r e (Winterton, 1985a) - e x a c t l y as the l e f t had 
hoped. V i c t o r y marked a s i g n i f i c a n t advance not j u s t f o r the miners, but 
f o r the organised working c l a s s i n g e n e r a l , as the labour movement 
confronted the anti-working c l a s s p o l i c i e s of the Heath government (chapter 
two) . 
I n 1974 the miners s t r u c k again, i n an atteir^st to c l o s e the gap on workers 
i n manufacturing i n d u s t r i e s , who had been able to take advantage of p l a n t 
b a r g a i n i n g s t r e n g t h to boost wages l e v e l s (Winterton, 1985a). Caught i n an 
economic c r i s i s , the Heath government c a l l e d a general e l e c t i o n on the 
theme of "Who governs?", hoping to cash i n on p u b l i c antagonism to the 
unions (Crouch, 1982, 83) . The gamble f a i l e d , and a f t e r a second general 
e l e c t i o n t h a t year. Labour was returned with a s m a l l minority. At the same 
time, the l e f t wing made noteable advances w i t h i n the NUM, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n 
the p r e v i o u s l y r i g h t wing Y o r k s h i r e area. However, the success of the l e f t 
wing e x p l o s i o n contained c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , c a r r y i n g with i t the r i s k t h a t the 
l e f t would prove s u s c e p t i b l e to the same s t r u c t u r a l p r e s s u r e s towards 
b u r e a u c r a t i s a t i o n and i n c o r p o r a t i o n which had engulfed the union's 
l e a d e r s h i p i n the p a s t . 
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4.2 1974-79: lABOUR IN POWER? 
Although the miners were not to take n a t i o n a l s t r i k e a c t i o n again u n t i l 
1984, a l l the elements which came together 10 years l a t e r were already 
p r e s e n t i n embryonic form by 1974. A p i t i n c e n t i v e scheme was on the 
agenda. P l a n F or Coal (PFC) was being negotiated, and a Labour government 
had assumed power and was t a k i n g the f i r s t s t e p s to s h a t t e r the defensive 
power of organised workers. Two developments i n p a r t i c u l a r e x e r c i s e d a 
d e c i s i v e i n f l u e n c e on the e v o l v i n g c r i s i s i n t h e i n d u s t r y . On the one hand, 
PFC endorsed massive investment i n new c a p a c i t y and new c o a l g e t t i n g 
t e c h n o l o g i e s , without regard f o r fut u r e markets. On the other, a new wages 
system was introduced e x p l i c i t l y aimed a t s p l i t t i n g the union (Rees, 1985, 
399). Both of these developments are considered below. 
4.2.i PLAN FOR COAL, AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF INCORPORATION 
The c o a l s t r i k e of 1974 was fought a g a i n s t the backdrop of an energy 
c r i s i s , p r e c i p i t a t e d by a sudden, massive i n c r e a s e i n the p r i c e of o i l . 
When Labour achieved a wafer t h i n o v e r a l l m a j o r i t y i n the Autumn General 
E l e c t i o n of 1974 (the second e l e c t i o n t h a t y e a r ) , they recognised the 
tr a n s f o r m a t i o n i n energy p o l i t i c s , and began n e g o t i a t i o n s with the NCB and 
NUM to t r y and ensure t h a t domestic c o a l production would be able to meet 
the country's energy demands. Agreed a t a time when the future f o r c o a l 
seemed assured. P l a n For Coa l (PFC) oozed optimism. I t a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t by 
1985 the demand f o r c o a l would be 150 m i l l i o n tonnes per annum (Mtpa) . I t 
rec o g n i s e d t h a t f a i l u r e t o i n v e s t i n the 1950's and 60's meant about four 
m i l l i o n tonnes (Mt) of new and replacement c a p a c i t y would be re q u i r e d a 
ye a r to reach t h a t t a r g e t (or a t o t a l of 42 Mt of new c a p a c i t y by 1985) . 
T h i s new c a p a c i t y would be o f f s e t by the c l o s u r e of around 2 Mtpa of o l d 
c a p a c i t y (Sweet, 1985). 
PFC attempted to provide a s t a b l e planning horizon f o r the industry, 
i n s u l a t i n g i t from short term market f l u c t u a t i o n s because of i t s s t r a t e g i c 
importance to the economy. However, the P l a n had s e v e r a l c r u c i a l areas of 
ambiguity which e f f e c t i v e l y allowed p i t s t o be c l o s e d on economic grounds 
so long as both s i d e s were prepared to fudge the i s s u e s . Exhaustion - as 
the f o l l o w i n g quote from a l a t e r document makes c l e a r - was c l e a r l y seen by 
the NCB as an economic concept. 
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"Since the 1950's... t h r e e e f f e c t s operated to reduce 
the c o a l i n d u s t r i e s apparent resource base [ i e apparent 
r e s e r v e s ] . F i r s t . . . t h e r e were the c o a l r e s e r v e s 
abandoned as a r e s u l t of c o l l i e r y c l o s u r e s : second, 
t h e r e was the c o a l p h y s i c a l l y e x t r a c t e d and used; and 
by f a r the most important, c o a l r e s e r v e s at continuing 
c o l l i e r i e s were w r i t t e n down as a r e s u l t of the 
reducing r e a l p r i c e of primary energy, o b l i g i n g the 
i n d u s t r y to s e l e c t the best r e s e r v e s , and thus reducing 
the proportion of r e s e r v e s r e c o v e r a b l e . " (NCB, 1976, 
26; emphasis added) 
D e s p i t e the a m b i g u i t i e s , PFC c o n s t i t u t e d perhaps the u l t i m a t e l e v e l of 
c o r p o r a t i s m and i n c o r p o r a t i o n i n the c o a l i n d u s t r y . Confronted with an 
energy c r i s i s , a m i l i t a n t workforce, and a high l e v e l of working c l a s s 
m o b i l i s a t i o n , the s t a t e needed a s t r a t e g y which would n e u t r a l i s e the power 
of t h e miners. I n doing so i t would secure energy s u p p l i e s , and stop the 
miners wage m i l i t a n c y from p r o v i d i n g a damaging demonstration e f f e c t to 
o t h e r groups of workers. By p r o v i d i n g the miners with apparent s t a b i l i t y i n 
employment, and by t y i n g the union i n t o a c o r p o r a t i s t agreement with the 
s t a t e and the employer, miners would (hopefully) be removed from the 
i n c r e a s i n g l y i n t e n s e s t r u g g l e being waged by B r i t i s h c a p i t a l against the 
o r g a n i s e d working c l a s s . Developing an i n c e n t i v e scheme to s p l i t the 
union's wages u n i t y was a l s o a key p a r t of t h i s s t r a t e g y (see s e c t i o n 
4 . 2 . i i i below). 
PFC continued the f a m i l i a r p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s u b s i d i e s f o r cheap energy, 
endorsing massive investment i n new low c o s t c a p a c i t y . I n doing t h i s i t 
continued a t r e n d e s t a b l i s h e d i n the 1950's of concentrating on low cost 
output, and o r i e n t a t i n g investment and technology around t h i s p r i o r i t y (see 
appendix two) . T h i s l e d to a c i r c u l a r argument. With the best resources put 
i n t o t h e best seams i t was i n e v i t a b l e t h a t c a p a c i t y i n the older c o a l f i e l d s 
- which s u f f e r e d poorer c o n d i t i o n s and underinvestment - would become 
"uneconomic". But i t a l s o l e d to a p o t e n t i a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n of e p i c 
p r o p o r t i o n s , because i f market demand d i d not keep up with i n c r e a s e d 
supply, then p r e s s u r e would r a p i d l y i n c r e a s e f o r new low c o s t c a p a c i t y to 
d i s p l a c e high c o s t c a p a c i t y , l e a d i n g to massive job l o s s . 
W h i l s t PFC promised investment i n new c a p a c i t y , other investment 
co n c e n t r a t e d on e s t a b l i s h i n g a new t e c h n o l o g i c a l phase i n c o a l mining. The 
development of t h i s technology evolved out of the h i s t o r i c a l experience of 
c l a s s r e l a t i o n s i n the i n d u s t r y , and i n t u r n had c r u c i a l i i t ^ s l i c a t i o n s f o r 
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the f u t u r e development of the s e c l a s s r e l a t i o n s . E s s e n t i a l l y , the NCB were 
motivated by a d e s i r e to r e g a i n c o n t r o l over the r a t e of work - c o n t r o l 
which they p e r c e i v e d power loa d i n g had s h i f t e d towards face workers. I n a 
s e r i e s of papers (Burns e t a l , 1983; 1985; Winterton, 1985a; 1985b; 
Winterton and Winterton, 1985) the Working Environment Research Group 
(WERG) a t Bradford U n i v e r s i t y o u t l i n e d the pr o c e s s e s a t work. 
Under mechanisation (the i n t r o d u c t i o n of power loading i n the 1950's and 
60's, r e p l a c i n g handgetting), the miners i n c r e a s e d t h e i r c o n t r o l over the 
labour process (although see C l a r k , 1980, and Douglass, 1972 f o r d i s s e n t i n g 
v i e w s ) . I n c o n t r a s t to handgetting, which had i n v o l v e d a r i g i d d i v i s i o n of 
labour (and t h e r e f o r e tended t o d i v i d e the workforce), mining became a 
s k i l l e d job, r e q u i r i n g g r e a t e r i n t e g r a t i o n of work teams, who were a l l 
i n v o l v e d i n the whole c o a l g e t t i n g process. Machinery however i s always 
prone t o breakdowns, and the NCB di s c o v e r e d t h a t 2/3 of p o t e n t i a l machine 
time was being l o s t , s p l i t e q u a l l y between " l o s t time" - delays caused by 
the men - and " o p e r a t i o n a l and a n c i l l a r y time" - delays caused by 
maintenance and r e p a i r . 
For the next phase of t h e i r t e c h n o l o g i c a l programme, the NCB t h e r e f o r e 
concentrated on automation, with the aim of d r a s t i c a l l y reducing machine 
down time. Using a systems approach, the NCB determined i t s p r i n c i p l e 
o b j e c t i v e s a s : i n c r e a s e d labour p r o d u c t i v i t y , i n c r e a s i n g p r o d u c t i v i t y and 
i n c r e a s e d c o n t r o l over a l l a s p e c t s of the work process (Burns e t a l , 1985, 
95-8). 
"The[se] o b j e c t i v e s were d e r i v e d from the h i s t o r i c a l 
problems of s u p e r v i s i o n and a d e s i r e to repeat the 
p r o d u c t i v i t y gains of the second phase of mechanisation 
[ i e the i n t r o d u c t i o n of sh e a r e r s and powered roof 
s u p p o r t s ] . . . The s t r a t e g y of c o n t r o l chosen was one 
which could be seen as r e d r e s s i n g the balance and 
removing the miners gains i n terms of s k i l l and 
workplace c o n t r o l t h a t had been won or c r e a t e d i n the 
second phased of mechanisation." ( i b i d , 96) 
I t was with these o b j e c t i v e s i n mind t h a t the NCB designed the MINOS 
system, "a h i g h l y c e n t r a l i s e d , h i e r a r c h i c a l l y organised system of remote 
c o n t r o l and monitoring i n mines" ( i b i d , 98) . Comprising a v a r i e t y of 
e l e c t r o n i c sub systems (introduced piecemeal and without c o n s u l t a t i o n ) , but 
u t i l i s i n g the same mining machinery as then i n use, MINOS give s management 
u n p a r a l l e l e d information and c o n t r o l over a l l a s p e c t s of the underground 
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o p e r a t i o n ( i b i d , 98-104) . Even the piecemeal a p p l i c a t i o n of sirt5>le 
subsystems l e d to a s t o n i s h i n g i n c r e a s e s i n p r o d u c t i v i t y , as management was 
more a b l e to c o n t r o l the pace of work (see graphs 4, 8 and 11) . 
I n output terms, the a p p l i c a t i o n of the MINOS subsystems l e d to in c r e a s e d 
p r o d u c t i o n with fewer workers. Burns e t a l estimated t h a t 1985 output could 
be produced with j u s t 49000 miners i f f a c e s with FIDO, MIDAS and IMPACT ( i e 
the f u l l MINOS package) were to produce a l l the NCB's output (1985). Job 
l o s s would be caused by a dual process. On the one hand, manning l e v e l s 
would be reduced as fewer men were needed on the face - f o r exanple IMPACT 
i n c r e a s e d the r e l i a b i l i t y of face machinery and provided a d i a g n o s t i c 
c a p a b i l i t y which d r a s t i c a l l y reduced the requirement f o r craftsmen on the 
f a c e . Secondly, and more importantly, by i n c r e a s i n g machine a v a i l a b l e time 
(MAT), production was i n c r e a s e d a t those p i t s which had the new technology 
i n s t a l l e d . As a l r e a d y explained, these p i t s were a l r e a d y the most favoured 
g e o l o g i c a l l y , and the e x t r a investment cuts t h e i r production c o s t s and 
i n c r e a s e d p r o d u c t i v i t y . 
I n a p e r i o d of s t a t i c demand, any i n c r e a s e i n low cos t c a p a c i t y must 
d i s p l a c e higher c o s t c a p a c i t y , u n l e s s some d e l i b e r a t e steps are taken to 
main t a i n what i s , i n the short term a t l e a s t , s u r p l u s c a p a c i t y . Burns et a l 
summarised i t l i k e t h i s . 
" S t a t i c UK demand, and the establishment of output 
t a r g e t s i n l i n e with t h i s demand t r a n s l a t e s 
p r o d u c t i v i t y i n c r e a s e s d i r e c t l y i n t o job l o s s e s . . . P i t s 
i n the p e r i p h e r a l areas f a c e c l o s u r e and s u f f e r from 
l a c k of investment, whereas miners i n the ' c e n t r a l ' 
c o a l f i e l d f a c e job l o s s e s through automation, and are 
exp e r i e n c i n g adverse changes i n work o r g a n i s a t i o n . " 
( i b i d , 93) 
There were t h e r e f o r e two ways i n which MINOS d e s t a b i l i s e d e x i s t i n g work 
r e l a t i o n s a t c o a l mines, and t h e i r r e l a t i v e e f f e c t d i f f e r e d geographically, 
f i r s t l y , through job l o s s , and secondly through d e s k i l l i n g . 
However, i t i s important to r e a l i s e t h a t t e c h n o l o g i c a l changes are a l s o 
s o c i a l changes i n the o r g a n i s a t i o n of production. For the miners, MINOS 
meant an i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of work (Tomaney, 1988) . T h i s was e s p e c i a l l y so 
because i t s i n t r o d u c t i o n was matched by the imposition of a new wages 
s t r u c t u r e - the area i n c e n t i v e scheme (AIS) - i n 1978 (see s e c t i o n 4 . 2 . i i i 
and Bohen and Wroughton, 1988). So MINOS d e s t a b i l i s e d e x i s t i n g r e l a t i o n s 
between workers and management, both a t n a t i o n a l l e v e l (where i t began to 
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have an impact on jobs) and a t l o c a l l e v e l (where i t a f f e c t e d r e l a t i o n s i n 
p r o d u c t i o n ) . 
Meanwhile, s u r p l u s production was growing due to other f a c t o r s too. An 
expanding i n t e r n a t i o n a l market i n cheap opencast coking c o a l l e d BSC to 
r e p l a c e NCB s u p p l i e s with c o a l imports. Most p i t c l o s u r e s i n the e a r l y 
1980's i n v o l v e d coking c a p a c i t y (see Beynon e t a l , 1985; McCloskey, 1986 
and s e c t i o n 4.4. i below) . Stimulated by the o i l p r i c e r i s e s of the e a r l y 
1970's, many o i l companies began to i n v e s t h e a v i l y i n c o a l which became 
again an economic f u e l . The l a t e 60's and e a r l y 70's were a l s o a period of 
b i g expansion i n the European s t e e l s e c t o r , and consequently the same 
coit^anies were a l s o committed to b i g investments i n coking c o a l mines. I t 
was i n the UK coking market t h e r e f o r e t h a t the i i r ^ a c t of these investments 
was f i r s t f e l t . 
Overseas investments by energy m u l t i n a t i o n a l s were bearing f r u i t by the 
l a t e 1970's, a t a time when the EEC s t e e l i n d u s t r y was moving i n t o 
r e c e s s i o n , and c o n t r a c t i n g . A spot market - never seen before i n the c o a l 
t r a d e - grew up, and p r i c e s tumbled. I n 1979 the newly e l e c t e d Conservative 
government l i f t e d r e s t r i c t i o n s on BSC'S c o a l imports, and the r e s u l t was 
c a t a s t r o p h i c f o r VK deep mined coking c o a l c a p a c i t y . A f u r t h e r h i g h l y 
s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r a f f e c t i n g deep mined coking c o a l c a p a c i t y was the growth 
- r e l a t i v e and a b s o l u t e - i n UK opencast c o a l production. I n Durham cheap 
opencast output competed d i r e c t l y with deep mined coking c o a l at a time 
when the market was s h r i n k i n g (see Beynon e t a l , 1985 and t a b l e 4.7). 
R e c e s s i o n i n the l a t e 1 9 7 0 ' s / e a r l y 1980's caused a c o l l a p s e i n the demand 
f o r c o a l . I n the power s t a t i o n s e c t o r , t h i s drop was masked by the 
s t r a t e g i c b u i l d up of s t o c k s (see t a b l e s 4.3 and 4.4), but i t occured 
d e s p i t e an i n c r e a s e i n c o a l ' s share of the e l e c t r i c i t y generating market 
(and i n the NCB's r e l i a n c e on the CEGB market - see t a b l e s 4.5 and 4.6). 
E x a c t l y how miners would r e a c t as the market began t o s h r i n k (so 
t h r e a t e n i n g t h e i r j o b s ) , was conditioned to an extent by t h e i r h i s t o r i c 
e xperience, and on the e f f e c t the changes would have on them. I n Durham, 
wit h i t s r e l i a n c e on the coking market, v u l n e r a b i l i t y was q u i c k l y apparent. 
I n c o n t r a s t , the Nottinghamshire c o a l f i e l d appeared r e l a t i v e l y s a f e , at 
l e a s t i n the s h o r t term. I study the p a r t i c u l a r e f f e c t of h i s t o r i c a l 
e x p e r i e n c e s on miners' r e a c t i o n s i n chapter f i v e , with r e s p e c t to Murton. 
But i t i s a l s o c l e a r t h a t t h e r e were at t h i s time other changes i n miners' 
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m a t e r i a l environment which a l s o c o n t r i b u t e d to a major d e s t a b i l i s a t i o n of 
the c o r p o r a t i s t agreements which the union was s t i l l enmeshed i n . I n 
p a r t i c u l a r , the i m p o s i t i o n of the i n c e n t i v e scheme had a d e c i s i v e e f f e c t on 
union p o l i t i c s . 
4 . 2 . i i THE INCENTIVE SCHEME IN CONTEXT: THE NUM AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 
I n 1974, at the same time as the PFC was being negotiated with the NUM, the 
new Labour government was a l s o i n i t i a t i n g the S o c i a l Contract. T h i s 
agreement between the TUC and the government was s o l d on the l a t t e r 
a greeing to l e g i s l a t e s o c i a l b e n e f i t s f o r the working c l a s s as a whole, i n 
r e t u r n f o r v o l u n t a r y wage r e s t r a i n t on the p a r t of the unions. I t was hoped 
t h a t as workers on the shop f l o o r saw and experienced the i n c r e a s e d s o c i a l 
b e n e f i t s , then t h e i r wage demands would moderate ac c o r d i n g l y (Coates, 1980, 
60; see a l s o chapter two, s e c t i o n 2 . 2 . i i above). PFC and the S o c i a l 
C o n t r a c t can t h e r e f o r e both be seen as elements of the same s t r a t e g y , i n 
what tu r n e d out to be the f i n a l attempt to rework the post war settlement 
(PWS). 
The 1972 and 1974 s t r i k e s had e s t a b l i s h e d the miners as p a c e s e t t e r s i n the 
annual p u b l i c s e c t o r pay n e g o t i a t i o n s . For the s t a t e and c a p i t a l i t was 
t h e r e f o r e v i t a l f o r the maintenance of the v a r i o u s stages of the S o c i a l 
C o n t r a c t t h a t the miners should s t a y w i t h i n t h e i r terms. Throughout the 
S o c i a l C o n tract, the NUM voted narrowly e i t h e r at conferences or i n b a l l o t s 
t o accept i n c r e a s e s i n l i n e with government p o l i c y (Al l e n , 1981; H a l l , 
1981), although the 1976 attempt to win e a r l y retirement came c l o s e to 
2 
d e f e a t i n g government p o l i c y from a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n . 
The l e f t found i t d i f f i c u l t to m o b i l i s e the membership during t h i s period. 
There seems l i t t l e doubt t h a t t h i s r e f l e c t e d a mood of coit^slacency which 
2 
The 1976 conference passed a motion c a l l i n g f o r retirement from 
60 i n the new year, with a r e d u c t i o n to 55 by 1980. An a l l out s t r i k e was 
t h r e a t e n e d i f the demand was not conceded, and a b a l l o t gave 78% f o r t h i s 
m i l i t a n t s t a n c e . But n e g o t i a t i o n s produced a conpromise which excluded 
s u r f a c e workers (because i n c l u d i n g them would s e t a precedent outside the 
i n d u s t r y ) , and which gave men who had 20 years of underground s e r v i c e 
r e t i r m e n t a t 62 from the sxmnner of 1977, and a t 60 from 1979. The d e a l was 
accepted by 55% ( H a l l , 1981, 230-231). 
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3 s e t t l e d over the rank and f i l e a f t e r two d e c i s i v e v i c t o r i e s . This i n tur n 
r e f l e c t e d the economistic and s e c t i o n a l b a s i s on which the membership were 
m o b i l i s e d during the 1972 and '74 cait^aigns. However, although the majority 
of the miners fought a l i m i t e d s t r u g g l e f o r b e t t e r wages, the s t a t e 
e x p e r i e n c e d the s t r i k e s as fundamental ch a l l e n g e s to i t s a u t h o r i t y (chapter 
two) . W h i l s t the wages s t r i k e s of 1972 and 1974, and the PFC, a l l 
r e i n f o r c e d the economistic, s e c t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r of the NUM (Panitch, 1981, 
32), the s t a t e was m o b i l i s i n g to win back the elements of c o n t r o l t h a t had 
been conceded during the e a r l y 1970's. 
By 1977, with the government t r y i n g to impose stage t h r e e of the S o c i a l 
C o n t r a c t - a 10% pay l i m i t - the pr e s s u r e of opposition had reached b o i l i n g 
p o i n t . R i s i n g unemployment, s p i r a l l i n g p r i c e s and p u b l i c s e c t o r cuts meant 
t h a t the government was m a n i f e s t l y seen to have f a i l e d t o d e l i v e r i t s s i d e 
of the S o c i a l C o n t r a c t bargain. Leaders on the r i g h t of the NUM however 
s t i l l wanted the miners to s t a y w i t h i n the 10% pay l i m i t . They saw the 
answer as an i n c e n t i v e scheme. However, an i n c e n t i v e scheme was a l s o an 
i n t e g r a l p a r t of the s t a t e and NCB s t r a t e g y to d i v i d e and weaken the NUM. 
4 . 2 . i i i SPLITTING THE NUM WITH INCENTIVES 
The 1972 and 1974 s t r i k e s showed how the NPLA provided the b a s i s f o r u n i t y 
w i t h i n the NUM. T h i s e f f e c t was obvious by 1972. So much so th a t the 
W i l b e r f o r c e Report, which provided the b a s i s f o r the settlement of the 1972 
s t r i k e , recommended the opening of immediate d i s c u s s i o n s on the 
i n t r o d u c t i o n of an i n c e n t i v e scheme. But i n 1974 - following intense 
campaigning by both l e f t and r i g h t - the miners r e j e c t e d a scheme i n a 
p i t h e a d b a l l o t ( i n which the NEC gave no recommendation) by 61.5% (Alle n , 
1981, 273: Rutledge, 1977). 
I n 1977, with the government atten^sting to impose a 10% pay l i m i t , the 
r i g h t r a i s e d the i s s u e again a t the n a t i o n a l conference, as an attenpt to 
s a t i s f y rank and f i l e resentment a t the l i m i t , without breaking i t . Despite 
being voted down, the NEC went ahead and negotiated an i n c e n t i v e scheme 
3 
My i n t e r v i e w s a t Murton confirm t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n - see 
chapter f i v e . 
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w i t h the NCB, which they submitted f o r a b a l l o t with a recommendation f o r 
acceptance ( A l l e n , 1981, 274; H a l l , 1981, 235) . The Kent area of the NUM 
promptly took the NEC to court, because i t was a c t i n g i n c l e a r defiance of 
union p o l i c y , and of the union c o n s i t i t u t i o n ( r u l e 8) which s t a t e s t h a t the 
NEC cannot a c t " c o n t r a r y t o or i n d e f i a n c e of Conference". Both the High 
Court and the Appeal Court decided t h a t a b a l l o t was p e r m i s s i b l e , because 
i t " i s the very essence of the democratic p r o c e s s " ( A l l e n , 1981, 277). 
To the s u r p r i s e of almost everyone, the ensuing b a l l o t r e j e c t e d the scheme 
(by 55.75%) . But Gormley, under p r e s s u r e from the government to keep the 
miners out of the annual percentage wages s t r u g g l e , and an ardent admirer 
of i n c e n t i v e schemes (Gormley, 1982, 66), allowed i n d i v i d u a l areas who had 
a c h i e v e d a m a j o r i t y f o r an i n c e n t i v e scheme to negotiate seperate Area 
d e a l s , c l a i m i n g t h a t the b a l l o t only r e j e c t e d a n a t i o n a l scheme (Allen, 
1981, 279). L e f t wing a r e a s went back to the c o u r t s , incensed by Gormley's 
c a v a l i e r d i s r e g a r d f o r the r e s u l t of the n a t i o n a l b a l l o t , and b o l s t e r e d by 
the Appeal Courts e a r l i e r v e r d i c t on the s a n c t i c i t y of b a l l o t s . However, Mr 
J u s t i c e Watkins d e v i s e d a new i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the union r u l e book, saying 
t h a t "the r e s u l t of a b a l l o t , n a t i o n a l l y conducted, i s not binding upon the 
NEC i n u s i n g i t s powers between conferences" (quoted i n i b i d , 280) . 
There seems l i t t l e doubt t h a t the Labour government regarded the i n c e n t i v e 
scheme as v i t a l i n removing the miners from the i n c r e a s i n g l y acrimonious 
o p p o s i t i o n to t h e i r stage t h r e e incomes p o l i c y ( H a l l , 1981, 235-237 and 
A l l e n , 1981, 278-9) . I n the longer term i t was p a r t of a concious s t r a t e g y 
by the NCB and the s t a t e t o weaken the power of the NUM (see d e t a i l s of the 
"Miron Report", i n F e i c k e r t , 1987, 10) Stage t h r e e of the S o c i a l Contract 
j u s t s u r v i v e d , with the help of i n c e n t i v e schemes, and at considerable 
c o s t . A n a t i o n a l firemens' s t r i k e had to be crushed, and p e n a l t i e s 
i n t r o d u c e d a g a i n s t f i r m s breaking the l i m i t . 
The government then t r i e d to iit^sose a a r t h year of pay r e s t r a i n t i n 1978, 
even t i g h t e r than the y e a r before. Th_i time union l e a d e r s had no hope of 
d e l i v e r i n g even p a s s i v e support f o r the government. Rank and f i l e 
o p p o s i t i o n was overwhelming, e s p e c i a l l y i n the low p a i d p u b l i c s e c t o r 
(Coates, 1980, 77-9) . The r e s u l t was the Winter of Discontent, as a b i t t e r 
and angry working c l a s s f a c e d a grim and h o s t i l e Labour government. 
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"Four y e a r s of wage r e s t r a i n t may have given B r i t i s h 
c a p i t a l i s m a b r e a t h i n g space on i n d u s t r i a l c o s t s , but 
they gave the Labour government i n the end i n d u s t r i a l 
u n r e s t and e l e c t o r a l d e f e a t . " ( i b i d ; 80.) 
But t h e d i s u n i t y engendered by the i n c e n t i v e scheme s u c c e s s f u l l y kept 
miners out of the s t r u g g l e s of the Winter of Discontent, and paved the way 
t o much more fundamental d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n the NUM. 
These d i v i s i o n s sprang from s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t f a c t o r s . At a p i t l e v e l , the 
AIS d i v i d e d d i f f e r e n t s e c t i o n s of workers, and gave management tremendous 
power t o manipulate earnings t o t h e i r advantage. I t d i v i d e d the areas 
between r e l a t i v e l y h i g h l y paid, secure jobs i n the c e n t r a l c o a l f i e l d , and 
the lower paid, i n s e c u r e jobs i n the p e r i p h e r a l c o a l f i e l d . I n combination 
w i t h MINOS, i t a l s o l e d to an immediate i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n i n the r a t e of 
e x p l o i t a t i o n of the workforce (Burns e t a l , 1985, 100-101; Bohen and 
Wroughton, 1988). 
I n r e t r o s p e c t t h e r e f o r e , the Labour government took two c r u c i a l steps which 
c o n t r i b u t e d to the d e s t a b i l i s a t i o n of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s i n the c o a l 
i n d u s t r y . I n the f i r s t p l a c e , the a l l e g e d s e c u r i t y o f f e r e d by the PFC, 
combined with repeated e x h o r t a t i o n s to s a c r i f i c e s e c t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s f o r 
the n a t i o n a l good, ensured t h a t the NUM was seperated from the mounting 
wave of labour u n r e s t which c h a r a c t e r i s e d the f i n a l years of the Callaghan 
government. Seperation l e d e v e n t u a l l y to i s o l a t i o n . Connected to t h i s was 
the reinforcement of a c o l l e c t i v e ideology w i t h i n the NUM t h a t the union's 
i n t e r e s t s could be guraranteed by the s t a t e . And i n the second place, the 
AIS began the process of i n t e r n a l l y fragmenting the union. 
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4.3 1979-1984: HEADLONG INTO CONFRONTATION 
4.3. i COAL AND CRISIS 
I n the e a r l y 1970's a t e n ^ o r a r y h a l t i n the long term d e c l i n e of the c o a l 
i n d u s t r y seemed to o f f e r new hope to the miners (see t a b l e 4.1). But short 
term advantages r a p i d l y metamorphosed i n t o longer term problems. The o i l 
p r i c e r i s e s s t i m u l a t e d the market f o r c o a l i n the short term, but 
encouraged energy m u l t i n a t i o n a l s to i n v e s t i n c o a l production overseas. 
Within B r i t a i n , p o t e n t i a l s h o r t term energy shortages met with a s i m i l a r 
s t r a t e g y to the 1950's p e r i o d of c o a l shortages - the NCB was s u b s i d i s e d by 
the s t a t e to provide cheap energy, and n e u t r a l i s e the power of the NUM. 
However, c o n d i t i o n s were ve r y d i f f e r e n t i n the 1970's. Up u n t i l the 1970's, 
c e r t a i n s e c t o r s of the B r i t i s h economy remained r e l a t i v e l y immune to d i r e c t 
competition from imports. Coal and s t e e l were perhaps the c l a s s i c exaii5>les. 
I t had t h e r e f o r e been i n the i n t e r e s t s of B r i t i s h c a p i t a l to support and 
s u b s i d i s e these i n d u s t r i e s , and n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n provided a mechanism to 
supply t h e s e b a s i c raw m a t e r i a l s at low p r i c e s . Coal was of course 
t h r e a t e n e d by imports of replacement f u e l s , but here again n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n 
was f u n c t i o n a l f o r c a p i t a l i n smoothing a managed rundown of the i n d u s t r y . 
By the 1970's the world economy had changed. I n both s t e e l and c o a l . T h i r d 
World production (financed by m u l t i n a t i o n a l c a p i t a l ) was a v a i l a b l e at 
r e l a t i v e l y low p r i c e s . Revolutions i n communications and tr a n s p o r t 
technology meant t h a t some of t h i s c o a l and s t e e l could p o t e n t i a l l y be s o l d 
i n European markets at l e s s than the p r i c e of domestic production. But 
corporate agreements between consumers and producers i n c o u n t r i e s l i k e 
B r i t a i n blocked imports. 
I n B r i t a i n , p r e s s u r e b u i l t up to break down the p r o t e c t e d markets. This i n 
t u r n was r e l a t e d to changes w i t h i n the s t r u c t u r e of c a p i t a l . Since World 
War Two, notions of " n a t i o n a l ec-fiomies" had crumbled, as t r a n s n a t i o n a l 
c a p i t a l - operating from i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c e c e n t r e s - conquered branch 
a f t e r branch of production. Now, huge energy m u l t i n a t i o n a l s such as S h e l l 
and BP had assumed even g r e a t e r dominance w i t h i n the B r i t i s h economy. With 
t h e i r massive i n t e r e s t s i n overseas c o a l production, they a p p l i e d t h e i r 
p o l i t i c a l power to break down the NCB monopoly supply of c o a l (Sweet, 1985, 
208) . 
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P r e s s u r e f o r an a t t a c k on the c o a l i n d u s t r y came from other m u l t i n a t i o n a l 
congloioerates i n the energy establishment too. S i n c e the 1960's, the s t a t e 
had been attempting to get out of c o a l and i n t o n u c l e a r power. So v i t a l i s 
energy t o the f u n c t i o n i n g of a modern c a p i t a l i s t economy that the 
o v e r r i d i n g aim became t o provide a c e n t r a l i s e d i n d u s t r y i n s u l a t e d from a l l 
e x t e r n a l f o r c e s . Nuclear power f i t t e d the b i l l . Huge c o n s t r u c t i o n 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l s ( l i k e T a y l o r Woodrow and Win^seys) and energy conglomerates 
( l i k e GEC, NEI and Babcock Power) have b i l l i o n s of pounds at stake i n 
B r i t a i n and i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y , and t h e i r p r e s s u r e was instrumental i n 
i n s u l a t i n g the n u c l e a r i n d u s t r y from p o l i t i c a l and economic a t t a c k (Sweet, 
1985; see a l s o t a b l e s 4.3 and 4.4). 
I n t h e s e two areas the economic p r e s s u r e on the UK c o a l i n d u s t r y i s 
encapsulated. These p r e s s u r e s i n t u r n r e l a t e back to one of Marx's most 
fundamental concepts, namely t h a t the p r i c e of a commodity r e l a t e s to the 
amount of s o c i a l l y n e c e s s a r y labour time needed to produce i t (Marx, 19G8). 
Coal i s a commodity which can be produced not only by d i f f e r e n t 
t e c h n o l o g i e s , but a l s o by t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t techniques. There are t h e r e f o r e 
massive v a r i a t i o n s i n the s o c i a l l y n e c e s s a r y labour time req u i r e d to 
produce c o a l . No matter what the l e v e l of s o p h i s t i c a t i o n i n v o l v e d i n deep 
mining, opencast c o a l mining r e q u i r e s i n t r i n s i c a l l y l e s s labour time than 
deep mines. Furthermore, w i t h i n deep mining - as s e c t i o n 4.2.i showed -
t h e r e a r e g r e a t v a r i a t i o n s i n s o c i a l l y n e c e s s a r y labour time r e q u i r e d per 
tonne, dependant on l e v e l s of investment, and on g e o l o g i c a l conditions. 
H e a v i l y worked out underground d i s t r i c t s r e q u i r e g r e a t e r labour i n t e n s i t y , 
and most B r i t i s h p i t s work i n p a r t i a l l y mined workings. This production i s 
i n c r e a s i n g l y f o r c e d to coit^ete with v i r g i n overseas opencast workings i n 
almost u n l i m i t e d supply (Beynon, 1987) . Overseas mines have one f u r t h e r 
advantage - the p r i c e of labour i s often r e l a t i v e l y low because the p r i c e 
of labour reproduction i s much lower than developed c o u n t r i e s . 
Faced w i t h such competition, the B r i t i s h c o a l i n d u s t r y ' s h i s t o r i c d e c l i n e 
begins t o assume a c h a r a c t e r of i n e v i t a b i l i t y . But added to the economic 
p r e s s u r e s on the i n d u s t r y was a p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g y engineered by the Tory 
government t o win back a r e a s of c o n t r o l which had been ceded to labour 
d u r i n g the PWS - p a r t i c u l a r l y v i a corporate agreements i n the s t a t e s e c t o r . 
The r u l e of the market was t o be iirposed as a supposedly d e p o l i t i c i s e d 
mechanism f o r economic r e s t r u c t u r i n g (chapter two). Given the h i s t o r i c 
s t r e n g t h of the NUM, the scene was s e t f o r an almost i n e v i t a b l e c o n f l i c t . 
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So long as the union was committed to defending members jobs - and 
t h e r e f o r e i m p l i c i t l y c h a l l e n g i n g the market mechanism - then a c o n f l i c t was 
i n e v i t a b l e . T h i s p o l i t i c a l dimension to the emerging c o n f l i c t i s examined 
i n the f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n . 
4 . 3 . i i THE ORGANISED STATE OFFENSIVE AGAINST LABOUR 
With the e l e c t i o n of the Conservative government i n 1979, a t t a c k s on the 
d e f e n s i v e s t r e n g t h of the working c l a s s r a p i d l y b u i l t up. The s c a l e and 
s u c c e s s of r e s i s t a n c e to the Heath government had rocked B r i t i s h c a p i t a l , 
and the s t a t e . I n p a r t i c u l a r , the impact of 2 s u c c e s s f u l miners s t r i k e s 
s ent shock waves through the establishment. Of the 1972 s t r i k e , Brendan 
S e w i l l (then s p e c i a l a d v i s o r t o the C h a n c e l l o r ) wrote: 
"At the time, many of those i n p o s i t i o n s of i n f l u e n c e 
looked i n t o the abyss and saw only a few days away the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of the country being plunged i n t o a s t a t e 
of chaos not so very f a r removed from t h a t which might 
p r e v a i l a f t e r a minor n u c l e a r a t t a c k . " (Quoted i n 
J e f f r e y and Hennessy, 1983, 238.) 
The d e f e n s i v e s t r e n g t h of the working c l a s s had to be broken, and i t was 
the s t a t e t h a t l e d the a s s a u l t . 
T h i s i n a way c o n s t i t u t e s the f i n a l s t r a n d i n the s t a t e s ' o f f e n s i v e against 
the c o a l i n d u s t r y . Defeating the NUM became one b i g step on the road to 
d e f e a t i n g the r e s i s t a n c e of the organised labour movement i n B r i t a i n . I n 
the long term, the s t a t e aimed to r e d e f i n e trade unionism i n B r i t a i n along 
the p u r e l y i n s t r i j m e n t a l l i n e s d e s c r i b e d i n chapters two and three. 
D e f e a t i n g the NUM would c o n s t i t u t e a milestone along t h i s road. 
I n t h i s context, the notorious R i d l e y Report on the n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s 
deserves a t t e n t i o n . Conceived when the T o r i e s were s t i l l i n opposition, the 
Report l a i d down a blue p r i n t f o r d e a l i n g with the n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s 
under a f u t u r e Conservative goverment. I n an annexe to the main report, a 
d e t a i l e d s t r a t e g y was o u t l i n e d f o r d e a l i n g with a " p o l i t i c a l t h r e a t " from 
enemies of the next Tory government i n a "vulnerable i n d u s t r y " such as 
c o a l , e l e c t r i c i t y or the docks (see Beynon and McMylor, 1985, 35-36) . I t 
p r e d i c t e d t h a t the most l i k e l y major t h r e a t would come from the NUM. The 
C o n s e r v a t i v e s understood c l e a r l y t h a t t h e i r s t r a t e g y would r e q u i r e the 
deployment of massive re s o u r c e s i n order to break the NUM's r e s i s t a n c e , and 
consequently they planned thoroughly and acted c a u t i o u s l y . 
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The 1984/5 s t r i k e showed t h a t the T o r i e s had made t h e i r preparations w e l l . 
I n the f i r s t f i v e y ears of the Thatcher government, s u c c e s s i v e b a t t l e s were 
fought a g a i n s t the labour movement. I n 1979 i t was BL, i n 1981 c i v i l 
s e r v a n t s , and i n 1982 h e a l t h workers and t r a i n d r i v e r s . Each union fought 
alone; p a r t l y a legacy of the economism unions s t r u c t u r a l l y tend towards 
(chapter t h r e e ) , and p a r t l y because t h i s tendency was accentuated by the 
l e g a c y of c o r p o r a t i s t agreements i n the post war y e a r s . The TUC stood by as 
unions came under a t t a c k , u n w i l l i n g to f i g h t back. 
"But the t r a d e union l e a d e r s had played much the same 
r o l e i n the e a r l y 1970's. The impulse t o f i g h t had come 
then from below, from the rank and f i l e . Thatcher 
b e n e f i t t e d from the e f f e c t of 5 years of Labour 
government, from the e r o s i o n of shop f l o o r 
o r g a n i s a t i o n . M i l i t a n t s no longer f e l t confident enough 
to f i g h t independently of the union l e a d e r s . To t h i s 
was added the e f f e c t of mass unen^loyment. For the 
f i r s t time s i n c e the 1930's the t h r e a t , and only too 
o f t e n the r e a l i t y of the dole queue, faced every 
m i l i t a n t trade u n i o n i s t . " ( C a l l i n i c o s and Simons, 1985; 
37.) 
As was noted i n chapter two, one of the main methods adopted by Thatcherism 
to achieve i t s aims, was to use i t s c o n t r o l over the s t a t e s e c t o r to 
provide a high p r o f i l e "demonstration e f f e c t " to the p r i v a t e s e c t o r . The 
new government understood w e l l the dynamics of c l a s s s t r u g g l e . I n 
p a r t i c u l a r , they knew the value of d i v i d e and r u l e , and the demoralisation 
which spread throughout the working c l a s s when a major defeat occurred, 
even i f i t i n v o l v e d r e l a t i v e l y few workers. So the s t a t e s e c t o r was 
a t t a c k e d hard, through B r i t i s h Leyland, B r i t i s h S t e e l , c i v i l servants, 
h e a l t h s e r v i c e workers, and so on. The s t a t e was able to stand the 
f i n a n c i a l c o s t of such d i s p u t e s , where c a p i t a l might have been forced onto 
the d e f e n s i v e i f i t had born the f i n a n c i a l brunt of the a t t a c k . At the same 
time, a t t a c k i n g the s t a t e s e c t o r served the i d e o l o g i c a l purpose of 
r e i n s t a t i n g the r u l e of the market as the b a s i c p r i n c i p l e of production and 
d i s t r i b u t i o n . T h i s i n t u r n r e l a t e d to the attempt to remove the operation 
of the market from the p o l i t i c a l sphere, and e s t a b l i s h i t s unin^eded 
op e r a t i o n a t the c e n t r e of a new consensus. 
4 . 3 . i i i HEADLONG TOWARDS CONFLICT 
However, the NUM s t i l l seemed to have the answer to the Tory s t r a t e g y . I n 
1981 the passage of the government's Coal I n d u s t r y Act threatened an 
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a c c e l e r a t i o n of p i t c l o s u r e s . S u b s i d i e s were to be removed, and the 
i n d u s t r y i n s t r u c t e d to break even by the end of 1984. Job l o s s e s seemed 
i n e v i t a b l e . However, l e f t and r i g h t on the NEC showed a r a r e f l a s h of 
unanimity, and t h r e a t e n e d n a t i o n a l s t r i k e a c t i o n . Within days p i c k e t s had 
c l o s e d down the Y o r k s h i r e and South Wales c o a l f i e l d s , and the a c t i o n looked 
c e r t a i n to spread ( H a l l , 1981) . R e a l i s i n g they were unprepared, the 
government p u l l e d back from the b r i n k of c o n f r o n t a t i o n (MacGregor, 1986, 
116) . 
F o l l o w i n g the 1981 s k i r m i s h , the NCB opted f o r a l e s s c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l 
approach. P i t s continued to c l o s e , and manpower to rundown (see t a b l e s 4.8 
and 4.9), but t h ey d i d so q u i e t l y , w i t h i n agreed procedures. Ned Smith, 
former I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s d i r e c t o r of the NCB d e s c r i b e d at a p i J ^ l i c 
l e c t u r e i n Durham i n 1986, how the i s s u e s i n v o l v e d i n p i t c l o s u r e s could be 
fudged. He claimed t h a t the NCB had c l o s e d 800 p i t s without mentioning 
economics. They were c l o s e d because they were " o l d and buggered". Since 
exhaustion and g e o l o g i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s are u l t i m a t e l y economic concepts (as 
r e c o g n i s e d i n PFC, which acknowledged t h a t l a c k of investment had decreased 
c o l l i e r y r e s e r v e s , and t h a t investment would i n c r e a s e them), then fudging 
was easy, e s p e c i a l l y i f the union accepted the b l u r r e d d i s t i n c t i o n s . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , the government was not i d l e . Defeating the NUM was s t i l l high 
on the agenda. Government s t r a t e g y was s e t by the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission (MMC) Report on the f u t u r e of the i n d u s t r y (1981) . I t spoke i n 
terms of c u t t i n g out the "high c o s t t a i l " of l o s s making p i t s . Management 
should be reorganised, and the i n d u s t r y s u b j e c t e d to the " f r e e market". 
S u b s i d i e s would g r a d u a l l y be removed, r e t u r n i n g the i n d u s t r y to 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y (see Glyn, 1984; O'Donnell, 1985; F i n e , 1984 and C u t l e r e t 
a l , 1985 f o r c r i t i q u e s of the economic r a t i o n a l e behind the NCB/government 
s t r a t e g y ) . T h i s s t r a t e g y l i n k e d with the p o l i c y of s u b j e c t i n g s t a t e 
i n d u s t r i e s to the r u l e of the market (as a prelude to p r i v a t i s a t i o n ) , and 
of d e f e a t i n g one of the s t r o n g e s t unions i n the country. Imposing the 
s t r a t e g y would r e q u i r e defeat f o r the NUM, whether i n an a l l out c o n f l i c t , 
or by g r a d u a l l y d e s t r o y i n g the unions c r e d i b i l i t y - f o r example v i a a 
s e r i e s of f a i l e d attempts to m o b i l i s e the membership over i n d i v i d u a l p i t 
c l o s u r e s . To t h i s end, redundancy payments were developed to d i v i d e and 
weaken o p p o s i t i o n to p i t c l o s u r e s w i t h i n the union (see chapter f i v e ) . 
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Opposition to p i t c l o s u r e s among rank and f i l e miners began to mount i n the 
1980's. Massive unemployment f u e l l e d a determination to prevent the 
seemingly r e l e n t l e s s subjugation of people to a b s t r a c t economic laws. 
W h i l s t the NCB s t r a t e g y from 1981 u n t i l 1984 was s u c c e s s f u l i n the sense 
t h a t i t avoided an a l l out c o n f r o n t a t i o n , i t was n e i t h e r uncontested nor 
smooth. However, the o p p o s i t i o n t h a t emerged was not consolidated. Closures 
proved h i g h l y d i v i s i v e , with miners i n r e l a t i v e l y secure employment 
r e l u c t a n t to make s a c r i f i c e s f o r those under t h r e a t . The i s s u e a f f e c t e d 
miners of d i f f e r e n t ages, and those l i v i n g i n d i f f e r e n t p l a c e s , very 
d i f f e r e n t l y . The union became i n c r e a s i n g l y d i v i d e d and weakened as three 
s u c c e s s i v e b a l l o t s f a i l e d to win a m a j o r i t y f o r s t r i k e a c t i o n (see t a b l e 
4.10). The u n i t y of r i g h t and l e f t i n 1981 s l i p p e d away i n a s e r i e s of 
b i t t e r and h u m i l i a t i n g r e t r e a t s and d e f e a t s . I t began to look as i f the 
government would get a v i c t o r y over the NUM without having to engage i n 
open b a t t l e . 
I n A p r i l 1982 Arthur S c a r g i l l r e p l a c e d Joe Gormley as n a t i o n a l P r e s i d e n t . 
He had been e l e c t e d the p r e v i o u s year with an overwhelming 70.3% of the 
v otes c a s t , and h i s campaign had g a l v a n i s e d a c t i v i s t s across the country. 
People voted f o r S c a r g i l l wanting a l e a d e r who would stand up to the NCB. 
S e v e r a l men I i n t e r v i e w e d who broke the s t r i k e s t a r t e d o f f as supporters of 
S c a r g i l l ^ . Armed with conference p o l i c y a s s e r t i n g uncon^romising opposition 
t o p i t c l o s u r e s , S c a r g i l l a r r i v e d with a c l e a r mandate to f i g h t c l o s u r e s . 
But the next two y e a r s were f r u s t r a t i n g ^ . I n November 1982 a n a t i o n a l 
b a l l o t was held, l i n k i n g pay and p i t c l o s u r e s , and recommending i n d u s t r i a l 
a c t i o n i f demands were not met. Only 39% supported the c a l l ( i n Durham, 
only 31% - see t a b l e 4.10). 
The f o l l o w i n g month came the c o n t r o v e r s i a l c l o s u r e of K i n n e i l i n Scotland. 
When the a g r e s s i v e S c o t t i s h Area d i r e c t o r A l b e r t Wheeler announced the p i t s 
' ^ S c a r g i l l ' s oppents were: B e l l (17.3%), Chadburn ( 9 . 1 % ) , Donaghy 
(3.3%) 
^One Murton a c t i v i s t s p eculated p l a u s i b l y t h a t many r i g h t wingers 
hoped t h a t S c a r g i l l would f r i g h t e n the NCB i n t o conceding b e t t e r pay and 
c o n d i t i o n s , as they thought he had i n Y o r k s h i r e . 
^Even before S c a r g i l l assumed o f f i c e , a n a t i o n a l b a l l o t on pay 
accepted an NCB o f f e r by 55%. 
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c l o s u r e on December 17th, the men launched a s i t down p r o t e s t over 
Chr i s t m a s . The recent b a l l o t , although r e j e c t i n g s t r i k e a c t i o n n a t i o n a l l y , 
had r e t u r n e d a 69% vote f o r a c t i o n i n Scotland. The K i n n e i l miners were 
a c t i n g i n l i n e with conference d e c i s i o n s . The S c o t t i s h Area o f f i c i a l s 
however persuaded the a r e a e x e c u t i v e and c o u n c i l t h a t Scotland would be 
i s o l a t e d i f they took a c t i o n (Textile, 1983; 31, C a l l i n i c o s and Simons, 
1985; 43; McCormack, 1989). The NCB's "salami t a c t i c s " - t a k i n g out a p i t 
and an area one a t a time - seemed to be working. S c o t t i s h opposition 
appeared to be n e u t r a l i s e d . 
The next defeat f o r the union came i n South Wales over Tymawr Lewis 
Merthyr. A f t e r i t s c l o s u r e was announced i n e a r l y 1983, the men staged a 
s t a y down p r o t e s t . The South Wales Area had won an overwhelming endorsement 
f o r s t r i k e a c t i o n i n a b a l l o t f o r s t r i k e a c t i o n i n the event of f a i l u r e to 
i n v e s t i n the c o a l f i e l d , and had c o n s i s t e n t l y voted f o r s t r i k e a c t i o n over 
p i t c l o s u r e s i n n a t i o n a l b a l l o t s (see t a b l e 4.10). Yet amid angry scenes at 
a South Wales delegate conference, the delegates decided to hold an Area 
b a l l o t . The Guardian reported: 
"As the delegate conference at Bridgend concluded, 
s t r i k i n g miners marched i n deinanding an immediate 
c o a l f i e l d s t r i k e and h a l t e d a p r e s s conference being 
given by the South Wales miners' P r e s i d e n t Mr Emlyn 
Williams with loud chants of 'out now' and c r i e s of 
' s o l d down the r i v e r ' . . . There were angry scenes 
however, as Mr Williams l e f t the h a l l , amid boos and 
i n s u l t s . He was confronted by s t r i k e r s demanding to 
know why he had not iirplemented a mandate to s t r i k e 
once the Board confirmed p l a n s to c l o s e another p i t . " 
(Guardian, February 24th 1983, quoted i n Temple, 1983; 
35.) 
An emergency NEC meeting was c a l l e d on March 3rd, with S c a r g i l l apparently 
arguing f o r a s t r i k e under r u l e 41, which allows the NEC to authorise Area 
s t r i k e s ( C a l l i n i c o s and Simons, 1985; 43) . However the NEC voted f o r 
another n a t i o n a l b a l l o t , and again only 39% supported a c t i o n (see t a b l e 
4.10) . 
By now many rank and f i l e a c t i v i s t s were ques t i o n i n g the v a l i d i t y of a 
n a t i o n a l b a l l o t on the c l o s u r e i s s u e (see appendix three f o r a d i s c u s s i o n 
of the b a l l o t i s s u e ) . C e r t a i n s e c t i o n s , notably i n the Midlands and the 
white c o l l a r workers (COSA) were c o n s i s t e n t l y v o t i n g l e s s than 25% f o r 
s t r i k e a c t i o n (see t a b l e 4.10). As Beynon p o i n t s out, the March b a l l o t was 
a d e c i s i v e event i n t h i s context. 
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"Nottingham and the Midlands, so many people argued, 
would never support threatened miners i n South Wales, 
Scotland and the North E a s t . " (Beynon, 1985a; 11.) 
I n the l e f t , the argument about "the b a l l o t " began to gather momentum. 
On October 31st the NUM began a n a t i o n a l overtime ban over pay, following 
the d e c i s i o n of a S p e c i a l Delegate Conference, and a l s o f o l l o w i n g c l o s e on 
t h e h e e l s of the appointment of I a n MacGregor as NCB Chairman (on September 
1 s t ) . There followed a four month low i n t e n s i t y war of a t t r i t i o n between 
union and management, with most of the s k i r m i s h e s t a k i n g p l a c e i n the 
e x p l o s i v e Y o r k s h i r e area. I n March 1984, b a t t l e was j o i n e d . 
T h i s s e c t i o n has reviewed the p r e s s u r e s c l o s i n g i n on the miners at a 
n a t i o n a l s c a l e . I t has shown t h a t the government became committed to 
d e f e a t i n g the NUM as p a r t of i t s s t r a t e g y of r e a s s e r t i n g the r u l e of the 
market as a d e - p o l i t i c i s e d b a s i s f o r economic d e c i s i o n making, and f o r 
d e c i s i v e l y r e - e s t a b l i s h i n g c a p i t a l i s t power over labour. The NUM was unable 
to m o b i l i s e e f f e c t i v e l y a g a i n s t p i t c l o s u r e s because of the d i v i s i v e 
e f f e c t s of the AIS, and a l s o because at a deeper l e v e l the legacy of post 
war c o r p o r a t i s m was a coit^lete f a i l u r e to c h a l l e n g e the s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s 
which s u b j e c t e d miners to the harsh consequences of c a p i t a l i s t 
r e s t r u c t u r i n g . 
I t has however a l r e a d y been pointed out t h a t t h e r e were sharp r e g i o n a l 
d i f f e r e n c e s i n the way t h a t the NCB's r e s t r u c t u r i n g was experienced and 
understood. I n the f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n , I focus on Durham, showing how the 
p o l i t i c a l and economic p r e s s u r e s b u i l d i n g up on the union were experienced 
i n t h i s t r a d i t i o n a l l y moderate c o a l f i e l d . L e f t wing f o r c e s gathered 
s t r e n g t h as the arrangements of the PWS were i n c r e a s i n g l y seen to have 
f a i l e d t h e p i t s and communities of the c o a l f i e l d . The NCB's o f f e n s i v e 
d e s t a b i l i s e d r e l a t i o n s at p i t and area l e v e l , c r e a t i n g a p o l i t i c a l gap 
which th e l e f t began to f i l l . 
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4.4: THE DURHAM COALFIELD 1947-1984 
4. 4 . i TO THE EDGE OF EXTINCTION - THE DURHAM COALFIELD UP TO 1978 
I n many ways Durham today r e p r e s e n t s the a r c h e t y p a l " p e r i p h e r a l " c o a l f i e l d , 
although i n the n i n e t e e n t h century i t was one of the ce n t r e s of the world 
c o a l i n d u s t r y . Perhaps the e a r l i e s t c o a l workings i n B r i t a i n were found 
along the banks of the Tyne - going back to Roman times. I n the nineteenth 
c e n t u r y the Durham c o a l f i e l d was the biggest i n the world, and the i n d u s t r y 
formed the backbone of an i n t e g r a t e d economy; c o a l , coke, s t e e l , 
s h i p b u i l d i n g , e n g i n e e r i n g and r a i l w a y s . As w e l l as he l p i n g make them, c o a l 
a l s o f u e l l e d the s h i p s and t r a i n s . I n common with the r e s t of the B r i t i s h 
c o a l i n d u s t r y , peak output was reached i n 1913 (see t a b l e 4.11). Since then 
i t has been i n almost u n i n t e r r u p t e d absolute and r e l a t i v e d e c l i n e , w h i l s t 
t h e r e l a t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e of the lat e - d e v e l o p i n g " c e n t r a l " c o a l f i e l d s has 
grown. 
Trade unionism has a long h i s t o r y i n the c o a l f i e l d , with b i t t e r b a t t l e s 
being fought between owners and miners i n the eighteenth and e a r l y 
n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s (see Douglass, 1972). But when the Durham Miners 
A s s o c i a t i o n (DMA) was f i n a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1870, i t was more i n the 
t r a d i t i o n of a c r a f t union than an i n d u s t r i a l union (see Hyman, 1975, 
45-47). I t s l e a d e r s h i p was p o l i t i c a l l y l i b e r a l , s t e e r i n g a path of 
compromise with the owners i n the face of repeated rank and f i l e r e v o l t s . 
"From i t s very i n c e p t i o n the Durham Miners A s s o c i a t i o n 
l e a d e r s h i p adopted a p o l i c y of c o n c i l i a t i o n and 
ac c o r d i n g l y i t spent a l a r g e p a r t of i t s time i n 
s t r u g g l e s not with the owners and t h e i r agents but with 
the rank and f i l e . " (Douglass, 1972, 45-46) 
(See Wilson, 1907 f o r an opposing view). 
Nine y e a r s l a t e r , the Durham C o l l i e r y Mechanics A s s o c i a t i o n (DCMA) was 
formed as a s m a l l , breakaway c r a f t union. The s p l i t o r i g i n a t e d i n the 
b e l i e f t h a t c r a f t workers "could make b e t t e r terms f o r themelves as a 
sep a r a t e body" ( H a l l , 1929, 1) . Not s u r p r i s i n g l y t h e r e f o r e , the mechanics 
maintained a s t r o n g l y c o n s e r v a t i v e and s e c t i o n a l t r a d i t i o n . This formal 
o r g a n i s a t i o n a l d i v i s i o n between miners and mechanics has remained u n t i l the 
p r e s e n t , unique to Durham, Northxunberland and Scotland, and i t has had 
important i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r p o l i t i c a l development w i t h i n the c o a l f i e l d . (A 
f u r t h e r breakaway group - the winding enginemen - a l s o formed a separate 
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A s s o c i a t i o n , but t h e i r p o l i t i c a l impact has been r e l a t i v e l y s l i g h t , and I 
have chosen not t o study them i n t h i s research''.) 
Although one of the most m i l i t a n t areas i n the 1926 s t r i k e , (when the 
membership voted to continue the s t r i k e a f t e r nine months d e s p i t e s u f f e r i n g 
a p p a l l i n g h a r d s h i p ) , f o l l o w i n g t h i s defeat the union adopted a c o n c i l i a t o r y 
p r o f i l e . Taking advantage of the rank and f i l e ' s c o l l a p s e i n morale, the 
r i g h t wing secured c o n t r o l of the union, and s t e e r e d i t i n an openly 
c o l l a b o r a t i o n i s t d i r e c t i o n . Sam Watson, who dominated the DMA from before 
World War Two u n t i l the end of the 1950's, was a l s o a s e n i o r member of the 
Labour P a r t y , and f e r v e n t l y opposed both to Communism and rank and f i l e 
m i l i t a n c y . He r u t h l e s s l y crushed opposition w i t h i n the union to maintain 
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i t s r i g h t wing Labour p r o f i l e (Durham NUM, 1987) . 
When n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n was f i n a l l y achieved i n 1947, the Durham c o a l f i e l d was 
s t i l l t h e l a r g e s t i n the country with over 120 p i t s and 100000 miners 
(Garside, 1971). But i t was i n h i s t o r i c a l d e c l i n e , and t h i s d e c l i n e 
a c c e l e r a t e d to the p o i n t where the 1984 s t r i k e i n v o l v e d j u s t 15000 thousand 
miners from eleven p i t s i n Durham (see t a b l e 4.9 and 4.11, and graphs 
5-11). I n i t i a l l y however, the c o a l f i e l d b e n e f i t t e d from the i n s a t i a b l e post 
war demand f o r f u e l . And the 1950 P l a n For Coal was r e l a t i v e l y o p t i m i s t i c 
about the f u t u r e , f o r e c a s t i n g s i m i l a r output f o r the Durham c o a l f i e l d i n 
1961-65 as i n 1949 (RPRU, 1979). 
However, the West of the c o a l f i e l d was d e s c r i b e d as "one of the i n d u s t r y ' s 
b i g g e s t problems" (quoted i n RPRU, 1979, 19) . N evertheless, the NCB i m p l i e d 
t h a t t h e s e problems were not insurmountable, but depended on s u f f i c i e n t 
investment being committed. The 1944/5 Survey of the c o a l f i e l d confirmed 
t h a t although e a s i l y a c c e s s i b l e r e s e r v e s had been depleted, t h e r e were 592 
Mt of economically and p h y s i c a l l y recoverable c o a l i n the West Durham 
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At the end of 1988 the NUM reorganised the v a r i o u s North E a s t 
unions i n t o a s i n g l e "North E a s t Area" of the NXM. However, a t p i t l e v e l 
miners and mechanics continue to be organised i n t o seperate branches, with 
s e p e r a t e committees. 
My i n t e r v i e w s with o l d e r miners at Murton, and with other miners 
i n the Durham c o a l f i e l d supported t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
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c o a l f i e l d , of which 226 Mt were "prime coking c o a l " . Despite these high 
q u a l i t y r e s e r v e s , p i t s i n West Durham were the f i r s t to c l o s e when the 
n a t i o n a l demand f o r c o a l began to c o l l a p s e i n the l a t e 50's. 
There were s p o r a d i c attempts to r e s i s t p i t c l o s u r e s i n the 1950's and 60's 
i n Durham, but the union squashed any s i g n s of m i l i t a n c y . The unions and 
Labour P a r t y were deeply enmeshed i n a c l a s s c o l l a b o r a t i o n i s t p o l i c y with 
the r e g i o n a l b o u r g e o i s i e . Indeed, the l a t t e r were remarkably s u c c e s s f u l i n 
c o n s o l i d a t i n g a profound consensus around the p o l i c i e s and expenditure 
r e q u i r e d f o r r e g i o n a l modernisation, which was v i t a l f o r them given the 
dominance of Labour a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s i n the region (Carney e t a l , 1977, 65) . 
The Labour P a r t y remained hegemonic i n the region d e s p i t e (or because of) 
the d e c l i n e of t r a d i t i o n a l i n d u s t r i e s . Union and p a r t y were very c l o s e l y 
l i n k e d , with the DMA r e t a i n i n g s i g n i f i c a n c e w e l l beyond i t s d e c l i n i n g 
membership. 
As markets c o n t r a c t e d i n the 1960's, and i t became c l e a r t h a t the Labour 
P a r t y ' s p r e - e l e c t i o n commitments to maintain the i n d u s t r y would not be 
honoured, the pace of p i t c l o s u r e s i n Durham a c c e l e r a t e d (see appendix two 
and t a b l e 4.2). As government p o l i c y i n c r e a s e d the p r e s s u r e on the NCB, 
c l o s u r e d e c i s i o n s became haphazard and a r b i t r a r y (Krieger, 1979). 
D e m o r a l i s a t i o n swamped the c o a l f i e l d . A f t e r 1966 the NPLA added to 
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , because f o r many miners - e s p e c i a l l y the h i g h e s t p a i d f a c e 
workers - wages began to f a l l . Miners l e f t the i n d u s t r y i n thousands 
(encouraged by growing government sponsorship of redundancy schemes), or 
headed down to the more secure c e n t r a l c o a l f i e l d s (aided by NCB t r a n s f e r 
g r a n t s ) . I n other words, because th e r e were no c o l l e c t i v e responses 
a v a i l a b l e , miners pursued i n d i v i d u a l s o l u t i o n s (a s t r a t e g y c o n s c i o u s l y 
encouraged by the s t a t e ) - e i t h e r by l e a v i n g the i n d u s t r y altogether, or 
t r a n s f e r r i n g to s a f e r , b e t t e r p a i d jobs. 
However, as s e c t i o n 4.1 above showed, by the l a t e 1960's these i n d i v i d u a l 
s o l u t i o n s were i n c r e a s i n g l y u n a v a i l a b l e . Unerqsloyment was r i s i n g , and fewer 
\ i t h the decimation of the West Durham c o a l f i e l d i n the 1960's, 
i t i s e s t i m a t e d t h a t a t l e a s t 100 Mt of prime coking c o a l was abandoned, 
along w i t h approximately 300 Mt of other p h y s i c a l l y r e c o v e r a b l e c o a l (see 
RPRU), 1979, 100). 
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jobs were a v a i l a b l e i n the c e n t r a l c o a l f i e l d . Although the pre-1972 s t r i k e 
wave only penetrated v e r y b r i e f l y i n t o Durham, the 1972 s t r i k e was very 
s o l i d l y supported. T h i s s t r i k e had a c r u c i a l impact on union p o l i t i c s . I t 
ended a c h a i n of events unbroken s i n c e 1926. The ideology, deeply embedded 
and promoted s i n c e then, t h a t " s t r i k i n g gets you nowhere" was toppled. 
Confirmation came i n 1974 when Durham miners voted by an unprecedented 
85.7% f o r s t r i k e a c t i o n . 
Rank and f i l e m i l i t a n c y i n 1972 seemed s u r p r i s i n g given the long slumber of 
union a c t i v i t y s i n c e 1926. But Durham too witnessed an explosion as the 
pent up f r u s t r a t i o n s of years of d e c l i n i n g wages, p i t c l o s u r e s , and r i s i n g 
unemployment at l a s t found exp r e s s i o n . The depth of f e e l i n g was 
demonstrated by the uncoir^sromising and r e l e n t l e s s p i c k e t i n g of NACODS 
(Na t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n of C o l l i e r y Overmen, Deputies and S h o t f i r e r s - the 
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s u p e r v i s o r s union) members a t many p i t s . So h o s t i l e was t h i s p i c k e t i n g 
t h a t some deputies s u f f e r e d p s y c h o l o g i c a l problems a f t e r the dispute, and 
l e f t t h e i n d u s t r y . At p i t l e v e l , miners and mechanics cooperated 
e x t e n s i v e l y , beginning to wear away some of the entrenched h i s t o r i c a l 
s u s p i c i o n (evidence from i n t e r v i e w s ) . 
Although t h e r e were major gains i n consciousness achieved by way of the 
1972 and 1974 s t r i k e a c t i o n , i t i s important to recognise the l i m i t s to 
t h i s p r o c e s s . M o b i l i s a t i o n was based on a s e c t i o n a l demand (notwithstanding 
the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the miners' v i c t o r y f o r the advancement of other 
workers i n t e r e s t s ) . As such, i t was not s u r p r i s i n g to see the m a j o r i t y of 
Durham miners - i n common with miners a c r o s s the country - subside i n t o 
complacency and i s o l a t i o n i s m f o l l o w i n g the apparent v i c t o r y represented by 
the PFC (see chapter f i v e ) . The 1974 s t r i k e and subsequent s i g n i n g of PFC 
confirmed miners i n t h e i r b e l i e f i n the l e g i t i m a c y of pursuing t h e i r 
i n t e r e s t s through the s t a t e , emphasising the continuing power of the PWS to 
i n f l u e n c e miners ideology. 
•'•^ NACODS were not in v o l v e d i n the s t r i k e , and t h e i r members 
attempted to work during the s t r i k e , where they performed s a f e t y work. 
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4 . 4 . i i POST 1978 - DESTABILISATION AND THE BEGINNINGS OF CHANGE^^ 
My i n t e r v i e w s i n d i c a t e t h a t perhaps the c r u c i a l event which s e t i n motion a 
c h a l l e n g e to the e x i s t i n g area union l e a d e r s h i p , culminating i n l e f t wing 
c o n t r o l of both miners and mechanics unions i n 1984, was the i n ^ o s i t i o n of 
the AIS (Area i n c e n t i v e scheme) i n 1978 (see s e c t i o n 4 . 2 . i i i above). I t i s 
c e r t a i n l y f a i r t o say t h a t the AIS r e v o l u t i o n i s e d union p o l i t i c s . I t s 
immediate impact was a t a l o c a l l e v e l - i n c o l l i e r y union-management 
r e l a t i o n s - but t h i s i n t a c t soon f i l t e r e d back to area and n a t i o n a l l e v e l . 
I n Durham, one immediate e f f e c t of the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the AIS was to 
s t i m u l a t e the growth of a l o o s e l y organised l e f t wing pr e s s u r e group - the 
"Broad L e f t " (BL) . Anger a t the manner of the iir^sosition of the AIS, i n 
d e f i a n c e of a n a t i o n a l b a l l o t encouraged a s m a l l group of a c t i v i s t s to 
begin v i g o r o u s l y campaigning f o r l e f t wing p o l i c i e s . 
The i n c e n t i v e scheme provided them with raw m a t e r i a l - i t immediately 
i n c r e a s e d d i s c o n t e n t i n the p i t s . I n many ways i t s impact was s i m i l a r to 
t h a t of p i e c e work. I t returned wages m i l i t a n c y to the point of production. 
Lodges which had been nodding o f f f o r l a c k of work suddenly found 
themselves deluged w i t h c o i t ^ j l a i n t s . Within a couple of years the r e t u r n of 
Tory government provoked r e c e s s i o n , and the market f o r c o a l began to f a l l . 
P i t s i n Durham again came under t h r e a t . As job h i e r a r c h i e s f o s s i l i s e d and 
redundancies i n c r e a s e d , so d i s c o n t e n t spread beyond wages. 
P i t c l o s u r e s i n Durham r e s u l t e d from two p r o c e s s e s . I n p a r t they d e r i v e d 
from d i f f e r e n t i a l p a t t e r n s of investment - as they had done i n the 1960's. 
Under P l a n For C o a l investment was again concentrated i n the most 
g e o l o g i c a l l y advantageous c o n d i t i o n s , and even the p r e v i o u s l y advantaged 
E a s t Durham p i t s l o s t out as money went to develop new c a p a c i t y i n the 
c e n t r a l c o a l f i e l d - most notably at Selby. As i n the 1960's t h i s l e d to 
underinvested p i t s being d e f i n e d as uneconomic. However a second process 
d e f i n e d l a r g e p a r t s of Durham output as "surplus c a p a c i t y " , and t h i s was 
the c o l l a p s e i n the market f o r c o a l , and i n p a r t i c u l a r , f o r coking c o a l 
(see s e c t i o n 4.2.i above). 
•^ •'"Much of t h e m a t e r i a l on Durham i n t h i s s e c t i o n comes from my 
i n t e r v i e w s and r e s e a r c h . 
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Most of the p i t s which shut i n the l a t e 1970's and e a r l y 1980's (other than 
those c l o s i n g because of e x h a u s t i o n ) , d i d so because they had l o s t the BSC 
market. I n Durham they i n c l u d e d South Hetton, E a s t Hetton, Houghton, 
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B l a c k h a l l , Marley H i l l , Eden and Boldon (see t a b l e 4.9 and graphs 9, 10 
and 11) . The exact i n t a c t of these c l o s u r e s , and how they i n t e r a c t e d with 
the o p e r a t i o n of the i n c e n t i v e scheme, and other processes of p o l i t i c a l 
change i s r e l a t e d i n the f o l l o w i n g chapter. ( I t was a l s o the l o s s of coking 
c o a l markets which i n d i r e c t l y i g n i t e d the spark which caused the Cortonwood 
walkout i n March 1984.) At a c o a l f i e l d l e v e l , the p e r i o d from the 
i n t r o d u c t i o n of the i n c e n t i v e scheme was one of growing p o l i t i c a l turmoil, 
i n both the mechanics and miners unions. Coit^slacency gave way f i r s t to 
u n c e r t a i n t y , and then to growing opposition. 
A f t e r s e v e r a l y ears i n abeyance, p i t c l o s u r e s began again i n the l a t e 
1970's (see t a b l e 4.9). Unease grew as unemployment climbed, and the other 
mainstay i n d u s t r i e s of the North E a s t began to c o l l a p s e . The c l o s u r e of 
Consett steelworks (see s e c t i o n 2.1.i) l e f t a deep mark on the c o l l e c t i v e 
psyche. Shipyards were c l o s i n g down, the banks of the Wear grassed over f o r 
Sunday walkers. Small f a c t o r i e s came, but many more went as the 
manufacturing base of the North E a s t was swept away. The young gathered on 
s t r e e t c o r n e r s , condemmed i t seemed to eke out an e x i s t e n c e on government 
schemes and s o c i a l s e c u r i t y . Communities f e l t a very r e a l sense of being 
under t h r e a t (Barker, 1984). 
With t h i s background, and an openly h o s t i l e Conservative government, the 
scene was r i p e f o r p o l i t i c a l change. Growing out of the i n c e n t i v e scheme, a 
s m a l l group of a c t i v i s t s - the Broad L e f t - began to form themselves i n t o a 
p r e s s u r e group w i t h i n the DMA. C a p i t a l i s i n g on i n c r e a s i n g d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n 
and d i s t r u s t w i t h i n the workforce, the BL grew s t e a d i l y i n st r e n g t h and 
i n f l u e n c e . Arthur S c a r g i l l ' s e l e c t i o n was an iit^aortant c a t a l y s t i n r a i s i n g 
c o n s ciousness. His s t a r q u a l i t y , high p r o f i l e cair^aign, d a z z l i n g e l e c t i o n 
addresses to thousands of miners, and s t r i d e n t warning made people aware of 
the grim r e a l i t i e s of the f u t u r e . Most i n ^ o r t a n t of a l l however, h i s 
•'•^ See the NCB's submissions to the European Coal and S t e e l 
Community f o r re a d a p t a t i o n a i d i n 1980 and 1981, quoted i n Beynon e t a l , 
1985, 50. See i b i d f o r a thorough examination of BBC's purchasing p o l i c i e s 
and t h e i r e f f e c t s of the E a s t Durham c o a l f i e l d . 
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cait^aign focussed a t t e n t i o n on the p o s s i b i l i t y t h e r e might be a r e a l 
a l t e r n a t i v e t o a c q u i e s c i n g i n t h e face of NCB p o l i c y . F i g h t i n g back was on 
the agenda. One BL member r e c a l l e d t h a t the cair^saign "galvanised everbody", 
g i v i n g a g r e a t boost t o the BL, l i f t i n g i t s p r o f i l e and c r e d i b i l i t y ^ ^ . 
I t i s important t o r e a l i s e t h a t many people who voted f o r S c a r g i l l didn't 
b e l i e v e i n a l l h i s p o l i c i e s . I n many ways, r i g h t wingers wanted a strong 
l e a d e r as much as those on the l e f t . The former however hoped t h a t the NCB 
would be f r i g h t e n e d by S c a r g i l l , and he would be able to win the 
s u b s t a n t i a l m a t e r i a l concessions t h a t were rumoured to abound i n Yo r k s h i r e 
(where he had p r e v i o u s l y been a r e a P r e s i d e n t ) . One man who broke the s t r i k e 
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and i s now UDM (Union of Democratic Mineworkers ) chairman a t Murton, 
s a i d : 
" I thought a t the time he was the b e s t t h i n g t h a t ever 
happened to the c o a l f i e l d , . . . because he was prepared 
to stand and f i g h t . " ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
R i g h t wing l e a d e r s a t are a l e v e l f e l t the ground begin t o move under t h e i r 
f e e t . Some l o s t h e a r t as the easy r e l a t i o n s h i p s of the past were replaced 
by an a b r a s i v e management s t r a t e g y which t r e a t e d them with i n c r e a s i n g 
contempt. 
Even i n the n o t o r i o u s l y r i g h t wing mechanics union, p o l i t i c s were changing 
a t a r e a l e v e l . I n 1982, i n the e l e c t i o n to r e p l a c e the long s e r v i n g r i g h t 
wing General S e c r e t a r y Tommy B a r t l e s ( k i l l e d i n a London c a r c r a s h ) , i t was 
the most openly l e f t wing candidate - B i l l y E therington - who narrowly 
d e f e a t e d the more moderate John Cummings, from Murton (see chapter 5) . 
Commenting on the turnaround i n the mechanics union, Etherington s a i d : 
" I t h i n k the changes [ i n the e a r l y 1980's] were many 
people had been q u i t e used to p i t c l o s u r e s , but hadn't 
bothered too much about i t because they'd been going to 
another p i t . But I b e l i e v e i t began to dawn on some of 
them t h a t the p i t s were g e t t i n g r a t h e r t h i n on the 
ground." 
One man he knew a t Dawdon c o l l i e r y was a t h i s e i g h t h p i t ! 
^ \ c c o r d i n g to at l e a s t one e a r l y BL member i t was perhaps too 
s u c c e s s f u l , because some people became i n v o l v e d f o r o p p o r t u n i s t i c reasons. 
•"•^ The UDM was formed as a breakaway union from the NUM a f t e r the 
1984/5 s t r i k e - see chapter seven. 
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"Also of course, our members [saw] t h a t t h e r e had been 
no a p p r e n t i c e s taken on (or very few) over the l a s t 5 
or 6 y e a r s . And I t h i n k t h a t perhaps made them r e a l i s e 
t h a t i t wasn't j u s t somebody e l s e s p i t t h a t was always 
c l o s i n g . They began to r e a l i s e t h a t i t was going to be 
t h e i r ' s ! More so when you've got p i t s l i k e B l a c k h a l l 
and Horden - p i t s t h a t had q u i t e good r e s e r v e s not so 
long ago - when they went down I t h i n k i t began to make 
a l o t of people t h i n k v e r y hard." ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
I n the miners union, the growing s t r e n g t h of the BL began to overwhelm the 
e s t a b l i s h e d r i g h t wing l e a d e r s h i p . S e v e r a l important lodges were "captured" 
by the l e f t - noteably Wearmouth and Easington. By o r g a n i s i n g f o r 
e l e c t i o n s , the BL were a b l e to wrest c o n t r o l of the Ex e c u t i v e Committee 
from the agents during 1983. From then on, the BL was e f f e c t i v e l y s e t t i n g 
the pace at area l e v e l i n the miners' union. 
I n Durham t h e r e f o r e , two p r e v i o u s l y r i g h t wing unions were moving l e f t as 
the NCB's a g g r e s s i v e new s t r a t e g y combined with the onset of p i t c l o s u r e s 
and the d e s t a b i l i s i n g e f f e c t s of the AIS brought home to miners t h a t t h e i r 
f u t u r e s were becoming ve r y i n s e c u r e . Yet the changes were i n many ways 
c o n t r a d i c t o r y . The mechanics e l e c t e d a l e f t wing general s e c r e t a r y , but 
continued to vote h e a v i l y a g a i n s t s t r i k i n g i n support of jobs. Some of the 
most threatened p i t s ( l i k e S a c r i s t o n ) showed no s i g n of p o l i t i c a l change, 
whereas some secure p i t s ( l i k e Wearmouth and Easington) went l e f t . C l e a r l y 
a s i m i l a r r e g i o n a l c u l t u r e could generate s t r i k i n g l y d i f f e r e n t responses 
w i t h i n the workforce. The f o l l o w i n g chapters on Murton explore the 
p a r t i c u l a r f a c t o r s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r p o l i t i c a l development at the l o c a l 
l e v e l . 
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4.5 CONLUSION 
T h i s chapter has sought to apply the t h e o r e t i c a l arguments e s t a b l i s h e d i n 
the f i r s t t h r e e c h a p t e r s . I n p a r t i c u l a r , I have l i n k e d the p o l i t i c a l and 
economic d e s t a b i l i s a t i o n of post war B r i t i s h s o c i e t y d i s c u s s e d i n chapter 
two, with the dynamics of t r a d e union r e l a t i o n s with the s t a t e and c a p i t a l , 
d i s c u s s e d i n chapter t h r e e . The recent h i s t o r y of the c o a l i n d u s t r y 
i l l u s t r a t e s the argument advanced i n chapter t h r e e t h a t the i n c o r p o r a t i o n 
of t r a d e unions w i t h i n an e s t a b l i s h e d network of s t a t e guaranteed r e l a t i o n s 
(an indulgency p a t t e r n on a n a t i o n a l s c a l e ) , i s c o n t i n u a l l y v u l n e r a b l e to 
economic d e s t a b i l i s a t i o n w i t h i n the system as a whole. Th i s d e s t a b i l i s a t i o n 
c r e a t e s room f o r the e x e r c i s e of human agency, d i s c u s s e d i n chapter one. 
Although the c e n t r a l concern of t h i s t h e s i s i s the processes of p o l i t i c a l 
s t r u g g l e and change a t the l o c a l l e v e l , i t i s i r t p o s s i b l e to make sense of 
developments i n a p a r t i c u l a r p l a c e , and i n a p a r t i c u l a r industry, without 
s i t u a t i n g both the i n d u s t r y and the p l a c e i n t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l context. I n 
other words, the focus has s h i f t e d from a d i s c u s s i o n of c l a s s s t r u g g l e i n 
g e n e r a l , through an a n a l y s i s of the p r i n c i p l e working c l a s s o r g a n i s a t i o n s 
of s t r u g g l e , t o the r e c e n t h i s t o r y of s t r u g g l e i n the c o a l i n d u s t r y . 
I n the 1 9 7 0 's the c o a l i n d u s t r y was i n i t i a l l y i n s u l a t e d from the a s s a u l t on 
working c l a s s wages and c o n d i t i o n s , provoked by the economic c r i s i s . A 
temporary energy c r i s i s p l a c e d the domestic c o a l i n d u s t r y i n a a p r i v i l e g e d 
p o s i t i o n , and the 1974 P l a n For Coal recognised t h i s r e a l i t y . However, PFC 
a l s o gave the s t a t e and the NCB time to plan a s t r a t e g y to weaken the power 
of the NUM. At the same time, PFC endorsed the MUM's economistic commitment 
to the defense and improvement of c o n d i t i o n s through s e c t i o n a l p r e s s u r e 
w i t h i n the s t a t e . W h i l s t the c o r p o r a t i s t agreement between the NCB, the NUM 
and the government kept the miners out of the p e r i o d of i n t e n s i f i e d c l a s s 
s t r u g g l e during the 1970 's, the i n c e n t i v e schema was ijttf)Osed to break the 
union's wages based u n i t y . I n c e n t i v e s were l i n k e d to the i n t r o d u c t i o n of 
new underground technology which i n c r e a s e d the r a t e of work, and l e d to job 
l o s s e s , 
When the C o n s e r v a t i v e s came to power i n 1979 they were committed to a 
s t r a t e g y of r e a s s e r t i n g c a p i t a l i s t c o n t r o l over labour, ending the post war 
i n c o r p o r a t i o n of the unions w i t h i n the s t a t e apparatus, and r e - e s t a b l i s h i n g 
the market as a d e - p o l i t i c i s e d mechanism f o r economic d e c i s i o n making. I n 
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t h i s context, the NUM's defence of the p r e v a i l i n g s i t u a t i o n was a l s o a 
r a d i c a l c h a l l e n g e t o the power of the s t a t e to c a r r y through i t s agenda -
more so because of the miners " s p e c i a l s t a t u s " as the l e a d e r s of the labour 
movement, and t h e i r r o l e i n supposedly b r i n g i n g down the Heath government. 
Although the miners appeared t o win a s i g n i f i c a n t v i c t o r y i n 1981, when the 
government was f o r c e d i n t o a h u m i l i a t i n g r e t r e a t over p i t c l o s u r e s , 
subsequent attempts t o m o b i l i s e the membership f a i l e d to d e l i v e r b a l l o t 
votes f o r s t r i k e a c t i o n , d e s p i t e the e l e c t i o n of Arthur S c a r g i l l as 
n a t i o n a l NUM P r e s i d e n t . 
I n Durham the c o l l a p s e of the c o a l i n d u s t r y i n the 1960's, took p l a c e 
w i t h i n the context of a deep rooted l a b o u r i s t consensus, i n which 
a l t e r n a t i v e jobs were promised w i t h i n the framework of r e g i o n a l p o l i c y . The 
NUM was a p r i n c i p l e bulwark of t h i s r e g i o n a l settlement, and as such 
r e f u s e d to countenance any c h a l l e n g e to the p i t c l o s u r e programme. However, 
f o l l o w i n g a p e r i o d of r e l a t i v e s t a b i l i t y i n the mid 1970's, the 
reappearance of an a c c e l e r a t i n g programme of f u r t h e r p i t c l o s u r e s began to 
d e s t a b i l i s e r e l a t i o n s between management and labour, and between miners and 
t h e i r union. Opposition t o the accomodative i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s of the 
p a s t began to harden under the p r e s s u r e of a g g r essive management and job 
l o s s e s . L e f t wing a c t i v i s t s i n both miners and mechanics s e c t i o n s of the 
union b u i l t upon th e s e d e s t a b i l i s i n g p r e s s u r e s . By the eve of the s t r i k e 
they had e f f e c t i v e l y won c o n t r o l of the miners' union, and e s t a b l i s h e d a 
s i g n i f i c a n t s h i f t i n the t r a d i t i o n a l l y more r i g h t wing mechanics' union. 
I n the f o l l o w i n g chapter, the focus moves to Murton. The n a t i o n a l and area 
changes which we have d i s c u s s e d conceal remarkable v a r i a t i o n s i n l o c a l 
a c t i v i t y . So f a r I have s a i d almost nothing about the processes of 
p o l i t i c a l change. F o r e x a i t ^ l e , I have assumed a mechanistic l i n k between 
the d e t e r i a t i n g s i t u a t i o n i n the i n d u s t r y , and the r i s e of the l e f t . 
However, the r i s e of the l e f t was a very uneven phenomena. Neither do these 
v a r i a t i o n s r e l a t e d i r e c t l y to the p e r c e i v e d prospects f o r p a r t i c u l a r p i t s 
or communities. I n the f o l l o w i n g chapters I weave together the v a r i o u s 
elements i n the account so f a r : the r o l e of conscious agents, the 
c o n s t r a i n t s of h i s t o r y and the s t r a t e g i e s of the s t a t e and the employer. 
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TABLE ^.1: UK DEEP MINED OUTPUT, PRODUCTIVITY, COLLIERIES AND nANPQUER 
SINCE 1942 
Year OUTPUT OriS (Tonnes NUMBER OF MANPOWER 
(000 tonnes) (per man s h i f t ) COLLIERIES (OOO's) 
19^7 187.5 1.09 958 703,9 
1950 205.6 1.23 901 690.8 
1955 211.3 1.25 850 698,7 
1960 186.8 l.'^2 698 602,1 
1965/6 177.0 1.83 •^83 it55,7 
1970/1 135,5 2.2i» 292 287,2 
1975/6 11^*.5 2.28 2^1 2^7,1 
1976/7 108.5 2.21 238 2i»2.0 
1977/3 106.3 2.19 231 2A0.5 
1978/9 105.5 2.2't 223 23't,9 
1979/80 109.3 2.31 219 232.5 
1980/1 110.3 2.32 211 229.8 
1931/2 103.9 2,it0 200 218.5 
1982/3 10^^.9 2.^it 191 207.6 
1983/it 90.1 2.^3 170 191.5 
198i»/5 27.6 2.08 169 175.it 
1985/6 88. 2.72 133 15ii.6 
1986/7 38.0 3,29 110 125.it 
1987/8 82.A 3.62 9^ lO^t.it 
Sources: NCB/BC Annual Reoorts and Accounts 
TABLE A.2; DURHAM DEEP MINED OUTPUT, PRODUCTIVITY. COLLIERIES AND MANPOWER, 
19it7 TO 1970 
YEAR OUTPUT ( m i l l i o n 
tonnes) 
OMS (tonnes/ 
man s h i f t ) 
COLLIERIES MANPOWER 
(OOO's) 
19it7 2it, 1 0.89 127 108.3 
1950 26,3 0.99 - lOit.8 
1955 25.it 1.01 - 101.5 
1960 22.8 1,12 109 87.2 
1965/6 19.1 1 .it2 67 62.0 
1970/1 12.7. 1.7it 3it 33.9 
Sources: NCB Reports and accounts 
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TABLE ^.3; CEGB FUEL BURN; Measured in tonnes coal equivalent (tee) 
Year 7^/5 75/6 76/7 77/8 78/9 79/80 80/1 81/2 82/3 83/^ S^j/S 85/6 86/7 
Coal 67.1 70.3 69.9 75.1 QO.h 79.5 76.3 75.3 77.2 ifO.5 79.0 77.0 
O i l 23.2 16.7 13.9 16.0 17.3 12.3 8.1 7.8 5.3 39.9 5.1 6.8 
Gas 3.6 3.8 2.0 2.1 0.5 0.8 - - - - 0.8 0.3 -
Nuc1 ear 9.5 8.7 10.7 11.8 10.7 10.9 9.8 10.1 12.5 13.5 16.0 16.A 16.2 
Tota l 101 96 97 100 10^ 10^ 97 95 93 95 97 101 100 
TABLE CEGB FUEL BURN; Percentages of d i f f e r e n t f u e l s . 
Year 7^/5 75/6 76/7 77/8 78/9 79/80 80/1 81/2 82/3 83/^ 8't/5 85/6 86/7 
Coal 63.9 69.9 72.5 69.9 72.2 77.3 82.0 80.8 81.0 81.3 Al .8 78.2 77.0 
O i l 23.0 17.i» li».3 16.0 16.6 11.8 8.it 8.2 5.7 5.1 ^1.1 5.0 6.8 
Gas 3.6 it.O 2.1 2.1 0.5 0.3 - - - - 0.8 0.3 -
Nuc1 ear 9.it 9.1 11,0 11.8 10.3 10.5 10.1 10.6 13.i+ l^t.S 16.5 16.2 16.2 
Sources: CEGB S t a t i s t i c a l Yearbooks 1978/9, 81/2 & 86/7, 
Chapter (112) 
TABLE it.5. NCB DISPOSALS & STOCKS; m i l l i o n tonnes per annum. 
Year 7ii/5 75/6 76/7 77/8 78/9 79/80 80/1 81/2 82/3 83/it 
Power s t a t i o n s 
Coke ovens/gasworks 
Domestic 
Other i n l a n d 
T o t a l i n l a n d 
Exports 
72.5 75.8 78.9 78.9 83.3 89.1 87.7 35.3 80.8 Bit.O 
20.5 18.5 19.6 16.3 lit.6 li|.it 11.3 11.2 10.0 10,6 
lit,5 l l . i t 10.6 10.8 10.1 10,3 8.5 8.6 8.0 7.8 
19.6 16.5 15.5 15.5 lit.it lit.6 12.7 11.9 11.6 11.3 
127 122 125 122 123 128 120 117 110 Hit 
2.1 l . i t l , i t 1,8 2,1 2,5 i|,7 9,it 7.1 6.9 
Tota l s a l e s 129 123 126 lEit 125 131 125 126 117 121 
Imports it.O it.8 2.it 2.7 2.1 5.1 7.3 A,2 3,it 5,1 
Stocks NCB 
customer 
t o t a l 
5,6 11,0 9,6 10,3 l i t . l 12.0 20.9 2ii.9 2it.9 21.7 
16.1 18.9 18.5 19.5 lit.7 15.8 17.5 18.6 28.3 2it.5 
21.6 29.9 28.1 29.8 28.8 27.7 38.it 43.5 53.3 it6.2 
TABLE it.6: NCB SALES; Percentages to d i f f e r e n t s e c t o r s . 
Year 7it/5 75/6 76/7 77/8 78/9 79/80 80/1 81/2 82/3 83/it 
Power s t a t i o n s 
Coke ovens/gasworks 
Domest i c 
Other inl a n d 
56.2 61.it 62,it 63,7 66.6 68.3 70.3 67.5 69.0 69.5 
15.9 15,0 15.5 13.2 11.5 11,0 9,1 8.9 8.5 8.8 
11.2 9.2 8.it 8.7 8.1 7.9 6.8 6,8 6,8 6.5 
15.2 13.it 12.3 12.5 11.5 11.2 10.2 9.it 9.9 9,3 
Tota l in l a n d 98,it 98.9 98.9 98.5 98.3 98.1 96.2 92.6 93.9 9it.3 
Exports 1.6 1.1 1.1 1,6 1.7 1.9 3.8 7,it 6.1 5.7 
SOURCE: NCB Report and Accounts, 1983/it. 
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TABLE UK OPENCAST AND DEEP MINED OUTPUT SINCE 19^7 
YEAR OPENCAST OUTPUT 
( m i l l i o n tonnes) 
DEEP MINED 0/P 
( m i l l i o n tonnes) 
19it7 
1950 
1955 
1960 
1965/6 
1970/1 
1975/6 
1976/7 
1977/8 
1978/9 
1979/80 
1980/1 
1981/2 
1982/3 
1983/'^ 
198it/5 
1985/6 
1986/7 
1987/8 
10.^ 
12.i* 
11.6 
7.7 
6.9 
8.1 
10.4 
l l . i t 
13.6 
13.5 
13.0 
15.3 
1A.3 
lit.7 
13.8 
13, 
lit, 
13, 
15, 
187.5 
205.6 
211.3 
186.8 
177.0 
135.5 
Hi*.5 
108.5 
106.3 
105.5 
109.3 
110.3 
108.9 
10i».9 
90.1 
27.6 
88.it 
88.0 
82.it 
Source: NCB Reports and Accounts, 1987/8 
TABLE it.8: CHANGE IN NCB MANPOWER AND PITS 1973-8it. 
Year. 73/it 7it/5 75/6 76/7 77/8 78/9 79/80 80/1 81/2 82/3 83/it 
No of p i t s . 259 2it6 241 238 231 223 219 211 200 191 170 
No of c l o s u r e s . 33 13 5 3 7 8 it 8 11 9 21 
Manpower(000's). 252 2it6 2it7 2it2 2i»l 235 233 230 219 208 191 
Manpower change. -21 -6 + 1 -5 -1 -6 -2 -3 -11 -11 -17 
Source: NCB Reports and accounts, 1983/A. 
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1 TABLE it.9; NORTH EAST COALFIELD' DEEP MINED OUTPUT, 
COLLIERIES, AND MANPOWER, 1975/6 TO 1988 
PRODUCTIVITY, 
YEAR OUTPUT ( m i l l i o n OMS (tonnes/ COLLIERIES MANPOWER 
tonnes) man s h i f t ) (OOO's) 
1975/6 16.2 1.93 37.7 
1976/7 16.0 1.82 36,6 
1977/8 14.9 1.83 35.4 
1978/9 12.8 1.87 34.9 
1979/80 14.0 2.07 27 33.4 
1980/1 14.2 2.07 24 32.0 
1981/2 13.4 2.03 22 29.0 
1982/3 12.5 2.09 18 26.4 
1983/it 11.0 2.23 16 22.9 
1984/5 0.4 0.47 15 21.9 
1985/6 9.6 2.23 10 17.9 
1986/7 10.2 2.98 8 14.4 
1987/8 10.3 3.51 7 11.8 
^ The North East c o a l f i e l d comprises Durham and Northumberland. A f u l l time 
s e r i e s of data i s not a v a i l a b l e for Durham for t h i s period. 
Source: NCB/BC Annual Reports and Accounts 
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TABLE it. 10: NUM STRIKE BALLOTS 1982-it. 
Approx Percentage for s t r i k e a c t i o n . 
AREA. Membership Jan 82 Nov 82 March 83 March 84 
COSA 16000 14 10 15 -
Cokemen itSOO 32 22 39 -
Cumber land 650 52 36 42 22 
Derbyshire 10500 50 40 38 50 
Durham 13000 i|6 31 39 -
Kent 2000 5it 69 68 -
Power group 7 17 15 19 -
L e i c e s t e r 2500 22 13 18 -
Midlands 12200 27 23 21 27 
Northumberland 5000 37 32 35 52 
North Wales 1000 18 24 23 36 
Nottinghamshire 32000 30 21 19 26 
North West 7500 40 44 39 41 
Scotland 11500 63 69 50 -
South Derbyshire 3000 16 13 12 16 
South Wales 21000 54 59 68 — 
Y o r k s h i r e 56000 66 56 54 -
S c o t t i s h Enginemen 54 53 49 — 
Durham Mechanics 32 22 32 — 
Durham Enginemen 21 11 16 -
N'land Mechanics 32 26 32 
NATIONAL AVERAGE 45 39 39 
?: F i g u r e unknown 
-: No b a l l o t held 
Source: C a l l i n i c o s and Simons, 1985, ; and Hudson, 1986, 17 
TABLE 4,11: DURHAM DEEP MINED OUTPUT 1880 TO 1947 
DATE OUTPUT 
(Mt) 
1880 28,1 
1885 27.7 
1900 34.8 
1905 37.4 
1910 39.4 
1913 41.5 
1920 30.8 
1925 31 .5 
1930 35.9 
1935 30.3 
1947 24.3 
Source: Garside, 1971, 18 I 63 
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CHAPTER FIVE: MURTON BEFORE THE STRIKE 
CHAPTER FIVE: MURTON BEFORE THE STRIKE^ 
INTRODUCTION . 
This chapter begins TOY analysis of the changing p o l i t i c s i n the Murton 
miners' and mechanics' branches, by considering the period from 1978 to 
1984. This account i s related to the h i s t o r i c a l analysis of the coal 
industry provided i n chapter four. I t shows how the destabilisation of the 
post war settlement - and the p a r t i c u l a r settlement i n the coal industry -
affected one c o l l i e r y i n Durham. I t also shows how changing management 
strategy provided the conditions for a decisive s h i f t i n union branch 
p o l i t i c s , as the disturbance of a long standing indulgency pattern provided 
the room for a c t i v i s t s to challenge existing union p o l i t i c s . 
My central focus i s on the operation of p o l i t i c a l processes at the l o c a l 
l e v e l . I n other words, attention i s concentrated on the s h i f t i n g p o l i t i c a l 
consciousness of the workforce, and the factors which created and shaped 
the direction of change. At t h i s scale of analysis, i t i s appropriate to 
distingruish between objective and subjective factors which affect the 
development of consciousness. Whatever the d i f f i c u l t i e s of separating 
objective and subjective factors at the l e v e l of capitalism i n general, the 
d i s t i n c t i o n has obvious a n a l y t i c a l advantages when applied to small scale 
studies such as t h i s . However complicated the interaction of working cl a s s 
action and c a p i t a l i s t strategies i s at the national scale, i n Murton there 
i s a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between factors which bring objective changes (pit 
closures, a new manager, changes i n the workforce), and factors which are 
subjective i n that they represent individuals and groups attenpts to 
influence developments - usually by encouraging certain interpretations and 
actions i n response to objective changes. 
Throughout the following three chapters, the miners' and mechanics' 
branches of the NUM at Murton are considered separately. This distinction 
i s not merely pedantic pandering to l o c a l chauvinism. I t r e f l e c t s inportant 
differences i n t h e i r p o l i t i c a l development. These differences are c r u c i a l 
because they derive largely from subjective forces, and conparison of the 
^See appendix one for d e t a i l s of the methodological approach 
adopted i n the following three chapters. 
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two branches therefore allows the is o l a t i o n of factors such as the 
iirportance of leadership. I t should be noted however, that i n many respects 
the Murton miners and mechanics were more similar than perhaps emerges from 
t h i s analysis. I f conparisons had been made between Murton and other NUM 
branches i n Durham, then s i m i l a r i t i e s between the Murton miners and 
mechanics would have swanped the differences. Enphasising the differences 
between the two Murton branches i s a consequence of the scale of analysis, 
and i s not meant to suggest that intractable c o n f l i c t s characterised 
rela t i o n s between the two sections of the workforce. 
E s s e n t i a l l y the main issue that emerges when studying the period from 
1974-1984 i n Murton i s the cl e a r leftward s h i f t i n both the miners' and 
mechanics' branches. These changes occurred despite the presence of right 
wing leaders i n both branches. However, the character and extent of changes 
i n the two branches were s i g n i f i c a n t l y different. To what can these 
developments be attributed? Why was the pace and character of change 
different between the two branches? What was the actual content of the 
p o l i t i c a l change i n each branch? And how did these developments relate to 
the events and processes discussed i n e a r l i e r chapters? 
In t h i s chapter these questions are answered by looking at four objective 
factors which des t a b i l i s e d the previous p o l i t i c a l orientation of the two 
branches. These were the incentive scheme; the a r r i v a l of miners t r a v e l l i n g 
from other p i t s which were closed down; the changing age composition of the 
workforce; and the iiif>act of p i t closures. Integrated into the account i s 
an analysis of the role of leadership i n directing the effect which these 
objective changes had on consciousness. This constitutes the subjective 
factor - the role of agency. My analysis shows that conscious agents 
exerted a c r u c i a l influence over the pace and character of p o l i t i c a l change 
i n both branches. But I begin the chapter with a br i e f h i s t o r i c a l review of 
Murton's history and p o l i t i c s up u n t i l 1978, to provide a context for the 
subsequent discussion of p o l i t i c a l change between 1978 and 1984. 
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5.1: THE MURTON BRANCHES BEFORE 1978 
Up u n t i l the mid 1970's, Murton remained an island. Largely detached from 
p o l i t i c a l manoeuvrings at area and national l e v e l s , i t was a quiet place 
where union business appeared to carry on much as i t had done since 
nationalisation. Yet t h i s apparent continuity was deceptive, because forces 
were building up which heralded major destabilisation and change i n \uiion 
p o l i t i c s . I n the following section I make some br i e f comments on Murton's 
history, as a prelude to discussing the development of union p o l i t i c s . 
S . l . i MURTON THE VILLAGE 
Like so many v i l l a g e s i n County Durham, Murton was just a tiny r u r a l hamlet 
u n t i l the coming of coal. In 1801 just 75 people clustered around the 
l i t t l e h i l l top known then as Murton Moor, or Murton i n the Whines. Up 
u n t i l the 1830's the v i l l a g e s East of the Permian Escarpment were xmtouched 
by the development of p i t v i l l a g e s which characterised the rest of the 
County, where the c o a l f i e l d was exposed. Then came the discovery of coal 
deep beneath the Permian escarpment, and East Durham was suddenly opened 
2 
up . 
The sinking of the f i r s t shaft at Murton was beg\in on February 18th 1838. 
amd the t h i r d shaft took u n t i l A p r i l 15th 1843 to conple, although the 
f i r s t caol was drawn i n 1842. I t was financed by the landowner Colonel 
Thomas Richmund Gale Braddyll. At the time the sinking was reputed to be 
"unparalleled i n the way of hazard, detemination and expense" (Abbott, 
1964/5, 40); and "the c o s t l i e s t and most hazardous sinking on record" 
(ibid, 37) . The main problem encountered during the sinking was the 
inundation of the shaft through sand feeder. At one time, the pun^jing 
engines were drawing 9300 gallons a minute. Thirty four boilers were 
required to provide the power for twenty seven punping columns (NCB, 1983) . 
Helen Abbott i n her marvellous two (unpublished) volumes on the 
history of Murton captures the s p i r i t and conditions of Murton's early 
years, and t h i s account leans heavily on her work (Abbott, 1964/5; 1985). 
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Hippo and buffalo hide buckets were worn out every two or three hours 
(Abbott, 1964/5)^. 
The fearsome cost of t h i s venture (£250000 i n 1843 prices) led to an 
unhappy reward for Colonel Braddyll's entrepeneurial s p i r i t - he was 
bankrupted i n 1846! 
Following the shaft sinking, Murton grew rapidly. By 1841 the population 
was 521, by 1851 i t was 1387, by 1901 i t was 6514, and by 1930 i t had 
swollen to 10000. The i n i t i a l manpower for the sinking came from Cornwall. 
Immigration was concentrated from just a few Cornish v i l l a g e s , with t h i r t y 
families coming from Colstock alone. In 1847 the f i r s t seventeen families 
arrived from Lord Londonderry's estates i n Ireland. The labour was "freed" 
by the siicqple expedient of expelling them from the land, so that they could 
go and work i n the mines. 
For many years the community was divided along religious l i n e s . Abbott's 
histo r y tends to gloss over these divisions. For exanple, she writes; 
"A kindly liefelong bond ex i s t s between these Cornish 
and I r i s h families of different religious persuasion, 
but of mutual hard working honesty and Christian 
brotherliness." (Abbott, 1985, 2) 
A man whose family had l i v e d i n Murton for s i x generations told a very 
different t a l e . The community was s p l i t along religious grounds, with the 
Cornish people l i v i n g i n a part of Murton c a l l e d Cornwall. 
"Murton i s personified by the fact that i t i s 
geographically peculiar. [You had] Cornwall i t s e l f . 
Cornish t i n miners. Cornish t i n miners dominated 
Cornwall, so they're nearly a l l Chapel people. Wesleyan 
Chapel... You had what I would c l a s s i f y the top end of 
Cornwall - that was the North Stretch - that was where 
the Catholic community came over i n the 1840's and 
1950's, and s e t t l e d there. And they inter-bred, and two 
or three streets i n there were t o t a l l y Catholic! The 
p r i e s t could go from one door, and never miss a door 
going down the s t r e e t ! 
"But there was a divide Jonathan, there was a divide. 
We c a l l e d i n the "Wide Street". The boundary of 
Cornwall was the Wide Street. There was Protestants 
over that side, and there was a wide street, and the 
^To put t h i s operation into perspective, i t i s worth conparing i t 
with the Horden-Blackhall mine - the wettest i n Europe prior to i t s closure 
i n 1985 - which was pumping 7500 gallons a minute. 
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nettles [ t o i l e t s ] was down the middle! And they were 
a l l Protestants or Chapel people down there, and a l l 
Catholics i n the three long streets. Funny." 
"But was there any antagonism between the two 
communities?" 
"Yes. Of course there was! I think they l i v e d side by 
side, but not close, for almost 60 year. And I think 
the f i r s t . . . record of a Catholic man marrying a non 
Catholic was... about 1902, 1903. Sixty years they were 
apart. C u l t u r a l l y apart as well. In dia l e c t they were 
apart. So you had the I r i s h brogue. In fact, when I was 
about 12 or 13 years old my Grandfather could s t i l l 
speak the Gaelic as p l a i n as could be! And there were 
about 50 or 60 old I r i s h men or old I r i s h women at that 
time i n t h e i r 80's and 90's who could speak [Gae l i c ] . . . 
They met each other i n the street and spoke Gaelic. 
They passed each other underground and spoke Gaelic. 
That antagonised people." 
Today religious dvisions are much l e s s s i g n i f i c a n t . However, the I r i s h 
Catholic t r a d i t i o n i s s t i l l strong i n the v i l l a g e , and i t i s not uncommon 
to hear rousing I r i s h folk songs being sung i n pubs and homes i n Murton. 
Although t h i s account would tend to suggest strong divisions within the 
community, from the outside i t s cohesiveness i s far more apparent than i t s 
di v i s i o n s . Although t h i s t h e s i s i s about change, i t i s iiif>ortant to 
understand the strong threads of continuity which weave back into the past 
of a p i t v i l l a g e l i k e Murton. Even i n the 1970's, Murton continued to 
display many of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the archetypal p i t v i l l a g e . I t s 
s o c i a l cohesiveness, r e l a t i v e i s o l a t i o n , domination by coal mining, and 
committment to Labour(ism), differed remarkably l i t t l e from the pattern so 
v i v i d l y established i n the c l a s s i c account of the Yorkshire p i t v i l l a g e of 
"Ashton", written i n the early 1950's (Dennis e t _ a l , 1969). 
An inportant point to make about Murton i s i t s r e l a t i v e physical isolation 
(map 2) . The road through Murton i s a very minor one, and i s not a 
routeway. The v i l l a g e has d i s t i n c t boundaries, and i s 2 miles from the 
nearest settlement. I t has therefore been able to maintain a high degree of 
s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y and community identity. The survival of the c o l l i e r y 
means that the p i t continues to dominate the l i f e of the v i l l a g e , and 
anchor the community to the s o c i a l traditions and relationships that have 
evolved h i s t o r i c a l l y . 
Four quotes help to catch the flavour of Murton, A mechanic who came to 
Murton from the cosmopolitan Wearmouth p i t said: 
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" I t was very much a community p i t , probably the l a s t of 
the r e a l p i t v i l l a g e s . . . I t was a v i l l a g e that had done 
a l l the things the old v i l l a g e s did. The community was 
actually b u i l t around the p i t , and they saw t h e i r role 
- and some of i t was probably ' l e f t wing' i n that sense 
as providing the community; you know, welfare 
schemes, and they were carried through i n Murton I 
believe longer than most, (interview) 
A respected member of the c o l l i e r y management, said t h i s about l i v i n g i n 
Murton: 
"There's a kind of freemasonry attached to i t . And they 
guard i t very jealously! . . I can remember, . . i f you 
came from outside the v i l l a g e , you were hated! There 
was nothing l i k e i t . Easington Lane were Easington 
Lane. They were a world apart. They may as well have 
been i n Europe, quite honestly!.. The r i v a l r y was 
intense. I mean, quite apart from the sporting r i v a l r y , 
there was the r i v a l r y you had as gangs... I t ' s s t i l l 
maintained now." (interview) 
Rivalry between Durham p i t v i l l a g e s has always been strong. The sense of 
identity and r e l a t i v e l y s e l f contained nature of each community inevitably 
bred a (generally benign) conpetitiveness between v i l l a g e s , especially 
nearby communities. This t r a d i t i o n a l form of mining community had inportant 
ii t y l i c a t i o n s for p o l i t i c s within the the two mining unions at Murton. I t 
forms the background to the inward looking, conservative, unpoliticized 
lodges that are described i n section A 3.2 below. 
The view from outside Murton i s somewhat different however, as t h i s comment 
from a member of Murton's management who came from nearby Eppleton i n 1970, 
shows. 
"When I went to Murton there was just a sort of blank. 
Not accepted. Nothing... They didn't accept me. They 
never did... Murton to me i s a place where there's a 
road through, and... i n effect they've just cut off... 
[the two ends of the road] and just intermarried and 
l i v e d there." (interview) 
And a man who l i v e d i n Trimdon Grange but transferred to Murton from East 
Hetton i n 1983 said: 
"Murton, i t seemed a bloody queer place you know. I t 
used to appear to me as i f they were i n a time warp -
they hadn't progressed l i k e . They had a queer outlook 
on l i f e . Always talking about getting drunk, and going 
out with other men's wives and things l i k e that. I t 
seems there's more to l i f e to me l i k e . " (interview) 
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S . l . i i OLD STYLE UNION POLITICS 
Although t h e r e were i n p o r t a n t r e g i o n a l and l o c a l v a r i a t i o n s , the t y p i c a l 
form of iinion p o l i t i c s , and management union r e l a t i o n s i n t h i s p e r i o d i s 
summarised by Dennis e t a l (1969; 84-116) i n t h e r e account of the Yo r k s h i r e 
p i t of "Ashton" i n the e a r l y 1950's. P i e c e work ensured a continuous 
i n t e r e s t i n the \inion because a l l p i e c e workers were c o n s t a n t l y i n c o n f l i c t 
w i t h management over t h e i r pay ( i b i d ; 86-7 and 106-12) . T h i s a l s o 
c o n s o l i d a t e d the inportance of faceworkers i n the union, and t h i s dominance 
i s s t i l l f a r from over today. 
I n Murton a s i m i l a r p a t t e r n emerges, but with iii5>ortant l o c a l v a r i a t i o n s . 
For exanple, a c o n t i n u a l problem a t Murton concerned the endemic use of 
"advance notes" by management - a r e l i c from p r e - n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n days. 
Workers i n each d i s t r i c t were p a i d not by the manager d i r e c t l y but by a 
" f o r e s h i f t overman". Often the f o r e s h i f t overman was given an inadequate 
sum t o cover the wages t h a t had a c t u a l l y been earned by the men t h a t week -
say £200 i n s t e a d of £250. So he would give an advance note to those workers 
he couldn't pay f u l l y , which they could c l a i m back i n cash i n fo l l o w i n g 
weeks. However, the men sometimes got t i r e d of chasing advance notes, 
4 
reasoning t h a t they were "only coppers" . D i s s e n s i o n was i n e v i t a b l e , but a t 
l e a s t the constant problems kept men attending meetings. 
However, the union a t Murton a t t h i s time appeared to be a p a t h e t i c , i t s 
l e a d e r s h i p l a c k i n g i n a b i l i t y and s t r e n t h . The committee was dominated by a 
s m a l l c l i q u e of Labour P a r t y members. Indeed, so strong was the domination 
of t he Labour P a r t y t h a t up i i n t i l 1965, union meetings d e a l t f i r s t with 
P a r t y b u s i n e s s , and only second with union a f f a i r s ! ^ One r e t i r e d miner and 
committee member put i t l i k e t h i s : 
"The people t h a t ran the union were people who were 
mainly i n the Labour Party. There was j u s t a c e r t a i n 
c l i q u e of them. You got the odd ones who came out of 
the ranks s o r t of s t y l e , and went i n , but they didn't 
4 
Advance notes made a comeback i n 1978 with the i n t r o d u c t i o n the 
i n c e n t i v e scheme. 
^So much so, t h a t i t was q u i t e p o s s i b l e the meeting had s t i l l not 
moved on t o union b u s i n e s s by the time the tub loading s h i f t l e f t f o r work 
at around 9.30pm! 
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seem to l a s t v e r y long 'cos they weren't i n the Labour 
P a r t y . . . Anybody with ambitions a t a l l was i n the 
Labour P a r t y . " ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
Behind t h e i r c o n t i n u a l r e - e l e c t i o n l a y whisperings of b a l l o t r i g g i n g . 
S u s p i c i o n s were never proved, but the whispers could have c o n t r i b u t e d to a 
g e n e r a l f e e l i n g of d i s i l l u i o n with the union. What was the point of t r y i n g 
t o c h a l l e n g e those i n power i f the r e s u l t was a c e r t a i n t y ? To become an 
o f f i c i a l , a l l you had t o do was s t a y on the committee, "keep your nose 
c l e a n " , make sure your Labour P a r t y s u b s c r i p t i o n was up to date, and stand. 
T h i s d e s c r i p t i o n makes c l e a r t h a t the r e s u l t i n g c a l i b r e of l e a d e r s h i p was 
poor. For exaiif>le, two c o n s e c u t i v e delegates had s e r i o u s stammers. They had 
t o r e a d out long r e p o r t s from Area C o u n c i l s , but no one had the heart to 
vote them o f f . You " j u s t had to s i t t h e r e and squirm". 
The r o l e of the Area i n c o n t r o l l i n g d i s s i d e n t opinion, and the d i s c r e e t 
spheres of i n f l u e n c e of Area and lodge were c l e a r l y i l l u s t r a t e d i n an 
i n c i d e n t t h a t took p l a c e i n the e a r l y 1960's. The f i l l e r s a t Murton 
t h r e a t e n e d to s t r i k e i n a p r o t e s t over wages. The t r i g g e r came from Murton 
men who had emigrated to the Doncaster and Nottinghamshire c o a l f i e l d s . They 
r e t u r n e d d u r i n g t h e i r h o l i d a y s with pay notes as c o n c l u s i v e proof they were 
e a r n i n g up t o £7 a week more than Murton men, f o r the same job. 
Sam Watson came out t o adress a meeting of the d i s s i d e n t Murton men. 
Watson's a d v i c e was t h a t they should hand 14 days n o t i c e i n , and when 
they'd a l l l o s t t h e i r jobs, they should get the men who s t a r t e d the s t r i k e 
t o f i n d them j o b s ! ! When a miner had the t e m e r i t y to challenge Watson from 
the f l o o r , suggesting t h a t t h i s wasn't the way t h i n g s happened, Watson t o l d 
him t h a t i t was c e r t a i n l y the way t h i n g s would happen t h i s time. 
As an o l d miner b i t t e r l y r e c a l l e d , "he f r i g h t e n e d the l i f e out of the men". 
They were c o n p l e t e l y demoralised by what Watson s a i d , and " j u s t went back 
t o work and forgot about i t " . The f o r m a l l y c o r r e c t procedure f o r men to 
p r o t e s t about the f i l l e r s p r i c e l i s t was to c a l l a c o a l f i e l d delegate 
conference. "But see, t h i n g s didn't seem to get t h a t f a r . " At Area l e v e l , 
R e d h i l l s c o n t r o l l e d the union, s e t t i n g the agenda and d e a l i n g 
a u t o c r a t i c a l l y w i t h c h a l l e n g e s from the rank and f i l e . P i t s were kept 
i s o l a t e d , and l e f t t o c a r r y on condusting t h e i r own i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s , 
w h i l s t t h a t Area d e a l t with c o a l f i e l d i s s u e s . 
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S . l . i i i MORTON LIVES ON 
While the i n d u s t r y was decimated i n the 1960's, the union a t n a t i o n a l and 
a r e a l e v e l accepted p i t c l o s u r e s and r e p r e s s e d any atteitpt to f i g h t them. 
At Murton, the c l o s u r e s seemed d i s t a n t , almost i r r e l e v a n t . Murton had been 
saved by the s i n k i n g of the Hawthorn s h a f t , which was opened i n 1960. T h i s 
transformed Murton from a " G u t l e s s Giant" (as the p i t was then known), i n t o 
a t h r i v i n g modem c o l l i e r y . 
A contenporary r e p o r t captures the extent of the change. 
"Vast changes i n the p a s t 3 y e a r s have transformed 
Murton c o l l i e r y p i t h e a d from a grey w i l d e r n e s s of 
demolition t o so d r a s t i c a scene of r e s u r r e c t i o n t h a t 
the o l d c o l l i e r y i s h a r d l y now r e c o g n i s a b l e . Old 
systems and methods have been made obsolete, the modern 
i s now s u c c e s s f u l l y c o n s o l i d a t e d and the f a c t i s 
proclaimed i n a r e v o l u t i o n a r y scheme t h a t marks the end 
of an e r a . Not f a r away. . . stands the cause of the 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , the Hawthorn Combined Mine." (Helen 
Abbott - Murtonian - Sunderland Echo, Oct 24th 1966, 
p4.) 
The Hawthorn s h a f t and coking p l a n t seemed to guarantee the f u t u r e of the 
p i t . 
Not u n t i l 1967 d i d the f i r s t t r a v e l l e r s a r r i v e to b r i n g f i r s t hand accounts 
of the wholesale c l o s u r e s i n the West of the county. And even then there 
were only a handful of men from Bowbum. I n those days 90% of the workforce 
of 2000+ l i v e d i n Murton, and most of the other 10% were men who'd married 
out of the v i l l a g e . Often t h e i r c h i l d r e n would r e t u r n to Murton. Everyone 
knew everyone e l s e . 
John Cvimmings d e s c r i b e d the d i s t i n c t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p s which were spawned i n 
t h i s e r a of the " v i l l a g e c o l l i e r y " . 
"What you've got to understand i s t h a t Murton i s a very 
p e c u l i a r s o r t of c o l l i e r y i n as much as i t ' s a f a m i l y 
p i t . Son f o llowed f a t h e r . F a t h e r followed Grandfather. 
Overmen would have t h e i r f a t h e r s being overmen, and 
t h e i r g r andfathers would have been overmen." 
( i n t e r v i e w ) 
Murton's management was s t a b l e . From 1936 t o 1983 t h e r e were j u s t 5 
managers. 
"So you had s t a b i l i t y w ith management. You had 
s t a b i l i t y w ith unions... We had no t r a v e l l e r s coming 
i n . We were an i s l a n d . And i t was t h e r e f o r e r a t h e r an 
i n c e s t u o u s s o r t of r e l a t i o n s h i p which e x i s t e d a t the 
time." ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
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One p a r t of t h i s t r a d i t i o n a l p a t t e r n of r e l a t i o n s h i p s - t y p i c a l of most 
p i t s - was the strong tendency f o r mechanics to work l a r g e amounts of 
overtime. T h i s p r e d i l e c t i o n was exaggerated by the t r a d i t i o n i n the miners' 
union of frowning on overtime work (see K r i e g e r , 1983) . John Cummings 
again: 
"Mechanics were always happy so long as they were 
working 10, 12 s h i f t s a week. And r e a l l y t h a t hasn't 
changed v e r y much... You were conditioned to work seven 
days a week as a matter of course. . . The only problems 
we used to have when I took over as s e c r e t a r y a t the 
c o l l i e r y - indeed f o r y e a r s before t h a t - was when 
management used to cut back on overtime. That was one 
i s s u e t h a t would c e r t a i n l y u n i t e the lodge, and cause 
i t t o become q u i t e r a b i d a c t u a l l y ! " ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
Other mechanics confirmed t h a t from t h e i r f i r s t days a t the p i t , management 
put then under s t r o n g p r e s s u r e t o work overtime. 
S . l . i v CONCLUSIONS 
Although t h i s t h e s i s i s concerned with the p e r i o d from 1978 to 1988, i t i s 
i n p o s s i b l e t o understand the development of p o l i t i c a l changes over t h i s 
p e r i o d without r e f e r e n c e to the h i s t o r y and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Murton, both 
as a community, and a union. T h i s s e c t i o n has t h e r e f o r e introduced Murton 
as a p l a c e and a community. E s s e n t i a l l y , i t shows a v i l l a g e dominated by 
the l a b o u r i s t consensus of the post war period. The NUM dominated l o c a l 
p o l i t i c s , but the p o l i t i c s a s s o c i a t e d with i t were l a r g e l y uncontested. At 
p i t l e v e l , management and union were s o c i a l i s e d i n t o a p a r t i c u l a r 
indulgency p a t t e r n , which i n c l u d e d i n the mechanics' union a high l e v e l of 
h a b i t u a l overtime. 
5. 2 . i UNION POLITICS BEFORE POWER LOADING 
I n t e r v i e w s w i t h men who remember the immediate post war e r a suggest t h a t 
the Murton miners' lodge was dominated by a s m a l l c l i q u e of Labour P a r t y 
members (see appendix t h r e e f o r more d e t a i l s ) . I t was a "top-down" lodge, 
c o n t r o l l e d from above by the committee. Some idea of the p r e v a i l i n g 
p hilosophy comes from the a t t i t u d e s of John Toft, Chairman of the miners' 
lodge from 1958 t o 1979. He regarded h i s job as being to c o n t r o l and l i m i t 
rank and f i l e m i l i t a n c y . He was deeply committed to the i n d u s t r y ' s 
c o n c i l i a t i o n machinery. 
"My r o l e i n anything was always to t r y and c o n t a i n 
d i s p u t e s . You know, c o n t a i n them i n the a r e a where they 
were, r a t h e r than spread them." (in t e r v i e w ) 
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However, the c o n c i l i a t i o n machinery e f f e c t i v e l y worked to management's 
advantage. I t was designed t o stop men r e s o r t i n g t o t h e i r p r i n c i p l e weapon 
- the s t r i k e . I t atte n p t e d t o " l e g a l i s e " management's a u t h o r i t y , by 
r e p l a c i n g the a r b i t r a r y power of i n d i v i d u a l managers with apparently 
i n p a r t i a l b u r e a u c r a t i c r u l e s . Because the machinery enshrined c e r t a i n 
assuir^Jtions about "the r i g h t t o manage", and other management p r e r o g a t i v e s , 
i t was v e r y d i f f i c u l t f o r the union t o win cases under i t . Workers could 
o n l y win i f they c h a l l e n g e d the b a s i c r i g h t s of management, and i n p r a c t i c e 
t h i s depended on the power they could e x e r c i s e through t h r e a t e n i n g - or 
in^slementing - s t r i k e a c t i o n . By s u b s t i t u t i n g n e g o t i a t i o n f o r a c t i o n , the 
union l o s t the i n i t i a t i v e i n pursuing g r i e v a n c e s . 
The p i e c e r a t e wages s t r u c t u r e (see chapter four and appendix two) and the 
nature of the c o n c i l i a t i o n procedure combined t o c r e a t e a d i s t i n c t i v e 
s e p a r a t i o n between the DMA (Durham Miners A s s o c i a t i o n ^ ) lodges and the 
Area. Lodges d e a l t with innumerable gr i e v a n c e s generated by pie c e work 
wages, and with other problems reported by workers, and i n general the 
ex h a u s t i v e procedures provided f o r by the machinery meant t h a t these i s s u e s 
never l e f t the c o l l i e r y . The Area union on the other hand d e a l t with the 
Area Board over a v a r i e t y of more s t r a t e g i c i s s u e s , i n c l u d i n g welfare 
b e n e f i t s , day wage r a t e s , s a f e t y i s s u e s , and so on. By and la r g e , these 
s e p a r a t e spheres operated without much mutual i n t e r a c t i o n . O c c a s i o n a l l y , a 
gr i e v a n c e which e n t e r e d the c o n s u l t a t i v e machineiry a t p i t l e v e l was 
unresolved, and under th e s e circumstances i t was r e f e r r e d t o an area 
meeting of union agents and NCB o f f i c i a l s . Also, p o l i c i e s were proposed by 
the lodges f o r d i s c u s s i o n a t are a c o u n c i l meetings, but the union 
bureaucracy was ab l e t o keep a t i g h t c o n t r o l over t h i s process. 
I n Murton the miners' lodge committee accepted t h i s i i i 5 > l i c i t d i v i s i o n of 
labour^. I t t h e r e f o r e f u l f i l l e d the k i n d of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s f u n c t i o n 
The Durham Miners A s s o c i a t i o n i s the name s t i l l u s u a l l y a p p l i e d 
t o the miners' union i n Durham. I n NUM terms, the DMA c o n s t i t u t e d the 
Durham Area of the NUM. I n c o n t r a s t the Durham C o l l i e r y Mechanics 
A s s o c i a t i o n (DCMA) was p a r t of the NUM's "Group number one", a l s o 
contprising the Durham Enginemen, Northumberland Mechanics and enginemen. 
Although i n NUM terms the unions were p a r t of the same group, the DCMA 
remained an independent union, as d i d the DMA. 
^Not a l l lodges d i d . T r a d i t i o n s of m i l i t a n c y s t r e t c h e d back i n t o 
(Footnote Continued) 
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f o r management which n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n had envisaged, concerning i t s e l f 
p r i n c i p a l l y with managing d i s p u t e s thrown up by the labour process. I n t h i s 
sense i t was not s e l f - c o n s c i o u s l y p o l i t i c a l . Nevertheless, i n the sense 
t h a t the Labour P a r t y r e t a i n e d a con^slete i d e o l o g i c a l hegemony over the 
lodge, the l e a d e r s h i p e x e r c i s e d a powerful p o l i t i c a l f u n c t i o n i n 
b u t t r e s s i n g a p a r t i c u l a r view of n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n , and trade union 
8 
f u n c t i o n . 
At t h i s time the mechanics' branch, although p o l i t i c a l l y to the r i g h t of 
t h e miners a t a r e a l e v e l , sported a nominally Communist s e c r e t a r y i n 
Murton. However, d e s p i t e h i s p o l i t i c a l a f f i l i a t i o n , h i s p o l i c i e s seem to 
have d i f f e r e d v e r y l i t t l e from h i s Labour comrades i n the miners' lodge. 
John T o f t , the miners' Chairman, spoke a f f e c t i o n a t e l y of him: 
"He was the most i n o f f e n s i v e Communist you could ever 
see. But a man of v e r y high standards. He used to t e l l 
me he'd t e l l any new man coming i n t o the p i t ; ' I want 
no t r o u b l e here mind'." ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
At an o f f i c i a l l e v e l , r e l a t i o n s between miners and mechanics were good a t 
Murton. They were helped by a strong l o c a l Mining Federation Board 
( p o p u l a r l y known as "The Fed"), on which members of the mining unions 
9 
(miners, mechanics, enginemen, COSA and NACODS) met r e g u l a r l y to d i s c u s s 
community i s s u e s . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e r e was always a l e v e l of h i s t o r i c a l antagonism between the 
two s e c t i o n s of the workforce, r e f l e c t i n g t h e i r d i f f e r e n t p l a c e s i n the 
production p r o c e s s . Because they were craftsmen, mechanics tended to see 
themselves as a c u t above "the men". I n t h e i r turn, miners f r e q u e n t l y 
r e f e r r e d t o mechanics as l a z y , and e l i t i s t . H a b i t u a l overtime working by 
craftsmen (a t r a d i t i o n p o w e r f u l l y f o s t e r e d by management p r a c t i c e s ) was a 
f u r t h e r source of f r i c t i o n w ith some miners. I n the days before power 
(Footnote Continued) 
the l a s t c e n t u r y (Douglass, 1972), and were continued by lodges l i k e Ryhope 
i n the 1960's and Easington i n the 1970's. 
T h i s domination had a long h i s t o r y . Before the Labour Par t y came 
i n t o e x i s t e n c e , the Mining F e d e r a t i o n Board c o n t r o l l e d the a l l o c a t i o n of 
s e a t s on the P a r i s h and D i s t r i c t C o u n c i l . When the Labour P a r t y was bom i n 
Murton, i t was - as elsewhere i n the c o a l f i e l d - e f f e c t i v e l y a c h i l d of the 
union. 
9 
C o l l i e r y o f f i c i a l s and s t a f f s a s s o c i a t i o n - the NUM's c l e r i c a l 
s e c t i o n . 
Chapter 5 (128) 
l o a d i n g the d i f f e r e n c e s were accentuated because the two s e c t i o n s were 
r e l a t i v e l y separate, with the m a j o r i t y of mechanics deployed i n s u r f a c e 
workshops. 
5 . 2 . i i THE EFFECT OF MECHANISATION AND THE NPLA 
a) On the Mechanics 
The i n c r e a s i n g mechanisation of c o a l mining during the 1950's and '60's, 
c u l m i n a t i n g i n the wholesale adoption of the Anderton Shearer Loader (ASL), 
l e d t o a r e v o l u t i o n a r y change i n the r o l e of the mechanic. From being an 
e l i t e s u r f a c e craftsmen, the t y p i c a l mechanic became an underground r e p a i r , 
maintenance and i n s t a l l a t i o n worker. Now he was i n near continuous contact 
w i t h the miners. However he s t i l l r e t a i n e d a d i s t i n c t i v e i d e n t i t y . 
Mechanics occupied a d i s t i n c t i v e p l a c e i n the production process, 
i n s t a l l i n g and m a i n t a i n i n g mechanical and e l e c t r i c a l machinery ( f i t t e r s and 
e l e c t r i c i a n s r e s p e c t i v e l y ) . C r a f t e l i t i s m t h e r e f o r e p e r s i s t e d among some 
mechanics, e s p e c i a l l y those s t i l l working on the s u r f a c e . Hence there was 
s t i l l room f o r antagonism between the two s e c t i o n s . 
The reason f o r changes i n the mechanics' r o l e a r e obvious. As underground 
machinery developed, i n c r e a s i n g i n complexity and quantity, so too d i d the 
requirement f o r s k i l l e d personnel to maintain i t . The r a t i o of mechanics to 
miners l e a p t , r i s i n g by the e a r l y 1970's from one i n ten to one i n t h r e e a t 
many p i t s . But the change i n the mechanics r o l e was a l s o an uneven 
development, r e f l e c t i n g the uneven s p a t i a l and teitporal i n t r o d u c t i o n of 
mechanisation i n the Durham c o a l f i e l d . Some p i t s i n the West of the county, 
which enjoyed a legendary r e p u t a t i o n f o r under-mechanisation and 
underinvestment, r e t a i n e d s u r f a c e deployment of craftsmen i n t o the 1980's 
(f o r exanple Bearpark) . However, most of the b i g p i t s i n the E a s t of Durham 
were dominated by powerloading by the mid 1960's. 
The new r o l e f o r mechanics brought changes i n union p o l i t i c s . I n the 
1960's, the Murton mechanics' lodge l e a d e r s h i p was s t i l l dominated by the 
e l i t e group of s u r f a c e craftsmen whose roots l a y i n the t r a d i t i o n a l 
mechanics' r o l e . Sammy Emery had been s e c r e t a r y s i n c e the war, a blacksmith 
and a man "steeped i n the t r a d i t i o n s of the DCMA". The i n t r o d u c t i o n of new 
jobs, and new technology brought new problems and new c o n f l i c t s . The o l d 
o f f i c i a l s were out of touch with t h i s new environment. 
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F o r exantple one of the main problems a t Murton concerned the f a c t t h a t 
under power l o a d i n g r a t e s , mechanics only q u a l i f i e d f o r the new enhanced 
r a t e of pay i f they worked on a c o a l i n g s h i f t . Shearer f a c e s a t the time 
only c o a l e d one s h i f t out of t h r e e . To get round t h i s , men on a non c o a l i n g 
s h i f t would take a " s l i p s h e a r " - i e take a s i n g l e shear i n order to a l i g n 
the s h e a r e r on the f a c e . There were constant arguments as to whether or not 
s h i f t s with a s l i p shear a t t r a c t e d the power loading r a t e . The su r f a c e 
dominated committee couldn't adapt t o the changes. These new b a t t l e s were 
beyond them. One mechanic joked t h a t Sammy Emery didn't even know what a 
s l i p shear was! ( I t took u n t i l the a r r i v a l of a new manager i n 1970 f o r 
management to concede what had apparently been standard p r a c t i c e a t other 
c o l l i e r i e s , and pay mechanics power loading r a t e s f o r a l l except "prep" 
[ p r e p a r a t i o n ] s h i f t s . ) 
I n 1968, Sammy Emery ( s e c r e t a r y ) and B i l l y Young ( t r e a s u r e r ) r e t i r e d , to be 
r e p l a c e d by John Cummings and Herbert Wood r e s p e c t i v e l y . So ended the 
s u r f a c e workers s t r a n g l e h o l d on the branch. However i t wasn't u n t i l the mid 
'70's t h a t a s e l f s t y l e d "coup" l e d to the complete dominance of 
underground men on the committee. The d i v i s i o n s between underground workers 
and the r i g h t wing s u r f a c e workers were sharp. Coining a c o l o u r f u l e l e c t i o n 
slogan ( " I f you want your committee to be sound, vote underground; i f you 
don't g i v e a wank, vote f o r bank!"), l e f t wingers stood a cortplete s l a t e of 
underground men a g a i n s t the s u r f a c e candidates. Numerical dominance meant 
t h a t once the s l a t e had been agreed, underground v i c t o r y was assured. 
Mechanisation t h e r e f o r e i n c r e a s e d involvement i n the mechanics branch, and 
had an in^jortant t ransforming e f f e c t on branch p o l i t i c s . T h i s was because 
w h i l s t the NPLA a l l but ended l o c a l d i s p u t e s over pay f o r miners, 
mechanisation c r e a t e d a s e r i e s of demarcation and grading d i s p u t e s ( l i k e 
t h a t over s l i p s h e a r s ) f o r mechanics, which were new arena's f o r s t r u g g l e . 
b) On the miners 
W h i l s t mechanisation i t s e l f transformed branch p o l i t i c s f o r the mechanics, 
the miners' lodge was a f f e c t e d more by the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a new wages 
s t r u c t u r e which had i t s r o o t s i n mechanisation. The N a t i o n a l Power Loading 
Agreement (NPLA), int r o d u c e d i n 1966 f e l l on the lodge l i k e a s u f f o c a t i n g 
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b l a n k e t . I t f o r m a l l y a b o l i s h e d p i e c e r a t e s i n the mining i n d u s t r y ^ ^ . The 
lodges p r i n c i p l e f u n c t i o n as the mens' r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n d e a l i n g with wages 
and allowances d i s p u t e s was l o s t . A l l the key i s s u e s a f f e c t i n g the 
workforce were now d e a l t with a t an Area or n a t i o n a l l e v e l . This l e d to 
s t a g n a t i o n i n the Murton lodge, and a d e c l i n e i n the c a l i b r e of lodge 
l e a d e r s h i p . Attendances a t lodge meetings c o l l a p s e d . One man who was on the 
committee through t h i s p e r i o d - Sam - commented: 
"So you got somebody t h a t was on the way to the l i b r a r y 
or siommatt, and he saw somebody going i n to the Miners 
H a l l . So he went to see i f t h e r e was something on. Lo 
and behold, he comes out and he was on the committee!" 
( i n t e r v i e w ) 
Chairman of the lodge from 1958 u n t i l 1980 was John Toft. I n 1962 Joe C l a r k 
r e p l a c e d Jacky Stevens as Murton's s e c r e t a r y , and he a l s o stayed u n t i l 
1980. 
"Now Joe was the b e s t of a bad bunch. People didn't 
r e a l i s e how good Joe was u n t i l he r e t i r e d . " ( i n terview) 
Together, the two of them dominated Murton miners lodge f o r twenty y e a r s . 
However, Sam summed up the r e s t of the committee l i k e t h i s . 
"They weren't a r t i c u l a t e . There was an a p p a l l i n g l a c k 
of i n t e l l i g e n c e o v e r a l l on the committee. I n f a c t , 
anybody t h a t c o u l d s t r i n g f i v e or s i x words together, 
they were b r i l l i a n t ! C o u n c i l l o r Toft had years and 
y e a r s of t h i s where he j u s t c a r r i e d on. His word was 
law, s o r t of t h i n g . " ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
Huw Beynon - a Durham U n i v e r s i t y academic with years of accumulated 
e x p e r i e n c e i n t h e Durham c o a l f i e l d - suggested t h a t the Murton lodge was 
run more l i k e a s o c i a l c l u b than a union. With t h i s k i n d of committee, i t 
was not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t C l a r k and Toft, who stayed so long, came to 
dominate the lodge so con?>letely. 
The miners' lodge l e a d e r s h i p a t Murton was c h a r a c t e r i s e d t h e r e f o r e by a 
high degree of s t a b i l i t y , p o l i t i c a l conservatism, and i n t r o s p e c t i o n . 
Adoption of the NPLA caused a c o l l a p s e i n involvement and i n t e r e s t i n the 
lodge, l e a v i n g a s i a a l l group of mainly Labour P a r t y p o l i t i c i a n s to run i t , 
u s i n g an a c q u i r e d fund of "custom and p r a c t i c e " . I n a way, i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s ran themselves, through the long e s t a b l i s h e d procedures of the 
•'•^However i t i s c l e a r from evidence i n K r i e g e r (1983) and my own 
i n t e r v i e w s t h a t many under mechanised p i t s i n the west of the County 
r e t a i n e d p i e c e r a t e s i n t o the 1980's. 
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c o n c i l i a t i o n scheme backed up by t r a d i t i o n a l work arrangements at the 
c o l l i e r y . C o n f l i c t s t i l l e x i s t e d , and the uniquely oppressive nature of 
work a t the p o i n t of production ensured t h a t t h e r e was never any danger of 
c l a s s antagonism d i s a p p e a r i n g down the p i t . But c o n f l i c t was h i g h l y 
l o c a l i s e d and i s o l a t e d , w i t h the union's adherence to the c o n c i l i a t i o n 
procedures e n s u r i n g t h a t managements p r e r o g a t i v e s were never fundamentally 
c h a l l e n g e d . Union o f f i c i a l s , having unconsciously i n t e r n a l i s e d the s p i r i t 
of the PWS, worked to defend c o n d i t i o n s a t the p i t , r e l y i n g on the union a t 
a h i g h e r l e v e l to look a f t e r t h e i r s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s , and never 
q u e s t i o n i n g the wage r e l a t i o n which underpinned the whole settlement. 
Fo r management t h e r e was l i t t l e i n c e n t i v e t o change these day t o day 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s so long as production t a r g e t s were met, and the p i t kept 
f u n c t i o n i n g . These then were the "cosy r e l a t i o n s h i p s " which I a n MacGregor 
found so i n v i d i o u s when he a r r i v e d a t the NCB i n 1983. From the NCB's point 
of view, c o o p e r a t i v e i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s provided a b e n e f i c i a l framework 
f o r production w i t h i n e x i s t i n g t e c h n o l o g i c a l and production c o n s t r a i n t s , 
because t h e union cooperated i n m a i n t a i n i n g production and modernising the 
i n d u s t r y . I n other words, the union (at a l l l e v e l s ) accepted important 
a r e a s of j o i n t i n t e r e s t w ith management. From the s t a t e ' s point of view, 
t h e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s were f u n c t i o n a l because they encapsulated the 
i n c o r p o r a t i o n of the peak r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of labour, and ensured t h a t the 
union never c h a l l e n g e d the r i g h t s of the s t a t e or c a p i t a l to manage the 
i n d u s t r y and the economy. 
5 . 2 . i i i PIT CLOSURES IN THE 1960'S 
I n 1954 Murton was a b i g , o l d c o l l i e r y - nick-named the "Gutless Giant" -
which c o u l d have been doomed by the c o l l a p s e i n markets of the 1960's and 
the NCB s t r a t e g y to concentrate production i n the C e n t r a l c o a l f i e l d . 
I n s t e a d , the NCB committed massive investment to the p i t , s i n k i n g new 
s h a f t s a t Hawthorn, modernising the underground t r a n s p o r t system, b u i l d i n g 
a l a r g e new coke works, and redeveloping the e n t i r e p i t as the "Hawthorn 
Combine". Nearby Elemore, Eppleton and South Hetton p i t s were i n t e g r a t e d 
i n t o t h e complex (although South Hetton r e t a i n e d independent c o a l drawing 
f a c i l i t i e s ) , c r e a t i n g one of the f i r s t major "combined mines" i n Durham. 
The Hawthorn s h a f t and coking p l a n t seemed to guarantee the f u t u r e of the 
p i t (see appendix t h r e e ) . 
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At Murton therefore, the decimation of the West Durham c o a l f i e l d seemed 
distant. Not u n t i l 1967 did the f i r s t t r a v e l l e r s a r r i v e to bring f i r s t hand 
accounts of the wholesale closures i n the West of the county. And even then 
there were only a handful of men from Bowburn. In those days 90% of the 
workforce of 2000+ l i v e d i n Murton, and most of the other 10% were men 
who'd married out of the v i l l a g e . Often t h e i r children would return to 
Murton. Everyone knew everyone el s e . This miner i s therefore art i c u l a t i n g a 
c o l l e c t i v e experience when he says: 
"When I f i r s t started at Murton c o l l i e r y [in the early 
1960s] I knew nearly every man I saw there. . . I was 
related to a l o t of them. A l o t of them knew me family. 
So i t was l i k e everybody knew each other. When I 
returned to Murton [from Hawthorn] t^<^ years ago, on a 
Sunday night, s t a r t i n g tub loading at 11 o'clock 
[pm], there were two men out of the f u l l s h i f t that I 
knew. A l l the others were strangers from 
different 
c o l l i e r i e s , different areas." (interview) 
During the 1960's and 70's however, t r a v e l l e r s seem to have been integrated 
reasonably well into the c o l l i e r y . Favouritism undoubtedly existed, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y at lower l e v e l s of management (deputies and overmen) . Because 
they knew work teams from Murton, s o c i a l i s e d with them, and had worked with 
them for many years, such behaviour was almost inevitable. However, John 
Toft admitted that the miners' lodge did i n s i s t that recruitment to the p i t 
should be from people l i v i n g i n Murton, and from the families of those who 
came from Murton. And evidence from Blackhall men who transferred to the 
p i t i n the 1980's suggests that the union remained heavily biased towards 
Murton i n i t s outlook (see section 5 . 4 . i i ) . 
5.2.iv THE 1972 AND 1974 STRIKES 
Murton was s t i l l e s s e n t i a l l y a "family p i t " when the 1972 s t r i k e erupted. 
T r a v e l l e r s constituted only a t i n y fraction of the workforce. The s t r i k e 
was marked by exceptional community so l i d a r i t y , and a well-organised, 
united picketing e f f o r t . Many young mechanics and miners became involved in 
picketing. Craft e l i t i s m was worn away, as young men from miners' and 
^^There are three main s h i f t s of 7 1/4 hours at most Durham 
c o l l i e r i e s . " F i r s t s h i f t " s t a r t s at about 5.40; "nightshift s t a r t s at about 
12.30; and tubloading at about 23.00. 
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mechanics' lodges l e s s imbued with the t r a d i t i o n s of the past, worked 
tog e t h e r on the p i c k e t i n g operation. T r a d i t i o n a l s e c t i o n a l consciousness 
was augmented by the development of a strong corporate consciousness as the 
working c l a s s came under a t t a c k i n the e a r l y 1970's (see chapters two and 
t h r e e ) . 
The power of t r a d i t i o n a l community s o l i d a r i t y was g r a p h i c a l l y i l l u s t r a t e d 
by the treatment meted out to the members of the s u p e r v i s o r s union NACODS 
who a t t e n p t e d t o work during the d i s p u t e . F e e l i n g s ran high, and d e s p i t e 
the f a c t t h a t NACODS were not t e c h n i c a l l y i n v o l v e d i n the s t r i k e , many 
miners r e s e n t e d them c r o s s i n g t h e i r p i c k e t l i n e s . Women j o i n e d miners on 
the p i c k e t l i n e , and gave the deputies a very rough r i d e . I t was 
" o l d s t y l e p i c k e t i n g . People t h a t went i n walked the 
g a u n t l e t . No p o l i c e t h e r e , nowt. You know, s h i n 
k i c k i n g , a l l kinds. But t h e r e was never nee bother, as 
such." ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
They were t r e a t e d l i k e p a r i a h s i n the community, and i t a f f e c t e d many of 
them v e r y badly. Some never f u l l y recovered from the p s y c h o l o g i c a l trauma. 
(Memories of t h i s e x p e r i e n c e had a profound demonstration e f f e c t on many 
miners conten5>lating r e t u r n i n g t o work i n 1984/5.) 
The 1974 s t r i k e was a much q u i e t e r a f f a i r . However, some of the 
developments of the 1972 s t r i k e were c o n s o l i d a t e d . I n p a r t i c u l a r , the 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the mechanics' branch under John Cummings l e a d e r s h i p 
continued. Many of the younger mechanics s t a r t e d to become in v o l v e d i n the 
union. Group i d e n t i t y was f o s t e r e d by a s e r i e s of h i g h l y s u c c e s s f u l s o c i a l 
events o r g a n i s e d by John, i n v o l v i n g mechanics and t h e i r wives. Because they 
were a r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l branch ( l e s s than 300, conpared to the miners' 
1200+), t h i s group i d e n t i t y was r e l a t i v e l y easy to c r e a t e and s u s t a i n . 
A f t e r t h e 1974 s t r i k e however, i n common with the union i n general, an aura 
of conplacency s e t t l e d over both miners' and mechanics' branches a t Murton. 
As the p i t c a r park r a p i d l y expanded, miners began to p l a n r e g u l a r overseas 
h o l i d a y s f o r the f i r s t time, and labour r e l a t i o n s appeared to d r i f t back 
i n t o the r o u t i n e of the decade before. However, as chapter four showed, the 
calm was de c e p t i v e . Changes a t a g l o b a l l e v e l were beginning to e x e r t 
p r e s s u r e on t h e NCB and the s t a t e , and a new o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t the NUM 
began t o take shape. 
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5.3: DESTABILISATION ONE: THE AREA INCENTIVE SCHEME 
The i n s u l a r i t y and coitplacency c h a r a c t e r i s i n g both branches of the NUM i n 
Murton co u l d not l a s t . The p r e s s u r e s d e s c r i b e d i n chapter four t r a n s l a t e d 
i n t o f o u r s p e c i f i c d e s t a b i l i s i n g i n f l u e n c e s on management u n i o n - r e l a t i o n s 
which developed from 1978 onwards a t Murton. They were; the i n c e n t i v e 
scheme, t r a v e l l e r s , the changing age s t r u c t u r e of the workforce, and p i t 
c l o s u r e s . Although c a u s a l l y r e l a t e d f a c t o r s , they were to an extent 
e x p e r i e n c e d s e p a r a t e l y , and can t h e r e f o r e be a n a l y s e d s e p a r a t e l y . The 
f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n s d e a l with each i n turn, showing what t h e i r p l a c e 
s p e c i f i c in^Jact was, what e f f e c t they had i n Murton, and how t h i s had an 
i n t a c t on p o l i t i c s and c l a s s consciousness, both a t a l o c a l and n a t i o n a l 
l e v e l . 
Chapter four showed t h a t the i n c e n t i v e scheme was designed to have 
p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l e f f e c t s , and t h a t i t s i n t r o d u c t i o n was surrounded by 
b i t t e r controversy. But what e f f e c t s d i d i t have at p i t l e v e l , i n the short 
and long term? What i n t a c t d i d i t have on xinion p o l i t i c s , and on 
management-union r e l a t i o n s ? And how d i d these developments t i e i n to area 
and n a t i o n a l events? 
5 . 3 . i HOW THE INCENTIVE SCHEME WORKS 
Under the i n c e n t i v e scheme, each f a c e and development i s s e t a standard 
t a s k . I f the men on the f a c e achieve t h i s t a s k they r e c e i v e a standard 
bonus. I f they achieve more, then they earn an i n c r e a s i n g bonus, c a l c u l a t e d 
on a s l i d i n g s c a l e . There are two v a r i a t i o n s i n payment systems f o r f a c e 
workers. I n the f i r s t system ( c a l l e d "pooling") each fa c e team earns the 
same bonus, c a l c u l a t e d by averaging the bonuses earned by a l l of them. 
(Development workers bonuses have never been pooled.) T h i s was the system 
which almost every p i t i n Durham s t a r t e d on i n 1978. I n the second system 
( c a l l e d " f a c e by f a c e " ) each f a c e team earns the bonus f o r i t s f a c e . 
Bonuses a r e not averaged between the d i f f e r e n t f a c e teams. At Murton, the 
miners voted t o pool bonuses, d e s p i t e advice from the p l a t f o r m at a union 
meeting t h a t they'd be b e t t e r o f f i f they went fac e to f a c e . ("Pooling" was 
c o n s i d e r e d t o be more c o l l e c t i v i s t than "face by f a c e " , and perhaps the 
vote i n favour of i t r e f l e c t e d community c o l l e c t i v i s m . ) 
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Non f a c e workers earn a percentage of the c o l l i e r y average bonus. The 
c o l l i e r y average i s c a l c u l a t e d by averaging the bonus achieved on a l l f a c e s 
and developments, what percentage of the c o l l i e r y average a miner earns 
(100%, 65%, 50%, 40%) i s dependant on h i s grade, which i n t u r n r e l a t e s to 
h i s p l a c e i n the production p r o c e s s . (Female canteen workers are p a i d a t 
the lowest s u r f a c e bonus.) Mechanics a l s o earn a percentage of the c o l l i e r y 
average, depending on where they they work. 
Apart from d i v i s i o n s between a r e a s and p i t s (see chapter f o u r ) , a t p i t 
l e v e l the i n c e n t i v e scheme became a constant source of c o n f l i c t . Manning 
l e v e l s , d i f f i c u l t t a s k s , and any other f a c t o r s which prevent men earning 
h i g h e r bonuses a l l c r e a t e d c o n f l i c t . For exanple, under the terms of the 
agreement, i f a f a c e team d i s p u t e d the t a s k s e t f o r a face, then they 
worked " i n suspense" f o r s i x weeks. During t h i s p e r i o d they r e c e i v e d only a 
reduced f a l l b a c k bonus, and the p i t average was t h e r e f o r e reduced. I f a t 
t h e end of the s i x week p e r i o d management agreed t h a t they they had shown 
t h a t the t a r g e t was unreasonably high, then the t a s k was lowered, and the 
bonus r e c a l c u l a t e d f o r the suspense p e r i o d from the new task. The 
faceworkers were then p a i d the backpay a c c r u i n g from t h i s new bonus. 
However, the c o l l i e r y average f o r the p e r i o d was not r e c a l c u l a t e d , and 
workers on c o l l i e r y average r e l a t e d bonuses r e c e i v e d no back pay. C l e a r l y 
t h i s s i t u a t i o n had the p o t e n t i a l t o heighten d i v i s i o n s between faceworkers 
and c o l l i e r y average workers. 
At Murton, d i v i s i o n s between miners and mechanics opened up because of the 
n e g o t i a t i n g arrangements introduced with the i n c e n t i v e scheme. Under the 
p r o v i s i o n s of the scheme, the mechanics had no r e p r e s e n t a t i o n on p i t l e v e l 
n e g o t i a t i o n s about the scheme. T h i s caused some f r i c t i o n between the two 
lodges f o r s e v e r a l y e a r s , as the mechanics' minute book shows. Although 
o n l y the miners' lodge were allowed to negotiate i n c e n t i v e d e a l s , the 
r e s u l t s of t h e s e d e l i b e r a t i o n s a f f e c t e d mechanics' wages, as they earned 
p r o p o r t i o n s of the c o l l i e r y average bonus. Some l e a d e r s of the mechanics' 
branch a l s o b e l i e v e d t h a t they were could have negotiated more e f f e c t i v e l y 
than the miners' branch. 
Under normal c o n d i t i o n s , a new t a s k was based on the standards e s t a b l i s h e d 
w i t h s i m i l a r manning l e v e l s , s i m i l a r machinery i n the same seam. I f s e r i o u s 
d i s p u t e s arose, then the union c o u l d c a l l i n an NCB method study team, who 
would c a r r y out measurements and t e s t s before coming to a d e c i s i o n . Apart 
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from method study, and working " i n suspense" however, t h e r e was l i t t l e 
o f f i c i a l scope f o r n e g o t i a t i o n over t a s k s , s i n c e management could not give 
more than a 5% c o n c e s s i o n on a t a s k to the union. But a t some p i t s i n the 
c o a l f i e l d , branch l e a d e r s were able to win s i g n i f i c a n t informal 
c o n c e s s i o n s . For example, when i t came to c a l c u l a t i n g the c o l l i e r y average, 
they c o u l d ask the manager to e f f e c t i v e l y "pretend" t h a t only twenty f i v e 
i n s t e a d of the r e a l twenty seven men had worked on a p a r t i c u l a r f a c e . Fewer 
men a c h i e v i n g a given t a s k i n c r e a s e d the bonus, so as long as the manager 
agreed t o t h i s l i t t l e deception, then the bonus and the c o l l i e r y average 
c o u l d be i n c r e a s e d (and t h e two men taken out of the c a l c u l a t i o n were a l s o 
p a i d the new bonus). At Murton though, the i n c e n t i v e scheme was always 
p l a y e d cozif>letely by the book. There were no s p e c i a l d e a l s . 
Furthermore, the branch decided on whether or not to accept t a s k s by 
b a l l o t i n g the f a c e teams concerned. T h i s enhanced the d i v i s i v e e f f e c t of 
the scheme, by g i v i n g faceworkers the only say i n an i s s u e which a f f e c t e d 
the whole workforce. I n doing so i t perpetuated the t r a d i t i o n a l dominance 
of faceworkers i n the NUM. (An a l t e r n a t i v e method of d e c i d i n g t a s k s would 
have been f o r the branch committee to make a recommendation to the e n t i r e 
membership a t a branch meeting - thus c o l l e c t i v i s i n g the d e c i s i o n , and a l s o 
o f f e r i n g the members a c l e a r lead.) 
5 . 3 . i i DISPUTES OVER THE INCENTIVE SCHEME AT MURTON 
From 1978 onwards, the i n c e n t i v e scheme caused constant problems a t the 
p i t . From time to time d i s c o n t e n t erupted i n t o c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . However, 
the v e r y nature of the i n c e n t i v e scheme was to s p l i t workers o f f from each 
other, and thereby discourage c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . But s i n c e fundamental 
c o n f l i c t s of i n t e r e s t s t i l l e x i s t e d , men s t i l l took a c t i o n . Often t h i s was 
a t the l e v e l of i n d i v i d u a l s , or s m a l l work groups, who fought f o r t h e i r own 
iit^srovement. I n t h i s way the i n c e n t i v e scheme i s o l a t e d c o n f l i c t , because 
c o n f l i c t s were generated a t a s m a l l s c a l e , and t h e r e f o r e the obvious l e v e l 
a t which t o r e s o l v e them was a t t h i s group l e v e l . I t s p l i t workers from 
each other because i t l i m i t e d the b a s i s f o r a u n i t e d i n t e r e s t i n any i s s u e . 
Chapter t h r e e d e s c r i b e d four l e v e l s of consciousness which could be 
i d e n t i f i e d i n working c l a s s groups (hegemonic, corporate, s e c t i o n a l and 
" f a c t o r y " ) . I n the c a s e of miners, " p i t " consciousness s u b s t i t u t e s e a s i l y 
f o r " f a c t o r y " c o n sciousness. However, the e f f e c t s of the i n c e n t i v e scheme 
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suggest a f i f t h l e v e l of consciousness - "group" consciousness. This 
a p p l i e s t o miners who i d e n t i f y with t h e i r work group - f o r exanple, 
faceworkers. Within mining t h e r e i s a long t r a d i t i o n of t h i s type of 
c o n s c i o u s n e s s , o f t e n a s s o c i a t e d with the t r a d i t i o n a l dominance of 
faceworkers (although see Daunton (1981) f o r strong r e g i o n a l v a r i a t i o n s i n 
t h e e x t e n t of t h i s e l i t i s m ) . However, i n the same way t h a t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
of c o r p o r a t e consciousness does not exclude simultaneous adoption of 
hegemonic consciousness, the e x i s t e n c e of group consciousness does not r u l e 
out the attainment of "higher" l e v e l s of consciousness. Group consciousness 
i s p a r t i c u l a r l y s i g n i f i c a n t i n the c o a l i n d u s t r y because, i n the absence of 
a s t r o n g counter ideology, i t i s easy f o r group consciousness to become the 
prime l e v e l a t which workers i d e n t i f y themselves. I n t e n t i o n a l l y or not, i t 
seems c l e a r t h a t the i n c e n t i v e scheme accentuates group consciousness a t 
the expense of " f a c t o r y " ( p i t ) and corporate consciousness. 
I n times of p r o f i t a b i l i t y enough f l e x i b i l i t y may e x i s t f o r lower management 
to n e g o t i a t e i n f o r m a l agreements s e t t l i n g g rievances with work groups. 
However, a t Murton the i n f l e x i b l e operation of the AIS l e d to a high l e v e l 
of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the operation of the bonus scheme. But i t i s a l s o 
c l e a r t h a t t h e response t o t h i s s i t u a t i o n accentuated some of the d i v i s i v e 
e f f e c t s of group consciousness. T h i s i s demonstrated by the p a t t e r n of 
d i s p u t e s i n the p e r i o d 1978-84 ( f o r f u r t h e r d e t a i l s on d i s p u t e s during t h i s 
p e r i od, see appendix f o u r ) . 
On May 17th 1978, powerloaders on E51 r e f u s e d t o descend i n t o the p i t i n a 
p r o t e s t a t the depressed l e v e l of bonus payments. The r e s t of the miners' 
lodge walked out i n sympathy. They went back to work the next day a f t e r a 
union S p e c i a l Meeting which passed a committee recommendation t h a t they 
work under p r o t e s t , a c t i v a t i n g the c o n c i l i a t i o n machinery. T h i s dispute s e t 
the scene f o r the next two y e a r s . F a i l u r e to r e s o l v e d i s p u t e s through the 
agreed procedures meant a b u i l d up of f r u s t r a t i o n and anger as a s e r i e s of 
i s s u e s b u i l t up. For exaitple, on December 11th 1978 i t was reported to the 
miners' lodge t h a t a deputation would i n c l u d e the s u b j e c t of E80's bonus. 
On June 14th 1980 a l e t t e r was r e c e i v e d by the lodge from the manager 
concerning a " r e s t r i c t i o n of e f f o r t " on E52, the problem apparently a 
manning d i s p u t e . 
F i n a l l y m atters came t o a head on September 2nd 1980. Faceworkers on E80 
walked out, and the r e s t of the p i t followed. I t q u i c k l y emerged t h a t the 
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d i s p u t e was a focus f o r a l l the simmering d i s c o n t e n t at the p i t , and at 
l e a s t f our i s s u e s were i n v o l v e d . The spark came from the p r a c t i c e of 
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" t e e i n g out" men from a fa c e to a l e s s e r p a i d job . Coicgplaints about 
" t e e i n g out" had s u r f a c e d r e g u l a r l y over the p a s t year. The s t r i k e l a s t e d 
u n t i l the weekend, although i t seems t h a t i t d i d not achieve many of i t s 
o b j e c t i v e s (see appendix f o u r ) . 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , t h i s d i s p u t e was both i n i t i a t e d and ended by facemen. Whilst 
the miners' minutes r e c o r d a unanimous d e c i s i o n to r e t u r n to work, 
i n t e r v i e w s confirmed t h a t only faceworkers were i n v o l v e d i n t h i s vote. 
Defending t h i s procedure, the t r a d i t i o n a l i s t lodge t r e a s u r e r argued t h a t 
t h i s was a faceman's d i s p u t e , and i f everyone had a vote then the p i t could 
have s t a y e d on s t r i k e even though a l l the faceworkers were happy to end the 
s t r i k e . A l e a d i n g l e f t wing a c t i v i s t - Frank Duffy - argued t h a t t h i s was a 
disingenuous p o s i t i o n , because the f a c e workers' bonus a f f e c t s a l l workers 
a t the p i t , who e a r n a percentage of the c o l l i e r y average bonus. Therefore, 
faceworkers' bonus r a t e s were the concern of every worker. 
I n f a c t , t h e faceworkers vote owed more t o the h i s t o r i c a l and continuing 
dominance of faceworkers w i t h i n the NUM than to any i n t r i n s i c m e r i t s of the 
procedure. D i v i s i o n s between the r e l a t i v e l y h i g h l y paid, high s t a t u s face 
jobs, and other underground ("backbye") and s u r f a c e workers were 
exacerbated by the i n c e n t i v e scheme. Under the scheme, fac e workers became 
the wage l e a d e r s a t each p i t . T h e i r r e s u l t s determined the wages of non 
t a s k based workers. A c t i o n by f a c e workers t h e r e f o r e had the p o t e n t i a l to 
a f f e c t e a r n i n g s throughout the c o l l i e r y . When combined with t h e i r a b i l i t y 
t o r e g u l a t e production, i t can be seen t h a t power loaders were r e l a t i v e l y 
powerful w i t h i n the p i t . However, the i n c e n t i v e scheme encouraged the 
deployment of t h i s power f o r group purposes, and f r e q u e n t l y t h i s s t r a i n e d 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h other workers. For exanple, i f power loaders l e d a p i t 
walk out over a bonus i s s u e , then c o l l i e r y average workers l o s t t h e i r bonus 
f o r a week. Furthermore, they inight have l i t t l e opportunity to make up 
t h e i r low wages w i t h overtime. Face workers on the other hand only l o s t 
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"Teeing out" r e f e r s to the p r a c t i c e of moving a faceworker on 
100% bonus onto a lower p a i d job i f t h a t worker f i n i s h e s t h e i r work before 
the end of the s h i f t . See appendix four f o r d e t a i l s about t h i s s t r i k e . 
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t h e i r bonus f o r the day(s) of the a c t i o n , and t h e i r r e l a t i v e l y high 
e a r n i n g s c o u l d e a s i l y be topped up with e x t r a overtime. 
The f a i l u r e of the 1980 " t e e i n g out" s t r i k e was apparent w i t h i n weeks, as 
c o i r ^ j l a i n t s about the bonus continued to preoccupy lodge meetings. F i n a l l y , 
a t a s p e c i a l meeting on 25th October 1981, the committee - forced i n t o 
a c t i o n by the depth of d i s c o n t e n t a t the p i t - recommended a work to r u l e 
i n p r o t e s t a t the low bonus (see appendix four f o r more d e t a i l s ) . But the 
manager r e f u s e d t o n e g o t i a t e u n l e s s the r e s t r i c t i o n was ended, and f i v e 
days l a t e r the committee got c o l d f e e t and recommended c a l l i n g o f f the work 
to r u l e . They were defeated 85-65 a t a branch meeting. On November 8th, 
a f t e r minor concessions from the manager the committee voted 10-6 to again 
recommend a r e t u r n t o normal working. At a s p e c i a l meeting however, the 
recommendation was r e j e c t e d , t h i s time overwhelmingly. On 15th November the 
committee again voted (13-7) t o recommend a r e t u r n to normal working. But 
t h e f u l l meeting r e j e c t e d t h i s a d vice once more, and by 62 to 55 decided to 
continue the work t o r u l e . Four days l a t e r however, a f t e r i n t e r v e n t i o n from 
the a r e a union ( i n the shape of a l e t t e r from the P r e s i d e n t , Harold 
M i t c h e l l ) , the men decided unanimously to r e t u r n to work. 
T h i s a c t i o n was h i g h l y s i g n i f i c a n t f o r a numnber of reasons. The committee 
was f o r c e d i n t o a c t i o n because of the mens' mounting d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with 
the bonus. The branch l e a d e r s h i p q u i c k l y l o s t i t s nerve and t r i e d to c a l l 
the a c t i o n o f f . But the members decided t h a t backing down would get them 
nowhere, and voted to continue the work to r u l e . Most s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
however, the d e c i s i v e f o r c e behind the d i s p u t e were the r e c e n t l y a r r i v e d 
t r a v e l l e r s from B l a c k b a l l c o l l i e r y (see s e c t i o n 5.5 below). A new p o l i t i c a l 
f o r c e had e n t e r e d t h e Murton branch. At B l a c k b a l l , a strong, w e l l organised 
branch had won s i g n i f i c a n t i n f o r m a l concessions from management over the 
o p e r a t i o n of the i n c e n t i v e scheme, and the men who t r a n s f e r r e d t o Murton 
a f t e r B l a c k b a l l ' s c l o s u r e were determined to s t i f f e n what they saw as an 
unacceptably weak union o r g a n i s a t i o n , and win b e t t e r c o n d i t i o n s . As s e c t i o n 
5 . 5 . i i shows. B l a c k b a l l t r a n s f e r e e s a p p l i e d a c r u c i a l p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e to 
the Murton branch. I n e f f e c t they challe n g e d the o f f i c i a l l e a d e r s h i p , 
p r o v i d i n g an " a l t e r n a t i v e l e a d e r s h i p " w i t h i n the p i t . 
At about the same tiiae as the work to r u l e , another attempt was made to 
improve wages, by changing the i n c e n t i v e scheme from a "pooling" to a "face 
by f a c e " system. Although d i s c u s s i o n s began i n the lodge a t the s t a r t of 
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1981, i t wasn't u n t i l August 8th t h a t a b a l l o t was c a l l e d . The d e c i s i o n was 
t o f o l l o w almost a l l t h e p i t s i n the county, and go f a c e t o f a c e . B l a c k h a l l 
miners again p l a y e d a prominent r o l e . They were convinced t h a t more money 
would be earned going f a c e to f a c e , and campaigned s t r o n g l y f o r the change. 
T h i s demonstrates the s t r o n g " p i t m i l i t a n c y " of the B l a c k h a l l men. They 
worked hard to i n c r e a s e t h e i r earnings, c h a l l e n g i n g the l e v e l of bonuses, 
and atten^Jting t o f o r c e the lodge i n t o more ag g r e s s i v e bargaining with 
management. Underground a t Murton they r e g u l a r l y confronted management, 
c h a l l e n g i n g long e s t a b l i s h e d customs and management p r e r o g a t i v e s , providing 
an iit^jortant demonstration e f f e c t f o r young Murton miners i n the process. 
T h e i r determined and s e l f conscious i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the work t o r u l e , going 
f a c e t o f a c e , and l a t e r the e l e c t i o n of John Dixon as lodge s e c r e t a r y (see 
s e c t i o n 5 . 6 . i i i ) , confirmed the B l a c k h a l l mens' conscious d e c i s i o n to s t i c k 
together. As w e l l as a h i g h l y developed p i t consciousness however, many of 
the B l a c k h a l l men were a l s o p o l i t i c a l l y l e f t wing. T h e i r branch s e c r e t a r y 
had been a l e a d i n g member of the Durham Broad L e f t (see s e c t i o n 4.3), and 
he had campaigned hard f o r p r o g r e s s i v e p o l i c i e s w i t h i n h i s branch. The 
B l a c k h a l l men t h e r e f o r e c o n s t i t u t e d a h i g h l y s i g n i f i c a n t educating element 
a t Murton, both by t h e i r a g g r e s s i v e p i t m i l i t a n c y , and t h e i r chair^aioning of 
l e f t wing p o l i c i e s . 
D i s p u t e s over bonuses, and the a g g r e s s i v e r e a c t i o n of B l a c k h a l l t r a v e l l e r s 
t o the Murton branch, r a i s e in^sortant questions about the c h a r a c t e r and 
q u a l i t y of l e a d e r s h i p i n the Murton miners' branch. What was branch 
l e a d e r s h i p l i k e a t t h i s time? Was t h e r e a l e a d e r s h i p c r i s i s i n the Murton 
branch? Why was the l e a d e r s h i p apparently unable to e s t a b l i s h i t s e l f i n the 
e a r l y 1980's, a f t e r so many y e a r s of s t a b i l i t y ? How d i d the lodge 
l e a d e r s h i p r e a c t t o the changing environment? 
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5.3 LEADERSHIP AND CHANGE 
A l l the d i s p u t e s regarding the i n c e n t i v e scheme were spontaneous a c t i o n s . 
One way of i n t e r p r e t i n g t h i s i s as the p e r s i s t e n t f a i l u r e of the lodge 
l e a d e r s h i p to s e t t l e the memberships' gr i e v a n c e s . Conpared to other 
c o l l i e r i e s , Murton miners' lodge was thought to be weak and i n e f f e c t i v e . 
Management was on top. Men t r a n s f e r r i n g i n from other p i t s noted t h a t 
Murton had worse d e a l s on bonus, and a more oppressive management than 
they'd been used t o . The mechanics on the other hand were known to be 
r e l a t i v e l y w e l l organised, but r i g h t wing. How then, and t o what extent d i d 
the two branches change? 
5 . 3 . i THE MINERS' LODGE 
I n 1980 t h e l e a d e r s h i p of the miners' lodge entered a p e r i o d of 
i n s t a b i l i t y . F or 20 y e a r s the committee had been dominated by John Toft and 
Joe C l a r k (see t a b l e 1) . The men who followed f a i l e d to in^ose t h e i r 
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a u t h o r i t y on the lodge . During a p e r i o d of i n c r e a s i n g turbulence and 
change, the o f f i c i a l s and t h e i r committee were unable to develop s t r a t e g i e s 
which p r o t e c t e d or advanced the memberships i n t e r e s t s . T h i s was 
p a r t i c u l a r l y so because of the continuous change i n membership, and because 
of the developing management s t r a t e g y , which was i n t e n t on r e w r i t i n g 
t r a d i t i o n a l management - union r e l a t i o n s (see chapter f o u r ) . Cosy 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s no longer worked f o r management. 
P o l i t i c a l l y the lodge l e a d e r s h i p was "moderate" and " r i g h t wing", but what 
does t h i s mean? A f t e r a l l , the committee men were Labour supporters, 
d i f f e r i n g o n l y i n t h e i r degree of support f o r the pa r t y . Outside Murton, 
they might be c o n s i d e r e d c o l l e c t i v i s t and s o c i a l i s t . To answer t h i s 
q u e stion, and t o provide f u l l e r d e f i n i t i o n s of other terms l i k e " m i l i t a n t " 
and " l e f t wing" i t i s n e c e s s a r y to r e t u r n to the c a t e g o r i e s and t h e o r i e s of 
chapt e r t h r e e . For as was made c l e a r t h e r e , l a b e l s are of l i t t l e use u n l e s s 
t h e i r content i s e 3 q > l i c i t l y s t a t e d . I n t h i s chapter, two key d i s t i n c t i o n s 
a r e adopted, between "moderate" and " m i l i t a n t " on the one hand, and " r i g h t 
12 
Both miners' and mechanics' branches e l e c t t h e i r committees and 
o f f i c i a l s i n annual b a l l o t s of t h e i r members. 
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wing" and " l e f t wing" on the other. What then do these l a b e l s imply, and 
why have they been chosen? 
Taking the l a t t e r q u e s t i o n f i r s t , t hese two dichotomous p a i r i n g s r e f l e c t 
c a t e g o r i e s f r e q u e n t l y used by miners and mechanics i n Murton, and as such 
they a r e anchored i n the experiences of those under study. Nevertheless, 
t h e i r usage i n Murton i s n e i t h e r u n i v e r s a l , nor s y s t e m a t i c . I t a l s o needs 
to be born i n mind t h a t a l l four c a t e g o r i e s c o n s t i t u t e " i d e a l types", 
whereas r e a l i t y d e f i e s such s i n g l e p o l a r i s a t i o n . I n e v i t a b l y , people occupy 
p o s i t i o n s on a continuum between th e s e extremes, and a l s o - most 
i n ^ j o r t a n t l y - t h e i r p o s i t i o n along these l i n e s i s r a r e l y f i x e d . Despite 
t h e s e r e s e r v a t i o n s , g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s a r e p o s s i b l e . S t a r t i n g then with the 
f i r s t dichotomous p a i r i n g t h e r e f o r e , what i s i t t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s a 
"moderate" from a " m i l i t a n t " ? 
E s s e n t i a l l y the d i v i s i o n hinges on the r e a d i n e s s t o r e s o r t to a c t i o n i n 
p u r s u i t of a c l a i m . A m i l i t a n t b e l i e v e s i n the power of, and the need f o r , 
d i r e c t a c t i o n . Moderates e r r towards n e g o t i a t i o n and coicpromise, p r e f e r r i n g 
to put t h e i r f a i t h i n the power of reasonable argument between r a t i o n a l 
people. S i g n i f i c a n t l y t h e r e f o r e , t h e r e i s no i n t r i n s i c p o l i t i c a l content to 
m i l i t a n c y (although i t i n v a r i a b l y has p o l i t i c a l e f f e c t s , both f o r 
management and t h e u n i o n ) . I t i s a two edged sword, whose exact c h a r a c t e r 
and i n t a c t depend on i t s a r t i c u l a t i o n to a conscious s t r a t e g y . Leadership 
o f t e n p l a y s a c r u c i a l r o l e i n c h a n n e l l i n g m i l i t a n c y , h e l p i n g determine, f o r 
exanple, whether i t i s wielded f o r group, s e c t i o n a l or hegemonic aims. 
P o l i t i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n s a re b e s t drawn between r i g h t and l e f t wings. For the 
l e f t , as Thatcherism gained a hold, the t a s k was i n c r e a s i n g l y to challenge 
t h e c a p i t a l i s t o r g a n i s a t i o n of the i n d u s t r y . They recognised the need to 
i d e n t i f y and j o i n with other s e c t i o n s of the working c l a s s , and to f i g h t 
a g a i n s t the government. They possessed a strong commitment to trade union 
p r i n c i p l e s , i n p a r t i c u l a r a fundamental b e l i e f i n s o l i d a r i t y at a l l l e v e l s 
of the movement. For some, t h i s extended f u r t h e r , towards b e l i e f i n the 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a s o c i a l i s t order i n B r i t a i n . Corporate consciousness was 
t h e r e f o r e strong, w i t h some elements of hegemonic consciousness apparent i n 
some i n d i v i d u a l s . 
Right wingers on the other hand, sought a c o n t i n u a t i o n of the s t a t u s quo. 
They saw the problems f a c i n g the i n d u s t r y as a T h a t c h e r i t e a b e r r a t i o n , and 
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sought t o defend the c o a l i n d u s t r y - and i n p a r t i c u l a r Murton - from the 
i n c u r s i o n of such d e v i a n t p o l i c i e s . T h e i r p o l i t i c s were t h e r e f o r e 
s e c t i o n a l , dominated by the need to p r e s e r v e the miners p o s i t i o n of 
r e l a t i v e p r i v i l e g e . I n t r a d e union terms, they deployed c o l l e c t i v e power 
f o r s e c t i o n a l or group aims. 
T h i s typology i s c l e a r l y r e s t r i c t e d to s p e c i f i c h i s t o r i c a l and s o c i a l 
c o n d i t i o n s . I t i s a l s o couched i n terms which stand outside the d i s c o u r s e 
of most of the people i t r e f e r s t o . As w e l l as d i f f e r e n c e s i n terminology, 
t h i s r e f l e c t s the h e s i t a n t , p a r t i a l and f i t f u l way i n which c l a s s 
c o nsciousness develops. R a r e l y i s the process as smooth and c l e a r as the 
c a t e g o r i e s of language c o n t i n u a l l y t r y and confer upon i t . I n p a r t i c u l a r , 
i t i s c r u c i a l to r e a l i s e t h a t many - i f not most - miners f i t t e d i n t o these 
c a t e g o r i e s only by i n f e r e n c e . I n other words, f o r most of the time, they 
b a r e l y f i t t e d themselves i n t o any groups. T h e i r p o l i t i c s - beyond a b a s i c 
commitment to s o l i d a r i t y and w e l f a r e Labourism - were not e x p l i c i t or 
coherent. Only l e f t wing a c t i v i s t s had a r e l a t i v e l y c l e a r , conscious 
p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g y . 
Having unpacked the c a t e g o r i e s of p o l i t i c a l consciousness applying i n 
Murton, and r e c o g n i s e d t h e i r l i m i t a t i o n s , the r o l e of l e a d e r s h i p f a l l s more 
n a t u r a l l y i n t o focus. W h i l s t i t i s t o be expected t h a t l e a d e r s would posses 
a sharper awareness of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n , and t h e i r p o l i t i c a l 
aims, t h i s can by no means be taken f o r granted. Hence the a c t u a l p r a c t i c e s 
and b e l i e f s of d i f f e r e n t l e a d e r s , and l e a d e r s h i p groups, r e q u i r e s p e c i f i c 
examination. 
I n Murton the miners' branch committee was " r i g h t wing". I n the e a r l y 
1980's they tended to be p o l i t i c a l l y unaware, i n as much as broader 
p o l i t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c i s s u e s d i d not f i g u r e i n t h e i r conception of t h e i r 
r o l e as lodge o f f i c i a l s . They were immersed i n the day to day running of 
the lodge, r e p r e s e n t i n g the men i n the p i t c o n s u l t a t i v e machinery. Wider 
s t r a t e g i c i s s u e s about the running of the i n d u s t r y were not often addressed 
by the committee. I n t h i s sense they were not conscious p o l i t i c a l agents. 
They were r i g h t wing i n the sense t h a t they r e j e c t e d p o l i t i c a l caicpaigning, 
had no conception of c h a l l e n g i n g the way the i n d u s t r y was run, and 
g e n e r a l l y supported the s t a t u s quo. 
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Another s i g n i f i c a n t a s p e c t of the lodge l e a d e r s h i p was a marked l a c k of 
confidence. Strong and u n i t e d l e a d e r s h i p might have been able to r e s o l v e 
t h e problems with the i n c e n t i v e scheme, but as a noted l e f t winger - Frank 
Duffy - commented, t h i s was l a c k i n g on the Murton committee. 
"They've never f e l t confident enough to address the 
m a j o r i t y of the men on any major problem. They've 
always been a f r a i d of the r e a c t i o n a r y s e c t i o n of the 
workforce who i n a l o t of c a s e s were more a r t i c u l a t e 
than the l e a d e r s . . . I would say [the r e a c t i o n a r i e s ] 
were the m a j o r i t y , and they were c e r t a i n l y the loudest 
shouters a t the meetings." (i n t e r v i e w ) 
Hence the l e a d e r s h i p s p o l i t i c a l i n c l i n a t i o n s found an iirportant echo i n the 
a t t i t u d e s of a s i g n i f i c a n t s e c t i o n of the workforce. Because the l e a d e r s h i p 
was not s t r o n g l y p o l i t i c a l l y motivated, and l a c k e d confidence, a 
b e l l i g e r e n t (and o c c a s i o n a l l y m i l i t a n t ) r i g h t wing group e x e r c i s e d 
c o n s i d e r a b l e i n f l u e n c e on lodge p o l i c y . 
As a consequence of weak l e a d e r s h i p , problems were r a r e l y r e s o l v e d 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y through the c o n c i l i a t i o n machinery. Branch o f f i c i a l s l a c k e d 
the power t o persuade management to back down, and they lacked the 
confidence t o use any i m p l i c i t or e x p l i c i t t h r e a t s of a c t i o n to f o r c e a 
management r e t r e a t . Because of the l a c k of conscious p o l i t i c a l commitment 
by committee members, t h e r e was l i t t l e a c t i v e campaigning w i t h i n the lodge. 
Consequently, t h e r e was l i t t l e union r e s i s t a n c e to the aggressive new 
management s t r a t e g y which was beginning to penetrate even to f a r f l u n g 
c o r n e r s of the B r i t i s h c o a l f i e l d l i k e Murton. Nevertheless, t h i s was not a 
s t a b l e s i t u a t i o n . 
A weak and a p a t h e t i c l e a d e r s h i p might have been able to stumble q u i e t l y on 
i n t h e days of cosy management-union r e l a t i o n s . But those days were under 
t h r e a t . By the 1980's, the g r i p of the r i g h t wing group was being 
chal l e n g e d , as miners t r a n s f e r r e d i n from c l o s e d c o l l i e r i e s , and (mainly) 
younger elements w i t h i n the workforce were r a d i c a l i s e d . Years of 
con?5lacency and i n a c t i v i t y hastened the c o l l a p s e of the r i g h t , f o r t h i s was 
no machine dominated branch. S e c t i o n s 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 take up these 
developments, showing how the p o l i t i c a l con^slexion of the lodge began to 
change under the p r e s s u r e of o b j e c t i v e circumstances and an a c t i v e l e f t 
wing o p p o s i t i o n t o the weak lodge l e a d e r s h i p . 
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5 . 3 . i i THE MECHANICS BRANCH. 
I n t h e i r o v e r a l l p o l i t i c a l coit5>lexion, the miners' and mechanics' branches 
e n t e r e d the 1980's w i t h a v e r y s i m i l a r p r o f i l e . The mechanics' branch 
o f f i c i a l s were on the r i g h t of the Labour spectriua, and committed to the 
c o n c i l i a t i o n p r o c e s s . They were moderate too, opposed to spontaneous 
o u t b u r s t s of rank and f i l e a c t i o n . U n l i k e the miners' l e a d e r s h i p however, 
the mechanics' o f f i c i a l s (and i n p a r t i c u l a r the s e c r e t a r y John Cummings) 
had a c l e a r and c o n s i s t e n t i d e a behind the d i r e c t i o n they s t e e r e d the 
branch i n . But the branch i t s e l f contained a number of people who r e j e c t e d 
t h i s l e a d e r s h i p . 
F o r exaicple, one m i l i t a n t mechanic d e s c r i b e d i n d e t a i l an i n c i d e n t which 
c a p t u r e s the a t t i t u d e and e f f e c t s of a r i g h t wing branch l e a d e r s h i p , and 
the way the c o n c i l i a t i o n procedures work f o r management r a t h e r than f o r the 
men i n d i s p u t e (see appendix four - s e c t i o n A4.3.iv - f o r f u r t h e r d e t a i l s ) . 
He walked o f f the job a f t e r being ordered to walk to a d i s t r i c t f o r which 
he was not r o s t e r e d . Other mechanics j o i n e d him, and together they rode to 
the s u r f a c e . There they were confronted not j u s t by an angry manager, but 
a l s o by an angry branch s e c r e t a r y , who accused them of b l a t a n t l y f l o u t i n g 
procedures by not r e p o r t i n g the i n c i d e n t , and then working "under p r o t e s t " . 
But as the mechanic s a i d : 
"the next week t h e r e was a s h i f t r o t a f i x e d up f o r t h a t 
d i s t r i c t . . . and i t got s o r t e d out. P o s i t i v e a c t i o n . 
P o s i t i v e a c t i o n gets r e s u l t s every time." (i n t e r v i e w ) 
I t was a c t i o n which brought concessions from management. P u t t i n g c o n p l a i n t s 
i n t o procedure r a r e l y brought s a t i s f a c t i o n , and often an i n d i v i d u a l could 
not be bothered t o pursue the matter through the tortuous c o n c i l i a t i o n 
procedure. 
The working r e l a t i o n s h i p between the mechanics' branch s e c r e t a r y - John 
Cummings (now the l o c a l MP) - and the personnel manager a t Murton r e f l e c t e d 
the way i n which the branch was s o c i a l i s e d i n t o the p i t s indulgency 
p a t t e r n . A s e n i o r member of Murton's management commented: 
" I mean Cummings used to openly admit to me... he 
didn't have a c l u e . He was more of a p o l i t i c i a n . He's 
where he should be [ i e i n the House of Commons]. And he 
used t o come i n t o o f f i c e and say; 'Well, can you 
t e l l us about such and such, and why does t h i s and why 
does t h a t happen. What's the t h i n k i n g behind t h i s . ' And 
I used t o t e l l him... John used to come i n t o ny o f f i c e 
times without number. Mainly i n the l a t e afternoon when 
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he was coming back from Easincrton. And have a good 
chat. I f he'd had a lodge meeting with uproarious 
e f f e c t the nigh t before he'd c a l l i n . 'Aye', he'd say, 
'We had the gloves o f f w i t h Teit5>le [ h i s p r i n c i p l e l e f t 
wing p r o t a g o n i s t ] again l a s t n i g h t ' . ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
Behind the " r i g h t wing", "moderate" approach of l e a d e r s l i k e John Cummings 
l a y an i m p l i c i t i n t e r n a l i s a t i o n of the PWS, i n which the union fought 
w i t h i n the agreed procedures f o r the defence of i t s members immediate 
economic i n t e r e s t s . T h i s philosophy came under t h r e a t as i t became 
i n c r e a s i n g l y c l e a r t h a t the NCB was embarked on a c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l course 
w i t h the union. 
Although the p o l i t i c a l s i m i l a r i t i e s between miners' and mechanics' branches 
outweighed t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s , t h e r e were some s i g n i f i c a n t p oints of 
c o n t r a s t . One of the most s i g n i f i c a n t was the c a l i b r e of lodge o f f i c i a l s i n 
the lodges. A member of Murton's management summed i t up when he s a i d ; "the 
d i f f e r e n c e was Cvimmings". 
John Cummings, the s e c r e t a r y of the mechanics' branch from 1968 to 1987 
(see t a b l e 2) was a st r o n g and abl e lodge s e c r e t a r y . He dominated h i s lodge 
i n a way which, a f t e r 1980, no-one i n the miners' lodge d i d . As an 
exper i e n c e d and ambitious p o l i t i c i a n (he was l e a d e r of Easington D i s t r i c t 
C o u n c i l from 1981 - 1986) he brought both p o l i t i c a l experience and a new 
dimension of p o l i t i c a l awareness t o the branch. He encouraged mechanics to 
go on e d u c a t i o n a l c o u r s e s . He helped s e t up a night school c l a s s which ran 
f o r s e v e r a l y e a r s i n Murton. Huw Beynon a t Durham U n i v e r s i t y played a key 
r o l e i n running t h e s e courses, which introduced mechanics to the 
approaching c r i s i s i n the i n d u s t r y . The courses educated a core of 
a c t i v i s t s , broadening t h e i r awareness of the problems i n the in d u s t r y , and 
r a i s i n g q u e s t i o n s eibout s t r a t e g i e s to defend the miners' i n t e r e s t s . U n like 
many of the miners' o f f i c i a l s , John Cummings was confident, and aware of 
h i s a b i l i t y t o l e a d the lodge, and aware of the l i m i t s t o t h a t l e a d e r s h i p . 
One f u r t h e r d i f f e r e n c e between the miners' and mechanics' lodges concerned 
the c h a r a c t e r of o p p o s i t i o n to the l e a d e r s h i p . I n the mechanics there was a 
s t r o n g l e f t wing o p p o s i t i o n to the moderate, r i g h t wing l e a d e r s h i p . T h i s 
was c e n t r e d around Dave Temple, a WKP (Workers Revolutionary Party) 
a c t i v i s t , and a t i r e l e s s f i g h t e r i n the s t r u g g l e t o r a i s e workers 
c o n s c i o u s n e s s . He c o n s t a n t l y pushed a g a i n s t the caut i o u s , c o n c i l i a t o r y 
i n s t i n c t s of John Cummings and the m a j o r i t y of the mechanics' committee, 
Chapter 5 (147) 
encouraging m i l i t a n t a c t i o n which would s t r i p away what he saw as the 
veneer of cooperation and compromise between management and union. Textile 
and other l e f t wingers b u i l t on changing m a t e r i a l c o nditions, and t h e i r 
can^aigns began t o t u r n the branch d e c i s i v e l y to the l e f t i n the l a t e 
1970's. 
a) The C Seam l o c o road d i s p u t e . 
A f t e r y e a r s of s t r u g g l i n g to get a p o s i t i v e response w i t h i n the branch 
d u r i n g the somnambulist y e a r s f o l l o w i n g P l a n For Coal, the f i r s t major 
s u c c e s s f o r the l e f t was the b a t t l e over the C seam loco road a t the end of 
1978. I t concerned the 9.00am s h i f t - considered the only s o c i a b l e s h i f t a t 
the p i t - which was having t o walk inbye^^ from the E seam up to the higher 
C seam workings. The o l d road from the s h a f t a t the C seam l e v e l was deemed 
by management to be out of conpliance with the Mines and Quarries Act. 
14 
However, the walk from E to C was four m i l e s , up the 1:18 loco road, and 
i t was a s a f e t y nightmare. 
At a branch meeting on December 5th, Dave Tenple attempted to persuade the 
branch to t a k e immediate f i r m a c t i o n , by r e f u s i n g to use the roadway. John 
Cummings however proposed - s u c c e s s f u l l y - t h a t the matter should be 
r e f e r r e d again f o r c o n s u l t a t i o n . T h i s r e s o l u t i o n was a c l a s s i c atten?)t to 
draw the s t i n g from a m i l i t a n t proposal, by p u t t i n g the matter back i n to 
t h e procedures. However, f u r t h e r n e g o t i a t i o n s only produced from the 
manager the tough response t h a t i f they didn't l i k e walking i n on the B to 
C road, he would knock the 9.00am s h i f t o f f , and put the men i n the normal 
t h r e e s h i f t s , where they would be a b l e to t r a v e l inbye i n a man s e t . He was 
c l e a r l y banking on the mens d e s i r e to keep the 9.00am s h i f t , which would 
make them back down. 
At a c r u c i a l s p e c i a l meeting c a l l e d to d i s c u s s t h i s response at the 
beginning of February 1979, l e f t and r i g h t confronted each other over 
Going "inbye" means t r a v e l l i n g i n t o the p i t , and t r a v e l l i n g 
"outbye" r e f e r s to journeys out of the c o l l i e r y . 
^*A l o c o road has a r a i l w a y t r a c k running along i t , f o r 
underground t r a n s p o r t of men and m a t e r i a l s . 
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whether or not t o c a l l the managers b l u f f . John Cimtmings argued t h a t there 
was a danger of a s t r i k e s i t u a t i o n developing, and t h i s should be avoided 
as i t would cause unnecessary hardship, and be counterproductive. The l e f t 
argued i n response t h a t they should r e f u s e to use the road out of 
p r i n c i p l e . For once, John's l e a d e r s h i p was not enough, and the branch 
p o l i c y was changed. The manager caved i n immediately, and agreed to do the 
work n e c e s s a r y to reopen the o l d C seam roadway. As the l e f t had argued, he 
needed the 9.00 am s h i f t , to cover between c o a l i n g s h i f t s . 
I t was t h e probably the f i r s t time the l e f t had beaten the s e c r e t a r y John 
Cummings on any major i s s u e . From now on John's dominance of the lodge was 
not so c e r t a i n . I t was no longer a dominance based e n t i r e l y on h i s own 
p o l i t i c a l i n s t i n c t s . I n order t o s u s t a i n h i s dominance, he had to modify 
h i s p o l i t i c a l s t a n c e t o t a k e account of a growing l e f t wing opposition 
which was a b l e t o b u i l d on i n c r e a s i n g d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h i n the p i t , 
caused by powerful d e s t a b i l i s i n g i n f l u e n c e s . 
b) The nurses day of a c t i o n 
T h i s development of l e a d e r s h i p and rank and f i l e advanced f u r t h e r i n 1982 
when the TUC o r g a n i s e d a cairpaign i n defence of the NHS. A "Day of Action" 
was c a l l e d f o r September 22nd. The NUM's NEC i s s u e d a c a l l f o r a s t r i k e on 
t h i s day, but without a n a t i o n a l b a l l o t i t was a non binding request. 
Throughout the country the response was patchy. Every p i t i n South Wales 
took a c t i o n , and many i n Y o r k s h i r e . I n Durham, the sporadic p a t t e r n of 
a c t i o n was taken by many a c t i v i s t s as a good i n d i c a t o r of the l e v e l of 
p o l i t i c a l development a t the v a r i o u s branches. Those t h a t ignored the 
s t r i k e c a l l were p o l i t i c a l l y r i g h t wing, w h i l s t those t h a t responded had a 
s t r o n g l e f t . 
I n Murton, the miners' lodge decided to l e a v e the d e c i s i o n up to the 
i n d i v i d u a l s c o nscience. I n the mechanics' lodge, the l e f t - l a c k i n g 
confidence i n t h e i r a b i l i t y t o win a b a l l o t - wanted t o l e a v e i t to the 
i n d i v i d u a l as w e l l . But they planned to ensure a s t r i k e by p u t t i n g a p i c k e t 
l i n e on, hoping t h a t no one would c r o s s i t . However the r i g h t argued f o r a 
b a l l o t , s a y i n g t h a t they c o u l d win support f o r a c t i o n i f they b a l l o t e d . 
S e c r e t l y however, many apparently hoped t h a t the b a l l o t would scupper 
a c t i o n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the r i g h t j u s t won the vote, and a b a l l o t was c a l l e d . 
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The l e f t then threw themselves i n t o the caitpaign to win support f o r a c t i o n . 
A p u b l i c meeting was o r g a n i s e d by the branch, addressed by a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e 
of t h e h e a l t h s e r v i c e unions. And a g a i n s t the odds, they won the b a l l o t . 
Although i t was s t i l l a non b i n d i n g vote almost a l l miners and mechanics 
went on s t r i k e . (One of the only mechanics to go i n was the l e a d e r of the 
f a c t i o n who had argued f o r a b a l l o t i n the f i r s t p l a c e ! ) 
T h i s b a l l o t r e s u l t was h i g h l y s i g n i f i c a n t . According to Dave, i t marked the 
p o i n t where John Ciimmings r e a l i s e d the p o t e n t i a l power of caitpaigning i n 
the lodge. He remembers John s a y i n g to him a f t e r the cairpaign, "We've got 
to become a canpaigning branch". The s t r i k e a l s o marked a s i g n i f i c a n t break 
w i t h the post 1974 complacency which had engulfed the union - i t began the 
p r o c e s s of breaking out of the cocoon which the union had s h e l t e r e d i n . By 
now John Cimimings thoughts were t u r n i n g to the e l e c t i o n f o r general 
s e c r e t a r y of the Mechanics A s s o c i a t i o n . His candidacy r e q u i r e d a high 
p r o f i l e , to get him known throughout the c o a l f i e l d . To achieve t h i s , he 
needed h i s branch behind him. And w i t h the powerful l e f t i n h i s branch, 
l e a d i n g them r e q u i r e d t a k i n g up i n c r e a s i n g l y l e f t wing p o s i t i o n s . I n p a r t 
t h e r e f o r e , John's way of d e a l i n g w i t h a l e f t he i n s t i n c t i v e l y knew he could 
not d e f e a t i n a head on c l a s h , was t o t a k e on l e f t wing p o s i t i o n s . 
I t i s i n p o r t a n t t o r e a l i s e t h a t t h i s was not n e c e s s a r i l y a c a l c u l a t i n g or 
even conscious p r o c e s s . I t wasn't crude opportunism which pushed John 
Cummings l e f t . H i s wider p o l i t i c a l involvement had convinced him t h a t the 
union was f a c i n g a major c r i s i s . As the c r i s i s began to deepen he a c t i v e l y 
sought to encourage wider awareness of the s i t u a t i o n i n the i n d u s t r y . 
The memberships' consciousness was changing g r a d u a l l y i n response to the 
changing m a t e r i a l environment, and the a c t i v i t i e s of conscious agents 
(predominantly on the l e f t ) who were a t t e n p t i n g to i n c r e a s e p o l i t i c a l 
awareness of t h e s e changes by i n t e r p r e t i n g them i n s p e c i f i c ways. Right 
wing arguments were i n c r e a s i n g l y squeezed out, as the p o l i t i c a l environment 
became more c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l . Pushed by h i s memberships i n c r e a s i n g 
m i l i t a n c y , of which he was o r i g i n a l l y s u s p i c i o u s , Cummings began to move 
w i t h them. The mechanics became known as a campaigning lodge, developing a 
s t r o n g l e f t wing p r o f i l e . I n 1983 f o r example, c o n p l e t e l y a g a i n s t the trend 
i n t h e county and n a t i o n a l l y , the Murton mechanics achieved a m a j o r i t y f o r 
s t r i k e a c t i o n i n the b a l l o t over Lewis Merthyr (there are no branch f i g u r e s 
a v a i l a b l e , but see chapter four f o r the n a t i o n a l r e s u l t ) . 
Chapter 5 (150) 
5.4 DESTABILISATION TWO: TRAVELLERS 
As p i t c l o s u r e s began t o i n c r e a s e i n Durham from the l a t e 1970's onwards, 
they began t o have q u i t e s p e c i f i c - and dramatic - o b j e c t i v e e f f e c t s on the 
c o i t p o s i t i o n of workforces a t the remaining c o l l i e r i e s . I n p a r t i c u l a r , the 
age and r e s i d e n t i a l c o n p o s i t i o n of the workforce a t Murton was transformed 
i n a v e r y v i s i b l e and v e r y r a p i d process of change. I t i s c l e a r t h e r e f o r e 
t h a t some changes i n the p o l i t i c a l p r o f i l e of the Murton branches were 
s i n p l y due t o changes i n personnel. However, i t i s a l s o t r u e t h a t new 
workers a t the p i t p a r t i c i p a t e d i n c o l l e c t i v e movements i n consciousness, 
w i t h t h e i r own p o l i t i c s - and t h a t of the Murton men they came i n t o contact 
w i t h - i n t e r a c t i n g to b r i n g changes i n both. 
E s s e n t i a l l y t h e r e f o r e , the composition of the workforce changed i n two 
i i t p o r t a n t dimensions'^. F i r s t l y , the r e s i d e n t i a l b a s i s s h i f t e d away from 
Murton as the numbers of miners t r a v e l l i n g to work a t the c o l l i e r y 
( f o l l o w i n g t h e i r own p i t s ' c l o s u r e ) i n c r e a s e d . Secondly, due to the 
o p e r a t i o n of the redundancy scheme, t r a v e l l e r s tended to be younger than 
the average, and they took the p l a c e of o l d e r men who l e f t the i n d u s t r y 
( s e c t i o n 5.6). T h i s s e c t i o n c o n s i d e r s the former dimension of change. 
I n 1967 the once g i a n t Bowburn c o l l i e r y c l o s e d , and the f i r s t t r a v e l l e r s 
a r r i v e d a t Murton. They were absorbed q u i e t l y i n to the workforce. There 
were v a c a n c i e s a v a i l a b l e , and t h e r e were r e l a t i v e l y few of them s i n c e they 
were shared around the many other p i t s open then. A second s i g n i f i c a n t 
group of a r r i v a l s were from Elemore (the Elemore "Wombles") i n 1974 - p a r t 
of the same Hawthorn Combine as Murton. They seem to have been accepted 
e a s i l y by the Murton workforce, although some rumours of f a v o u r i t i s m 
towards Murton men on the p a r t of lower management and the miners' lodge 
committee have p e r s i s t e d . 
The f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n c o n c e n t r a t e s on the events surrounding the a r r i v a l a t 
Murton of a s i g n i f i c a n t group of t r a v e l l e r s from B l a c k h a l l C o l l i e r y . There 
were a t l e a s t t h r e e other major groups of t r a n s f e r e e s i n t o Murton before 
15. No NCB f i g u r e s a re a v a i l a b l e f o r the c o l l i e r y workforce before 
1984. 
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t h e s t r i k e , stemming from a major manpower rundown a t Horden, and the 
c l o s u r e s of South Hetton and E a s t Hetton (see t a b l e 5.3 f o r a d e t a i l e d 
breakdown of the r e s i d e n t i a l background of Murton's workforce i n 1984). 
F o c u s i n g on B l a c k b a l l r e f l e c t s the major in^jact t h i s group of t r a v e l l e r s 
had as conscious agents of p o l i t i c a l change. Although not n e c e s s a r i l y 
n u m e r i c a l l y the most s i g n i f i c a n t t r a v e l l i n g group, they were xmquestionably 
the most p o l i t i c a l l y i n f l u e n t i a l . 
5 . 4 . i HOW MURTON REACTED TO THE TRAVELLERS FROM BLACKHALL 
B l a c k b a l l t r a v e l l e r s were s p e c i a l from the s t a r t . They were the f i r s t b i g 
group of t r a n s f e r e e s of the 1980's, and t h e i r a r r i v a l swept an i c y b l a s t of 
change i n t o the cosy world of Murton p o l i t i c s . The key change compared to 
p r e v i o u s t r a n s f e r a l s , was t h a t the B l a c k b a l l i n f l u x c o i n c i d e d with the end 
of j u v e n i l e recruitment and a p p r e n t i c e s h i p s a t Muirton. 
"You s t a r t e d to get the resentment - i t would be 1980 -
when they stopped s e t t i n g the l o c a l l a d s on!.. That was 
when the resentment was r e a l l y s t a r t i n g , when a l a d 
who'd worked a t the p i t a l l h i s l i f e couldn't get h i s 
son a job, which had happened up t i l l then f o r 
g e n e r a t i o n s . " ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
I t was a rude awakening, and l e d to a h o s t i l e r e c e p t i o n f o r the t r a v e l l e r s 
from many Murton men. 
The c u r r e n t s e c r e t a r y of the miners' lodge admitted t h a t Murton miners had 
a tendency t o see the p i t as " t h e i r s " , and t h e r e f o r e to r e s e n t t r a v e l l e r s . 
"The c r a c k was; 'Murton men should get t h i s , and y o u ' l l 
get what we l e a v e you'. And then they say; 'We're a l l 
Murton men'. Other men say; ' Y o u ' l l never be a Murton 
man, you don't belong i n Murton, so how can you c l a s s 
y o u r s e l v e s as Murton men?^ Which i s wrong, because we 
a l l work a t the p i t . " ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n c e r t a i n l y t i e s i n with the understanding t r a v e l l e r s had 
of t h e i r p o s i t i o n . They f e l t t h a t Murton men wanted to keep the p i t f o r 
themselves, c l i n g i n g on t o the ( o b j e c t i v e l y outdated) i l l u s i o n t h a t Murton 
was a v i l l a g e c o l l i e r y , w i t h a l l the meanings t h a t went with i t . 
The c l o s u r e of B l a c k b a l l was announced i n J u l y 1980. However, i t was a 
phased c l o s u r e , so t h a t e v e n t u a l l y , of the 1318 enployed a t the time of the 
c l o s u r e , 535 accepted redundancy, 732 (55.5%) t r a n s f e r r e d , 38 stayed to 
m a i n t a i n the punping s t a t i o n , and 13 r e t i r e d . Of the 535 t r a n s f e r e e s , 132 
went t o Murton i n the v e r y f i r s t stage of the phased rundown (see Hudson e t 
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a l , 1984, 11) . F o r t y redundancies were proposed by the manager at Murton 
f o r January 1981, t o make way f o r the B l a c k h a l l t r a n s f e r e e s . 
The miners' lodge r e a c t e d s t r o n g l y a g a i n s t the news. On September 30th 1980 
i t was r e p o r t e d t h a t a deputation had seen management to request t h a t 
B l a c k h a l l t r a i n e e power l o a d e r s (faceworkers) be put at the bottom of the 
Murton w a i t i n g l i s t , and not s l o t t e d i n according to age and length of 
s e r v i c e . T h i s d e s i r e f o r Murton preference was f o r c e f u l l y r e s t a t e d at a 
f u l l meeting on February 1 s t , 1981, l e s s t h a t two weeks before the 
B l a c k h a l l men were due t o a r r i v e . On the committees recommendation i t was 
agreed: 
"That we inform Mr T C a l l a n [General S e c r e t a r y of the 
Durham Miners A s s o c i a t i o n ] to seek advice on the 
B l a c k h a l l men coming to Murton and get a postponement 
of two weeks t o g i v e the lodge time to d i s c u s s with 
management the f o l l o w i n g : - That spare power loa d e r s get 
permanent jobs before B l a c k h a l l men. The same to apply 
to d a t a l hands who would l i k e to be upgraded to grades 
B-C, and t h a t a l i s t be drawn up f o r men who would l i k e 
t o be upgraded to grades B-C. And t h a t s u r f a c e jobs be 
kept open f o r our underground members who are s i c k or 
i n j u r e d . And t h a t we seek to have jobs f o r our school 
l e a v e r s . And t h a t the t r a i n i n g l i s t be honoured." 
(Murton miners' minute book) 
The language of t h i s r e s o l u t i o n i n d i c a t e s the depth of f e a r s about future 
employment and c o n d i t i o n s a t the p i t . (Not u n t i l March 23rd 1982 was t h i s 
minute r e s c i n d e d , and a l l t r a n s f e r e e s o f f i c i a l l y p l a c e d on equal terms. And 
i t was t h e B l a c k h a l l men themselves who were i n s t r u m e n t a l i n a c h i e v i n g t h i s 
change of p o l i c y . ) Meanwhile, on March 7th 1981, with a second batch of 
B l a c k h a l l t r a v e l l e r s threatened, i t was unanimously r e s o l v e d : 
"That a l e t t e r be s e n t t o Durham t h a t we do not take 
any more B l a c k h a l l men as t h e r e has been no recruitment 
of j u v e n i l e s a t Murton." (Murton miners' minute book) 
Ten days l a t e r however, the r e v o l t ended. 
" I t was agreed t o inform the f u l l meeting t h a t we w i l l 
have t o t a k e the B l a c k h a l l men as i t i s county p o l i c y 
passed on September 15th 1978." (miners' minute book) 
I n t e r e s t i n g l y , a s i m i l a r r e v o l t took p l a c e a t Easington a t around the same 
time. I n Murton, as a t Easington, t h a t h o s t i l i t y stemmed from the end of 
j u v e n i l e r e c r u i t m e n t i n the e a r l y 1980's. T h i s c o i n c i d e d with a r a p i d 
i n c r e a s e i n unenployment, and the v i s i b l e c o l l a p s e of the North E a s t ' s 
manufacturing economy. E f f e c t i v e l y the "indulgency p a t t e r n s " of the post 
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war e r a were under a t t a c k (Gouldner, 1955; see a l s o chapter three above) . 
Murton miners had become used to a c e r t a i n s e t of expectations, which 
t o g e t h e r helped to r e g u l a t e management-worker r e l a t i o n s . One of the key 
elements of t h i s "indulgency p a t t e r n " was the recruitment of youngsters 
from Murton i n t o the p i t . R e j e c t i o n of t h i s p a t t e r n p r e c i p i t a t e d 
c o n s i d e r a b l e d i s c o n t e n t , d e s t a b i l i s i n g r e l a t i o n s between management and 
men. However, B l a c k b a l l men (and to an extent other t r a v e l l e r s as w e l l ) 
were used t o a d i f f e r e n t "indulgency p a t t e r n " , and t h e r e f o r e brought a 
d i f f e r e n t s e t of e x p e c t a t i o n s to t h e i r new p i t . F r u s t r a t i o n b u i l t up among 
d i f f e r e n t groups of workers t h e r e f o r e , who a l l f e l t t h a t expected norms of 
behaviour were being broken. 
I n t h i s context, the r e a c t i o n of Murton miners was perhaps understandable, 
i f s t i l l c h a u v i n i s t i c . A f t e r almost 150 y e a r s , the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of p i t 
and community had broken down. The unwritten understanding - c u l t i v a t e d by 
p a t e r n a l i s t i c owners and the NCB - t h a t the p i t was i n some way a p a r t of 
the community, and t h e r e f o r e owed something to t h a t community, had been 
s h a t t e r e d . The f i r s t response t o t h i s t h r e a t was a c l o s i n g of ranks i n an 
a t t e n p t t o defend the community. T h i s r e f l e c t e d the p o l i t i c s of the post 
war e r a , which promoted an ideology which accepted the r i g h t of management 
to manage the i n d u s t r y . The f i r s t r e a c t i o n to the t h r e a t of job l o s s 
t h e r e f o r e was t o see i t as a l o c a l problem, with l o c a l s o l u t i o n s . 
However, as chapter four demonstrated, changes i n Murton stemmed from 
powerful f o r c e s a long way removed from the management block a t the 
c o l l i e r y . That t h i s was not immediately apparent to many miners i n d i c a t e s 
the v e r y r e a l l i m i t s p l a c e d on the development of consciousness by the 
weight o f h i s t o r i c a l e xperience and ideology. Whether or not workers came 
to understand the c r i s i s f a c i n g the i n d u s t r y , and how they would respond to 
i t , were matters dependant on the a c t i o n of conscious agents working i n 
t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r m a t e r i a l context. 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , t r a v e l l e r s never became a major problem i n the mechanics' 
branch. Although many mechanics a l s o h e l d views s i m i l a r to the miners, the 
mechanics' l e a d e r s h i p t r i e d hard to ensure p r e j u d i c e d i d not a f f e c t lodge 
p o l i c y . When t h r e e s u r f a c e e l e c t r i c i a n s con5>lained to the branch t h a t 
B l a c k b a l l t r a n s f e r e e s working on the s u r f a c e , who were on a guaranteed 
power l o a d i n g wage, were being put i n f o r overtime r o t a s (and t h e r e f o r e 
being g i v e n the chance to earn even more than the Murton s u r f a c e workers), 
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John Cxjininings defended lodge p o l i c y . He i n s i s t e d t h a t a l l members should be 
t r e a t e d ecpially. He s t r o n g l y a d v i s e d a g a i n s t changing branch p o l i c y , 
because the p r o t e c t i o n of earnings b e n e f i t s r e c e i v e d by t r a n s f e r e e s (which 
guaranteed t h e i r power l o a d i n g wage even i f they were assigned to s u r f a c e 
work) , were p a r t of n a t i o n a l agreements won by the union. He argued t h a t 
once t r a v e l l e r s a r r i v e d , they were Murton men. A combination of r e l a t i v e l y 
few t r a v e l l e r s and d e c i s i v e l e a d e r s h i p t h e r e f o r e meant t h a t the mechanics' 
branch had fewer problems a c c e p t i n g the new members i n to the branch. I n 
c o n t r a s t , the miners' r i g h t wing l e a d e r s h i p backed r i g h t wing elements i n 
the workforce, f a i l i n g t o c h a l l e n g e knee-jerk r e a c t i o n s to t r a v e l l e r s . 
5 . 4 . i i HOW BLACKHALL TRAVELLERS REACTED TO MURTON 
The h o s t i l i t y of the Murton workforce to the a r r i v a l of the B l a c k h a l l men 
was matched by the n e g a tive f e e l i n g s of the t r a n s f e r e e s to t h e i r new p i t . 
T r a v e l l e r s from B l a c k h a l l were amongst the most d i s a f f e c t e d of those t h a t 
a r r i v e d a t Murton. As the ex lodge s e c r e t a r y a t B l a c k h a l l s a i d , "Murton and 
B l a c k h a l l has gone down i n f o l k l o r e ! " One of the most in^jortant f a c t o r s 
behind the g e n e r a t i o n of t h i s f o l k l o r e was the d i f f e r e n c e i n power 
r e l a t i o n s between management and the union a t Murton con^sared to B l a c k h a l l . 
At B l a c k h a l l the union h e l d on t o cavilling"*"^, d e s p i t e s e v e r a l management 
o f f e n s i v e s a g a i n s t the system. From the lodges point of view, i t was an 
i n p o r t a n t weapon. Because a p p a l l i n g working c o n d i t i o n s i n the undersea 
d i s t r i c t s a t B l a c k h a l l c o e x i s t e d w i t h r e l a t i v e l y b e t t e r conditions i n the 
i n l a n d d i s t r i c t of the c o l l i e r y , management was i n a p o t e n t i a l l y strong 
p o s i t i o n to d i v i d e and r u l e the workforce by operating a "blue eyed boy" 
system of f a v o u r i t i s m . By m a i n t a i n i n g c o n t r o l of manpower deployment, the 
union stopped t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y , and ensured u n i t y a g a i n s t the employer. 
Throughout most of the Durham c o a l f i e l d ( i n c l u d i n g Murton) the i n t r o d u c t i o n 
of the NPLA i n 1966 s p e l t the end of the t r a d i t i o n a l c a v i l l i n g system of 
d e c i d i n g job a l l o c a t i o n s ( K r i e g e r 1983). I t brought such a d r a s t i c 
Put simply, c a v i l l i n g i s a l o t t e r y s y s t e n organised by union 
branches ( t y p i c a l l y four times a year) to decide workplace a l l o c a t i o n . I t 
i s unique t o the north e a s t c o a l f i e l d , and i s s i g n i f i c a n t because i t 
a p p r o r i a t e s an i n p o r t a n t management perogative, namely the r i g h t to decide 
who shoud work where (Kr i e g e r , 1983). 
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r e o r g a n i s a t i o n of work and payment systems, t h a t i t broke y e a r s of "custom 
and p r a c t i c e " (as i t was intended t o ) , g i v i n g r i s e to a new s e t of 
workplace r e l a t i o n s h i p s . However, B l a c k h a l l , i n common with s e v e r a l other 
Durham c o l l i e r i e s , s u c c e s s f u l l y r e s i s t e d management pressure to end 
c a v i l l i n g . 
The same lodge u n i t y and s t r e n g t h which a t B l a c k h a l l r e t a i n e d c a v i l l i n g 
a l s o helped the union win s i g n i f i c a n t concessions under the i n c e n t i v e 
scheme. For exanple, the bonus r a t e f o r power l o a d e r s assigned to non power 
l o a d i n g work should have been the bonus r a t e a p p l i c a b l e to the new grade. 
But a t B l a c k h a l l f a l l b a c k bonus f o r power l o a d e r s was never l e s s than 100%. 
And no underground worker was on l e s s than 65% bonus, whereas a t Murton 
d a t a l workers were on 50% (as s t i p u l a t e d by the scheme) . At B l a c k h a l l 
t h e r e f o r e the men were u n i t e d behind a strong l e a d e r s h i p , and they 
developed a high l e v e l of work c o n t r o l and " p i t m i l i t a n c y " . Also, t h e i r 
branch de l e g a t e was a l e a d i n g l e f t wing a c t i v i s t i n the c o a l f i e l d , and t h i s 
promoted a more p r o g r e s s i v e consciousness among many B l a c k h a l l miners. 
A r r i v i n g a t Muirton was a c o n s i d e r a b l e shock to the B l a c k h a l l men. They 
found o p p r e s s i v e management, an undercurrent of h o s t i l i t y from the men, and 
a weak union. They a l s o f e l t they were d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t both by f i r s t 
l i n e management, who favoured the Murton men they had worked with f o r so 
long, and by the Murton men, who enjoyed the b e n e f i t s of t h i s 
c o l l a b o r a t i o n . Murton men have denied t h a t t h e r e was any animosity towards 
B l a c k h a l l (or other) t r a v e l l e r s , but my i n t e r v i e w s with t r a v e l l e r s suggest 
t h a t t h i s r a t h e r g l o s s e d over the r e a l i t y . Although many Murton miners 
f u l l y accepted t r a v e l l e r s , t h e r e were undeniably in?)ortant elements of 
h o s t i l i t y and d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t the new a r r i v a l s . For exasple, a t 
Murton a t r a v e l l e r c o u l d f i n d h i m s e l f dropped on to 50% bonus when he was 
doing the same job as a Murton man who was r e c e i v i n g a higher l e v e l of pay. 
The miners' lodge a t Murton helped perpetuate d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t 
t r a v e l l e r s . B l a c k h a l l t r a v e l l e r s found the union o f f i c i a l s f a i l e d to pursue 
t h e i r coit^Jlaints w i t h any vigour, or were incon^jetent. For exanple, 
B l a c k h a l l miners d i s c o v e r e d t h a t t r a v e l l e r s who a r r i v e d from Bowbum i n 
1967 were s t i l l unaware t h a t i f the NCB bus f a i l e d t o a r r i v e to take them 
t o work, they c o u l d phone t h e p i t and c l a i m a days pay. I n s t e a d , they used 
t o phone i n and c l a i m one of t h e i r r e s t days. T h i s discrepancy arose a f t e r 
c o n p l a i n t s from B l a c k h a l l t r a v e l l e r s , and an i n v e s t i g a t i o n by the B l a c k h a l l 
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branch s e c r e t a r y on b e h a l f of h i s ex members. Murton branch o f f i c i a l s had 
been unable or u n w i l l i n g t o pursue the matter. 
T r a v e l l e r s from E a s t Hetton a l s o r e v e a l e d strong d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with 
Murton. One man who l i v e d i n Trimdon Grange, damned Murton with the e p i t h e t 
" S t a l a g 17". I t was a nickname t h a t stuck. I n h i s experience. E a s t Hetton 
was a " f r i e n d l y p i t " . Murton was d i f f e r e n t . He summed Murton up l i k e t h i s : 
" I t would break t h e i r h e a r t s t o sm i l e o r even laugh 
down t h e r e . I t was a standing joke t h a t you had to get 
i n t o a refuge hole to have a laugh! That's the way i t 
was. I t was bloody s e r i o u s . " ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
D e s p i t e t h e i r d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , and u n l i k e B l a c k h a l l t r a v e l l e r s , the E a s t 
Hetton men d i d l i t t l e t o t r y and change the s i t u a t i o n a t Murton. T h e i r own 
branch had been weak, and i n any case, r e l a t i v e l y few came to Murton. 
I n c o n t r a s t , the B l a c k h a l l mens' negative f e e l i n g s had a c o n s t r u c t i v e 
element, because they s e t out to change the Murton lodge. They had two main 
e f f e c t s i n Murton. I n ge n e r a l terms they brought home the e f f e c t s of a 
s h r i n k i n g c o a l f i e l d . They came from a once l a r g e p i t , and t h e i r a r r i v a l 
c o i n c i d e d w i t h and caused the end of j u v e n i l e recruitment and c r a f t 
a p p r e n t i c e s h i p s a t the p i t . But they a l s o caicpaigned a c t i v e l y w i t h i n the 
lodge. T h e i r m i l i t a n t r e f u s a l to accept managements word, by arguing back, 
provided an i n s p i r a t i o n a l demonstration e f f e c t to younger miners a t Murton, 
and helped s e t i n motion major p o l i t i c a l changes, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the 
miners' lodge (see s e c t i o n 5.6). 
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5.5 DESTABILISATION THREE: THE CHANGING AGE COMPOSITION OF THE WORKFORCE. 
At the same time as the r e s i d e n t i a l con^josition of the workforce was 
changing, and f o r broadly s i m i l a r reasons, the age conposition of the 
workforce was a l t e r i n g . Table 5.4 and graph 12 show the age conposition of 
Murton's workforce i n 1984, alongside a con5>arison i n t a b l e 5.5 with 
n a t i o n a l f i g u r e s . Redundancy and severance schemes had two main e f f e c t s . 
F i r s t l y they undermined o p p o s i t i o n t o p i t c l o s u r e s by d i v i d i n g the 
workforce. Secondly they a l t e r e d the age coit^josition of the remaining 
workers. 
As the number of p i t c l o s u r e s i n c r e a s e d again i n the 1980's (see chapter 
f o u r ) , the NCB, w i t h government and EEC help, developed a l a r g e and 
p r o g r e s s i v e l y more generous package of measures to encourage redundancy and 
e a r l y r e t i r e m e n t (Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 1983, 24-26). When a 
p i t c l o s e d , redundancy payments were a v a i l a b l e f o r men over 50. They 
c o n s i s t e d of a l\jaap sum, a weekly pension, and an allowance of 
con c e s s i o n a r y c o a l . I f a redundant miner was employed again, he l o s t the 
weekly s\am and t h e c o a l allowance. Miners under 50 were o f f e r e d severance -
a conplete break w i t h the i n d u s t r y . They were p a i d a s i n g l e lump sum, 
c a l c u l a t e d by m u l t i p l y i n g t h e i r previous y e a r s s e r v i c e by a s e t sum ( i n 
pounds) f o r each y e a r . I n 1981, and again i n March 1984, the sums a v a i l a b l e 
under the v a r i o u s schemes were d r a m a t i c a l l y i n c r e a s e d by the government, i n 
obvious attempts to defuse o p p o s i t i o n to p i t c l o s u r e s . 
The r e s u l t of such schemes was t o o f f e r v e r y powerful i n c e n t i v e s f o r older 
miners t o l e a v e the i n d u s t r y when a p i t c l o s u r e o r manpower rundown was 
announced. By t h i s method, the NCB was able to d i v i d e opposition to 
c l o s u r e s because a p a r t of the workforce had a strong m a t e r i a l i n t e r e s t i n 
a c c e p t i n g c l o s u r e . T h i s i n t e r e s t was eit^hasised by the inadequacies of the 
NCB's r e t i r e m e n t and pension schemes. Despite strong union claims, miners 
s t i l l had t o work u n t i l they were 60, a t which point the terms a v a i l a b l e to 
them were l e s s i n v i t i n g than those on o f f e r f o r e a r l y retirement and 
redundancy. I n e f f e c t , the NCB's o f f e r s on e a r l y retirement and redundancy 
conceded the union's c l a i m s , but wi t h the key q u a l i f i c a t i o n t h a t they were 
only a v a i l a b l e i n r e t u r n f o r permanent job l o s s . 
F o r an i n d i v i d u a l miner the terms were a t t r a c t i v e . His choice was between 
l e a v i n g t h e i n d u s t r y w i t h a r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e sum of money, a t an age when 
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he c o u l d s t i l l expect to l i v e to enjoy h i s retirement; or to s t a y on with 
an e v e r i n c r e a s i n g r i s k of a c c i d e n t or i n j u r y , the l i k e l i h o o d of d e c l i n i n g 
wages and s t a t u s , u n t i l f i n a l l y l e a v i n g the i n d u s t r y with the prospect of a 
s h o r t r e t i r e m e n t on a low pension. I n e f f e c t , the f a i l u r e of the union to 
a c h i e v e b e t t e r r e t i r e m e n t terms and working c o n d i t i o n s (see chapter four) 
undermined a t t e n p t s to f i g h t c l o s u r e s . Opposing a c l o s u r e could i n v o l v e 
c o n s i d e r a b l e i n d i v i d u a l m a t e r i a l s a c r i f i c e f o r many old e r miners, and could 
t h e r e f o r e only be s u s t a i n e d by s t r o n g c o l l e c t i v e r e s i s t a n c e , when there was 
a reasonable e x p e c t a t i o n of s u c c e s s . S u c c e s s i v e b a l l o t defeats, and 
v a c i l l a t i n g l e a d e r s h i p (see chapter four) made r e s i s t a n c e seem l i k e a 
p o i n t l e s s gesture. 
There were two p r i n c i p l e outcomes of t h i s s i t u a t i o n . The f i r s t was a major 
d i v i s i o n w i t h i n most workforces when a p i t was e i t h e r under t h r e a t of 
c l o s u r e , or a c t u a l l y being c l o s e d . Many miners wanted the p i t to c l o s e , so 
as t o a v a i l themselves of the generous payments a v a i l a b l e . On the other 
hand, the younger men, who b e n e f i t e d very l i t t l e from the redundancy 
schemes, had a s t r o n g e r i n t e r e s t i n f i g h t i n g c l o s u r e s , e s p e c i a l l y given the 
hopeless en^^loyment pros p e c t s i n and around most p i t v i l l a g e s (see Hudson 
e t a l . 1985). 
The second outcome of the redundancy schemes was a c o n t i n u a l change i n the 
age c o n p o s i t i o n of the workforce a t those c o l l i e r i e s which r e c e i v e d 
t r a n s f e r e e s (see t a b l e 5.4). I n order t o accept the i n f l u x , each t r a n s f e r e e 
had t o be accoit^anied by a redundancy a t the r e c e i v i n g p i t (unless manpower 
was being i n c r e a s e d ) . T h i s meant t h a t an o l d e r miner a t the r e c e i v i n g p i t 
was i n v a r i a b l y r e p l a c e d by a younger man t r a n s f e r r i n g i n . 
The p o l i t i c a l e f f e c t s of t h i s changing age con^josition were q u i t e confused, 
and depended on the p a r t i c u l a r circumstances a t each p i t . On the one hand, 
the younger men were more l i k e l y to be m i l i t a n t i n defending t h e i r jobs, 
because they had r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e to gain from redundancy. On the other, 
t h e f a c t t h a t t h e i r p i t was c l o s e d (and t h e r e f o r e t h e i r primary a l l e g i a n c e 
t o p i t and community was broken), and t h a t other miners had f a i l e d to 
support them when t h e i r p i t shut, meant t h a t some f e l t a r e l a t i v e l y weak 
l o y a l t y t o t h e i r new p i t . T h i s confused s i t u a t i o n was compounded by the 
g e n e r a l l y more m i l i t a n t a t t i t u d e of the younger miners - a f a c t assply 
confirmed during the s t r i k e when they formed the backbone of the p i c k e t s . 
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and proved extremely l o y a l i n the f a c e of massive hardship. T h i s m i l i t a n c y 
was due t o many f a c t o r s . 
F i r s t , the c o n t i n u a l d e c l i n e of the i n d u s t r y had p a r t i a l l y f o s s i l i s e d the 
d i v i s i o n of labour w i t h i n the p i t s . Upward m o b i l i t y i n wages and s t a t u s was 
r e s t r i c t e d (and i s even harder now). The t r a d i t i o n a l " c a r e e r path" of a 
miner would be to s t a r t o f f on d a t a l work, and then move on to r e c e i v e face 
t r a i n i n g , and become a powerloader. However, with p i t c l o s u r e s , and the 
t r a n s f e r of young miners, t h e r e was a s u r p l u s of men a t the r e c e i v i n g p i t s 
i n the younger age groups. There wasn't room f o r them a l l to advance 
forward. I n f a c t , t h e r e o f t e n wasn't enough p l a c e s f o r powerloaders 
t r a n s f e r r i n g i n to be put on to powerloading. T h i s r e s t r i c t i o n on earnings 
t h e r e f o r e a c t e d as a source of t e n s i o n f o r the younger men. By t h e i r l a t e 
20's many would be b r i n g i n g up f a m i l i e s , and they t r a d i t i o n a l l y r e l i e d on 
b e ing i n a high e a r n i n g job by t h i s time. I n the new s i t u a t i o n , they found 
themselves s t r u g g l i n g to cope. 
Secondly, the o p e r a t i o n of the AIS (Area I n c e n t i v e Scheme) added to the 
aggravation. Although t a s k workers (powerloaders) were the most d i r e c t l y 
a f f e c t e d by the o p e r a t i o n of a bonus system (with numerous disputes over 
allowances, machine stoppages, standard t a s k s , manning e t c i n e v i t a b l e ) , i t 
a l s o caused problems f o r men on c o l l i e r y average r e l a t e d bonuses. Through 
v a r i o u s d e v i c e s , management could suppress the c o l l i e r y average. 
Furthermore, t h e r e were l i k e l y t o be d i s p u t e s about grading. And as already 
mentioned, the r e l a t i v e l y low wages f o r men on c o l l i e r y average bonuses 
were a source of wage m i l i t a n c y and f r u s t r a t i o n . 
T h i r d l y , perhaps the most s i g n i f i c a n t although i n t a n g i b l e f a c t o r i n the 
m i l i t a n c y of younger miners was the end of the e r a of hope of the 1960's. 
W h i l s t p i t c l o s u r e s i n the 60's took p l a c e i n the context of optimism and 
g e n e r a l growth i n the econoity, by the e a r l y 1980's a l l t r a c e s of 1960's 
optimism were gone. John P i l g e r summed up the meaning of the "era of hope" 
when he wrote: 
"For working people, the 'consensus' d i d not have q u i t e 
the same c o s i n e s s [as i t d i d f o r the p o l i t i c i a n s ] , but 
i t d i d mean t h a t i n exchange f o r t h e i r acceptance of 
low wages and the acquiescence of t h e i r t rade union 
l e a d e r s , they were granted reasonably p r i c e d housing, 
c l o t h i n g and food, as w e l l as b a s i c s e r v i c e s such as 
n a t i o n a l i s e d h e a l t h c a r e and the hope of a 'new s t a r t ' 
f o r a t l e a s t one c h i l d . .. The hope on which the 
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'consensus' turned... was escape from the drudgery and 
greyness and iicprisonment of c l a s s . I t was t h i s which 
was h e l d out so t a n t a l i s i n g l y to the young. ., and i t 
was t h i s which, i n l i t t l e more than a decade, would be 
the source of so much ' d i s r u p t i o n ' , when the b e t r a y a l 
i m p l i c i t i n the 'consensus' would be made c l e a r . " 
( P i l g e r , 1986, 53-54) 
I n Murton the o l d order was p r e c a r i o u s l y c l o s e to breaking point. P i t 
c l o s u r e s , redundancy and permanent high unenployment formed the new 
context. Unease and f e a r seeped through the community. 
I n t h e s e circumstances, young miners f e l t l i t t l e a l l e g i a n c e to the PWS. 
Whereas t h e i r f a t h e r s had seen c o n d i t i o n s iit^jrove w i t h n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n and 
the o ther post war changes, young miners were l i v i n g with the f a i l u r e of 
the new order. Older miners were t o r n between a l i f e t i m e s s o c i a l i s a t i o n 
i n t o the " e r a of hope", and the t a n g i b l e e r o s i o n of much t h a t i t meant. 
They were o f t e n confused by the pace of change around them, and could make 
l i t t l e sense of how to cope w i t h i t . Some became angry, but many more 
sought an e a s i e r way out of the c h i l l y new c l i m a t e . Younger miners c a r r i e d 
l e s s baggage from the p a s t - f o r them the i s s u e s were more immediate, more 
c u t t i n g , and l e s s e a s i l y ducked. 
The changing age s t r u c t u r e of the workforce t h e r e f o r e added to a growing 
i n s t a b i l i t y caused by the i n f l u x of miners from d i s t a n t communities. As 
o l d e r miners d r i f t e d away from the p i t , a t t r a c t e d by high redundancy 
payments, the balance of power a t the c o l l i e r y began to t i l t towards 
younger miners. And the same p o l i c i e s which produced t h i s s t r u c t u r a l change 
a l s o pumped up the l e v e l of d i s c o n t e n t among these workers. More elements 
of t h e t r a d i t i o n a l "indulgency p a t t e r n " were being v i o l a t e d . Often more 
headstrong and m i l i t a n t anyway, younger miners found l i t t l e i n the o l d 
r i g h t wing ideology which g e l l e d with t h e i r own experiences. 
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5.6 DESTABILISATION FOUR: PIT CLOSURES, REDUNDANCY AND UNEMPLOYMENT. 
The minute books o f both miners' and mechanics' branches show the 
s i g n i f i c a n c e of the re-emergence of p i t c l o s u r e s i n the e a r l y 1980's. As 
w e l l as the iit^jact of t r a v e l l e r s , p i t c l o s u r e s were d i s c u s s e d as an i s s u e 
i n themselves many times a t branch meetings. On October 14th 1980 the 
mechanics heard a re p o r t from branch s e c r e t a r y and delegate John Cummings 
on the s t a t e of the i n d u s t r y , and Murton's p o s i t i o n i n i t . I n 1981 the 
miners' lodge reported d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the l a c k of l e a d e r s h i p over the 
r o l l i n g s t r i k e a g a i n s t p i t c l o s u r e s (see chapter f o u r ) , which saw p i c k e t s 
from s t r i k i n g S a c r i s t o n a r r i v e a t the p i t gates. From then on there were 
r e g u l a r r e p o r t s to branch meetings on the d e t e r i o r a t i n g s t a t e of the 
i n d u s t r y . 
1983 w i t n e s s e d a marked a c c e l e r a t i o n i n the pace of change sweeping across 
the Durham c o a l f i e l d . D e s p i t e the f a i l u r e of thr e e n a t i o n a l b a l l o t s (see 
cha p t e r f o u r ) , A r t h u r S c a r g i l l ' s vigorous cait5>aigning had put the i s s u e of 
c l o s u r e s f i r m l y on the agenda. I n Durham, the c o a l f i e l d was disappearing 
before peoples eyes. By now Murton was under b l a t a n t t h r e a t of c l o s u r e . I n 
1983, South Hetton - p a r t of the same Hawthorn Combine as Murton - c l o s e d 
i n c o n t r o v e r s i a l and b i t t e r circumstances, to be followed a few weeks l a t e r 
by the shock c l o s u r e of E a s t Hetton. But i t was South Hetton's c l o s u r e 
which focused a t t e n t i o n on the f u t u r e of the Combine, which was by then 
known t o be performing badly. 
5.6 . i THE SOUTH HETTON DEBACLE 
The events surrounding the c l o s u r e of South Hetton (or i t s "merger" with 
Murton, as the NCB p r e f e r r e d to c a l l i t ) , showed the s t r a t e g y of the NCB i n 
the p r e - s t r i k e p e riod, and the d i v i d e d but i n c r e a s i n g l y v o c a l opposition to 
t h a t s t r a t e g y w i t h i n the NUM. I n the l a t e 1970's. South Hetton was run down 
to the p o i n t where i t was a one fa c e , one development p i t , eitploying about 
430 men. Then i n 1981 a South Hetton DOSCO'''^  team s t a r t e d work on a 
^^A DOSCO i s a l a r g e road heading machine use f o r t u n n e l l i n g new 
underground roadways. 
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d r i v e a g e through t o Murton. Frank Duffy - who was working at South Hetton 
a t the time - t a k e s up the s t o r y . 
"You see, what happened a t South Hetton was they s a i d ; 
'Drive t h a t l i n k road, and t h e r e ' s . . . f i v e f a c e s f o r 
you, amounting to a f u r t h e r e i g h t y e a r s l i f e s p a n ' . 
South Hetton went ahead and drove the road, d e s p i t e 
s p e c u l a t i o n t h a t i t would i n e v i t a b l y l e a d to the 
c l o s u r e . They went ahead and drove t h a t road. Men were 
making such f a n t a s t i c bonuses on t h a t l i n k road 
[£40/day] t h a t they were knocking the yards out ham 
sam. Sure enough, the minute they holed through, the 
Coal Board then s a i d ; 'Well, i t would be b e t t e r I t h i n k 
to take the c o a l out from the Murton s i d e . ' " 
( i n t e r v i e w ) 
S e c r e t a r y of South Hetton miners' committee a t the time was John Dixon, a 
former r i g h t winger, but now a s s o c i a t e d with the BL. When the c l o s u r e was 
announced, the lodge committee recommended t h a t the men f i g h t i t . "But they 
were howled down. By the faceworkers r e a l l y ! " Manipulation of the i n c e n t i v e 
scheme had overcome doubts about the purpose of the l i n k road, and now 
r e l a t i v e l y w e l l p a i d f a c e workers were happy to see the p i t c l o s e d so they 
c o u l d t a k e advantage of redundancy terms. Others were seduced by the o f f e r 
of £1500 t r a n s f e r money, which was p a r t i c u l a r l y a t t r a c t i v e to men who would 
be t r a n s f e r r i n g to the p l a c e where they a l r e a d y l i v e d ! The area l e a d e r s h i p 
f u r t h e r undermined o p p o s i t i o n to the c l o s u r e when they t o l d the men t h a t 
union p o l i c y was t h a t w i t h other p i t s c l o s i n g i n the area, i t was b e t t e r to 
t r a n s f e r w h i l s t the option was s t i l l open. 
Meanwhile, over a t Murton, the f i n a l n a i l s were hammered i n to South 
Hetton's c o f f i n . The Murton lodges were requested to support an i n i t i a t i v e 
from the South Hetton branches to r e a l l o c a t e c o a l from Murton to South 
Hetton. T h i s was the zone of c o a l which South Hetton had d r i v e n towards, 
and which they had been promised they would be able to work. I n a 
r e s o l u t i o n proposed from the platform, the Murton miners' lodge vowed not 
t o g i v e South Hetton a nut of c o a l from the disputed d i s t r i c t . Murton 
mechanics' passed a s i m i l a r r e s o l u t i o n . As one Murton mechanic r u e f u l l y 
acknowledged s e v e r a l y e a r s l a t e r . South Hetton was 
"a b i t of a shambles... I t could honestly be s a i d t h a t 
Murton c l o s e d South Hetton as much as anyone e l s e . " 
( i n t e r v i e w ) 
Under t h e s e circumstances, i t i s e a s i e r to see why the men at South Hetton 
voted not t o f i g h t the c l o s u r e . But the s t o r y didn't end there. Some men -
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i n c l u d i n g John Dixon - t r a n s f e r r e d to E a s t Hetton, only to experience 
c l o s u r e again w i t h i n weeks. And men - often younger miners - who a r r i v e d at 
Murton brought the experience of NCB " d i r t y t r i c k s " i n the run up to 
c l o s u r e , as w e l l as b i t t e r n e s s a t the way they'd been t r e a t e d by t h e i r 
Murton c o l l e a g u e s . I t a l l had an e f f e c t on the changing morale and 
co n s c i o u s n e s s of those miners t h a t were l e f t . 
Some men drew l a s t i n g and powerful commitment from the South Hetton 
debacle. Frank Duffy - then a headstrong young m i l i t a n t - l e f t South Hetton 
c l o s e to t e a r s . 
"We were doing wrong, and I knew we were doing wrong. 
And I was determined from t h a t day on t h a t I was going 
to do something about i t a t Murton. I was going to get 
on the lodge, I was going to have me say, and I wasn't 
going to have any r e p e t i t i o n of what had took p l a c e . " 
( i n t e r v i e w ) 
Frank went on to keep h i s word, becoming the dominant f i g u r e i n the Murton 
miners' branch d u r i n g the s t r i k e (see chapter s i x ) . 
However, oth e r s l e f t South Hetton f e e l i n g t h a t i t confirmed t h a t the union 
was no longer a b l e or w i l l i n g to f i g h t c l o s u r e s . Many t r a v e l l e r s argued 
b i t t e r l y d uring the s t r i k e t h a t no one stood by t h e i r p i t when i t had 
c l o s e d . As the NCB got away w i t h c l o s u r e a f t e r c l o s u r e , then i t became 
harder and harder t o m o b i l i s e a g a i n s t them. The union seemed to have 
accepted the p r i n c i p l e , why f i g h t f o r one p i t and not another? Frank t r i e d 
t o e x p l a i n why he thought the men were so r e l u c t a n t to f i g h t . 
" I t h i n k i t was j u s t a t the time the coirplacent 
a t t i t u d e throughout the c o a l f i e l d . . . I t h i n k i t was 
more a s i t u a t i o n where men didn't know how to f i g h t , 
d i d n ' t have any k i n d of l e a d e r s h i p who would prepare to 
take up a f i g h t i n any c a p a c i t y other than a l e a f l e t 
campaign or a few pious words. And I t h i n k t h a t was 
about as much as what any k i n d of f i g h t i n t h i s 
c o a l f i e l d amounted to u n t i l the d i s p u t e . " (interview) 
E v e nts a t E a s t Hetton only twelve weeks l a t e r seemed to bear t h i s a n a l y s i s 
out. 
5 . 6 . i i EAST HETTON CLOSES DOWN 
South Hetton shut on A p r i l 4th 1983. On J u l y 1 s t , only 12 1/2 weeks l a t e r . 
E a s t Hetton shut. Once again, the NCB got away without a f i g h t . As Beynon 
e s p h a s i s e s (1984c), t h e speed w i t h which E a s t Hetton shut i s s t i l l a matter 
of anger and b i t t e r n e s s amongst a c t i v i s t s t h e r e . One man r e c a l l e d coming 
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back from f i r s t s h i f t and going to bed a t 1.45pm. At 2.00pm h i s wife woke 
him, and s a i d "They've shut the p i t ! " . I t had j u s t been announced on the 
l o c a l news. The b i t t e r n e s s i n c r e a s e d when i t began to look l i k e the NOB had 
been p l a n n i n g the c l o s u r e f o r some time. Typewritten sheets were already 
p r i n t e d , d e t a i l i n g t r a n s f e r arrangements, and which p i t every man was going 
t o . 
The NCB claimed they had d i s c o v e r e d one m i l l i o n g a l l o n s of water above the 
main workings i n the c o l l i e r y . Whether the water was there, whether 
management should ever have moved i n t o the disputed area and whether or not 
they c o u l d have coped w i t h the problem are a l l matters of dispute. 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t i s i n p o r t a n t to a p p r e c i a t e t h a t t h e r e was considerable 
m i s t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n of the NCB among men working a t E a s t Hetton. But why 
d i d n ' t the men f i g h t ? 
Fundamentally, the reasons were the same as those a t South Hetton. A s e r i e s 
of d e c i s i o n s by management c a s t doubt on t h e i r commitment to the f u t u r e of 
the p i t . Rumours b u i l t up and morale c o l l a p s e d . The union a t the branch was 
coit^slacent, and had never geared up to f i g h t c l o s u r e . T h i s con^jlacency 
extended t o the a r e a union, which again a d v i s e d the men t o take t r a n s f e r or 
redundancy money w h i l e they had the opportunity. Under these circumstances 
i t would almost have been s u r p r i s i n g i f the men had voted to f i g h t . 
5 . 6 . i i i MURTON TJNDER THREAT 
The double shock of the c l o s u r e of South Hetton and E a s t Hetton w i t h i n 
weeks of each other was matched by a c c e l e r a t i n g f e a r s over the f u t u r e of 
Murton. John Cummings - mechanics' branch s e c r e t a r y - r e c a l l e d t h a t the 
months before the s t r i k e were marked by a sharp change i n managements 
a t t i t u d e . He r e l a t e d t h i s to changes a t n a t i o n a l l e v e l , culminating i n the 
appointment of I a n MacGregor i n September 1983. Arthur S c a r g i l l picked up 
on the new s t r a t e g y as i t began t o emerge, and began a very s u c c e s s f u l 
propaganda can^aign, c o n c e n t r a t i n g on the emotive i d e a of a s e c r e t NCB " h i t 
l i s t " - based on the "high c o s t t a i l " i d e n t i f i e d i n the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission r e p o r t on the c o a l i n d u s t r y (1983). People s t a r t e d to 
t a l k about p i t c l o s u r e s . "And the t r u t h f i n a l l y emerged." 
U n c e r t a i n t y a t Murton was f u e l l e d by r a p i d changes a t the p i t . Two 
d i s t r i c t s were f a c i n g c l o s u r e - C seam E a s t and the seven quarter. Men were 
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being t r a n s f e r r e d around the p i t to new d i s t r i c t s and new jobs, sometimes 
on lower pay. T h i s was combined with the i n t e g r a t i o n of t r a v e l l e r s , 
a r r i v i n g from p i t s a l l around. The c o a l f i e l d was v i s i b l y s h r i n k i n g , and 
Murton looked l i k e i t might be next. One mechanics a c t i v i s t r e c a l l e d the 
e f f e c t nearby c l o s u r e s had. 
"That's when men s t a r t e d to become r e a l l y aware. Seeing 
them get c l o s e r . Some of what people might c l a s s as 
s a f e p i t s , the l i k e s of Horden. . . They was j u s t l i k e 
w h i t t l i n g away a t the s i d e s , you know, and sooner or 
l a t e r people d i d r e a l i s e , the k n i f e ' s going to go 
through the middle one day." ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
A management hard l i n e - h e r a l d e d by the appointment of a new manager from 
t h e c l o s e d E a s t Hetton p i t - r e i n f o r c e d the f e e l i n g of danger and 
d e s t a b i l i s a t i o n . Mr Dunbar was widely seen as a hatchet man. Men s a i d t h a t 
he'd been sent t o E a s t Hetton to c l o s e i t , and s p e c u l a t e d t h a t he'd been 
se n t t o Murton t o do the same. The operation of the overtime ban f u r t h e r 
i n c r e a s e d u n c e r t a i n t y . 
The a c t i v i t i e s of the BL were iit^jortant i n supporting and i n i t i a t i n g l e f t 
wing canpaigns i n the c o a l f i e l d , a t a time when the area l e a d e r s h i p was 
s t i l l c o n p l a c e n t l y r i g h t wing. BL members were e l e c t e d to lodge committees. 
Other lodge o f f i c i a l s j o i n e d . When b i g lodges such as Easington and 
Wearmouth became inv o l v e d , the scope of the BL's a c t i v i t i e s r a p i d l y 
i n c r e a s e d , as g r e a t e r funds were made a v a i l a b l e . Exchanges with South Wales 
miners took p l a c e . 
E d u c a t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s were a l s o a s i g n i f i c a n t f e a t u r e of BL a c t i v i t i e s . 
Huw Beynon a t Durham U n i v e r s i t y organised and ran s e v e r a l courses which 
miners' a c t i v i s t s attended. I n Murton the mechanics' lodge s e c r e t a r y John 
Cummings began o r g a n i s i n g courses i n the e a r l y 1980's f o r h i s members. 
"Indeed a l o t can be put down to the emergence on the 
scene of Huw Beynon, the ' P r i n c e of Darkness'. Lo and 
behold - and i t v i r t u a l l y happened overnight - t h a t 
people s t a r t e d to a t t e n d e d u c a t i o n a l courses, and 
weekend sc h o o l s and seminars. Which c e r t a i n l y in5>roved 
t h e i r awareness of problems. And i t c e r t a i n l y enabled 
them t o break out of t h i s cocoon they'd surrounded 
themselves i n - surrounded o u r s e l v e s i n - s i n c e the 
1974 s t r i k e . " ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
I n t h e miners' lodge, John Dixon's c o n t r o v e r s i a l 1983 v i c t o r y i n the b a t t l e 
f o r the lodge s e c r e t a r y s h i p - d e f e a t i n g the incumbent Eddie Brown by j u s t 6 
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v o t e s - exposed the r u p t u r i n g of past r e l a t i o n s h i p s c l e a r l y . Dixon was the 
f i r s t non-Murton man t o be e l e c t e d s e c r e t a r y of the Murton branch (he had 
t r a n s f e r r e d from South Hetton and E a s t Hetton, although he l i v e d i n 
Durham) . W h i l s t many miners a t t r i b u t e d t h i s v i c t o r y to the apathy of Murton 
men, who assumed Brown would win, t h e r e i s no doubt t h a t t r a v e l l e r s , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y an a c t i v e and s e l f conscious B l a c k h a l l group, canpaigned 
v i g o r o u s l y to get Dixon e l e c t e d . Dixon was a member of the BL, (although 
h i s e a r l i e r days had betrayed l i t t l e l e f t w a r d l e a n i n g ) . He had been lodge 
s e c r e t a r y a t South Hetton, had then t r a n s f e r r e d to E a s t Hetton where he had 
j u s t been e l e c t e d s e c r e t a r y when i t too cl o s e d , and so h i s e l e c t i o n a t 
Murton rep r e s e n t e d h i s t h i r d e l e c t e d o f f i c e i n one year! 
However, w h i l s t Dixon's e l e c t i o n i n d i c a t e d a s i g n i f i c a n t advance by the 
l e f t a t Murton, i t d i d not rep r e s e n t a dominant l e f t wing presence i n the 
miners' lodge. Rop Naylor was chairman - a man who was to r e s i g n and re t u r n 
t o work i n the s t r i k e . A l b e r t Swan was t r e a s u r e r , and although a thoroughly 
l o y a l union man, he was not considered a l e f t winger. Although the l e f t had 
made in r o a d s , and t h e r e was an a c t i v e group of m i l i t a n t mainly younger 
miners, they were a long way from being the dominant presence. Ob j e c t i v e 
developments (the changing age and r e s i d e n t i a l coitposition of the 
workforce, p i t c l o s u r e s , r i s i n g unen^loyment) had combined with s u b j e c t i v e 
f a c t o r s (the cair^^aigning a c t i v i t i e s of B l a c k h a l l t r a v e l l e r s and the BL, and 
m i l i t a n t younger miners) to c r e a t e a v o l a t i l e and unstable s i t u a t i o n , i n 
which n e i t h e r l e f t or r i g h t had secured o u t r i g h t c o n t r o l . 
5 . 6 . i v THE SEAM CAMPAIGN AND THE ADVANCE OF THE LEFT IN THE MECHANICS 
By the eve of the s t r i k e the mechanics' branch a t Murton was e s t a b l i s h e d as 
a cait5>aigning l e f t wing branch. B i l l y E t h e r i n g t o n (the newly e l e c t e d l e f t 
wing g e n e r a l s e c r e t a r y of t h e Durham Mechanics) bracketed Murton with 
Eppleton and Easin g t o n i n the pre s t r i k e days, saying; 
"They were w e l l l e d branches, they l e d the way. Well 
organised, w e l l educated, not prepared t o l e t the Coal 
Board g u l l them. And of course two of them were under 
t h r e a t . . . Murton s t i l l i s . " [Eppleton c l o s e d i n 1986.] 
( i n t e r v i e w ) 
Murton mechanics were i n s t r u m e n t a l i n s e t t i n g up and or g a n i s i n g the SEAM 
(Save E a s i n g t o n Area Mines) can^aign, which developed i n Easington D i s t r i c t 
i n l a t e 1983. The o r i g i n a l i d e a came out of a mechanics' committee meeting, 
and was the b r a i n c h i l d of Dave Temple. 
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SEAM was launched on November 29th, 1983 (Barker, 1984) . The c l o s u r e of 
B l a c k h a l l and South Hetton c o l l i e r i e s w ith a combined job l o s s of 1849 had 
s e n t unemployment i n Easington D i s t r i c t to 18.2% - over 7000 people. A 
f u r t h e r 2000+ were on YTS ( i b i d ) . The Cairpaign aimed to u n i t e the commxanity 
behind a defence of the remaining c o l l i e r i e s . Easington Chamber of Trade 
o f f e r e d s t r o n g support. A massive propaganda e f f o r t was i n i t i a t e d . On 
February 25th 1984, N e i l Kinnock, P e t e r H e a t h f i e l d and l o c a l MP Jack 
Dormand spoke a t a hugely s u c c e s s f u l r a l l y i n Easington. The canpaign 
s t r u c k a chord i n E a s t Durham. Communities f e l t a very strong sense of 
being under t h r e a t . 
The inportance of SEIAM i n Murton was underscored by a mechanics' a c t i v i s t 
from the west of the c o a l f i e l d . He commented: 
" [The] SEAM caitpaign was operating i n Murton at the 
time. And they were a c t i v e l y mounting a canpaign i n 
Murton to prepare f o r the s t r i k e . I've got no doubt 
about t h a t . People knew what was happening, and [t h a t ] 
i t was i n e v i t a b l e . And q u i t e r i g h t wing c h a r a c t e r s l i k e 
John Cummings had understood t h a t , and were a c t u a l l y 
p r e p a r i n g f o r i t . And w i l l i n g to f i g h t i t . And t h a t way 
they should never be c r i t i c i s e d . " ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
E d u c a t i o n a l courses organised by John Cummings meant t h a t Murton mechanics' 
a c t i v i s t s were v e r y aware, and w e l l p l a c e d to win arguments i n the p i t and 
i n t h e branch. The c r i s i s f a c i n g the i n d u s t r y through the i n t r o d u c t i o n of 
new technology and the c o l l a p s e of markets was brought home. The o l d r i g h t 
wing l e a d e r s h i p had e i t h e r been replaced, or had adapted to the new 
environment by a c c e p t i n g l e f t arguments. Given t h a t the mechanics 
18 
A s s o c i a t i o n a t a c o a l f i e l d l e v e l was s t i l l r i g h t wing , lagging behind the 
miners i n p o l i t i c a l development a t almost every p i t , t h i s was a not 
i n c o n s i d e r a b l e achievement. As John Cummings s a i d . 
18 
D e s p i t e the e l e c t i o n of the l e f t wing general s e c r e t a r y B i l l y 
E t h e r i n g t o n i n 1983 ( j u s t d e f e a t i n g John Cummings) the Durham mechanics 
continued t o d i s p l a y a marked r e l u c t a n c e to back up t h e i r vote with a 
committment t o a c i t o n . I n the 1982 and 1983 s t r i k e b a l l o t s (see t a b l e 4.10) 
they c o n s i s t e n t l y voted l e s s than 30% f o r s t r i k e a c t i o n . Along with r i g h t 
wingers who voted f o r S c a r g i l l , i t seems l i k e l y t h a t they hoped t h a t a 
s t r o n g g e n e r a l s e c r e t a r y would " d e l i v e r the goods" without the need f o r 
a c t i o n . 
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"We were known as a bolshy p i t . So a t t i t u d e s had 
changed. We were a l l s u s p i c i o u s . We a l l s t a r t e d to get 
worried. What the h e l l i s going on i n the i n d u s t r y . We 
then s t a r t to [hear] about MINOS and FIDO and high 
technology." ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
A l l t h e o l d c e r t a i n t i e s seemed t o be breaking down. I n these circiuostances, 
i n c r e a s i n g l y c o n f i d e n t l e f t wing a c t i v i s t s were able to b u i l d considerable 
support. The committee was dominated by a strong, r e l a t i v e l y cohesive group 
of a c t i v i s t s , forming a l e a d e r s h i p e l i t e commanding a u t h o r i t y and respect 
among the membership. 
However, t h e r e were s t i l l s t r ong elements of a r i g h t wing t r a d i t i o n i n the 
branch, p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h r e s p e c t to overtime, e s p e c i a l l y among su r f a c e 
workers, and o l d e r members (see appendix t h r e e f o r comments about the 
mechanics' overtime t r a d i t i o n ) . Elements of these t r a d i t i o n s s u r f a c e d on 
October 9th 1982, when the branch voted overwhelmingly a t a s p e c i a l meeting 
to r e j e c t the i n s t r u c t i o n from the NUM's NEC (National E x e c u t i v e Committee) 
to inpose a n a t i o n a l overtime ban. John Cummings played an inportant r o l e , 
because although as delegate he was duty bound t o support the NEC 
recommendation, i t was c l e a r from h i s speech a t the meeting t h a t he d i d not 
support the ban. The r e b e l s i n c l u d e d some of the men who were to be the 
backbone of the mechanics p i c k e t i n g e f f o r t during the s t r i k e . Habitual 
overtime workers, they f e l t t h a t the ban was the wrong way to put pressure 
on t h e NCB. 
However, i n the weeks t h a t followed, a t t i t u d e s changed d r a m a t i c a l l y , and 
the l e f t won a d e c i s i v e v i c t o r y a g a i n s t the r e b e l s . The miners supported 
the ban, and they were j o i n e d by a core of l e f t wing mechanics. Together 
they p i l e d p r e s s u r e on the r e b e l mechanics, i s o l a t i n g them a t work, 
t r e a t i n g them almost as scabs. The p r e s s u r e began to t e l l . Then the 
manager, i n a move which he must have hoped would i n t e n s i f y d i v i s i o n s i n 
the union, o f f e r e d t o double the amount of overtime a v a i l a b l e to the 
mechanics. I t gave the branch a reason to c a l l another meeting to consider 
the changed circumstances. On October 25th a s p e c i a l meeting was c a l l e d 
"owing to confusion over the working of overtime a t the 
weekend... The chairman was of the opinion t h a t members 
a t t i t u d e s had hardened over the p a s t week and t h a t 
u n i l a t e r a l a c t i o n by people i n t e r f e r i n g with report 
s h e e t s and other members r e f u s i n g to work warranted 
f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n . " (mechanics' minute book) 
Ag g r e s s i v e a c t i o n by l e f t wingers, p i l i n g p r e s s u r e on the overtime workers, 
swung the mood of the branch away from c o n f r o n t a t i o n with the n a t i o n a l 
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union. Recognising the changed circximstances, the committee recommended 
t h a t t h e branch should impose a t o t a l overtime ban, and the d e f i a n c e ended. 
(Two weeks l a t e r the ban was c a l l e d o f f a f t e r a n a t i o n a l b a l l o t had 
accepted the NCB's o f f e r . ) 
However, the mechanic's i d i o s y n c r a t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of n a t i o n a l overtime 
bans was again i n evidence the f o l l o w i n g year. On October 11th 1983, the 
branch a g a i n d i s c u s s e d a n a t i o n a l overtime ban, p r i o r t o a c o u n c i l meeting 
c a l l e d to decide the A s s o c i a t i o n ' s p o s i t i o n . 
"Members were of the opinion t h a t t h i s a c t i o n i s by i t s 
v e r y nature d i v i s i v e and could r e s u l t i n the main 
i s s u e s being overshadowed. Therefore the delegate [to 
c o u n c i l ] should oppose an overtime ban, but i f a ban 
was agreed upon a t the s p e c i a l delegate conference then 
the mechanics' d e l e g a t i o n should support a t o t a l ban. 
Members being l e f t i n [no?] doubt as to the 
consequences." (mechanics' minute book) 
I n due course the c o u n c i l and s p e c i a l delegate conference voted to support 
the overtime ban, so Murton mechanics decided to impose a s t r i c t 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a ban. 
According t o Dave Tenple, t h i s determination to s t i c k to the l e t t e r of a 
ban was the r e s u l t of an unholy and u n w i t t i n g a l l i a n c e of l e f t and r i g h t i n 
the lodge. Some l e f t wingers wanted a t o t a l ban out of p r i n c i p l e . But some 
on the r i g h t hoped t h a t the f r u s t r a t i o n s and t r o u b l e t h a t would be caused 
by a t o t a l ban would undermine the ban c o n p l e t e l y . John Cimmings confirmed 
t h i s l a t t e r motive when he e x p l a i n e d t h a t the p o l i c y was due to: 
"Sheer bloody f r u s t r a t i o n . . . The aim was to t r y to 
b r i n g t o the n o t i c e of the area o f f i c i a l s the f u t i l i t y 
of an overtime ban." ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
These comments, and the support the previous y e a r by some l e f t wingers f o r 
d e f i a n c e of a n a t i o n a l overtime ban, i l l u s t r a t e the c o n t r a d i c t o r y and 
uneven way i n which consciousness develops among workers. I t i s not always 
a t a l l c l e a r what the " l e f t wing" stance i s . F u r t h e r , l e f t wing opinions 
over one i s s u e can c o e x i s t w i t h r e a c t i o n a r y sentiments over another (and 
v i c e v e r s a ) . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , the mechanics' s t r i c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the ban i n c r e a s e d 
f r i c t i o n s t e a d i l y towards the end of 1983 and i n the f i r s t few months of 
1984. Murton's manager, Mr Dunbar, urged a f l e x i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the 
ban, which would a l l o w miners t o work f i v e s h i f t s . But the mechanics 
r e f u s e d t o rearrange t h e i r s h i f t s , w i t h the r e s u l t t h a t some miners were 
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only a b l e to work t h r e e s h i f t s a week, and many only worked four s h i f t s . At 
a r e a l e v e l , a s p e c i a l "Emergency Committee" had been s e t up to t r y and 
r e s o l v e problems caused by the ban. S e v e r a l times i t asked the Murton 
mechanics t o be more f l e x i b l e , but each request was turned down 
overwhelmingly a t branch meetings. T h i s v o l a t i l e and a b r a s i v e s i t u a t i o n 
ground on i n t o 1984. 
5.6 . V RUN UP TO MARCH 1984 
John Cummings i s convinced t h a t around t h i s time t h e r e was a s i g n i f i c a n t 
hardening i n management a t t i t u d e s , c o i n c i d i n g with the appointment of I a n 
MacGregor as Chairman of the NCB ( i n September 1983} . Management knew t h a t 
under the s t r i c t f i n a n c i a l c r i t e r i a being l a i d down by the government, they 
had t o confront and break the power of the union, both n a t i o n a l l y and 
l o c a l l y . I n Murton the screws began to t u r n i n February 1984. The manager 
requested weekend working f o r e s s e n t i a l maintenance a t Hawthorn f o r 
February 18th and 19th. I f the union r e j e c t e d t h i s , then he would l a y the 
whole mine o f f on F r i d a y 24th and Monday 27th to enable the work to be done 
then. The mechanics r e s o l v e d not to work the weekend u n l e s s work could be 
found f o r a l l members. A meeting was c a l l e d f o r the 21st, i n v o l v i n g a l l 
lodge chairmen and s e c r e t a r i e s f o r Hawthorn, Eppleton and Murton, area 
union and management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . 
At t h i s meeting the union requested t h a t the mine produce ROM (run of 
19 
mine ) c o a l on the 24th and 27th, and t h a t a l l men should be erqployed on 
e s s e n t i a l maintenance. The NCB r e p l i e d t h a t t h i s was impossible as stocks 
were i n danger of overheating, and t h e r e was no f u r t h e r space f o r s t o c k i n g 
elsewhere. The union p r e s s e d f o r f i g u r e s j u s t i f y i n g these c l a i m s . The 
mechanics' minute book records the r e p l y . 
"The Board d e c l i n e d , and on being p r e s s e d f u r t h e r 
s t a t e d t h a t r e g a r d l e s s of the above [ i e whether or not 
t h e r e was a problem producing ROM c o a l ] they were not 
prepared under any s e t of circumstances to produce ROM 
c o a l , t h i s being an Area Board P o l i c y d e c i s i o n . " 
[emphasis added] (mechanics' minute book) 
washery. 
19 
Coal i n i t s raw s t a t e , before being processed through a 
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T h i s was i n t e r p r e t e d by a l l unions present as a h i g h l y provocative change 
i n Board p o l i c y . Management went ahead and l a i d men o f f . 
A second s i m i l a r d i s p u t e was brewing over a rope cap a t Hawthorn a t the 
s t a r t of March, when events a t Cortonwood i n Y o r k s h i r e intervened. 
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5.7 CONCLUSION 
I t i s c l e a r from the m a t e r i a l examined i n t h i s chapter t h a t p o l i t i c a l 
development tu r n e d on the s u b j e c t i v e experience of o b j e c t i v e processes and 
events. I n the e a r l y 1980's the most s i g n i f i c a n t o b j e c t i v e processes were: 
the i n c e n t i v e scheme, the changing con^josition of the workforce (by 
r e s i d e n c e and age), p i t c l o s u r e s , and i n c r e a s i n g unemployment. On t h e i r 
own, t h e i r p o l i t i c a l e f f e c t c o u l d not be p r e d i c t e d . Only by a r t i c u l a t i n g 
o b j e c t i v e developments w i t h s u b j e c t i v e f a c t o r s could the t r a j e c t o r y of 
p o l i t i c a l change i n a p a r t i c u l a r p l a c e l i k e Murton be understood. 
S u b j e c t i v e a c t i v i t i e s a t t h i s l e v e l transform the e f f e c t s of common 
o b j e c t i v e p r o c e s s e s i n t o a b e w i l d e r i n g v a r i e t y of l o c a l l y s p e c i f i c 
e x p e r i e n c e s and responses. D e s t a b i l i s a t i o n began with the i n c e n t i v e scheme, 
which s h i f t e d the wages i s s u e back from n a t i o n a l to l o c a l l e v e l . I n the 
miners' lodge, perhaps the key p o l i t i c a l r o l e was played by the B l a c k h a l l 
t r a n s f e r e e s . Not only d i d t h e i r a r r i v a l mark a d e c i s i v e breach with the 
post war "indulgency p a t t e r n " a t Murton c o l l i e r y ( s i g n a l l i n g the end of 
l o c a l r e c r u i t m e n t and c r a f t a p p r e n t i c e s h i p s ) , but by b r i n g i n g expectations 
of a d i f f e r e n t indulgency p a t t e r n , they c o n s t i t u t e d a powerful p o l i t i c a l 
agency. The changing age c o n p o s i t i o n of the workforce a c c e l e r a t e d the 
B l a c k h a l l mens' ixtpact by s h i f t i n g the balance w i t h i n the branch towards 
miners whose attachment to the PWS was s i g n i f i c a n t l y l e s s than the older 
miners who were l e a v i n g the i n d u s t r y i n i n c r e a s i n g numbers. 
The miners' lodge l e a d e r s h i p was r e l a t i v e l y weak, l a c k i n g both i n strong 
p e r s o n a l i t i e s and i n confidence. Before the d e s t a b i l i s a t i o n of the 1980's, 
i t b a r e l y c o n s t i t u t e d a p o l i t i c a l agency a t a l l . As changes enveloped the 
p i t , the l e a d e r s h i p proved unable to o f f e r a d e c i s i v e l e a d . At area l e v e l 
t h e c h a l l e n g e was taken up by the BL. At Murton, a combination of 
determined a g i t a t i o n by B l a c k h a l l t r a v e l l e r s , and the i n c r e a s i n g 
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n of younger miners l e d to the e l e c t i o n of BL member John 
Dixon as branch s e c r e t a r y . But the branch committee was s t i l l dominated by 
t h e r i g h t on the eve of the s t r i k e . I n the mechanics' branch, s i m i l a r 
o b j e c t i v e changes provided a d e s t a b i l i s i n g i n f l u e n c e i n branch p o l i t i c s 
(although t r a v e l l e r s were a l e s s s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r ) . However, the 
c h a r a c t e r of the moderate l e a d e r s h i p of the branch ( i n p a r t i c u l a r John 
Cummings) and of the l e f t o p p o s i t i o n ( i n p a r t i c u l a r Dave Tenple) had a 
d e c i s i v e i n f l u e n c e on the way i n which the branch changed. As the popular 
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s e c r e t a r y of the branch f o r almost twenty y e a r s , Cummings p o s i t i o n was 
u n a s s a i l a b l e . However, d e s t a b i l i s a t i o n and the end of the e r a of hope 
provided l e f t wing a c t i v i s t s w ith powerful can?)aigning m a t e r i a l . The SEAM 
canpaign - launched by John Cummings i n h i s c a p a c i t y as Chairman of 
E a s i n g t o n D i s t r i c t C o u n c i l - heightened awareness of the i s s u e s f a c i n g the 
i n d u s t r y and the communities. As unease and f e a r c r e p t i n t o the branch, 
Cvmimings d r i f t e d i n the d i r e c t i o n the l e f t were pushing i t . Indeed, to 
m a i n t a i n h i s a u t h o r i t y , he p l a c e d h i m s e l f a t the head of the movement, and 
campaigned w i t h commitment and a u t h o r i t y a g a i n s t p i t c l o s u r e s . 
At Murton t h e r e f o r e , the operation of n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l and economic 
p r o c e s s e s had s p e c i f i c , i d e n t i f i a b l e , o b j e c t i v e l o c a l e f f e c t s ( p i t 
c l o s u r e s , t r a n s f e r s , redundancy, end of r e c r u i t m e n t ) . The general n a t i o n a l 
p o l i t i c a l and economic s i t u a t i o n , e x c l u s i v e of i t s p a r t i c u l a r e f f e c t s i n 
Murton, a l s o a f f e c t e d consciousness. But i n d i v i d u a l s and groups staitped 
t h e i r own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n on the observed and experienced o b j e c t i v e 
s i t u a t i o n , and t h i s c o n s t i t u t e s the s u b j e c t i v e s i d e of p o l i t i c a l 
development. Sometimes agents s e l f c o n s c i o u s l y sought to i n f l u e n c e other 
peoples' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of events, other times people worked things out 
alone or i n groups, u s i n g t h e i r acciunulated s t o r e of knowledge and 
ideology. 
I t i s i n p o r t a n t however to re-enphasise t h a t the e x e r c i s e of agency i n 
Murton was h e a v i l y c o n s t r a i n e d by the weight of p a s t experience. Movements 
i n c onsciousness r e f l e c t e d these c o n s t r a i n t s , p l a c i n g powerful l i m i t s on 
the pace and d i r e c t i o n of change. Nevertheless, these changes brought with 
them the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the dominant ideology which had become entrenched 
throughout the c o a l f i e l d under the PWS would be challenged, and with t h i s 
came the p o s s i b i l i t y of s i g n i f i c a n t mass changes i n consciousness. W h i l s t 
the developments up to March 1984 c l e a r l y c o n s t i t u t e d the beginnings of a 
rupture w i t h the p a s t , i t was the s t r i k e i t s e l f which blew apart the 
o b j e c t i v e b a s i s f o r the o l d ideology, o f f e r i n g a l l manner of opportunities 
t o remold c l a s s c o n sciousness. The e f f e c t of the s t r i k e i s considered i n 
the f o l l o w i n g chapter. 
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TABLE 5.1: LEADERSHIP OF MURTON MINERS LODGE 1960 - PRESENT. 
YEAR CHAIRMAN SECRETARY 
1960 J T o f t J S t e v e n s 
1961 
1962 J C l a r k 
1963 " 
196A " 
1965 " " 
1966 
1967 " 
1968 
1969 " 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 " 
197'4 
1975 
1976 " 
1977 
1978 " " 
1979 " 
1980 G E l w i c k M Wylde 
1981 G E l w i c k M Wylde 
1982 M Wylde E Brown 
1983 R N a y l o r J D i x o n 
198^ A B e l l J D i x o n 
1985 S J a c k s o n F D u f f y 
1986 S J a c k s o n F D u f f y 
1987 S MusgrovG A Young 
S o u r c e : Murton m i n e r s ' l o d g e m i n u t e books. 
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TABLE 5.2. MECHANICS BRANCH LEADERSHIP, 1960 - PRESENT. 
YEAR CHAIRMAN SECRETARY TREASURER 
1960 B Olloman S Emery 
1961 I I " 
1962 i> I I 
1963 M I I 
196^* I I I I 
1965 I I I I 
1966 I I I I 
1967 11 11 B Young 
1968 I I J Cummings H Wood 
1969 11 I I I I 
1970 I I " I I 
1971 " I I I I 
1972 M I I 
1973 I I " I I 
1974 A Robson n " 
1975 I I I I 
1976 I I I I 
1977 A W i l l i a m s o n I I I I 
1978 11 I I I I 
1979 B A r m s t r o n g " I I 
1980 u 
1981 I I " 
1982 I I " 
1983 I I I I 
1984 I I H I I 
1985 " I I " 
1986 I t n 
1987 M Rooney D Temple S Vardy 
1988 D A n d e r s o n I I t i 
S o u r c e : Murton M e c h a n i c s m i n u t e books. 
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TABLE 5.3; MURTON WORKFORCE BY RESIDENCE, 198-^ 
Town/vi11 age ^ Number employed 3 y. o f w o r k f o r c e 
Murton 630 38.9 
Seaham 121 7.5 
E a s i n g t o n L a n e 113 6.9 
S o u t h H e t t o n 107 6.6 
H e t t o n L e H o l e 90 5.5 
B l a c k h a l l 73 A.5 
P e t e r l e e 72 
Tr imdon 33 2.0 
W h e a t l e y H i l l 30 1.9 
Horden 28 1 .7 
Houghton Le Spr 28 1.7 
T h o r n l e y 26 1.6 
Haswel1 25 1.5 
Durham 22 1.^ 
Wingate 19 1.2 
Trimdon S t a t i o n 15 0.9 
Ryphope 13 0.8 
Sunder 1 and 13 0.8 
Tr imdon Co 1 1 ^ 12 0.7 
Trimdon Grange 12 0.7 
S h e r b u r n 12 0.7 
F e n c e h o u s e s 9 0.6 
E a s i n g t o n 7 O.'^  
Bowburn 6 O.k 
H e s l e d o n 6 0.^ 
S h e r b u r n H i l l 6 OA 
C a r v i l i e 5 0.3 
S h o t t o n C o l l ^ 5 0.3 
D a l t o n L e D a l e 0.3 
E a s t R a i n t o n 0.3 
Ludworth 0.3 
S h i n e y Row ^ 0.3 
B u r n s i d e 3 0.2 
F e r r y h i 11 3 0.2 
G r e a t Lumley 3 0.2 
H a r t l e p o o 1 3 0.2 
High H e s l e d o n 3 0.2 
P i t t i n g t o n 3 0.2 
S i 1kswor th 3 0.2 
W ashington 3 0.2 
Brandon 2 0.1 
D a l t o n H e i g h t s 2 0.1 
F i s h b u r n 2 0.1 
Hawthorn 2 0.1 
L a n g l e y P a r k 2 0.1 
Howden Le Wear 1 0.1 
B i s h o p l l i d d l e h s m 1 0.1 
H u t t o n Henry 1 0.1 
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TABLE 5.3 ( C o n t ) 
T o w n / v i 1 l a g e Number employed '/. o f w o r k f o r c e 
Penshaw 1 0.1 
S h a d f o r t h 1 0.1 
Ushaw Moor 1 0.1 
Broompark 1 0.1 
S h i I d o n 1 0.1 
N e w b o t t l e 1 0.1 
C r o x d a l e 1 0.1 
G r a s s w e l 1 1 0.1 
West R a i n t o n 1 0.1 
K e l l o e 1 0.1 
H a r t S t a t i o n 1 0.1 
C o l d H e s l e d o n 1 0.1 
S t a n l e y 1 0.1 
B i r t l e y 1 0.1 
New H e r r i n g t o n 1 0.1 
E a s i n g t o n V i l l 1 0.1 
W i l l i ngton 1 0.1 
P h i l a d e l p h i a 1 0.1 
C h e s t e r - L e - S t 0.1 
TOTAL 1621 100.0 
1. S e v e r a l o f t h e s e c o m m u n i t i e s have been formed by amalgamating d i s t r i c t s 
w i t h i n one town. F o r example, Seaham i n c l u d e s p e o p l e from W e s t l e a . E a s t l e a , 
Dswdon, D e n e s i d e and P a r k s i d e . 
2. T h e s e f i g u r e s i n c l u d e a l l g r a d e s o f e m p l o y e e s ( i e NUM. NACDDS), e x c e p t 
management. 
3. P e r c e n t a g e s a r e to t h e n e a r e s t t e n t h o f one p e r c e n t , hence t h e 
p e r c e n t a g e t o t a l does not add up to e x a c t l y 100. 
S o u r c e : P r i v a t e l y s u p p l i e d f i g u r e s 
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TABLE 5.4: MURTON WORKFORCE BY AGE, 1984 
Age Murton t o t a l 7. o f w o r k f o r c e 
< 20 21 1.3 
20-24 297 18.3 
25-29 261 16.1 
30-34 207 12.8 
35-39 184 11.4 
40-44 161 9.9 
45-49 220 13.6 
50-54 210 13,0 
55-69 59 3.6 
60+ 1 0.1 
T o t a l 1621 100.0 
S o u r c e : P r i v a t e l y s u p p l i e d f i g u r e s 
TABLE 5.5: NCB WORKFORCE (NATIONAL) BY AGE, 1982/3 
„ 1 
Age N° employed '/, o f w o r k f o r c e 
< 20 13592 6.6 
20-25 28436 13.3 
25-30 23265 10.5 
30-40 42645 20.1 
40-50 47870 22.8 
50-55 23775 11.5 
55-60 28186 13.2 
60+ 2941 1.6 
T o t a l 205710 100.0 
1, Note t h a t age bands a r e not i d e n t i c a l to t h o s e used f o r t a b l e 4, 
S o u r c e : NCB Annual R e p o r t and A c c o u n t s , 1982/3 
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CHAPTER SIX: MURTON AND THE STRIKE 
CHAPTER SIX: MURTON AND THE STRIKE 
INTRODUCTION 
The l a s t two chapters approached the s t a r t of the 1984/5 s t r i k e from 
d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s . Chapter four examined the a c c e l e r a t i n g d r i f t towards 
c o n f l i c t w i t h i n the c o a l i n d u s t r y n a t i o n a l l y i n the e a r l y 1980's, providing 
a framework f o r the f o l l o w i n g t h r e e chapters. Chapter f i v e showed how these 
n a t i o n a l events wove through the experiences of Murton c o l l i e r y . I t showed 
how conscious agents were ab l e to shape the d i r e c t i o n of p o l i t i c a l change 
w i t h i n the p l a c e s p e c i f i c context e s t a b l i s h e d by the p r e v a i l i n g 
d e s t a b i l i s i n g p r e s s u r e s . 
Up u n t i l March 1984, the extent and meaning of the changes a t Murton were 
l a r g e l y u n c l e a r . I t was the miners' s t r i k e of 1984/5 which turned the 
developments of the previous t e n y e a r s i n t o a sharp p o l i t i c a l 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . As chapter t h r e e showed, s t r i k e s f r e q u e n t l y generate sudden 
s h i f t s i n union p o l i t i c s , (although the p r e s s u r e s c r e a t i n g them u s u a l l y 
b u i l d up over a longer time p e r i o d ) . The miners' s t r i k e represented the 
most elemental i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t of the T h a t c h e r i t e e r a (see chapters two 
and f o u r ) ; a c o n f l i c t over the s u r v i v a l of the post war settlement and the 
a t t e i i p t t o inpose a new settlement between c a p i t a l and labour. With such 
fundamental i s s u e s a t stake, i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t Murton's 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c indulgency p a t t e r n was blown apart during the s t r i k e . 
More than four y e a r s a f t e r the end of the 1984/5 s t r i k e , i t i s easy to 
f o r g e t j u s t what a monumental event i t was. Talked and w r i t t e n about so 
often, i t has now become p a r t of the everyday p o l i t i c a l landscape i n 
B r i t a i n . F or many people i t i s d i s t a n t h i s t o r y . I n the mining communities 
themselves however, the s t r i k e l i v e s on, a s s i m i l a t e d i n t o the c o l l e c t i v e 
c o n s c i o u s n e s s v i a the o r a l t r a d i t i o n of s t o r y t e l l i n g ( F r a n c i s , 1985). 
Underneath the b u s t l i n g s u r f a c e veneer of normality, t h e r e are s t i l l today 
some jagged edges l e f t over from the s t r i k e . I n Murton, Rop Naylor - the 
former miners' branch chairman who t r i e d t o l e a d a r e t u r n t o work - i s 
o s t r a c i s e d , a c o n t i n u i n g v i c t i m of p s y c h o l o g i c a l (and o c c a s i o n a l l y 
p h y s i c a l ) i n t i m i d a t i o n . Yet f o r many people, the s t r i k e was the best year 
of t h e i r l i v e s . 
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I n e v i t a b l y perhaps - giv e n the elemental nature of the c o n f l i c t - the 
s t r i k e c o n j u r e d up almost every extreme of human emotion. As w e l l as the 
astounding f o r t i t u d e of the communities i n s u s t a i n i n g the s t r i k e f o r a 
year, i t a l s o contained w i t h i n i t enormous c o n t r a d i c t i o n s and c o n f l i c t s . 
T h i s chapter i s about the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s and c o n f l i c t s , and how they 
r e f l e c t e d and a f f e c t e d the changing p o l i t i c s of the branches. I n the f i r s t 
s e c t i o n , i t shows how the s e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s out of the c o n t r a d i c t o r y 
t e n d e n c i e s present i n the y e a r s before the s t r i k e , and i n p a r t i c u l a r the 
t e n s i o n between younger miners and the o l d e r men. The s t a r t of the s t r i k e 
i n Murton encapsu l a t e d t h e s e d i v i s i o n s , and i s t h e r e f o r e examined i n some 
d e t a i l . From then on the workforce s p l i t i n t o s e v e r a l d i s t i n c t groups, 
which I study i n t u r n . 
Of t h e s e groups, t h e most v i s i b l e were the s t r i k e a c t i v i s t s . Yet even the 
a c t i v i s t s were d i v i d e d , l a r g e l y along age l i n e s , with the youngest the most 
committed p i c k e t s , and the o l d e r ones showing more cau t i o n and r e s t r a i n t . 
These cleavages were l i n k e d to the d i f f e r i n g experiences of d i f f e r e n t 
g e n e r a tions, and i n p a r t i c u l a r t h e i r a r t i c u l a t i o n t o the ( c o l l a p s i n g ) PWS. 
Some d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n the unions ranks were exacerbated, i f not caused, by 
the s h e e r p h y s i c a l demands of space. Miners working a t Murton went home to 
v i l l a g e s spread out over most of County Durham. There they were i s o l a t e d 
from the s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y which s u s t a i n e d the s t r i k e i n the p i t v i l l a g e s ^ . 
The i n ? 5 l i c a t i o n s of t h i s p h y s i c a l s e p a r a t i o n are analysed, along with the 
a c t i v i s t s atten^Jts t o cope w i t h the d i f f i c u l t i e s of o r g a n i s a t i o n which they 
posed. 
I n the second s e c t i o n I explore the sm a l l m i n o r i t y of " a n t i - s t r i k e 
d i e h a r d s " . Many were opposed t o the s t r i k e from i t s beginning. T h e i r 
a c t i o n s a r e r e l a t e d t o developments w i t h i n the s t r i k e a t a n a t i o n a l l e v e l . 
Appendix f i v e c o n t a i n s a b r i e f e x p l o r a t i o n of the r o l e of women 
and women's support groups i n the s t r i k e , and Murton's r o l e i n the women's 
m o b i l i s a t i o n . Although t h i s was p o s s i b l y the most in p o r t a n t long term 
development du r i n g the s t r i k e , I have not attenpted to analyse i t i n depth 
i n t h i s t h e s i s (see appendix one). I t i s too l a r g e a s u b j e c t to be tacked 
on as one p a r t of a chapter, and s i n c e t h i s t h e s i s i s about processes of 
p o l i t i c a l change i n two branches of the NUM a t Murton, the changing r o l e of 
women i n Murton i s not c e n t r a l t o the argument. 
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as the s t a t e and the c o u r t s sought to undermine the l e g i t i m a c y of the 
s t r i k e . T h e i r o p p o s i t i o n was based on a profound i d e o l o g i c a l h o s t i l i t y to 
the s t r i k e . Most of the a n t i - s t r i k e diehards were t r a v e l l e r s . However a 
second group of maybe twenty or so Murton men were a l s o h o s t i l e to the 
s t r i k e , and a g i t a t e d a g a i n s t i t w i t h i n the community. T h e i r h o s t i l i t y i s 
r e l a t e d t o the t e i t p t a t i o n o f f e r e d by massive redundancy payments, which was 
b o l s t e r e d by the economistic and faceworker b i a s of the union i n the 
p r e - s t r i k e p e r i o d. 
F i n a l l y , I look a t the m a j o r i t y of s t r i k e r s - people who c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y 
supported the s t r i k e ' s cause, but who wanted an honourable compromise to 
end the s t r i k e . L o y a l t y and p r i d e kept them out, but f o r some those l i n k s 
snapped a f t e r Christmas 1984. Mostly they supported the aims of the s t r i k e . 
They had no a l l e g i a n c e t o the Thatcherite-MacGregor programme f o r the 
i n d u s t r y (the two were i n v a r i a b l y seen as synonymous). P r a c t i c a l f a c t o r s -
the degree of s o c i a l i s o l a t i o n , m a t e r i a l hardship - were d e c i s i v e i n 
determining t h e i r b r e a k i n g p o i n t . 
Running through the account of the s t r i k e i s the continued s t o r y of 
p o l i t i c a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n w i t h i n the branches. I n p a r t i c u l a r , the s t r i k e 
c r e a t e d the c o n d i t i o n s f o r a l e f t wing transformation of the miners' 
branch. Murton became the c l a s s i c exaicple of a union branch t h a t swxing l e f t 
because of the s t r i k e . 
As w i t h chapter f i v e , t h i s chapter i s based on d e t a i l e d evidence gained 
predominantly by i n t e r v i e w (see appendix 1 ) . However, the type and q u a l i t y 
of the data gathered was i n some ways d i f f e r e n t to t h a t a v a i l a b l e before 
1984. For exaitple, i t became more d i f f i c u l t to maintain the d i s t i n c t i o n 
2 
between miners' and mechanics' branches through the s t r i k e . Also, 
p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t a l k i n g to the NUM's "middle ground", l e d to a 
2 
T h i s was p a r t l y the r e s u l t of changing r e s e a r c h aims. When I 
began i n t e r v i e w s , I concentrated p a r t i c u l a r l y on the s t r i k e , where the 
d i f f e r e n c e s between the branches d i d not appear g r e a t . T h i s concentration 
b l i n d e d me to the f u l l s i g n i f i c a n c e of the d i f f e r e n c e between miners and 
mechanics, which was only f u l l y r e v e a l e d when I began to look a t the p e r i o d 
befo r e the s t r i k e i n more d e t a i l . My i n i t i a l i n t e r v i e w s concentrated on 
miners because I had b e t t e r c o n t a c t s i n the miners' lodge, and was a t t h a t 
stage unaware t h a t t h i s " b i a s " was i n p o r t a n t (see appendix 1 f o r d e t a i l s ) . 
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s t r o n g ( l e f t and r i g h t wing) a c t i v i s t " b i a s " i n i n t e r p r e t i n g the s t r i k e 
(appendix 1) . Furthermore, the absence of a common workplace based 
framework o f events around which t o hang the n a r r a t i v e posed f u r t h e r 
d i f f i c u l t i e s . A huge v a r i e t y of events marked the year from March 1984, 
many of which were h i g h l y s p e c i f i c to a sma l l group, and others of which 
assumed f a r g r e a t e r s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r some groups (eg t r a v e l l e r s ) than f o r 
o t h e r s . 
For f e a r of becoming trapped i n t h i s t a n g l e d web of s t r i k e experiences, 
t h i s account does not provide a d e t a i l e d , c h r o n o l o g i c a l n a r r a t i v e of the 
s t r i k e . I n s t e a d , i t assumes a b a s i c knowledge of the main events, which a r e 
g e n e r a l l y w e l l known (see chapter one f o r r e f e r e n c e s ) , and focuses i n s t e a d 
on s i g n i f i c a n t l o c a l i s s u e s . 
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6.1 THE START OF THE STRIKE. 
On March 1 s t 1984, George Hayes, the South Y o r k s h i r e Area D i r e c t o r , 
announced t h a t Cortonwood C o l l i e r y was t o c l o s e . T h i s a c t - regarded as 
deeply p r o v o c a t i v e by the NUM - caused an immediate s t r i k e a t the p i t , and 
w i t h i n days the whole of the Y o r k s h i r e c o a l f i e l d was out. On March 6th, the 
NCB met the mining unions i n London, and announced the need f o r a c a p a c i t y 
r e d u c t i o n of four m i l l i o n tonnes (Mt) over t h a t which had been achieved i n 
1983/4 (see t a b l e 6.1)^. S e v e r a l c o l l i e r i e s were to c l o s e immediately, 
i n c l u d i n g Cortonwood, St Johns i n South Wales, Polmaise i n Scotland, and 
Herrington i n Durham. 
F o l l o w i n g t h i s announcement, the Y o r k s h i r e a c t i o n began to snowball. 
Although a m a j o r i t y of South Wales p i t s i n i t i a l l y voted not to s t r i k e , they 
were soon p i c k e t e d out (Adeney and Lloyd, 1986) . Scotland and Kent j o i n e d 
the s t r i k e too. I n Durham, t h e r e was an i n i t i a l r e l u c t a n c e to s t r i k e . Some 
p i t s came s t r a i g h t out, but ot h e r s ( p a r t i c u l a r l y the Seaham p i t s ) attempted 
to work on pending a n a t i o n a l b a l l o t , although mass p i c k e t i n g soon ended 
the r e b e l l i o n . But even those p i t s which supported the s t r i k e from the 
beginning, j o i n e d the unanimous c a l l from the Durham p i t s f o r a n a t i o n a l 
b a l l o t . Events a t Murton r e f l e c t e d the degree of confusion and d i v i s i o n 
throughout the c o a l f i e l d a t the time. They a l s o showed the way t h a t 
c o n t r a d i c t o r y f o r c e s developing before the s t r i k e a f f e c t e d the way i t 
developed from the v e r y s t a r t . 
6.1.i MURTON MINERS DIVIDED 
Both miners' and mechanics' branches a t Murton c a l l e d s p e c i a l meetings f o r 
Sunday March 11th, f o l l o w i n g the Y o r k s h i r e walkout and the appeal f o r 
n a t i o n a l s o l i d a r i t y a c t i o n t o prevent p i t c l o s u r e s . Events at the Miners 
Welfare H a l l , where the miners' branch h e l d t h e i r meeting, foreshadowed the 
deep d i v i s i o n s which p e r s i s t e d w i t h i n the workforce throughout the s t r i k e . 
At the committee meeting before the s p e c i a l meeting, the committee voted 
^Because the overtime ban had reduced a c t u a l production i n 1983/4 
to 4 Mt below the planned f i g u r e , the NCB's planned reduction of 4Mt was 
a c t u a l l y an 8 Mt c u t i n planned output. 
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18-4 to recommend action to the men. But they were b i t t e r l y divided over 
the recommendation, and three of the dissenters resigned i n protest. 
I n the packed h a l l , the newly elected, l e f t leaning lodge secretary John 
Dixon moved the committee resolution from the platform. But he faced a 
h o s t i l e reception, with some miners trying to shout him down. The meeting 
was s p l i t , with a band of pro-strike militants congregating at the front of 
the h a l l , and a n t i - s t r i k e miners gathering at the back. Some of these were 
v i r u l e n t l y a n t i - s t r i k e , and formed the core a n t i - s t r i k e group within Murton 
(discussed i n section 6 . 3 . i i i ) . Although the lodge committee gave a lead, 
there was considerable uncertainty within the h a l l over what the true 
sit u a t i o n was. At the end of an emotive, bad tertpered and confused debate, 
only about 25% voted (by a show of hands) for a s t r i k e . 
6 . 1 . i i THE MECHANICS TAKE THE LEAD 
Although throughout the county the mechanics were more right wing and 
h o s t i l e to the s t r i k e than the miners, at Murton they turned the tables on 
the miners. Their committee were unanimous i n recommending immediate s t r i k e 
action. They decided to hold a secret b a l l o t following t h e i r emergency 
branch meeting, and count the votes immediately so that i f the decision was 
for a s t r i k e , action could be taken at once. Left and right were united, 
both believing that the union now had no alternative but to take action. 
John Cummings, the i n f l u e n t i a l and formerly right wing branch secretary, 
was as determined and committed as the l e f t wing a c t i v i s t s . From the moment 
that Ian MacGregor was appointed Chairman of the NCB (in Sept 1983), he had 
f e l t that a s t r i k e was inevitable. Now the time had arrived. 
At the s p e c i a l meeting i t was John Cummings who was the decisive influence. 
Because h i s reputation was moderate and right wing, his coitplete support 
for the s t r i k e c a r r i e d formidable authority. One a c t i v i s t recalled the 
meeting l i k e t h i s . 
"Cummings spoke well as usual. I think he swayed the 
meeting you know. He can do that..., he's a bloody good 
speaker. There was a hard core of us who wanted a 
s t r i k e I think. John swayed i t . There was a l o t of 
discussion. I t was a bloody good meeting as I 
remember." (interview) 
The l a s t minute i n the mechanics' book u n t i l the end of the s t r i k e records 
the following: 
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"The ballot was then conducted and counted, the result 
being 130 FOR, 80 against. It was therefore decided 
that the mechanics were on s t r i k e . " (mechanics' minute 
book) 
The SEAM cairpaign, educational courses, and national campaigning a l l 
contributed to the fee l i n g that a battle was inevitable. A decisive, united 
lead from a stable and respected committee, combined with a free and open 
discussion persuaded the "middle ground" that there was no alternative but 
to support Cortonwood, and make a stand against p i t closures. And the 
manner of t h i s decision conferred legitimacy on the s t r i k e i n the branch, 
imposing strong d i s c i p l i n a r y pressures on the dissident minority. 
e . l . i i i ALL OUT 
Although the two branches reached contradictory decisions, there was l i t t l e 
doubt that the mechanics' s t r i k e would be respected by the miners. On 
Monday March 12th, the mechanics mounted a picket on the c o l l i e r y gates, 
and the miners were e f f e c t i v e l y on s t r i k e from that day forth. Very few 
even turned up for work, and no-one t r i e d to go through the l i n e . Having 
secured t h e i r own p i t , mechanic a c t i v i s t s headed out to join appeals for 
s o l i d a r i t y at units s t i l l working. They were joined by eager young miners -
organised by Frank Duffy and Alan Young - keen to be involved despite th e i r 
branch's reluctance to join the s t r i k e . 
At the end of the f i r s t week, the miners' branch met again. They were now 
faced with a f a i t acconpli. John Dixon argued again for st r i k e action, but 
he argued now on pragmatic grounds - since the mechanics were on st r i k e 
there was no p o s s i b i l i t y of the miners working. The minute book reported 
t e r s e l y on the decision of that March 18th special meeting: 
"Out of the delegates report the following was agreed: 
That we take s t r i k e action pending a national ballot." 
(miners' minute book) 
There was only one dissenter. 
In e f f e c t - as many mechanics and miners told me - the miners were "shamed 
out" by the mechanics. I t was an unprecedented turn of events. Throughout 
the county i t was the miners who led the s t r i k e , as the mechanics voted by 
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4 a large majority to r e j e c t the s t r i k e . This was despite significant 
p o l i t i c a l s h i f t s within the mechanics i n the years running up to the 
s t r i k e . For exait^ile, i n 1983 B i l l y Etherington - the most l e f t wing 
candidate - defeated John Cimtmings (among others) for the post of general 
secretary of the Durham mechanics (chapters four and fiv e above). Electing 
a l e f t wing agent ref l e c t e d clear d i s i l l u s i o n with the p o l i t i c s of 
conpromise and acquiescence, but i t did not signal a decisive break with 
the mechanics' traditions of moderation and passivity. 
By contrast, the miners' branches a l l voted (eventually) to join the st r i k e 
"pending a national b a l l o t " . Loyalty was probably the decisive factor, but 
the vote also reflected the r e l a t i v e l y greater militancy of the miners 
conpared to the mechanics. At Murton the tables were turned, and the 
mechanics showed themselves to be more militant and l e f t wing than the 
miners. I n a sense i t was the culmination of developments i n the pre-strike 
years (see chapter f i v e ) . In 1984, despite residuals of d i v i s i v e craft 
t r a d i t i o n s , the mechanics were better organised by a strong leadership, 
which was well prepared for the coming c o n f l i c t (although right wing 
elements were by no means absent) . I n contrast the miners - despite 
advances by the l e f t , and a powerful militant element of young miners -
lacked united leadership, and had not can5>aigned e f f e c t i v e l y on the issue 
of p i t closures. The miners t r a d i t i o n a l right wing leadership was being 
eroded, but the l e f t had yet to supply a clear, dominant alternative. In 
short, the miners' branch was s p l i t . 
6.1.iv THE BALLOT THAT NEVER WAS^  
Divisions i n Murton were of course merely an echo of divisions throughout 
the NUM over the question of p i t closures, and how to fight them. Chapter 
four showed how the sequence of events i n the early 1980's - culminating i n 
the t h i r d b a l l o t rejection of s t r i k e action i n March 1983 - began to 
*0n March 12th the other Durham mechanics' branches voted to 
r e j e c t the s t r i k e c a l l . Only Murton, Easington and Eppleton voted i n favour 
of action. 
^The wider issues behind the s t a r t of the s t r i k e at national 
l e v e l - and the development of the no-ballot t a c t i c - are discussed i n 
d e t a i l i n appendix s i x . 
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persuade many a c t i v i s t s throughout the country t h a t a b a l l o t was 
i n a p p r o p r i a t e over the quest i o n of p i t c l o s u r e s (see a l s o Adeney and Lloyd, 
1986; 82-3). 
" I n March only 15% of COSA and 19% of Nottingham 
members voted 'Yes'. I n L e i c e s t e r the percentage was 
18%; i n South Derbyshire 12%. Notts and the Midlands, 
so many people argued, would never support threatened 
miners i n South Wales, Scot l a n d and the North E a s t . The 
March b a l l o t vote was seen to condemn them almost out 
of hand - 'only 20% of the f u c k e r s would vote to help 
save the job of another man - t h a t ' s f u c k i n g 
d i s g r a c e f u l t h a t . I t i s mind. I t ' s d i s g r a c e f u l ' . " 
(Beynon, 1985a; 11) 
When Cortonwood began the s t r i k e i n 1984, young m i l i t a n t s q u i c k l y emerged 
as i t s d r i v i n g f o r c e . And one t h i n g they were a b s o l u t e l y c e r t a i n of - the r e 
was no way t h a t miners i n s a f e jobs elsewhere i n the country were going to 
" c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e " them out of a c t i o n . As they saw i t , they were on s t r i k e 
f o r a b a s i c t r a d e union p r i n c i p l e , and support from other areas was t h e i r 
r i g h t . 
With rank and f i l e a c t i v i s t s t a k i n g the l e a d , the emergence on the r i g h t of 
c a l l s f o r a n a t i o n a l b a l l o t were seen by the a c t i v i s t s as t r e a c h e r y . 
"The b a l l o t i s s u e i n the minds of the m i l i t a n t s , had 
become a symbol of b e t r a y a l f o r those i n favour, and 
v i r i l i t y among those who opposed. As Ken Capstick, the 
Labour v o t i n g NUM delegate from S t i l l i n g f l e e t , i n the 
Selby complex, l a t e r summed i t up: 'The t r o u b l e was the 
n a t i o n a l b a l l o t had been made i n t o an i s s u e i n i t s e l f . 
I t was l i k e g i v i n g i n . You've got to remember t h a t we 
had l a d s , masses of them, who were p i c k e t i n g every day, 
t o t a l commitment, never seen such commitment from 
people... They looked a t i t t h a t Margaret Thatcher 
wanted a b a l l o t , I a n MacGregor wanted a b a l l o t , the 
media wanted a b a l l o t , and they weren't going to have 
one.'" (Wilsher e t a l . , 1985, 79) 
Many Murton a c t i v i s t s f e l t the same. Defeating the b a l l o t c a l l became the 
f i r s t b i g b a t t l e of the s t r i k e . Coach loads of Murton miners and mechanics 
headed down the A l t o lobby the meetings d i s c u s s i n g the b a l l o t i s s u e . These 
mass l o b b i e s were a key e x p r e s s i o n of the way i n which rank and f i l e 
a c t i v i s t s had taken c o n t r o l of the s t r i k e . Dave Ten?>le (the l e a d i n g l e f t 
winger on the mechanics' committee) an a l y s e d the s i t u a t i o n i n t h i s way. 
"What you've got to c o n s i d e r i s t h a t a t the time the 
miners' s t r i k e began, i t s t a r t e d o f f as a spontaneous 
movement. I t wasn't l e d from the top... That 
spontaneous movement i n f l u e n c e d the l e a d e r s h i p . The 
demand f o r no b a l l o t came from the bottom and i t was 
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based on the f a c t t h a t they hadn't won a b a l l o t on the 
q u e s t i o n of p i t c l o s u r e s on t h r e e o c c a s i o n s . And they 
didn't want to be f o r c e d not to take a c t i o n themselves 
because of the i n a b i l i t y or u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o f i g h t of 
other s e c t i o n s . " ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
Photos taken as S c a r g i l l announced from a balcony a t the NUM's S h e f f i e l d HQ 
t h a t t h e r e was t o be no b a l l o t show a tumultuous sea of e c s t a t i c f a c e s , 
arms u p r a i s e d i n triuirphant a c c l a i m . A d e f i a n t chorus of: 
"Shove the b a l l o t . 
Shove the b a l l o t , 
Shove the b a l l o t up your hole , " 
rang out to the assembled media. 
The evidence suggests t h a t f o r most a c t i v i s t s the d e t a i l s of the arguments 
were unintportant - the important t h i n g was the need to stand and f i g h t the 
government. Men i n s a f e jobs were not going to "vote them out of a job". 
With one s e c t i o n of the workforce t a k i n g a c t i o n i n defence of union p o l i c y , 
i t was the duty of a reas l i k e Durham to j o i n the f i g h t . As one Murton 
mechanic commented about the g e n e r a l s t r a t e g y a t the time: 
"You know, l e t ' s f a c e i t , we t o l d l i e s . We t o l d them: 
Righto, we'd agree w i t h wanting a n a t i o n a l b a l l o t , when 
the time's r i g h t . But we want you out on s t r i k e before 
we have t h a t b a l l o t . " ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
But as a miners' a c t i v i s t s a i d , the q u a l i f i c a t i o n about the b a l l o t "was p i e 
i n the sky. Everyone knew t h e r e was going to be no b a l l o t . " (interview) 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e r e i s no doubt t h a t the v a s t m a j o r i t y of miners and 
mechanics i n Murton and i n Durham wanted a b a l l o t . An Area Conference 
passed the f o l l o w i n g r e s o l u t i o n on March 21st (subsequently confirmed by 
County Lodge Vote coi q i l e t e d on A p r i l 6th by 96-0): 
"The d e c i s i o n of the Area C o a l f i e l d Conference h e l d on 
Wednesday 21st March, unanimously decided to request an 
emergency meeting of the NEC f o r t h w i t h and an 
i n d i v i d u a l b a l l o t vote by iit^jlementation of NUM r u l e 43 
without d e l a y . " 
H i s t o r i c a l l y , a long t r a d i t i o n of b a l l o t i n g had developed i n the NUM, and 
t h e r e f o r e i t was i n e v i t a b l e t h a t whatever the p h i l o s o p h i c a l arguments, the 
m a j o r i t y of the rank and f i l e would demand a b a l l o t . Even among some miners 
who p i c k e t e d - almost e x c l u s i v e l y the o l d e r ones - t h e r e were strong doubts 
about the l a c k of a b a l l o t . One man s a i d : 
"Well, everyone should have a vote, shouldn't they?.. 
L i k e I say, I didn't get a vote, but I would have voted 
f o r a c t i o n , to f i g h t f o r jobs. But when I never got a 
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vote, i t ' s l i k e getting your arm cut off and having 
nothing to say about i t ! I t was just stupid." 
(interview) 
In t h i s sense, i t was argued that regardless of what might be seen as 
desirable i n terms of having a union membership which could be called out 
on s t r i k e by the leadership, the traditions of the NUM did not favour t h i s 
l e v e l of executive power. As another man saw i t , the tradition of balloting 
meant the c a l l for a ba l l o t "was a legitimate demand from the rank and 
f i l e " . 
These con5>eting attitudes to the ba l l o t were indicative of fundamental 
divisions within the workforce. However, the absence of a ballot did not i n 
i t s e l f determine any p a r t i c u l a r course of the s t r i k e . Many people who would 
have preferred a b a l l o t were highly active during the s t r i k e . (Indeed, one 
of the three men who resigned from the Murton miners' committee over the 
decision to recommend a s t r i k e went on to picket throughout the dispute.) 
Rather the lack of a ba l l o t should be seen as providing the state with a 
powerful lever against the union, enhancing the p o s s i b i l i t i e s for driving 
wedges between different groups of s t r i k e r s (see section 6 . 3 . i i ) . 
For a n a l y t i c a l purposes, the workforce at Murton can be s p l i t into three 
groups. F i r s t , there were the pro-strike a c t i v i s t s (usually referred to 
sLraply as " a c t i v i s t s " ) . Most (although not a l l ) were against a ballot. They 
were the core supporters of the s t r i k e , and were involved i n i t s 
prosecution either through picketing or support a c t i v i t i e s . Secondly, there 
was a very small minority of a n t i - s t r i k e diehards; people who were 
implacably h o s t i l e to the s t r i k e from the beginning. But most s t r i k e r s 
f i t t e d into a middle category - more or l e s s syn5>athetic to the aims of the 
s t r i k e , unhappy about the way i t had been called, and hoping that a 
covapromLae would be reached that could get them back to work with honour. 
Things were not as s t a t i c as t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n suggests - for exanple, 
some people s h i f t e d between groups. Nevertheless, i t provides a useful 
framework for analysing p o l i t i c a l developments within the Murton workforce, 
given the enormous variety of effects that the s t r i k e had on different 
people. However, a f u l l assessment of these effects depends on carrying the 
analysis through into the post s t r i k e period - a task carried out i n 
chapter seven. In the meantime, each of the major groups of workers 
involved i n the s t r i k e i s analysed i n turn. 
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6.2 ACTIVISTS 
From the moment of the Yorkshire walkout, i t was clear that i n many cr u c i a l 
respects i t was a c t i v i s t s i n the p i t s who were leading the st r i k e ^ . 
Equally, i t was c l e a r that even i n coa l f i e l d s where support for the str i k e 
was never i n dovibt, these a c t i v i s t s constituted only a minority of the 
workforce. I n Durham and Murton nty research indicates that no more than 10% 
were regular pickets - the same percentage as Winterton and Winterton found 
i n Yorkshire (1989). Yet despite t h e i r minority status, they led the 
s t r i k e , setting a pace which union leaders were forced to follow i n order 
to put themselves back at the head of the movement. 
In terms of the central questions t h i s t hesis addresses, the st r i k e created 
massive p o l i t i c a l upheavals i n the p o l i t i c s of the union branches, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the miners' lodge. This section therefore examines the 
Murton a c t i v i s t s . Who were they? What effect did the s t r i k e have on them? 
How did they r e l a t e to the non-active majority? What effect did they have 
on branch p o l i t i c s ? Before answering these questions, the seperation of the 
a c t i v i s t s into two groups (with inevitable overlapping membership) must be 
acknowledged. 
Pickets formed the s t r i k e ' s powerhouse - i t s driving energy. But within the 
picketing group there was an iir5)ortant difference between the majority of 
yoiinger miners - who tore into picketing with uninhibited enthusiasm - and 
a smaller group of older pickets, who were more cautious and trad i t i o n a l i n 
t h e i r approach. The divisions between them hinted at inportant ideological 
differences, related p r i n c i p a l l y to the d i f f e r i n g experiences of the PWS 
encountered i n chapter f i v e . Secondly, there were a c t i v i s t s who chose not 
to picket (or who did l e s s picketing), but who became involved i n support 
a c t i v i t i e s of various kinds. Often they were spread around various outlying 
communities, and therefore e x i s t as a group only conceptually. But both 
pickets and support workers had s p e c i f i c p o l i t i c a l effects, which are 
examined below. 
^Following Winterton and Winterton (1989), definition of 
activism i s based on actions rather than office holding or attendance at 
branch meetings (see also Fosh, 1981). This definition i s necessary because 
not a l l branch o f f i c i a l s were active i n prosecuting the s t r i k e . 
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6.2.i WHO WERE THE PICKETS? 
A c t i v i s t s can broadly be s p l i t into two categories. F i r s t , there were the 
pickets, and secondly those engaged i n support group a c t i v i t i e s , with an 
overlap between the two. According to the miners' lodge treasurer, who 
f i l l e d i n the dai l y picketing returns reclaiming expenses from Redhill^, 
the miners' lodge mobilised about 200 pickets, out of a t o t a l membership of 
around 1200, but only 100-150 of these were regular pickets. (Towards the 
end of the s t r i k e many older miners picketed Murton purely for the money). 
For the mechanics, with a membership of l e s s than 300, the t o t a l number to 
have picketed was around 80, with half that number classed as regular 
pickets. I n other words, both Murton branches achieved f a i r l y t y p i c a l 
l e v e l s of mobilisation conpared to Durham and other coa l f i e l d s . 
The overwhelming majority of pickets from both branches were younger men -
mostly under under 30. However, as Winterton and Winterton found i n t h e i r 
study of s t r i k e activism i n Yorkshire (1989), the people who organised the 
s t r i k e - the picket "generals", branch secretaries, etc - were much l e s s 
easy to c l a s s i f y . Many were i n t h e i r 40's and 50's. The same was true i n 
Durham. In Murton, the mechanics' branch organisation was dominated by 
experienced p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i s t s - John Cummings, Alan Napier, Dave Tensile, 
Mickey Rooney, Geordie Maitland. Many were i n t h e i r l a t e 30's. By contrast 
however, the miners' picket organisation was run by young men - dominated 
by Frank Duffy and Alan Young. This reflected the lack of enthusiasm for 
the s t r i k e among the miners' lodge committee. Without the passionate 
involvement of these committed young men, i t i s very doubtful that the 
Murton miners' branch would have sustained such a high l e v e l of commitment 
to the s t r i k e . Youthful picket organisation i n the miners' lodge also 
r e f l e c t e d the explosion of militancy among young miners, almost a l l of whom 
had never been involved i n the union before. 
Given that i n 1984 only 39% of the workforce came from Murton (see chapter 
f i v e ) , i t seems that Murton residents were proportionately more involved i n 
the picketing than t r a v e l l e r s . There were obvious p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s 
^Redhill i s the headquaters of the Durham Miners. As far as I am 
aware, these l i s t s were destroyed for fear that they could be used as 
evidence i n court proceedings against pickets. 
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for t r a v e l l e r s i n joining the Murton pickets, given the distance from the i r 
homes to the picketing centre i n Murton. Assessing the residential 
coir^josition of picketing forces i s however coit?>licated by the frequency 
with which pickets i n distant communities operated separately from the 
Murton branches, organising themselves within group linked to other 
branches (for exanple Easington). 
I t i s important to r e a l i s e that from the outset the pickets did not 
constitute a homogenous group with a coherent ideology and a united 
purpose. A basic d i v i s i o n existed between those (mainly older) men who 
regarded picketing as a duty (the minority), and those (mainly, although 
not exclusively younger) men who flung themselves into picketing as the 
main object of the s t r i k e (the majority) . Hartley et a l . (1983) noted 
s i m i l a r divisions within pickets i n South Yorkshire during the 1980 s t e e l 
s t r i k e . These differences had iitportant iitplications for the conduct of the 
s t r i k e i n Murton. They derived from the d i f f e r i n g environments into which 
miners of different ages had been so c i a l i s e d . 
6.2.ii PICKETS YOUNG AND OLD 
One of the key developments apparent i n the early days of the st r i k e was 
the involvement and commitment of young miners and mechanics i n the s t r i k e . 
They flung themselves into the fray with astonishing energy and enthusiasm. 
Many had never been to a union meeting before the s t r i k e , and they found i t 
d i f f i c u l t to a r t i c u l a t e what propelled them into such wholehearted 
commitment to the s t r i k e . 
One young miner - "Mick" - t r i e d to explain how he found himself down on 
the picket l i n e the day a f t e r the s p l i t vote i n Murton. Unti l then, he had 
taken no i n t e r e s t i n union a f f a i r s . He couldn't give a clear answer. 
"Just quite a few of me mates, we decided to go out. I t 
was a laugh l i k e at f i r s t . Get a f i r e going. Lads was 
bringing rabbits and that. Just having a drink on the 
picket l i n e . Nobody was going i n . And then we started 
getting t r i p s away." (interview) 
Most had not been involved p o l i t i c a l l y before. And to begin with, even 
though they were on the picket l i n e s , they could not c l e a r l y articulate 
what the s t r i k e was about. To Mick, 
" i t was j u s t saving the p i t s . That was a l l . I knew t h i s 
[pit] could be on the knock anytime." (interview) 
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Mick, and the other young p i c k e t s , i d e n t i f i e d con?>letely with Arthur 
S c a r g i l l , who symbolised t h e i r m i l i t a n t stand a g a i n s t the government. 
Many of the young miners formed a s e l f conscious e l i t e of f l y i n g p i c k e t s . 
They went everywhere, p i c k e t i n g p i t s i n Durham f i r s t , and moving on a f t e r 
e a r l y s u c c e s s e s to the opencast s i t e s throughout the county. Then they 
began t o t a r g e t c o a l f i e l d s w i t h p i t s t h a t had never j o i n e d the s t r i k e , 
heading over t o L a n c a s h i r e , and down to S t a f f o r d s h i r e . They were organised 
by Frank Duffy, who, although holding no o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n on the miners' 
branch committee, a c t e d as the u n o f f i c i a l l e a d e r and spokesman f o r the 
p i c k e t s . Through the BL he i n t e g r a t e d the Murton p i c k e t s i n t o the Area 
p i c k e t i n g o r g a n i s a t i o n . 
But other, mainly o l d e r , p i c k e t s q u i c k l y s e t t l e d down i n t o a p i c k e t i n g 
r o u t i n e , s t a b i l i s i n g i n t o cohesive groups, and p i c k e t i n g the same t a r g e t 
week a f t e r week u s i n g a r e g u l a r s h i f t system. S i m i l a r s t a b i l i s a t i o n was 
r e p o r t e d by H a r t l e y e t a l . (1983) w i t h regard to the 1980 s t e e l s t r i k e (see 
a l s o chapter t h r e e ) , and was a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r ideology of 
p i c k e t i n g . H a r t l e y e t a l . found t h a t most p i c k e t s saw p i c k e t i n g i n terms of 
a duty t o the union. T h i s i n t u r n r e f l e c t e d v a r y i n g "boundaries of 
l e g i t i m a c y " , d e f i n e d i n terms of a t t i t u d e s to v i o l e n c e and l e g a l i t y . They 
wanted t o remain l e g a l and non v i o l e n t . However, t h e r e were a s i g n i f i c a n t 
number who were l e s s w o r r i e d about th e s e boundaries, and were prepared to 
engage i n more a g g r e s s i v e p i c k e t i n g , regarding the i s s u e s of l e g a l i t y and 
v i o l e n c e i n i n s t r u m e n t a l terms - i n other words, t r a n s g r e s s i n g these 
boundaries depended on the e f f e c t s of doing so. And " f i n a l l y , t h e r e e x i s t e d 
among a s m a l l s e c t i o n of s t r i k e r s a d i s t i n c t r e a d i n e s s to use f o r c e . " 
( i b i d . 66) 
Such d i v i s i o n s were a l s o c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of Murton p i c k e t s . Within the 
Murton miners' branch t h e r e were o f t e n sharp d i v i s i o n s between the older 
miners from s t a b l e p i c k e t groups, and the young, ag g r e s s i v e f l y i n g p i c k e t s . 
These d i v i s i o n s remained throughout the dispute, and followed s i m i l a r 
boundaries to those found by H a r t l e y e t a l . P i c k e t meetings - e s p e c i a l l y i n 
the miners' lodge - sometimes wit n e s s e d angry exchanges between the 
(dominant) young p i c k e t s , and the o l d e r men. A t t e n t i o n o f t e n focused on the 
"boundary of l e g i t i m a c y " , w i t h o l d e r men r e s i s t i n g the " v i o l e n c e " of the 
younger p i c k e t s . Understanding th e s e d i v i s i o n s compels examination of the 
e x p e r i e n c e s which gave r i s e to them. 
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a) P i c k e t i n g d i v i s i o n s 1: Older p i c k e t s 
Older p i c k e t s - and many other o l d e r miners - r e a c t e d to the s t r i k e very 
d i f f e r e n t l y t o t h e young p i c k e t s . T h e i r c l a s s consciousness was already 
shaped and moulded by t h e i r experiences before 1984. T h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s 
were rooted i n t h e i r experience of the Post War Settlement, and i t s f i n a l 
c o r p o r a t i s t m a n i f e s t a t i o n during the 1970's - the "Derek and Joe show". 
H i s t o r i c a l l y , miners - perhaps more than any group of workers - came to 
b e l i e v e t h a t i t was through the s t a t e t h a t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s could be 
advanced (Beynon, 1985b) . Hence t h e i r coit?>lacency a f t e r the s i g n i n g of 
"Plan For C o a l " (see chapter f o u r ) . Rather than s e e i n g the s t r i k e as a 
fundamental c l a s h between competing (and u l t i m a t e l y i r r e c o n c i l a b l e ) f o r c e s , 
many miners were s o c i a l i s e d i n t o a p e r s p e c t i v e which saw the s t r i k e as a 
l e g i t i m a t e attempt t o wrest c e r t a i n l i m i t e d d e f e n s i v e concessions from the 
government. 
Hence the o l d e r miners c o u l d be d e s c r i b e d as " t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s " , i n the 
manner of Gouldner's a n a l y s i s (1955; see a l s o chapter t h r e e ) . They sought a 
r e s t o r a t i o n of the s t a t u s quo, a r e t u r n to the o l d " c o r p o r a t i s t consensus". 
They supported the broad aims of the s t r i k e p r e c i s e l y because they were 
couched i n t h e s e o s t e n s i b l y l i m i t e d terms. They were able to support i t 
because they c o u l d not understand the f e r o c i t y of the s t a t e s ' response. 
Samuel's term " r a d i c a l conservatism" captures t h i s t e n s i o n w e l l (1986, 
22-29). I t was a defence of what had been b u i l t up, and t h e r e f o r e a gesture 
of l o y a l t y to p a s t generations who had s t r u g g l e d to b u i l d a b e t t e r future, 
not a c h a l l e n g e to the power of the s t a t e . T h i s was p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e of 
the s m a l l group of o l d e r p i c k e t s a t Murton, who were mainly ex-branch 
o f f i c i a l s , and t h e i r f r i e n d s . They had a deep l o y a l t y to the NUM, and a 
s t r o n g commitment to the defence of c o n d i t i o n s which had been won i n the 
p a s t . 
However, as chapter four showed, even the l i m i t e d defensive demands of the 
s t r i k e posed a fundamental c h a l l e n g e t o the s t a t e . Although many o l d e r 
s t r i k e r s t h e r e f o r e supported the s t r i k e , they were d i s t u r b e d to the extent 
t h a t i t seemed t o i n v o l v e a more f a r - r e a c h i n g " p o l i t i c a l " challenge. The 
s t a t e p l a y e d h e a v i l y on t h i s u n c e r t a i n t y , p r e s e n t i n g the s t r i k e as an 
a t t a c k on "democratic" government. Media coverage enphasised t h i s aspect, 
c o n c e n t r a t i n g on v i o l e n c e and the l a c k of a b a l l o t , to t r y and d e l i g i t i m i s e 
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the s t r i k e by h i g h l i g h t i n g i t s consensus-breaking a s p e c t s . P i c k e t l i n e 
v i o l e n c e became a key i s s u e f o r many of the o l d e r miners. 
I n the mechanics' branch, t h e s e p i c k e t i n g d i v i s i o n s d i d not e x i s t . Because 
t h e i r committee was u n i t e d behind the s t r i k e , and because of the general 
s h i f t t o the l e f t of young and o l d committee members before the s t r i k e , the 
s m a l l e r mechanics' branch d i d not d i v i d e along age l i n e s . Indeed, the 
p i c k e t s were l e d by the experienced p o l i t i c a l f i g u r e s i n the lodge - f o r 
exanple, Dave Teitple, Geordie Maitland, Tomn:^  P a r r y and Mickey Rooney 
(mostly i n t h e i r middle or l a t e r 3 0 ' s ) . T h e i r committee was wholeheartedly 
committed to the s t r i k e , so young p i c k e t s (of whom t h e r e were much fewer 
than i n t h e miners' lodge) were i n t e g r a t e d e a s i l y w i t h the experienced 
p o l i t i c a l f i g u r e s i n the branch, who formed the core of the mechanics' 
p i c k e t i n g f o r c e . At are a l e v e l , the mechanics' l e a d e r s h i p ( B i l l y 
E t h erington) a l s o supported the s t r i k e , so the Murton mechanics had a 
st r o n g o f f i c i a l base f o r t h e i r p i c k e t i n g operation. 
However, the miners' lodge remained deeply d i v i d e d over the s t r i k e f o r i t s 
e n t i r e d u r a t i o n . Frank Duffy - the u n o f f i c i a l l e a d e r of the p i c k e t s - was 
only a committee member during the dispute, and the committee s t i l l 
i n c l u d e d men whose commitment to the s t r i k e was d i s t i n c t l y t e p i d . The 
r e s i g n a t i o n of t h r e e committee members at the s t a r t of the s t r i k e 
e f f e c t i v e l y handed a p r e c a r i o u s m a j o r i t y to the l e f t on the committee. But 
d i v i s i o n s on the committee were r e f l e c t e d i n lodge meetings, which were 
o f t e n s t o m ^ . V e r b a l c o n f r o n t a t i o n s between o l d e r miners who were h o s t i l e 
t o the s t r i k e and the young p i c k e t s were a f e a t u r e of most branch meetings. 
b) P i c k e t i n g d i v i s i o n s 2: The young p i c k e t s 
For young p i c k e t s , the government's a s s a u l t on the s t r i k e ' s l e g i t i m a c y was 
i r r e l e v a n t . Because they t r a v e l l e d t o the biggest t r o u b l e spots, avoiding 
s t a b l e p i c k e t s i t u a t i o n s , they w i t n e s s e d and engaged i n the most f i e r c e 
c l a s h e s w i t h the p o l i c e . I n these s i t u a t i o n s , a very strong sense of 
outrage q u i c k l y developed. For them i t was the s t a t e , not the miners, who 
were e n g i n e e r i n g d e c i s i v e breaks w i t h consensus p o l i t i c s . For them, the 
i s s u e was not the b a l l o t , or a l l e g e d p i c k e t l i n e v i o l e n c e , but the a c t i o n s 
of the p o l i c e . T h e i r a s s a u l t s , b l a t a n t f a b r i c a t i o n of charges and evidence, 
provocation and a t t e n p t s to hxamiliate miners ( f o r exaitple t a u n t i n g them by 
waving t e n pound notes a t p i c k e t s ) broke down consensus notions of 
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p o l i c i n g , and s t i m u l a t e d r e t a l i a t o r y v i o l e n c e (see C o u l t e r e t a l . . 1984; 
M i l l e r e t a l . [ e d s ] , 1985 f o r d e t a i l s of p o l i c e t a c t i c s ) . Whether i t was at 
the p r i v a t e opencast s i t e a t Tow Law, i n S h e f f i e l d a t the Trades and Labour 
Club, or Orgreave on June 18th, Murton p i c k e t s f e l t they were attacked 
without provocation (see appendix seven f o r d e t a i l e d accounts of these 
i n c i d e n t s ) . I n e v i t a b l y , they responded with v i o l e n c e of t h e i r own. They saw 
i t as c l a s s war. 
Even f o r the young p i c k e t s though, the aim of the s t r i k e was p r i n c i p a l l y 
d e f e n s i v e ; p r e s e r v a t i o n o f jobs, p r o t e c t i o n of communities, and so on. But 
u n l i k e the o l d e r men, they f e l t - from t h e i r experiences on the p i c k e t l i n e 
as much as anything - t h a t the time f o r pushing t h e i r i n t e r e s t s through the 
s t a t e apparatus was gone. They f e l t t h a t to "win" they had to d e c i s i v e l y 
beat the government, and the f o r c e s of the s t a t e which the government was 
deploying a g a i n s t them. T h e i r aims were defensive, but they understood t h a t 
i n the p o l i t i c a l context of Thatcherism, such " l i m i t e d " demands were 
extremely r a d i c a l . 
D e s p i t e d e f e a t s , a r r e s t s and v i c t i m i s a t i o n , a c t i v e p i c k e t s experienced the 
s t r i k e as a phenomenal l i b e r a t i o n . Now they were p a r t i c i p a n t s i n h i s t o r y , 
not i t s p a s s i v e o b j e c t s . I n the cald r o n of new experiences t h a t the s t r i k e 
generated, t h e i r consciousness was moulded and remolded. I n t h i s process, 
miners and mechanics d i f f e r e d l i t t l e , s i n c e t h e r e was considerable 
i n t e r a c t i o n and cooperation between t h e i r p i c k e t i n g operations. Experiences 
were d i s c u s s e d r e p e a t e d l y , shaping a c o l l e c t i v e memory of events. Within 
t h i s p r o c e s s , some i n d i v i d u a l s played a g r e a t e r r o l e than others. 
P o l i t i c a l l y educated a c t i v i s t s provided l e a d e r s h i p , u s i n g t h e i r experience 
and knowledge to i n t e r p r e t events. 
Dave Teitple, from the mechanics' branch, brought the p e r s p e c t i v e of 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y "Trotskyism" to bear, and won s i g n i f i c a n t support and respect 
among the p i c k e t s . He was able to r e c r u i t some new members to the Workers 
Re v o l u t i o n a r y P a r t y . But the subsecjuent s p l i n t e r i n g of the WRP towards the 
end of the s t r i k e d i s s i p a t e d t h i s impact c o n s i d e r a b l y . The miners' BL a l s o 
®See Armstrong and N i c h o l s (1976) and S c a r g i l l (1975) f o r 
comparable o b s e r v a t i o n s about the 1972 S a l t l e y p i c k e t . 
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a c t e d as a key e d u c a t i o n a l forum, and w i t h i n i t Frank Duffy was 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i i t p o r t a n t f o r Murton miners. At a n a t i o n a l s c a l e , Arthur 
S c a r g i l l p e r s o n i f i e d the p i c k e t s m i l i t a n t l e f t wing challenge to the s t a t e , 
and he was r e v e r e d w i t h u n c r i t i c a l admiration by the young a c t i v i s t s . 
Both miners' and mechanics' l e a d e r s t r i e d t o maintain d i s c i p l i n e among 
t h e i r p i c k e t s . A s t r o n g group p r i d e and camaraderie b u i l t up among the 
young f l y i n g p i c k e t s , welding them together i n t o a cohesive group, 
r e s i s t a n t to o u t s i d e c r i t i c i s m . I n the miners' lodge t h e i r l e a d e r was Frank 
Duffy. 
" F r a n k i e wouldn't l e t us j u s t get i n amongst i t . He'd 
say: 'Right, a l l together. We're going s t r a i g h t down 
the f r o n t . Murton l a d s i n the f r o n t . ' I t was always 
l i k e t h a t . . . We always had to be at the f r o n t . F r a n k i e 
make us. Well, he didn't make us, but he encouraged us. 
He always l i f t e d people." ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
As a member of the Broad L e f t (which e f f e c t i v e l y ran the s t r i k e i n 
Durham ) , Frank's l e a d e r s h i p of the Murton p i c k e t s was c r u c i a l , because i t 
i n t e g r a t e d them i n t o the e f f e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p of the s t r i k e . He b e l i e v e d i n 
the need f o r d i s c i p l i n e , and h i s l e a d e r s h i p undoubtedly helped c o n t r o l and 
d i r e c t the a g g r e s s i o n of the p i c k e t s . Also, h i s f o r c e f u l , dynamic 
p e r s o n a l i t y c o n t i n u a l l y r a i s e d t h e i r enthusiasm. He r e c e i v e d strong support 
from other miners, whose p o l i t i c a l consciousness and commitment developed 
r a p i d l y during the s t r i k e . 
c) P i c k e t i n g d i v i s i o n s 3: the Murton r i o t 
One i n c i d e n t which summed up the d i v i s i o n s between o l d and young p i c k e t s 
o c c u r r e d towards the end of August 1984, when the NCB were making strenuous 
e f f o r t s to break the s t r i k e i n p r e v i o u s l y s o l i d areas l i k e Durham. A f i e r c e 
b a t t l e developed a t Easington, where Paul Wilkinson had i n d i c a t e d h i s 
d e s i r e to break the s t r i k e (Beynon, 1984b). A f t e r s e v e r a l days i n which 
mass p i c k e t s prevented h i s r e t u r n by sheer f o r c e of numbers, the p o l i c e 
9 
By 1984 the Broad L e f t had won c o n t r o l of the DMA executive, and 
t h e two agents - Tom C a l l a n and Harold M i t c h e l l - were e f f e c t i v e l y i t s 
p r i s o n e r s . The s t r i k e was t h e r e f o r e run by the BL, which was so c e n t r a l to 
the conduct of the s t r i k e i n Durham t h a t mechanics' a c t i v i s t s began to 
a t t e n d i n i n c r e a s i n g numbers. Towards the end of the s t r i k e , the mechanics 
s e t up t h e i r own l e f t o r g a n i s a t i o n . 
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f i n a l l y sneaked him into work v i a a back entrance, breaking a guarantee 
given by the manager that anyone who went back would go through the front 
gates (Beynon, 1985a). 
" I t was a d i r t y t r i c k taking him through the back 
entrance. 'Cos they would never have got him through 
the front entrance at the time. Everybody's blood was 
boiling that night." (interview) 
That day the pickets i n Easington rioted i n frustration and fury at the 
police occupation. Disturbances continued through the night i n many other 
p i t v i l l a g e s , with Murton seeing some of the worst troiibles. 
I t began i n good humour, with a l o t of laughing. As some people came out of 
the pub that night, they started s i t t i n g i n the road. More people joined 
the ones s i t t i n g . Then the police arrived, "trying to be clever", and i t 
erupted into violence. About a hundred people became involved i n a pitched 
bat t l e with the police. A l l the anger and coiled up tension of the day was 
unleashed. The police were chased out of the v i l l a g e down to Cold Hesledon. 
Reinforcements arrived, but the pickets charged again. People pulled cars 
out, turned them over and set them alight, making barricades. A pub was 
burnt down. F i n a l l y more police arrived, "and i t was just a mad scanner" to 
get away. 
Next day a young picket - "Mick" - was arrested, with several others. There 
was trouble i n the next miners' picket meeting. Rop Naylor - the branch 
chairman - argued that the r i o t had been a disgrace, and that thca keys to 
the c e l l s of the arrested men should be thrown away. He was applauded by 
some men for that. There were strenuous arguments on the committee about 
whether or not to use the union's s o l i c i t o r s to defend the inprisoned men, 
with Rop Naylor suggesting he'd resign i f the lodge l i f t e d a finger to help 
them. Frank Duffy arranged with B i l l y Etherington (General Secretary of the 
Durham Mechanics) to use the mechanics' s o l i c i t o r s . However, Rop t r i e d to 
undermine t h i s action, only to be faced with a committee vote of censure, 
moved by Frank. I t was a humiliating rebuff for the lodge chairman, whose 
authority was badly damaged. Six or eight weeks l a t e r , he resigned as 
Chairman. 
d) Picketing divisions 4: The boundaries of legitimate action 
The Murton r i o t showed how deeply many of the older pickets were opposed to 
picket l i n e violence. They picketed l o c a l l y , and avoided some of the most 
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v i o l e n t c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . They didn't b e l i e v e i n r e t r i b u t i o n , even i f there 
was v i o l e n c e conducted a g a i n s t the p i c k e t s . Mick argued t h a t 
"the uniforms f r i g h t e n e d a l o t of people. You h i t a 
copper you know f o r a f a c t you've got a h e l l of a 
chance of going down... I t h i n k t h a t ' s what f r i g h t e n e d 
a l o t of people." ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
A f t e r a few a r r e s t s on the p i c k e t l i n e , people i n v a r i a b l y began to back 
o f f . A mechanics' a c t i v i s t confirmed the point, r e f l e c t i n g on the moment i n 
August 1984 a t a Wearmouth c o l l i e r y p i c k e t when the p i c k e t s broke through 
the p o l i c e l i n e s . 
"Arthur says i t wasn't a f a i l u r e of p i c k e t i n g during 
the s t r i k e , i t was a f a i l u r e to p i c k e t . But he's wrong, 
'cos the l a d s were f r i g h t e n e d ! The power of the s t a t e 
was too g r e a t . The l a d s were too i n t i m i d a t e d . They'd 
have a go, and they'd do r e a l l y s t u p i d t h i n g s , but i n 
the main, the mast m a j o r i t y of the people who were 
p i c k e t i n g were i n t i m i d a t e d to come to c l o s e q u a r t e r s 
w i t h the p o l i c e . . . We as a group were f r i g h t e n e d of the 
p o l i c e , and i t dawned on us then, and i t s t r u e , we 
were." ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
Even f o r the young p i c k e t s t h e r e f o r e , t h e r e were d i s t i n c t l i m i t s to how f a r 
they would go. 
Only a t i n y m i n o r i t y - i n c l u d i n g Mick - l a c k e d these i n h i b i t i o n s . He and 
many of the "young 'uns" - a group of 15-20 from the same year group at 
school - wanted to h i t back. Commenting on the Orgreave p i c k e t on June 18th 
1984, he s a i d : 
"There was a l o t of coppers. There was a l o t of us! But 
the d i f f e r e n c e i s , t h e y ' r e allowed to h i t us and get 
away w i t h i t . " ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
He quoted as an exanple the policeman seen on t e l e v i s i o n beating a p i c k e t 
a t Orgreave, who wasn't even cautioned, and r e c a l l e d what happened to a 
Welsh miner he was a t Orgreave with. 
"He was whacked. I'm not kidding you, i t opened l i k e a 
f i s h , the back of h i s head. I t j u s t s p l i t wide open! He 
had t h i s union j a c k cap on, and i t was j u s t red! Blood 
was p i s s i n g out of h i s head! We got him next to the bus 
and we were t r y i n g t o bandage him. There was more than 
one, t h e r e was loads l i k e t h a t . They were j u s t c r a c k i n g 
about the s k u l l s . I s a i d we should be able to do the 
same t o them without being charged! There's no way 
they'd have got away w i t h t h a t . " ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
He invoked s e l f defence - the r i g h t t o f i g h t back ( f o r more d e t a i l s about 
Orgreave and other p i c k e t i n g experiences, see appendix seven). 
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e) P i c k e t i n g d i v i s i o n s 5: Conclusions 
Even w i t h i n the r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l p i c k e t i n g group a t Murton, there were 
t h e r e f o r e important d i v i s i o n s . Older miners, h e a v i l y i n f l u e n c e d by t h e i r 
s o c i a l i s a t i o n i n t o the PWS, p i c k e t e d because they were l o y a l to the union, 
and they wanted to defend t h e i r jobs and communities. Younger miners, 
s o c i a l i s e d i n t o a much more c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l 
environment, saw a need t o c h a l l e n g e and defeat the f o r c e s of the s t a t e to 
win t h e i r defence of jobs and communities. For them, the s t r i k e had a 
profound, p o l i t i c i s i n g e f f e c t . 
6 . 2 . i i i DISCIPLINING THE RANKS 
When the f i r s t miners began c r o s s i n g p i c k e t l i n e s i n Murton (see s e c t i o n 
6.3), they were met by a d i s b e l i e v i n g and e x p l o s i v e mass p i c k e t . From then 
on, the s t r i k e b r e akers f e l t the f u l l weight of the p i c k e t s h o s t i l i t y . 
E v e r y k i n d of p r e s s u r e was brought to bear, from informal a c t s such as 
v e r b a l g e s t u r e s , through formal d i s c i p l i n i n g by the union, and beyond to 
the shadowy world of d i r e c t p h y s i c a l i n t i m i d a t i o n ( H i l l e r , 1969, 103-113). 
However, the unprecedented r o l e of the p o l i c e i s o l a t e d returnees from 
s o c i a l p r e s s u r e s . Hence other measures were designed, to t r y and enforce 
d i s c i p l i n e . 
Both the miners' and mechanics i n Durham s e t up d i s c i p l i n a r y committees, 
f o l l o w i n g the NUM r u l e changes i n August 1984 (which provided f o r area 
d i s c i p l i n a r y committees - see Goodman, 1985). They r e f l e c t e d f r u s t r a t i o n , 
as the s t r i k e dragged on without any new o f f e n s i v e s . Anger was d i r e c t e d at 
the unions own members who - as end products of the s t a t e back to work 
s t r a t e g y - were i d e n t i f i a b l e and a c c e s s i b l e enemies. T h i s testimony - from 
a Murton man who s a t on the miners' d i s c i p l i n a r y committee - captures the 
mood of the time. 
"Well my f e e l i n g s i n r e s p e c t of the scabs was to expel 
the b a s t a r d s . . . At the time I was very b i t t e r . L i k e I 
say, a c t i v e every day of the s t r i k e , 100% i n favour of 
the s t r i k e , and I was 100% i n favour of e x p u l s i o n s . I n 
the b i t t e r c l i m a t e of the s t r i k e t h a t was the a t t i t u d e 
of a l l the a c t i v i s t s I t h i n k . " ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
I t was c l e a r too t h a t t h e miners' d i s c i p l i n a r y committee was not a model of 
i m p a r t i a l judgement. 
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"Well, I ' l l t e l l you something now. There was nowt 
decided. I f you were a scab you were e x p e l l e d . I f 
you... [came] i n f r o n t of the d i s c i p l i n a r y committee 
you were e x p e l l e d . I t was as s i n g l e as t h a t . iVnd I 
voted f o r t h a t . Obviously, i t ' s easy to look back now 
i n r e t r o s p e c t , and I'm the f i r s t to admit t h a t I done 
wrong. But a t the time you're an a c t i v i s t , you've been 
a r r e s t e d two or t h r e e times on p i c k e t l i n e s t r y i n g t o 
stop scabs e n t e r i n g , the boys you surround y o u r s e l f 
w i t h are a l l a c t i v i s t s screaming f o r t h e i r blood as 
scabs, and a t the time you cannot r e a l l y s t a r t t a l k i n g 
about being coit^iassionate or l e n i e n t w i t h them f e l l a ' s . 
That was the s i t u a t i o n . I voted every time to expel 
them. Every time." ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
Other t a c t i c s were used t o t r y and enforce d i s c i p l i n e w i t h i n the union. 
When the f i r s t men broke the s t r i k e a t Murton, l a t e i n 1984, a small 
subgroup of the p i c k e t s - about 10-15 - formed the "Murton H i t Squad", 
which a t t a c k e d scabs i n Murton. They met i n f o r m a l l y but r e g u l a r l y to plan 
t h e i r a c t i o n s . U s u a l l y these i n v o l v e d breaking windows and other a t t a c k s on 
property. A t t a c k s were a l s o coordinated with the Easington H i t Squad; i f 
E a s i n g t o n had a scab i n the Murton ar e a then they would ask Murton to do 
the job f o r them, and the Murton Squad would make r e c i p r o c a l requests. Many 
of the most m i l i t a n t p i c k e t s condemned these a t t a c k s - i n c l u d i n g the p i c k e t 
l e a d e r , Frank Duffy - but t h e r e was no doxibting t h e i r e f f e c t i v e n e s s , on one 
l e v e l a t l e a s t . As s e c t i o n 6 . 3 . i i . c shows, f e a r of t h i s s mall minority 
helped persuade many men not t o go back. 
V i o l e n c e of t h i s type r e f l e c t e d the sheer anger and f r u s t r a t i o n of the 
s t r i k e r s as hopes of v i c t o r y faded throughout the winter. The s t a t e 
s t r a t e g y meant normal p i c k e t i n g was now i n e f f e c t i v e and i l l e g a l . The 
massive propaganda onslaught a g a i n s t the s t r i k e meant t h a t sooner or l a t e r 
those who had never wanted to be on s t r i k e would att e i q j t to break i t . To 
some, i t seemed the only way l e f t to t r y and maintain the dispute was 
through t e r r o r . I t was not a t a c t i c l i k e l y to b r i n g v i c t o r y , only prolong 
d e f e a t . However, any c r i t i c i s m of t e r r o r t a c t i c s must understand t h a t they 
were provoked by a s t a t e s t r a t e g y which used the law to destroy the union's 
a b i l i t y to d i s c i p l i n e i t s membership, and rendered most at t e i i p t s to 
10 
prosecute the s t r i k e more e f f e c t i v e l y i mpossible 
10 I n the USA, where the law r e g u l a t e s s t r i k e s even more t i g h t l y 
(Footnote Continued) 
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6.2.iv SUPPORT ACTIVITIES 
As the s t r i k e progressed beyond the f i r s t few weeks, and i t became 
i n c r e a s i n g l y obvious t h a t i t would be a prolonged stoppage, so people 
t u r n e d t o the everyday problems of how to support thousands of s t r i k e r s 
w i t h almost no means of support. Government changes to s o c i a l s e c u r i t y 
b e n e f i t s d e p r i v e d s t r i k e r s of the f i r s t £16 of b e n e f i t because of an 
a r b i t r a r y and u n j u s t i f i e d assurtption t h a t they r e c e i v e d s t r i k e pay (Jones 
and Novak, 1985) . Many s i n g l e miners t h e r e f o r e had no income a t a l l , and 
a l l s t r i k e r s s u f f e r e d extreme hardship. These problems were i n t e n s i f i e d f o r 
s t r i k e r s l i v i n g i n v i l l a g e s f a r from the p i t , where t h e r e were few other 
people on s t r i k e , and s o c i a l i s o l a t i o n added to m a t e r i a l d e p r i v a t i o n . At 
l e a s t i n Murton (and other v i l l a g e s s t i l l w i th a p i t ) , hardships were 
shared, and t h e r e was a common bond of s o l i d a r i t y . 
As w e l l as the womens' support groups ( d i s c u s s e d i n appendix 5 ) , there were 
many other a c t i v i t i e s undertaken to s u s t a i n the s t r i k e r s . They ranged from 
union sponsored a c t i v i t i e s l i k e c o l l e c t i o n s , to informal support work 
between neighbours - f o r exaicple h e l p i n g with redecoration. As the s t r i k e 
progressed, the s c a l e of support a c t i v i t i e s m u l t i p l i e d , and became more 
organised. Within Murton and the other v i l l a g e s around Easington, the SEAM 
canqpaign p l a y e d a c r u c i a l r o l e , as i t was transformed from a canqpaigning 
weapon i n t o a support o r g a n i s a t i o n (Barker, 1984; see a l s o chapter f i v e ) . 
I n o u t l y i n g v i l l a g e s i t was o f t e n harder t o b u i l d and s u s t a i n support 
groups. 
a) Support groups i n Murton 
Within Murton, some people l i k e n e d the atmosphere to wartime - everyone 
p u l l i n g together, a g r e a t sense of community. T h i s view was shared by a 
prominent member of Murton's management who l i v e d i n the v i l l a g e . He 
thought i t a shame t h a t people breaking the s t r i k e broke the community 
atmosphere. L o c a l newspapers r e i n f o r c e d the image by c a r r y i n g s t o r i e s 
p o r t r a y i n g Murton as a community u n i t e d by the s t r i k e (Sunday Sun, 
(Footnote Continued) 
than B r i t a i n , s t r i k e d i s c i p l i n e i s sometimes enforced by shootings 
(Cleaver, 1975; Green, 1978. See a l s o chapter 8 f o r a broader d i s c u s s i o n of 
l e v e l s of l e g i t i m a c y i n s t r i k e s . ) 
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20-5-84) . But the r e a l i t y was more complex, f o r j u s t as the workforce was 
d i v i d e d from the f i r s t day over whether or not to s t r i k e , so the community 
was c h a r a c t e r i s e d by s i g n i f i c a n t d i v i s i o n s . 
The b i t t e r e s t opponents of the s t r i k e were those men who'd taken redundancy 
before the s t r i k e . Older miners h o s t i l e to the s t r i k e g r a v i t a t e d towards 
d i s t i n c t s o c i a l groups (concentrated f o r exan?>le i n the B r i t i s h Legion 
cltob), and sniped c o n t i n u a l l y a g a i n s t the a c t i v i s t s (see s e c t i o n 6.3). I n 
g e n e r a l , l o c a l shops - r e a l i s i n g t h e i r dependency on the miners - o f f e r e d 
s t r o n g support, g i v i n g f r e e food and so on. The only shopkeeper who 
i n i t i a l l y r e f u s e d to g i v e anything had h i s windows pushed i n . I n the e a r l y 
days, management a t the p i t o f f e r e d some support t o the s t r i k e r s . Old wood 
was f r e e d from the c o l l i e r y s tockyards f o r chopping and d i s t r i b u t i o n to o l d 
people. 
Among t h e a c t i v i s t s however t h e r e i s no doubt t h a t the sense of commxinity 
was tremendous. At times they g i v e the i i r p r e s s i o n of forming an almost 
h e r m e t i c a l l y s e a l e d u n i t . T h i s group i d e n t i t y was p a r t of t h e i r s t r e n g t h -
what kept them together. One p i c k e t sximmed up h i s memories of the s t r i k e : 
"Some marvellous moments you know. There's nee doubt 
about i t . Marvellous f e e l i n g s ! I was brought to t e a r s 
on many o c c a s i o n s . F i l l e d up and t h a t . P a r t i c u l a r l y 
around Christmas time. I t was amazing the type of 
support we got Jonathan you know. We could never ever 
have b e l i e v e d i t . " ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
W h i l s t the s e c r e t world of the a c t i v i s t was a source of tremendous 
s t r e n g t h , i t a l s o had l i m i t a t i o n s . One obvious problem was the s o c i a l 
d i s t a n c e between a c t i v e p i c k e t s and the m a j o r i t y of non a c t i v e members. The 
degree of mutual e x c l u s i v i t y was a s t o n i s h i n g . One mechanic - asked what 
e f f e c t he thought the p o l i c e presence (when the f i r s t scabs went back i n 
Murton) had on the community g e n e r a l l y - didn't f e e l able to comment. 
" I d i d n 't r e a l l y mix wi t h anyone e l s e [other than the 
a c t i v i s t s ] . I couldn't r e a l l y t e l l you what the general 
f e e l i n g was." ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
T h i s d i s t a n c e between a c t i v i s t s and non a c t i v i s t s s i g n a l l e d deep chasms i n 
understanding, which a r e examined i n s e c t i o n 6.3. I t a l s o had c r u c i a l 
i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the i s o l a t i o n of many s t r i k e r s from the ki n d of s o c i a l 
networks which were so d e c i s i v e i n s u s t a i n i n g the s t r i k e . 
I n a sense, Murton - i n common with the handful of other v i l l a g e s s t i l l 
w i t h t h e i r own p i t - was s p e c i a l . Although only 39% of Murton's miners came 
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from the v i l l a g e , the community was s t i l l dominated by the p i t . 
P a r a d o x i c a l l y perhaps, i n some ways the s t r i k e teii?>orarily r e v e r s e d the 
t r e n d before the s t r i k e towards the breaking down of the pit-community 
i d e n t i t y . T r a v e l l e r s were no longer around, and each community became 
something of an i s l a n d . I n Murton, w i t h the p i t s t i l l dominant, k i n s h i p and 
f r i e n d s h i p t i e s brought a s o c i a l i s a t i o n of the s t r i k e experience. I n t r i g u e 
and f a c t i o n a l i s m were a l s o common, but strong s o c i a l networks added to the 
i n t e n s i t y of the s t r i k e . 
b) T r a v e l l e r s and support work 
Outside Murton however, the sense of community was more f r a c t u r e d . I n many 
v i l l a g e s the p i t s had c l o s e d i n the 1950's or 60's, and t h e i r economic 
bases were now more d i v e r s e . Miners were a minority. Furthermore, d i f f e r e n t 
miners from one v i l l a g e worked a t many d i f f e r e n t c o l l i e r i e s , and so l a c k e d 
a communal sense of s o l i d a r i t y . 
"That's the one t h i n g t h a t everybody overlooked - t h a t 
p a r t of the campaign was the defence of communities, 
ye t i n t h e s e e x - c o a l miining areas the community base 
has gone i n t h a t sense. I t ' s l o s t . " ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
There were p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r people wanting to becomie i n v o l v e d i n 
the s t r i k e . Without money, t r a v e l to the s t r i k e c e n t r e was d i f f i c u l t . 
Cosmopolitan working populations meant t h a t miany workers i n the o u t l y i n g 
v i l l a g e s were not on s t r i k e , l e a d i n g to a f e e l i n g of i s o l a t i o n , and strong 
s o c i a l p r e s s u r e s t o earn mioney"'"''". 
Both miiners' and miechanics' branches t r i e d to overcomie the i s o l a t i o n of the 
t r a v e l l e r s . Dave Temiple rememibered making strenuous e f f o r t s to miaintain 
s o l i d a r i t y i n the miechanics' branch. 
" I always i n mass meetings avoided any pronouncemients 
about our chances of winning. I always s t r e s s e d t h a t 
the consequences of not f i g h t i n g were g r e a t e r than of 
f i g h t i n g and l o s i n g . I would always say they are 
These d i f f i c u l t i e s c a l l t o miind the " K e r r - S i e g e l " hypothesis, 
which suggests t h a t c e r t a i n o c c u p a t i o n a l groups have a higher propensity to 
s t r i k e because they l i v e i n " i s o l a t e d mass" communities, which are 
i n s u l a t e d from o u t s i d e s o c i a l p r e s s u r e s (Kerr and S i e g e l , 1959). Winterton 
and Winterton found t h a t i n Y o r k s h i r e , the hypothesis - i f a p p l i e d a t the 
inter-commuhity r a t h e r than i n t e r - i n d u s t r y l e v e l - was p a r t i c u l a r l y 
r e l e v a n t i n e x p l a i n i n g p a t t e r n s of s t r i k e breaking and a c t i v i s m i n the area 
(1989). 
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l e a v i n g us no choice but to f i g h t . We understand how 
hard i t i s , we a p p r e c i a t e t h a t many of you d i d not 
agree w i t h our d e c i s i o n to s t r i k e , but are showing 
l o y a l t y to the union. We had to express t h i s concern i n 
deeds, and the r e l i e f work we engaged i n was testimony 
to our concern. No member who contacted us l i v e d too 
f a r away to be v i s i t e d , and i n v o l v e d i n p i c k e t i n g . On a 
morning I would get up and d r i v e seven m i l e s i n the 
opposite d i r e c t i o n t o Murton t o p i c k up men f o r 
p i c k e t i n g . A f t e r fourteen m i l e s I was p a s s i n g my house 
t o d r i v e another seven m i l e s to Murton." (personal 
communication) 
Frank Duffy i n the miners' branch made s i m i l a r e f f o r t s , but the miners' 
bigger branch posed formidable l o g i s t i c a l o b s t a c l e s , and some t r a v e l l e r s 
complained t h a t they had to make t h e i r own p i c k e t i n g arrangements. Some 
j o i n e d groups of p i c k e t s organised by other branches - f o r exaii?5le 
E asington. Also, the e f f o r t s of l e f t wingers were hindered by a lodge 
committee which was s t i l l i n f l u e n c e d by men who were lukewarm i n t h e i r 
commitment t o the s t r i k e . For exair^sle, Frank Duffy t r i e d to persuade the 
lodge committee to t a k e some of t h e i r meetings out i n t o the West of the 
c o a l f i e l d , but he was r u l e d out of order by the s e c r e t a r y , John Dixon. I t 
i s i n the context of the i n a b i l i t y of the union to reach a l l i t s members, 
t h a t the gradual d r i f t back t o work towards the end of the s t r i k e must be 
l o c a t e d . 
Because miners i n o u t l y i n g communities came from many d i f f e r e n t p i t s , any 
support o r g a n i s a t i o n c l e a r l y had to be g e o g r a p h i c a l l y r a t h e r than branch 
based. As such, the a r e a unions had to take the dominant r o l e . However, 
evidence suggests t h a t a c t i v i s t s i n o u t l y i n g areas d i d not r e c e i v e a l l the 
support they needed. The F e r r y h i l l support group - supplying 700 people i n 
around 16 v i l l a g e s w i t h food p a r c e l s - appealed f o r help towards Christmas. 
I t s o r g a n i s e r - B r i a n - e x p l a i n e d : 
"We were g e t t i n g i n d i c a t i o n s 1 would say around about 
l a t e October, November t h a t t h i n g s weren't r i g h t with 
t h e people. They were becoming desperate! We made 
appeals. We e x p l a i n e d . . . And what was happening, a l l 
the t v programmes, a l l the newspapers, were t a l k i n g 
about t h e meals a day over on the c o a s t at the soup 
k i t c h e n s , . . and t h a t they were g e t t i n g f e d t h r e e meals 
a day. Yet t h e s e people we were p r o v i d i n g f o r were only 
g e t t i n g the p a r c e l every other week, and they were 
becoming bloody i n f u r i a t e d with i t you know. So then we 
decided t o make an appeal to the unions to g i v e more 
support t o t r a v e l to work miners. Quite s a d l y , i t f e l l 
on deaf e a r s . " ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
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B r i a n had an i n t e r v i e w w i t h the DMA e x e c u t i v e a t R e d h i l l s . He suggested 
t h a t a l l funding should go i n t o a c e n t r a l k i t t y , which would then be shared 
e q u a l l y between c o a s t a l p i t v i l l a g e s and o u t l y i n g communities. The response 
was n e g a t i v e . " [ I ] informed them t h a t t h e r e would be a crack, and i t would 
be from t h e s e a r e a s . " 
The p l a n would have i n v o l v e d c o a s t a l p i t v i l l a g e s g i v i n g up some of the 
money they gathered f o r r e d i s t r i b u t i o n i n l a n d . T h e i r resource base was much 
str o n g e r - more people w i l l i n g to c o l l e c t , miore sympathetic people to 
donate, more o r g a n i s a t i o n a l r e s o u r c e s t o send c o l l e c t o r s f u r t h e r a f i e l d . 
The t r a d i t i o n a l p i t - v i l l a g e i d e n t i t y ensured t h a t most of what was 
c o l l e c t e d was spent i n and on the v i l l a g e , and th e r e were very strong 
p r e s s u r e s to keep i t t h i s way. 
As w e l l as l a c k i n g m a t e r i a l support, t r a v e l l e r s were p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y 
i s o l a t e d from the s t r i k e . An a c t i v i s t from K e l l o e emphasised the importance 
of overcomiing i s o l a t i o n i n the o u t l y i n g v i l l a g e s . 
" I went on mty knees to get the union reps to comie out 
to t h e s e v i l l a g e s . I knew where the s t r i k e would break. 
We knew i t would break i n these o u t l y i n g v i l l a g e s 
because they weren't g e t t i n g the information f e d to 
them the same way as they were i n the p i t v i l l a g e s 
themiselves. I miean, e v e r y t h i n g t h a t you organised here 
was a s t r u g g l e . You b a t t l e d f o r everything. Well on the 
c o a s t - Easi n g t o n - you could go and get your dinner. 
There was no such t h i n g here. You got your food p a r c e l 
once every two weeks - about f i v e quids worth of 
g r o c e r i e s . . . 
Then the mieetings were t h e r e , where people could go. 
And they had the informiation. Where here, i t was j u s t a 
few of us, b a t t l i n g to t r y and give the mien 
information. And they were l i s t e n i n g to t h a t [the t v ] , 
and b e l i e v e d t h a t more than they b e l i e v e d us. And I 
begged and begged B i l l y Stobbs and Davy Hopper and Alan 
Cumanings ( l e a d i n g BL a c t i v i s t s ) : get out i n these 
v i l l a g e s 'cos i t s going to break from t h e r e . And sure 
enough, i t broke from here. ( I t broke from F e r r y h i l l 
more than anywhere l i k e . ) But we knew." (in t e r v i e w ) 
I n the autumm and winter, the union (miainly v i a the BL) and support groups 
org a n i s e d a s e r i e s of mieetings i n the v i l l a g e s , to t r y and keep the 
s t r i k e r s i n touch w i t h the union view of the s t r i k e . T h i s was v i t a l because 
the miedia onslaught a g a i n s t the s t r i k e was so overwhelmiing t h a t anyone out 
of touch w i t h the union case was very s u s c e p t i b l e to NCB r e t u r n to work 
propaganda (Douglass, 1985; Schwarz and Fountain, 1985; Jones e t a l . , 
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1985). Dave Hopper and B i l l y Stobbs (both members of the miners' BL), B i l l y 
E t h e r i n g t o n (General S e c r e t a r y of the Durham Mechanics) and Huw Beynon 
(from Durham U n i v e r s i t y ) , were among those who came out to address 
meetings. L e a f l e t s were put i n with the food p a r c e l s . I n the run up to 
Christmas, t h e cairpaign seemed t o work. The r e t u r n was stemmed. But " a f t e r 
Christmas i t j u s t broke c o n p l e t e l y " . That dam b u r s t was a c r u s h i n g blow to 
those i n v o l v e d i n the s t r i k e . ( S e c t i o n 6.4 examines t h i s dam b u r s t i n the 
terms of the people who were i n v o l v e d i n i t . ) 
T i e s of k i n s h i p and community had a l r e a d y been weakened i n o u t l y i n g 
v i l l a g e s . Hardship was exacerbated by the r e l a t i v e weakness of these 
support networks. P a r t of the s t r i k e s meaning - the defence of communities 
- spoke only d i f f u s e l y to s t r i k e r s s c a t t e r e d a c r o s s the commuter v i l l a g e s 
o f Durham. They were se p a r a t e d from the f u l l i n t e n s i t y of the s t r i k e 
e x p e r ience. And because most had seen a t l e a s t one of t h e i r o l d p i t s c l o s e , 
they f e l t confused by the union's apparently a r b i t r a r y stand over 
Cortonwood. 
P a r t of the reason why the dam b u r s t a f t e r Christmas was because a t i n y 
m i n o r i t y of miners had a l r e a d y broken the s t r i k e . I n doing so they lowered 
the t h r e s h o l d of r e s i s t a n c e f o r others who were t h i n k i n g of g i v i n g up. I n 
the f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n t h e r e f o r e I examine the motivation and r o l e of the 
" a n t i - s t r i k e diehards"; men who never wanted to be on s t r i k e , and some of 
whom became the f i r s t men back a t Murton c o l l i e r y . 
Chapter 6 (209) 
6.3 THE ANTI-STRIKE DIEHARDS 
De s p i t e the media's l i o n i s a t i o n of s t r i k e breakers, r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e has 
been w r i t t e n a n a l y s i n g who the s t r i k e breakers were, why they went back to 
work, and what they now f e e l about t h e i r d e c i s i o n (see Parker, 1986, f o r a 
s i g n i f i c a n t e x c e p t i o n ) . Indeed, the l i t e r a t u r e on s t r i k e breaking i n 
ge n e r a l i s notable mainly f o r i t s absence. Unfortunately, i t i s impossible 
t o provide a d e t a i l e d s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s i s of s t r i k e breakers a t Murton 
(broken down by age, r e s i d e n c e , type of work, when they returned, e t c ) , but 
my i n t e r v i e w s y i e l d e d c o n s i d e r a b l e q u a l i t a t i v e information concerning t h e i r 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , m otivations and ideology. 
As noted e a r l i e r , a b a s i c d i v i s i o n e x i s t e d between s t r i k e r s who opposed the 
d i s p u t e from the beginning, and those who supported i t s general aims, but 
harboured a v a r i e t y of doubts about i t . T h i s s e c t i o n i s concerned to 
an a l y s e the r o l e and b e l i e f s of the sma l l m i n o r i t y of a n t i - s t r i k e diehards. 
D e s p i t e the media's c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of a l l s t r i k e breakers as i d e o l o g i c a l 
T h a t c h e r i t e s , i t i s in^ ^ o s s i b l e to c l a s s i f y the workforce purely on whether 
or not they went back t o work. T h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y so with r e s p e c t to the 
committed a n t i - s t r i k e miners, some of whom never broke the s t r i k e ! A 
d i s t i n c t i o n can be drawn between the ver y f i r s t men back (a small minority 
of t h i s m i n o r i t y group), and the l a r g e r group of a n t i - s t r i k e r s , some (but 
not a l l of whom) went back. I n general, the former were t r a v e l l e r s from 
o u t s i d e Murton, and the l a t t e r were o l d e r miners from Murton. 
The a c t i o n s and b e l i e f s o f both subgroups cannot be understood without 
r e f e r e n c e t o n a t i o n a l events during the s t r i k e , because i t was t h i s l e v e l 
t o which they appealed f o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n of t h e i r a c t i o n s . T a l k i n g to some 
of the f i r s t men back i t was s t r i k i n g j u s t how f u l l y they i d e n t i f i e d with 
the a n t i - s t r i k e ideology of the government. National events were a l s o 
i i r p o r t a n t a t a p r a c t i c a l l e v e l , i n pr o v i d i n g the immediate stimulus f o r 
people r e t u r n i n g to work. 
6.3.i THE CONTEXT 
At a n a t i o n a l l e v e l , n e g o t i a t i o n s to end the s t r i k e continued f i t f u l l y 
u n t i l J u l y 18th, when they broke o f f and were not resumed again u n t i l 
September (Goodman, 1985). I n North Derbyshire, Area D i r e c t o r Ken Moses 
r e a c t e d t o the stalemate by pio n e e r i n g a m e t i c u l o u s l y planned and 
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a g g r e s s i v e l y executed back to work movemient. I t becamie the blue p r i n t f o r 
every a r e a encouraging a d r i f t back t o work. (Wilsher e t a l . . 1985; 
200-203) . At the samie timie. Ken Foulstone and Bob T a y l o r were beginning the 
l e g a l moves which would e v e n t u a l l y l e a d the c o u r t s to pronounce the whole 
s t r i k e u n o f f i c i a l . Other court a c t i o n s were a l r e a d y underway to d e c l a r e the 
s t r i k e u n o f f i c i a l i n L a n c a s h i r e , Nottinghamishire, and North Wales (De 
F r i e n d and Rubin, 1985; 324). I a n MacGregor understood the s i g n i f i c a n c e of 
t h e s e court a c t i o n s . 
"[T]he cumulative e f f e c t of the court a c t i o n s was to 
g i v e a tremiendous boost to the back-to-work movement. 
Every timie a case was won i t gave a few more u n c e r t a i n 
s t r i k e r s pause f o r thought: maybe working was not 
d i s l o y a l , maybe S c a r g i l l was not r i g h t , miaybe i t was 
not l e t t i n g your c o l l e a g u e s down." (MacGregor, 1986; 
228) 
T h e i r a c t i o n bore f r u i t i n October, when the c o u r t s announced t h a t the 
Y o r k s h i r e s t r i k e was u n o f f i c i a l , and i n s t r u c t e d the NUM to d e s i s t from 
attempting to persuade miiners not to c r o s s p i c k e t l i n e s . When S c a r g i l l 
continued to p r o c l a i m the s t r i k e o f f i c i a l , he and the union were d e c l a r e d 
to be i n contempt of court, and on October 10th, were f i n e d £1000 and 
£200000 r e s p e c t i v e l y . When the l a t t e r f i n e went unpaid (the formier was p a i d 
anonymiously), the unions funds were sequestrated, and a r e c e i v e r appointed 
(on October 2 5 t h ) . 
Although p a i n f u l l y slow, the back t o work miovem:ient gathered pace during the 
summer. Even i n North Derbyshire, only 800 had gone back out of a t o t a l 
workforce of 10500 by the s t a r t of Septemiber. I n Durham, the f i r s t mioves 
were miade a t E a s i n g t o n and Wearmouth, i n the week beginning August 20th 
(Beynon, 1984b). A f t e r the f a i l u r e of the f i r s t attempt to l a y on buses i n 
J u l y , t h i s second attempt y i e l d e d a r e v o l t by 16 COSA ( o f f i c e workers) 
memibers a t Wearmouth ( l e d by t h e i r secretairy Ken Seed), and the lone 
d e f i a n c e of P a u l Wilkinson a t Easington (see s e c t i o n 6.2). P i c k e t i n g was 
i n t e n s e , but the f i r s t mien were i n . Wilkinson began court a c t i o n against 
the union s h o r t l y a f t e r . 
Throughout Septemiber the r e b e l s niutibers b a r e l y i n c r e a s e d . S i n g l e s t r i k e 
b r e a k e r s were re p o r t e d to be back a t work a t a few other i n s t a l l a t i o n s 
( F i s h b u r n coke works and Ashington i n Northumiberland f o r example) . But 
n e g o t i a t i o n s were r e s t a r t e d a t a n a t i o n a l l e v e l , i n c r e a s i n g the hope t h a t 
the s t r i k e miight reach an agreed c o n c l u s i o n . These hopes were d r a m a t i c a l l y 
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boosted by the t h r e a t of a c t i o n by NACODS, when the deputies voted on 
September 29th by 82.5% to s t r i k e over p i t c l o s u r e s and l o s s of pay f o r 
r e f u s i n g to c r o s s p i c k e t l i n e s . 
However, on October 25th the NACODS s t r i k e t h r e a t was f i n a l l y c a l l e d o f f 
f o l l o w i n g an agreement to s e t up an Independent Review Body as a f i n a l 
(non-binding) appeals stage t o the c o l l i e r y c l o s u r e procedure. And on 
October 31st, t a l k s between the union and NCB ended with no s i g n of a 
resunption. At t h i s time t h e r e were s t i l l only 23 men back a t work i n 
Durham, and 21 of t h e s e were a t Wearmouth (Newcastle Journal) . But now the 
NCB stepped up p r e s s u r e on the union by t h r e a t e n i n g to switch o f f 
e l e c t r i c i t y a t mines - i n c l u d i n g Murton - where the NXJM had p i c k e t e d out 
deputies ( e f f e c t i v e l y t h r e a t e n i n g c l o s u r e , as mines would f l o o d without 
e l e c t r i c i t y t o supply the pumps). And i n a f u r t h e r move, they o f f e r e d 
anyone r e t u r n i n g t o work by November 19th a £580 Christmas bonus, payable 
on December 21 s t . 
I n the f i r s t week of November, these moves proitpted the biggest r e t u r n to 
work n a t i o n a l l y s i n c e the d i s p u t e s t a r t e d (2236 by NCB f i g u r e s ) . I n North 
Derbyshire, over 1000 went back. I n Y o r k s h i r e , Cortonwood witnessed the 
f i r s t break i n i t s ranks. I n Durham, the s t r i k e began to crack too. By the 
end of t h a t week (November 10t h ) , t h e r e were two men back a t the Hawthorn 
Combine (which i n c l u d e d Murton), one a t Eppleton, one a t Seaham, f i v e a t 
T u r s d a l e workshops, f i v e a t Vane Tempest and two a t Easington (Newcastle 
J o u r n a l , 9/11/84; 8 ) . That s t i l l l e f t S a c r i s t o n , Horden, Westoe, Herrington 
and Dawdon c o n p l e t e l y strikebound. On November 5th, Monty Stubbs became the 
f i r s t man to break the s t r i k e a t Murton ( t r a v e l l i n g i n from Easington 
Lane). His r e t u r n was met w i t h mass p i c k e t s , and dozens of a r r e s t s . 
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6 . 3 . i i THE FIRST MEN BACK AT MURTON 
The f i r s t men to break the s t r i k e a t Murton c o n s t i t u t e d a t i n y m inority who 
were b i t t e r l y opposed to the s t r i k e from the f i r s t day. They were n e a r l y 
a l l o l d e r miners. I n a "normal" dispute, the weight of communal union 
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A more d e t a i l e d account of my i n t e r v i e w s with two of the f i r s t 
men back a t Murton i s contained i n appendix 8. 
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s o l i d a r i t y would have precluded s t r i k e breaking as an option, even f o r 
those most h o s t i l e t o the s t r i k e . However, with the unprecedented length 
and nature of the d i s p u t e , and the miassive government and media attempt to 
d e l e g i t i m i i s e i t , p o t e n t i a l r e t u r n e e s were able to appeal to a n a t i o n a l 
arena f o r l e g i t i m a c y , bypassing t r a d i t i o n a l l o c a l v a l u e s . 
Within any l a r g e workforce, a wide v a r i e t y of p o l i t i c a l views c o e x i s t , and 
during any s t r i k e t h i s w i l l i n c l u d e a percentage who do not i d e n t i f y with 
the a c t i o n ( H i l l e r , 1969, 100; Lane and Roberts, 1971, 100). I n any s t r i k e , 
c o n t r o l l i n g the d i s s i d e n t miinority becomies i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t as timie 
drags on. Murton was no exception, and t h e r e were known " r i g h t wingers" who 
a c t i v i s t s were aware c o n s t i t u t e d weak l i n k s i n t h e i r s o l i d a r i t y . Often they 
were b i g overtimie workers, which mieant t h a t they were dependant on 
mianagemient f o r m a i n t a i n i n g t h e i r e arnings. They supported the 1972 and '74 
s t r i k e s , but were c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y opposed to almost any other s t r i k e 
s i t u a t i o n . 
E s s e n t i a l l y t h e r e f o r e , the f i r s t mien back espoused a primiitive 
i n d i v i d u a l i s m , r e j e c t i n g a l l formis of c o l l e c t i v e d i s c i p l i n e (see appendix 8 
f o r more d e t a i l s about the ideology of the f i r s t mien back) . They camie out 
on s t r i k e r e l u c t a n t l y , and went back to work as soon as t h e i r s a f e t y could 
be guaranteed, and the s t r i k e had been s u f f i c i e n t l y delegitimiised to 
j u s t i f y such a momientous miove. T h e i r opposition to the s t r i k e c r y s t a l l i s e d 
around c e r t a i n key i s s u e s ; namiely the b a l l o t , union "corruption", and 
v i o l e n c e . But t h e s e i s s u e s can i n a sense be regarded mierely as " t r i g g e r s " , 
which were used t o l e g i t i m a t e a c t i o n based on a much deeper i d e o l o g i c a l 
h o s t i l i t y t o the s t r i k e . 
During the r e s e a r c h f o r t h i s t h e s i s I c o u l d not e s t a b l i s h strong enough 
c o n t a c t s w i t h " a n t i - s t r i k e d i e h a r d s " to i n v e s t i g a t e the i n d i v i d u a l b a s i s 
f o r t h e i r i d e o l o g i c a l h o s t i l i t y to the s t r i k e (see appendix one f o r the 
p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s involved) . But i n the i n t e r v i e w s I d i d do, somie 
important p o i n t s emierged. Most s i g n i f i c a n t of a l l was the degree to which 
" T h a t c h e r i t e " notions about the e x c e s s i v e power of the unions, and the 
dangers of c o l l e c t i v i s m were emibedded i n t h e i r ideology. They s e i z e d upon 
the governmient's and the media's a n t i - s t r i k e r h e t o r i c , and reproduced i t 
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passionately'''^. T h i s was v e r y d i f f e r e n t to other o l d e r miners who f e l t 
unhappy about being out on s t r i k e f o r so long (some of whom e v e n t u a l l y went 
back t o work), but who n e v e r t h e l e s s r e t a i n e d a deep underlying h o s t i l i t y to 
Thatcherism. A n t i - s t r i k e diehards accepted most of the government's 
arguments, both w i t h regard to the immediate s t r i k e i s s u e s , and the broader 
t h r u s t of i t s t r a d e union s t r a t e g y . 
a) The b a l l o t 
U n s u r p r i s i n g l y , the b a l l o t was o f f e r e d as a key l e g i t i m a t i n g f a c t o r by the 
f i r s t men back. I f t h e r e had been a b a l l o t they would have voted a g a i n s t a 
s t r i k e , but would have s t a y e d out had the vote gone a g a i n s t them. 
" I s a i d then, and I say now, and I ' l l s t i l l repeat: i f 
they'd had a proper b a l l o t I would have voted a g a i n s t a 
s t r i k e . . . I f i t had voted f o r the s t r i k e , I would then 
have s t u c k by the vote. I ' d have stopped on s t r i k e . 
Even though I wasn't happy, I ' d have stopped. I t wasn't 
money t h a t f o r c e d me back to work. I went back to work 
because I didn't want to stop on s t r i k e . " ( i n terview) 
Another s a i d " I ' d s t i l l be out today", i f the b a l l o t had been f o r a s t r i k e . 
The "missing" b a l l o t removed the l e g i t i m a c y of the s t r i k e f o r these people. 
However, i n t e r v i e w s r e v e a l e d such a deep h o s t i l i t y to the concept of 
s t r i k i n g , t h a t i t must be regarded as questionable whether a b a l l o t would 
have prevented them from breaking the s t r i k e . N a t i o n a l a c t i o n through the 
c o u r t s - although r a r e l y mentioned e x p l i c i t l y - seemed to have played a 
s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e here. G e t t i n g the s t r i k e d e c l a r e d u n o f f i c i a l i n every area 
gave l e g a l backing and c r e d i b i l i t y to the view - d i f f i c u l t to s u s t a i n i n 
Murton d e s p i t e some l a t e n t h o s t i l i t y to the s t r i k e - t h a t the s t r i k e wasn't 
l e g i t i m a t e . Breaking i t t h e r e f o r e became j u s t i f i a b l e . 
Because of the s t r o n g t r a d i t i o n s of c l a s s s o l i d a r i t y c r y s t a l l i s e d w i t h i n 
the NUM, d e v i a n t views would normally have remained marginal. Nevertheless, 
the e x i s t e n c e of t h e s e views - present i n any l a r g e union o r g a n i s a t i o n -
t h r u s t a l e v e r i n t o the s t a t e ' s hands, which commanded i n c r e a s i n g power the 
longer the s t r i k e went on. Manipulating t h i s l e v e r allowed the government 
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See appendix e i g h t f o r a more d e t a i l e d account of i n t e r v i e w s 
w i t h the a n t i - s t r i k e d iehards, and f o r a t e n t a t i v e atterqjt to e x p l a i n these 
a t t i t u d e s i n terms of the "ideology of s a c r i f i c e " . 
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t o pursue t w i n o b j e c t i v e s ; the imimiediate d e s t a b i l i s a t i o n of the s t r i k e ' s 
power bases, and the long term d e s t a b i l i s a t i o n of non-instrumiental niodes of 
c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . T h i s r e l a t e s to Offe and Wiesenthal's point - r a i s e d i n 
chapter t h r e e - about the c o n t i n u a l d i f f i c u l t y f o r trade unions of 
ma i n t a i n i n g a " d i a l o g i c a l " d e f i n i t i o n of i n t e r e s t s . The s t a t e was engaged 
i n a s y s t e m a t i c attempt to r e d e f i n e trade unionism along narrowly 
conceived, i n s t r u m e n t a l (or "monological") l i n e s (Offe and Wiesenthal, 
1980) . 
b) Corruption i n the lodge. 
A s t r o n g theme running through accounts from a n t i s t r i k e a c t i v i s t s was 
a l l e g e d c o r r u p t i o n i n the miiners' branch. A l l e g a t i o n s were s p e c i f i c . One 
returnee claimied t h a t he had been down on the miiners' lodge p i c k e t i n g l i s t 
s i n c e the s t a r t of the s t r i k e , when he had never p i c k e t e d . Somebody was 
s i g n i n g f o r h i s p i c k e t i n g mioney, and pocketing i t . (A sim i i l a r a c c u s a t i o n 
was made about Eppleton miiners lodge.) 
A second a l l e g a t i o n was t h a t union support was a v a i l a b l e only i f you were 
an a c t i v e p i c k e t . Numierous examples were quoted. For example, Christmas 
g i f t s from f o r e i g n t r a d e u n i o n i s t s were one of the biggest boosts f o r the 
s t r i k e . The French i n p a r t i c u l a r were extremiely generous, donating 27000 
t o y s to the Durham c o a l f i e l d , apparently with an average p r i c e of £10 
(Newcastle J o u r n a l , 15-12-84; 5) . (Another s i x l o r r i e s went to 
Northumiberland and Scotland.) But a n t i s t r i k e a c t i v i s t s complained t h a t a l l 
t h e b e s t p r e s e n t s - BMX b i k e s , computers, e t c - were taken by the p i c k e t s 
before anyone e l s e got a look i n . They were l e f t w ith f o o t b a l l s , sweets, 
and shoes. I n s i m i i l a r v e i n , i t was a l l e g e d t h a t a c t i v i s t s l i v i n g i n Murton 
got p r e f e r e n t i a l treatmient w i t h other b e n e f i t s . For example, lodge 
committee members kept food p a r c e l s back. Unless you knew the r i g h t people 
you d i d n ' t get t o know about the support t h a t was a v a i l a b l e . 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o v a l i d a t e or deny these a c c u s a t i o n s . What i s c e r t a i n 
however (and probably miore r e l e v a n t ) i s t h a t f e e l i n g s run very s t r o n g l y 
among the a n t i - s t r i k e a c t i v i s t s t h a t those who weren't i n v o l v e d i n the 
s t r i k e l o s t out c o n s i d e r a b l y compared to those who were involved. 
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c) The p i t " b u l l y boys". 
One of the most c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s s u e s during the s t r i k e was the extent to 
which v i o l e n c e - or the t h r e a t of v i o l e n c e - was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r keeping 
people out on s t r i k e . A n t i - s t r i k e a c t i v i s t s have no doubts. I t was the 
" b u l l y boys" (as they dubbed them), who stopped more people going back. One 
man made q u i t e s p e c i f i c a l l e g a t i o n s a g a i n s t a group of p i c k e t s who he 
c l aimed were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r p u t t i n g people's windows i n . He was one of the 
f i r s t h a l f dozen back, and l i k e most "superscabs" (a s u b j e c t i v e l y defined 
group regarded as e s p e c i a l l y treacherous by the p i c k e t s ) , had h i s windows 
put i n . 
P i c k e t s r e a d i l y admit t h a t t h e i r was a l o t of " v e n t i l a t i o n " during the 
s t r i k e . Miners committee members stood up a t meetings and condemned the 
p r a c t i c e . Frank Duffy, the u n o f f i c i a l p i c k e t l e a d e r , was p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i n s i s t e n t on t h i s p o i n t , arguing t h a t i t was wrong to a t t a c k a s t r i k e 
b r e a ker through h i s f a m i l y . But as s e c t i o n 6.2 shows, h i s appeals f e l l on 
deaf e a r s . A Murton " h i t squad" was formed, with the s e l f - a p p o i n t e d r o l e of 
e n f o r c i n g s t r i k e d i s c i p l i n e v i a window smashing and other i n t i m i d a t i o n . 
However, v i o l e n c e was not a l l one way. With the tape recorder o f f , one of 
the f i r s t men back a t Murton d e s c r i b e d with s a t i s f a c t i o n how some of the 
r e t u r n e e s s e t up a " v i g i l a n t e group" which r e t a l i a t e d a g a i n s t a t t a c k s on 
r e t u r n e e s homes by p u t t i n g out a p i c k e t ' s windows every time one of t h e i r 
windows went i n . They a l s o t r a v e l l e d through to Durham to smash the windows 
of the miners' lodge s e c r e t a r y (John Dixon), on December 20th 1984 
( J o u r n a l , 21-12-84; 5) . 
G e t t i n g the f i r s t man i n was a l s o c r u c i a l i n i n c r e a s i n g the opportunity f o r 
s t r i k e breaking. T h i s p e r c e p t i v e comment from a (non Murton) mechanics 
a c t i v i s t shows what was a t s t a k e . 
"There i s no such t h i n g as being able to h a l t a r e t u r n 
to work once i t s t a r t s . From the f i r s t man to r e t u r n i n 
North Derbyshire... i t was i n e v i t a b l e t h a t i f the 
s t r i k e went on long enough a l l the men would be back i n 
North Derb y s h i r e . 'Cos every man t h a t goes back 
undermines the r e s o l v e of the others t h a t s t a y out. . . 
I f they can get a man back, i t weakens the second 
weakest man i n the branch, who wouldn't want to be the 
f i r s t , you know? I f you can keep t h a t f i r s t man out, 
you can keep them a l l out. But every one who who goes 
i n makes i t e a s i e r f o r those t h a t go i n a f t e r him." 
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( i n t e r v i e w ) 
Returnees may have looked a t i t from a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e , but 
the sense was the samie. They didn't want to be the f i r s t back. One man had 
t a l k e d about going back during the siammier, but as he s a i d , "nobody's s t u p i d 
- no brave - enough t o s t i c k t h e i r necks out l i k e t h a t ! " But once somieone 
was s a f e l y through the gates, o t h e r s f e l t a b l e to fo l l o w . 
One of the f i r s t mien back a t Murton t o l d how he was "looking i n the papers" 
to see i f t h e r e was anyone back, when he saw t h e r e was, he phoned up the 
c o l l i e r y . "As soon as they c o u l d get mie through t h a t p i c k e t l i n e , I went 
back t o work!" So why hadn't he gone back e a r l i e r ? 
"Because you couldn't get i n . Anybody who t r i e d to walk 
i n would have been k i l l e d ! " ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
Another man who went back even e a r l i e r agreed t h a t although he'd considered 
r e t u r n i n g over the summer i t simply seemied impossible. The f i r s t mien i n 
proved i t wasn't. 
6 . 3 . i i i WITHIN BUT AGAINST THE STRIKE: MURTON'S RELUCTANT STRIKERS 
The a n t i - s t r i k e mavericks d i s c u s s e d so f a r were a miinority of the s t r i k e 
b r e a k e r s . They were spread throughout the county. There was however a 
r e l a t i v e l y d i s t i n c t group of about twenty i n Murton (and no doubt i n other 
v i l l a g e s w i t h l a r g e populations of s t r i k e r s ) who a g i t a t e d a g a i n s t the 
s t r i k e almost from the s t a r t . They were overwhelmiingly - i f not e x c l u s i v e l y 
- o l d e r miiners ( i n t h e i r 50's) . They drank i n the Legion ( j u s t as the 
a c t i v i s t s c oncentrated i n the C o l l i e r y I n n ) . They c o n t i n u a l l y sniped a t the 
s t r i k e , c r i t i c i s i n g the a c t i v i s t s . A l l the complaints v o i c e d by the 
a n t i - s t r i k e diehards were echoed by these mien, but they had a g r e a t e r 
r e l u c t a n c e t o a c t . They l i v e d w i t h i n a community dominated by t r a d i t i o n s of 
l o y a l t y t o the union. Memories of what happened to deputies who worked 
during the 1972 s t r i k e l i n g e r e d i n the background (see chapter f o u r ) . 
U n l i k e t r a v e l l e r s , Murton men f a c e d a l i f e t i m i e of i n t e n s e s o c i a l i s o l a t i o n 
i f they "scabbed". 
The s i g n i f i c a n t and v o c a l r i g h t wing t r a d i t i o n w i t h i n the branch, which had 
been so i n f l u e n t i a l before the s t r i k e , was s t i l l present, almiost 
e x c l u s i v e l y among o l d e r miiners. The Legion Club d r i n k e r s were the samie mien 
t h a t a c t i v i s t s i d e n t i f i e d as the v o l u b l e r i g h t wing elemient which the 
former weak lodge l e a d e r s h i p had never been able to dominate (see s e c t i o n 
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5 . 4 . i ) . They were b i t t e r l y opposed to the s t r i k e . But scabbing was another 
matter. One mechanic's a c t i v i s t r e f l e c t e d on: 
"the amazing emotional p u l l of the National Union of 
Mineworkers. E s p e c i a l l y f o r people who'd worked i n the 
p i t a l l t h e i r l i v e s . So long as t h e r e was a chance of 
winning, i t didn't even e n t e r t h e i r heads to go back. 
Not even the most v e n a l ones!" ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
Only towards the end d i d a s m a l l number take t h i s enormous step. I t seems 
l i k e l y t h a t more than anything they hoped t h a t the s t r i k e would end so t h a t 
they c o u l d go back w i t h what they saw as d i g n i t y - even i f the union had 
l o s t . 
No-one from Murton dared to break the p i c k e t l i n e s u n t i l Rop Naylor - the 
former Chairman of the Murton miners' lodge committee (he resigned suddenly 
i n the Autumn of the s t r i k e ) - went back two months before the end of the 
s t r i k e . Rop was a s p e c i a l c ase. E a r l i e r i n the s t r i k e , he had been an 
a c t i v e p i c k e t , even t o the extent of t r a v e l l i n g away with the mainly 
younger p i c k e t s . But i n the Autumn when he resigned, h i s commitment to the 
s t r i k e was c a l l e d i n t o s e r i o u s doubt. He was i d e n t i f i e d with the Legion 
c l u b d r i n k e r s . I n the weeks before he went back, i t was known t h a t he had 
been t r y i n g to persuade other people to go back. But very few men wanted 
anything to do w i t h i t . I n the end he persuaded t h r e e other men to go back 
w i t h him i n February. They were the f i r s t men from Murton to go back to the 
p i t . (One of them came s t r a i g h t back out on s t r i k e , and stayed out to the 
end.) 
The consensus among a c t i v i s t s i n Murton i s t h a t Rop thought he was going to 
t a k e t h e v i l l a g e back w i t h him. C e r t a i n l y he was encouraged i n t h i s view by 
a s e n i o r member of Murton's management. 
"Rop on o c c a s i o n s came down to the c o n t r o l room, and 
we'd be s a t c h a t t i n g . And I was of the opinion t h a t Rop 
was the figurehead. . . You know, he used to say to me: 
'I'm s i c k of t h i s bloody s t r i k e ' . And I used to say: 
'Well look, a l l i t ' l l take Rop i s a f e l l a l i k e you - to 
see you coming i n - and t h e y ' l l a l l walk i n with you'. 
'Ee,' he says, ' t h e y ' l l not'. And mind, he was r i g h t . 
I t was he who t o l d me t h a t i t was the young m i l i t a n t s 
who were standing up i n the lodge meetings and 
shouting. The Duffy's and t h a t k i n d of people. I was 
t o t a l l y s u r p r i s e d . I thought Rop Naylor had a good g r i p 
on everybody, but he obviously d i d n ' t . " (inteirview) 
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Even over the f o l l o w i n g weeks, few followed Rop back to work from w i t h i n 
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Murton . Many wanted to, but f a m i l y t i e s or f r i e n d s h i p s with a c t i v i s t s , or 
a myriad of other p e r s o n a l bonds kept them out. 
A major f a c t o r undermining support f o r the s t r i k e among o l d e r miners was 
the a v a i l a b i l i t y of redundancy money - up to £30000 f o r miners with 30 
y e a r s s e r v i c e . The s t r i k e e f f e c t i v e l y c u t o f f an option t h a t many older 
miners would have been t a k i n g had i t not been f o r the stoppage. I t imposed 
a c o l l e c t i v e r e s i s t a n c e to job l o s s a g a i n s t the immediate m a t e r i a l 
i n t e r e s t s of many miners. 
For most people i n Murton, l o y a l t y and f e a r of the s o c i a l consequences of 
"scabbing" enforced d i s c i p l i n e , but the grumblings had a strong m a t e r i a l 
base. And many of those who d i d break the s t r i k e thought t h a t by doing so 
they c o u l d v i r t u a l l y guarantee themselves redundancy. T h i s p e r c e p t i v e 
a n a l y s i s comes not from a p i c k e t , but from a v e r y s e n i o r member of Murton's 
management. 
" A l l t h e s e guys a r e not w h i t e r than white. A l o t of 
th e s e f e l l a s came back to work only because they 
thought they would be promised redundancy... There were 
some dubious c h a r a c t e r s come back to work. They weren't 
a l l doing i t f o r the sake of the nation! There was some 
ver y v e r y dubious c h a r a c t e r s . That's not to say they 
were a l l l i k e t h a t . But most men - a l o t of men - came 
back t o work because they thought they would get 
redundancy out of i t . " ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
Another s e n i o r member of Murton's management recounted how he advised 
miners who contacted him during the s t r i k e t h a t i n h i s opinion the best way 
of g e t t i n g redundancy would be t o go back t o work (although he emphasised 
t h a t he never made any p r o m i s e s ) . 
There was a strong sense i n which the NUM's economistic t r a d i t i o n s - the 
focus on the use of c o l l e c t i v e muscle f o r m a t e r i a l i n t e r e s t s - came home to 
r o o s t during the s t r i k e . C e r t a i n l y i n Murton, the legacy of a weak 
committee unable or u n w i l l i n g to f i g h t a g a i n s t a v o c i f e r o u s r i g h t wing, 
combined w i t h faceworkers e l i t i s m was a profoundly deep rooted t r a d i t i o n of 
^^Rop p a i d (and s t i l l pays) a heavy p r i c e f o r h i s r e t u r n . By a l l 
accounts he i s a shadow of the man he once was. Treated l i k e a l e p e r by the 
v a s t m a j o r i t y of people i n Murton, he has p h y s i c a l l y wasted away. 
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i n d i v i d u a l m a t e r i a l i s m . When i t became c l e a r t h a t c o l l e c t i v e muscle was 
u n l i k e l y to win a quick v i c t o r y , then the temptation of £30000 became 
almost i r r e s i s t i b l e . 
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6.4 FIGHTING FOR THE MIDDLE GROUND 
So f a r I have looked a t the s t r i k e a c t i v i s t s and the a n t i - s t r i k e diehards. 
D i v i s i o n s w i t h i n them have been examined, and age has emerged as a key 
v a r i a b l e i n determining miners' approach to the s t r i k e . However, i t was 
a l s o suggested t h a t p l a c e of r e s i d e n c e had a strong impact on support f o r 
the s t r i k e . The longer the s t r i k e went on, the more s i g n i f i c a n t t h i s 
v a r i a b l e became. Because the s t r i k e was about a defence of community and 
t h e r e f o r e u l t i m a t e l y about a defence of c o l l e c t i v i s m , the i s o l a t i o n of 
s t r i k e r s i n o u t l y i n g v i l l a g e s t o r e the very h e a r t out of the dispute. Many 
t r a v e l l e r s were not only p h y s i c a l l y remote from v i l l a g e s l i k e Murton, they 
were a l s o s o c i a l l y i s o l a t e d . D espite the t r u l y h e r o i c e f f o r t s of women and 
men i n the support groups, i n many cases i t was i i q j o s s i b l e to i n t e g r a t e 
t r a v e l l e r s i n t o supportive s o c i a l networks. 
I n t h i s s e c t i o n I c o n s i d e r the s t r i k e ' s "middle ground". I n p a r t i c u l a r I 
focus on the s t r i k e r s who went back a t the end of the dispute. The m a j o r i t y 
of t h e s e r e t u r n e e s (and t h e r e were about 350 i n a l l a t Murton) came from 
o u t l y i n g a r e a s . I argue t h a t they d i f f e r e d from many miners i n Murton who 
d i d not go back mainly i n l a c k i n g a dense network of community r e l a t i o n s 
which - through support and the t h r e a t of censure - s u s t a i n e d the strike"*"^. 
6.4.i CONTEXT 
At the end of November 1984, the back to work d r i f t t a i l e d o f f , both i n 
Durham and n a t i o n a l l y . S t r i k e a c t i v i s t s thought they'd stemmed the flow 
f o l l o w i n g the hemorrhage of s t r i k e breakers i n the wake of the NACODS d e a l . 
They thought t h a t i f they c o u l d h o l d people out over Christmas then they 
c o u l d h o l d them out i n d e f i n i t e l y . Christmas i t s e l f was f o r most s t r i k e r s a 
joyous c e l e b r a t i o n of a l l the best t h i n g s i n the s t r i k e . G i f t s from 
supporters and f e l l o w t r a d e u n i o n i s t s helped overcome f i n a n c i a l hardship 
(Saunders, 1989). P i t communities l i k e Murton r e v e l l e d i n a c a r n i v a l , p a rty 
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The s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s p oint i s proved by the exan?>le of 
t r a v e l l e r s from B l a c k h a l l . Chapter f i v e showed t h a t t h i s group of 
t r a v e l l e r s formed a r e l a t i v e l y cohesive u n i t , and during the s t r i k e they 
maintained - along w i t h B l a c k h a l l men who worked a t other c o l l i e r i e s - much 
of t h e community atmosphere and support t h a t c h a r a c t e r i s e d v i l l a g e s which 
s t i l l had a p i t . Only a t i n y number went back to work. 
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atmosphere, born of a common s o l i d a r i t y and p r i d e . Even i n the t r a v e l l e r s ' 
v i l l a g e s , u n b e l i e v a b l e e f f o r t s were made by support groups to ensure t h a t 
everyone had something to c e l e b r a t e , and the means to c e l e b r a t e with. 
But then, as an a c t i v i s t from the F e r r y h i l l support group sadly noted: 
" A f t e r Christmas i t j u s t broke c o n ^ l e t e l y . . . I t h i n k i t 
were the heartbreak of Christmas t h a t done i t you know. 
They hadn't been a b l e t o g i v e the c h i l d r e n what they 
wanted. P l u s the propaganda..." (i n t e r v i e w ) 
That propaganda began before the New Year, with a huge o f f e n s i v e 
e n ^ h a s i s i n g t h a t a p o s s i b l e £2118 could be earned by miners' tax f r e e 
between the s t a r t of January and the end of the f i n a n c i a l y e ar on March 
31s t . I n c e n t i v e s combined w i t h the bleak a n t i c l i m a x of New Year to cirush 
s t r i k e r ' s morale. 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , the f i r s t few days of 1985 were encouraging f o r the union. 
The number of "new f a c e s " a t North E a s t e r n p i t s b a r e l y c r e p t i n t o double 
f i g u r e s on the 3rd and 4th of January. But i t was a f a l s e dawn. On Monday 
January 7th, the NCB claimed t h a t 363 men broke the s t r i k e i n Durham and 
Northvm±ierland. On the Monday a f t e r , a f u r t h e r 147 went back. On Monday 
21st , another 260 broke the s t r i k e i n Durham alone. I n the l a s t two weeks 
of January, North E a s t miners l e d the n a t i o n a l r e t u r n to work. But Murton -
along w i t h Easington, Horden, S a c r i s t o n and Westoe - remained 
overwhelmingly behind the s t r i k e (see t a b l e 6.2 and graphs 13a and 13b). 
Two or t h r e e weeks i n t o 1985, a l l hope of a s u c c e s s f u l end to the s t r i k e 
f o r the NUM had faded. I t was c l e a r t h a t "General Winter" was not going to 
come to the rescue. I n a h u m i l i a t i n g climbdown a t the end of January, 
A r t h u r S c a r g i l l admitted t h a t t h e r e would be no power c u t s . I t was i n t h i s 
context t h e r e f o r e t h a t the a c t i o n s of people conteicplating r e t u r n i n g to 
work e a r l y i n the New Year must be placed. 
6 . 4 . i i STARVED BACK TO WORK? 
Making g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s about l a r g e groups of workers i s never easy. To the 
people concerned, d i v e r s i t y o f t e n appears t o swan^J s i m i l a r i t y . Threading a 
way through t h i s coirplex s o c i a l world i n v o l v e s s a c r i f i c e s i n d e t a i l f o r the 
sake of t h e o r e t i c a l c l a r i t y . I n t h i s case, the t a s k i s to d i f f e r e n t i a t e 
w i t h i n the l a r g e group of miners and mechanics i n the "middle ground". 
S e v e r a l key q u e s t i o n s emerge. Why d i d some people go back, when others d i d 
Chapter 6 (222) 
not? Were t h e r e fundamental d i f f e r e n c e s i n ideology between those who 
s t a y e d out and those who d i d not, or d i d minor d i f f e r e n c e s i n personal 
s i t u a t i o n s e x p l a i n p a t t e r n s of s t r i k e breaking? Undoubtedly t h e r e were 
d i f f e r e n c e s between those who went back, and those who didn't. The r e a l 
q u e s t i o n though, i s whether these d i f f e r e n c e s were more s i g n i f i c a n t than 
t h e d i f f e r e n c e s between many people who d i d not go back! 
W h i l s t Rop Naylor went back to work hoping to c o l l a p s e the s t r i k e i n 
Murton, o t h e r s had l e s s ambitious motives. Many people agreed t h a t t h e r e 
was a d i s t i n c t i o n ( i n p r a c t i c e a c o n t i n u a l g r a d a t i o n ) , between a number of 
people who wanted an excuse to go back (see s e c t i o n 6 . 3 . i i i ) , and another 
group of men who had simply reached the end of t h e i r endurance - t h e i r 
l o y a l t y had been s t r e t c h e d to breaking p o i n t . Crudely speaking, people i n 
the f i r s t group went back before people i n the l a t t e r group. 
The q u e s t i o n of redundancy i s a c r u c i a l one, and demonstrates once again 
the d i v i s i v e in^iact of the redundancy scheme i n s p l i t t i n g the union's ranks 
(see a l s o chapter f i v e ) . S e c t i o n 6 . 3 . i i i has a l r e a d y shown how many miners 
went back l o o k i n g f o r redundancy. There i s no doubt t h a t many, many ol d e r 
miners went back to work i n the hope and e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t they could get 
redundancy. They saw i t as a way of c l e a r i n g t h e i r debts, and escaping from 
the b i t t e r l egacy of the s t r i k e . But as the s t r i k e dragged on, more and 
more men j u s t f e l t t h e i r r e s o l v e c o l l a p s e . A combination of f a c t o r s 
overwhelmed t h e i r l o y a l t y , and t h e i r f e a r of the p i c k e t l i n e . Often i t was 
something apparently t r i v i a l t h a t provided the f i n a l t r i g g e r (see appendix 
nine f o r more d e t a i l e d comments based on i n t e r v i e w s with miners i n the 
"middle ground"). 
F o r o t h e r s , t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s d u r i n g the s t r i k e c r e a t e d a s i t u a t i o n where 
they were e f f e c t i v e l y f o r c e d back. The s t r i k e didn't only spawn a c u l t u r e 
of c o l l e c t i v e s o l i d a r i t y . Some s t r i k e r s turned entrepreneur, s e l l i n g c o a l 
s t o l e n from p i t heaps, or running poaching b u s i n e s s e s . Others pinched c o a l 
j u s t to keep t h e i r own f i r e s burning. But i f the NCB caught men pinching 
c o a l , or performing other o f f e n c e s , they were threatened with d i s m i s s a l i f 
they d i d n ' t r e t u r n t o work. One a n t i - s t r i k e d i e h a r d remembered one of the 
p i c k e t s coming back t o work f o r t h i s reason, shaking with t e a r s i n the 
knowledge t h a t h i s comrades would never speak to him again. 
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I n t he l a s t weeks, as the government drove hard f o r t o t a l v i c t o r y , and 
union l e a d e r s s t i l l r e f u s e d to buckle, the rank and f i l e f i n a l l y made the 
d e c i s i o n f o r them. As each desperate i n i t i a t i v e f a i l e d - i n v o l v i n g the TUC, 
appealing to the church, r e s u r r e c t i n g the NACODS d e a l - more and more 
miners decided t h a t u n l e s s they took the l e a d then the s t r i k e would never 
end. T r a v e l l e r s were most s u s c e p t i b l e . As the union organised l a s t d i t c h 
meetings i n the communities t o t r y and r a l l y support, i t was c l e a r t h a t the 
s t r i k e would crumble. A s t r i k e r d e s c r i b e d one such meeting: 
" I went t o t h i s meeting, and we were t r y i n g to t a l k our 
opinion over. What we thought about the s t r i k e . And we 
couldn't get a word i n . . . A l l these young l a d s was j u s t 
s t anding a t the f r o n t - what we c a l l e d ' b u l l y boys' -
j u s t shouting back a t us. 'Get your bloody s e l v e s 
home.' You know, other language... 
" A l l the men were saying: 'Whey, i t ' s time we were back 
t o bloody work!' ' J u s t keep hanging on' - t h a t ' s a l l 
[the union] ever s a i d ! They didn't g i v e you any l i g h t 
or anything! They j u s t s a i d : 'keep hanging on l a d s . 
We' r e f i g h t i n g f o r you.' We could hear what was going 
on - t h e r e was nothing going on... There's men walked 
out of t h a t meeting and went back to work!" (interview) 
Going through the p i c k e t l i n e was a t e r r i b l e experience though. 
" I t was a hard d e c i s i o n t h a t . One of the worst 
d e c i s i o n s - I ' d not say the worst - but one of the 
hardest d e c i s i o n s I ' v e ever made i n my l i f e . You 
couldn't r e a l i s e how I f e l t when I went back. I t was 
t e r r i b l e . Oh God, I f e l t s i c k ! I could have spewed up! 
When we got i n , and the others were t a l k i n g and t h a t , I 
couldn't t a l k . I j u s t f e l t s i c k . Con^jletely drained." 
( i n t e r v i e w ) 
These words came from a man who supported f i g h t i n g a g a i n s t p i t c l o s u r e s , 
and who had voted f o r S c a r g i l l i n 1982. Although he was no m i l i t a n t l e f t 
winger, he wanted to support the union, and f i g h t f o r jobs. By the end 
though, h i s l o y a l t y crumbled as the s t r i k e l o s t a l l sense f o r him. F i g h t i n g 
on i n a s m a l l v i l l a g e w i t h j u s t a few other s t r i k e r s , no contact with the 
union, confused and i n c r e a s i n g l y desperate, he f i n a l l y succumbed to the 
massive s o c i a l p r e s s u r e , and went through the p i c k e t l i n e . 
By c o n t r a s t , a mechanic who h e l d s i m i l a r views about the s t r i k e - although 
he opposed Art h u r S c a r g i l l - n e v e r t h e l e s s stayed on s t r i k e . He l i v e d i n 
Murton and had s a t on the branch committee, and h i s l o y a l t y ran too deep to 
go through a p i c k e t l i n e , as h i s wife - who opposed the s t r i k e - b i t t e r l y 
r e c a l l e d . 
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"You might not have been a S c a r g i l l i t e , but how many 
times d i d you defend him during the s t r i k e ? How many 
times would you not have anything s a i d a g a i n s t him i n 
here? Or was t h a t j u s t the union? Was i t because he was 
l e a d e r of t h e union and you didn't want anything bad 
s a i d about the union?" ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
I n a s k i n g the question, she answered i t . Her husband didn't l i k e being on 
s t r i k e , he didn't agree w i t h the way i t was c a l l e d , but he couldn't 
conteii:5>late breaking h i s l o y a l t y . 
I d e o l o g i c a l l y however l i t t l e s eparated t h i s mechanic from the Trimdon man 
who d i d go back - but h i s p e r s o n a l s i t u a t i o n was d i f f e r e n t . He l i v e d i n a 
community which was s t i l l almost c o i t ^ l e t e l y on s t r i k e ; he came from a small 
branch which had a s m a l l e r percentage of men back than the miners, and h i s 
p a s t involvement i n the branch strengthened t r a d i t i o n a l bonds of l o y a l t y to 
the union. These f a c t o r s overcame h i s w i f e ' s p a s s i o n a t e h o s t i l i t y to the 
s t r i k e , and h i s own a n t i p a t h y t o i t s conduct. I t i s apparent t h e r e f o r e t h a t 
w h i l s t r e t u r n i n g to work was, from a p r a c t i c a l p oint of view a d e v a s t a t i n g 
departure from t r a d i t i o n a l norms, s i g n a l l i n g an immense emotional 
s e p a r a t i o n from those t h a t s t a y e d out, i t sprang from a s i m i l a r i d e o l o g i c a l 
background t o the mechanic d i s c u s s e d above, who didn't go back. 
Returnees never f a i l e d to t e l l me t h a t t h e r e were hundreds of men queuing 
up t o go back when the s t r i k e was c a l l e d o f f . I t was a point confirmed by 
management, and acknowledged by s t r i k e a c t i v i s t s . Another week and hundreds 
more miners and mechanics would have been marked as scabs. By the end of 
the s t r i k e , l o c a l p i c k e t l i n e s had l o s t some of t h e i r m y s t i c a l potency i n 
the f a c e of r o u t i n e and r e p e t i t i v e media coverage of s t r i k e breaking. A 
c l i m a t e had been c r e a t e d which lowered the p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e s i s t a n c e to 
"scabbing" among s t r i k e r s r a p i d l y becoming desperate. I n these conditions 
i t was p e r s o n a l circumstances more than fundamental i d e o l o g i c a l cleavages 
which marked the d e c i s i o n to r e t u r n . 
Summoning up a l l h i s con^assion two y e a r s a f t e r the s t r i k e , one a c t i v i s t 
produced t h i s memorable v e r d i c t on the p r e s s u r e s t h a t f o r c e d some men -
e s p e c i a l l y t r a v e l l e r s - back to work. I t i s a testament which g r a p h i c a l l y 
c a p t u r e s the p l i g h t of men i n the o u t l y i n g v i l l a g e s . 
"Some of them were desperate when they returned to 
work. Some men who d e f i n i t e l y I ' d never c a l l a scab. 
They gave f a r more to the s t r i k e than I ever gave. 
T h e i r wives and k i d s l e f t them. They s o l d e v e r y t h i n g 
out of the house. They were on the verge of nervous 
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breakdowns. Them men weren't scabs. They went back to 
work out of d e s p e r a t i o n . 
"They gave more than I gave. My wife never l e f t me - my 
w i f e supported me. I never had t o s e l l owt from the 
house... And I had the support of me f a m i l y . . . I wasn't 
f a c e d w i t h the mental problems or f o r t h a t matter 
f i n a n c i a l problems t h a t some men were s u b j e c t e d to. I 
p i c k e t e d every day of the s t r i k e , got £2 every day f o r 
p i c k e t i n g , which I gave to irty w i f e . That helped out a 
b i t . . . 
"But some of them boys i n o u t l y i n g areas who didn't 
have the b e n e f i t of being p a r t of a l a r g e body of 
a c t i v e p i c k e t s - which cheered you up at times when you 
were down - you know, i t must have been t e r r i b l e f o r 
them. To wake every morning, s w i t c h the t e l e v i s i o n on -
no more progress, s t r i k e s t i l l on, no end to i t . 
MacGregor s a y i n g he's not going to coirpromise, S c a r g i l l 
s a y i n g he's not going t o coirpromise. F i n a n c i a l problems 
mounting. Wives nagging. Kids without shoes. And as you 
say, i s o l a t e d . Nobody to t a l k to, other than among 
themselves. Holding t h e i r own s o r t of l i t t l e meetings 
i n t h e i r own community..." ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
Looking back, i t wasn't so s u r p r i s i n g t h a t some of them buckled. 
By the beginning of March 1985, the t r i c k l e back to work had f i n a l l y become 
a f l o o d . I n Durham, Eppleton - p a r t of the same Hawthorn Combine as Murton, 
and one of the most vigorous p i c k e t i n g p i t s - c o l l a p s e d i n l e s s than a week 
( t a b l e 6.2, graph 13a) . Morale pliunmeted. A hard core of miners and 
mechanics p i c k e t s wanted d e s p e r a t e l y to f i g h t on, " f o r e v e r " i f necessary. 
But now the numbers sweeping p a s t t h e i r own in^jotent p i c k e t l i n e were 
m u l t i p l y i n g . On March 3rd, a b i t t e r n a t i o n a l s p e c i a l delegate conference 
voted narrowly to r e t u r n t o work without a settlement. A f t e r almost e x a c t l y 
one year, i t was a l l over. 
At Murton, about 350 had broken the s t r i k e - 25% of the workforce. But 
almost h a l f went back i n the l a s t week, as the s t r i k e f e l l a part. Only a 
few dozen of the r e t u r n e e s came from w i t h i n Murton. Elsewhere i n the Area, 
only Easington, S a c r i s t o n and Horden were more s o l i d . Westoe showed a 
s i m i l a r " s t r i k e p r o f i l e " , w h i l s t p i t s l i k e Herrington, Seaham and Wearmouth 
had w e l l over h a l f t h e i r workforces back a t work. Murton was kept 
r e l a t i v e l y s o l i d because the branch l e a d e r s h i p s ' committed and vigorous 
support f o r the s t r i k e r a i s e d the t h r e s h o l d a t which s t r i k e r s l o y a l t y caved 
i n . S o c i a l networks of support were underdeveloped i n o u t l y i n g v i l l a g e s , 
consequently the t h r e s h o l d f o r t r a v e l l e r s was o f t e n lower. 
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6.5: CONCLUSION 
I n 1984 the NUM f a c e d a s t a t e onslaught because the s t a t e was l e a d i n g an 
ambitious s t r a t e g y t o r e f a s h i o n c a p i t a l - l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s i n B r i t a i n . A 
p a r t i c u l a r postwar i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the balance of c l a s s f o r c e s -
symbolised i n many r e s p e c t s by the NCB and the NUM - was being taken apart. 
(The reasons f o r t h i s have been examined i n chapters two and four.) I n t h i s 
c hapter the course of the 1984/5 s t r i k e a t Murton c o l l i e r y has been 
i n v e s t i g a t e d . T h i s p e r i o d saw r a p i d p o l i t i c a l change i n both branches of 
the NUM a t Murton. I t was during the s t r i k e t h a t Murton's reputation 
changed so d r a m a t i c a l l y , as the o l d r i g h t wing l o s t c o n t r o l to the young 
a c t i v i s t s who were g a l v a n i s e d i n t o a c t i o n by the dispute. The post war 
indulgency p a t t e r n wasn't j u s t d i s t u r b e d , i t was destroyed. I n t h i s 
context, the way was open f o r massive changes i n the p o l i t i c a l 
understandings of miners and mechanics a t Murton. 
Although only about 25% of Murton's workforce broke the s t r i k e , i t i s c l e a r 
t h a t the d i s p u t e r e f l e c t e d and generated important p o l i t i c a l d i v i s i o n s 
w i t h i n the miners' and mechanics' branches. These d i v i s i o n s grew out of the 
s i t u a t i o n before the s t r i k e , where the postwar p a t t e r n of management-labour 
r e l a t i o n s had been d e s t a b i l i s e d , l e a d i n g to l e f t w a r d d r i f t s i n both 
branches. The s t a r t of the s t r i k e i n Murton c l o s e l y r e f l e c t e d the d i f f e r i n g 
p o l i t i c a l conf>lexions of the two lodges, with the mechanics' l e a d e r s h i p 
d e c i s i v e l y u rging support f o r the s t r i k e , w h i l s t the miners voted a t a 
stormy meeting t o work on. Nevertheless, the mechanics p i c k e t l i n e was 
never c h a l l e n g e d by the miners, and a week a f t e r the s t a r t of the s t r i k e 
a l l b a r one of the miners voted a t a meeting t o j o i n the s t r i k e . Following 
the s t a r t of the s t r i k e , the l e f t achieved a shaky m a j o i r t y on the miners' 
committee, but the branch remained d i v i d e d . 
Q u i c k l y the s t r i k e r s s e p a rated i n t o a m i n o r i t y of committed a c t i v i s t s , a 
t i n y number of a n t i - s t r i k e diehards, and the m a j o r i t y occupying the middle 
ground. Looking f i r s t a t the a c t i v i s t s , I showed how - p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the 
miners' lodge - the s t r i k e c a l l e d f o r t h a remarkable surge i n enthusiasm 
and commitment from young miners. I r e l a t e d t h i s u n i n h i b i t e d involvement to 
younger miners remoteness from the consensus p o l i t i c s of the post war e r a . 
I n c o n t r a s t , a s m a l l number of o l d e r p i c k e t s were i n v o l v e d p r e c i s e l y 
because of t h e i r deep d e s i r e t o defend the post war "indulgency p a t t e r n " , 
both i n i t s l o c a l and n a t i o n a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n s . 
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Looking a t a n t i - s t r i k e diehards, I i d e n t i f i e d two d i s t i n c t groups. The 
f i r s t was made up of i s o l a t e d t r a v e l l e r s . I noted how thoroughly they had 
absorbed the r h e t o r i c of the government's antiunion propaganda. I a l s o 
e x p l o r e d the s p e c i f i c j u s t i f i c a t i o n s they o f f e r e d f o r t h e i r a c t i o n s , and 
r e l a t e d them to the government's a s s a u l t on the s t r i k e ' s l e g i t i m a c y , and i n 
p a r t i c u l a r the i s s u e s of the "missing" b a l l o t , union c o r r u p t i o n and p i c k e t 
v i o l e n c e . F o r the s e men, going back t o work hinged on opportunity, not 
hardship . The t h r e a t of communal s a n c t i o n h e l d them out u n t i l the s t r i k e 
had been s u f f i c i e n t l y d e l e g i t i m i s e d a t n a t i o n a l l e v e l to bypass the 
community l e v e l . 
A second group of a n t i - s t r i k e diehards were based i n Murton, although many 
d i d not break i t . Within a community atmosphere the t h r e a t of sanctions 
h e l d them back. But they a g i t a t e d a g a i n s t the s t r i k e almost from the s t a r t . 
Redundancy became an i n c r e a s i n g l y s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r i n undermining 
c o l l e c t i v e support f o r the cait$)aign a g a i n s t job l o s s , because i t encouraged 
a f i n a n c i a l l y rewarding i n d i v i d u a l option. Many s t r i k e r s were tenpted by 
the b e l i e f t h a t going back to work would p l a c e them a t the head of the 
queue f o r redundancy. Such i n s t r u m e n t a l approach to a c t i o n was r e l a t e d to 
the economistic approach of the NUM, and the f a i l u r e of the branch 
l e a d e r s h i p over many y e a r s to impose norms of c o l l e c t i v e s o l i d a r i t y and 
s a c r i f i c e i n a union dominated by faceworkers. 
The temptation of redundancy a p p l i e d a l s o f o r many s t r i k e r s i n the middle 
ground. U n l i k e the a n t i - s t r i k e diehards, most of these people supported the 
b a s i c aims of the s t r i k e . The ones I i n t e r v i e w e d expressed a deep antipathy 
f o r the Thatcher-MacGregor a t t a c k on jobs and the union. I f they broke the 
s t r i k e , i t was due i n l a r g e measure to desperation. Whether t h e i r l o y a l t y 
was s t r e t c h e d beyond breaking point depended on a con^lex web of s o c i a l and 
p e r s o n a l f a c t o r s . Broadly speaking, the l a c k of community support i n 
t r a v e l l i n g a r e a s , and the f a i l u r e of the union to bridge the gap to the 
v i l l a g e s , undermined the support networks which s u s t a i n e d people on s t r i k e 
i n Murton. T h i s was a c r u c i a l f a i l u r e by the union, because so much of the 
s t r i k e was about the defence of a p a r t i c u l a r c o l l e c t i v i s t notion of 
community and c l a s s . Many t r a v e l l e r s d i d not connect with t h i s s t r a n d of 
the s t r i k e . 
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I n the f o l l o w i n g chapter, the i i t ^ l i c a t i o n s of the s t r i k e f o r p o l i t i c a l 
development w i t h i n the miners' and mechanics' branches are c a r r i e d through 
i n t o the post s t r i k e p e r i o d . 
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TABLE 6.1; NCB FORECAST DEEP MINED REVENUE OUTPUT, MARCH 198^, 
AREA 1983/^^ 2 198it/5 DIFFERENCE 
S c o t t i s h 5.9 5.15 - 0.75 
North E a s t 11.9 10.5 - 1 
North Y o r k s h i r e 9.1 9.3 + 0.2 
Doncaster 6.3 6.3 -
Barnsley 8.0 8.2 + 0.2 
South Y o r k s h i r e 7.6 7.1 - 0.5 
North Derbyshire 7.5 7.5 -
North Nottingham 12.0 12.0 -
South Nottingham 7,7 7.2 - 0.5 
South Midlands 7.^ 7.1 - 0.3 
Western 10.7 10.3 - 0.^ 
South Wales 7.3 6.75 - 0.55 
Great B r i t a i n 101 .'4 97.^ - ^ .0 
1 EstiiTiated production f o r 52 weeks, adjusted for overtime ban lo s s e s 
( m i l l i o n tonnes). 
2 Budgeted production f o r 198^^/5 ( m i l l i o n tonnes). 
Source: Report to NUM's NEC meeting, 9-3-8^. 
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TABLE 6.2: NCB BACK TO U U R K FIGURES. 
NCB UNIT, TOTAL TOTAL NUMBER OF RETURNEES 
(1) 1984 1985 - — > 
21-11 15-1 22-1 29-1 5-2 13-2 19-2 26-2 
DAWDON 17^2 14 119 157 183 240 285 306 425 
EASINGTDN 2173 28 42 52 57 61 61 65 100 
EPPLETON 865 11 42 82 109 180 226 254 404 
HAWTHORN 296 6 20 20 36 47 61 59 107 
MURTON 1503 17 74 78 91 110 131 120 250 
HERRINGTON 6^2 27 286 338 357 386 411 420 469 
HORDEN/BLACKHALL IIS'^ 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 9 
PHILADELPHIA ^70 112 N/A 318 363 382 406 404 411 
SACRISTON 201 0 0 1 1 7 7 10 15 
SEAHAM/VT 1339 93 308 261 388 448 531 567 730 
TURSDALE 430 188 264 265 257 276 284 233 276 
WEARMOUTH 2062 200 526 664 716 748 1075 1133 1361 
WESTOE 2088 39 115 153 180 211 228 236 283 
SOURCE: Newcastle Journal f o r dates quoted. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: MURTON SINCE THE STRIKE 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter f i v e showed how the "cosy r e l a t i o n s h i p s " of union-management 
r e l a t i o n s were d e s t a b i l i s e d as the s t a t e i n s p i r e d management s t r a t e g y 
a l t e r e d the age and r e s i d e n t i a l c o n p o s i t i o n of the workforce, and p l a c e d 
Murton's f u t u r e i n jeopardy. I n the miners' branch, the l e f t was becoming 
an i n c r e a s i n g l y i n f l u e n t i a l f o r c e , but t h e r e were sharp d i v i s i o n s between 
t h i s ascendant f o r c e and r i g h t wing t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s . I n the mechanics' 
branch, l e f t wing p r e s s u r e swung the committee l e f t , and turned i t i n t o an 
e f f e c t i v e campaigning u n i t . Chapter s i x showed t h a t during the s t r i k e , the 
a c t i v i s t p i c k e t s became the dominant f o r c e i n both branches through t h e i r 
t o t a l commitment t o the d i s p u t e . Former r i g h t wing elements conplained 
b i t t e r l y about the s t r i k e , but few dared c r o s s p i c k e t l i n e s . I n o u t l y i n g 
communities, the b a t t l e f o r t h e "middle ground" ended w i t h the m a j o r i t y 
s t i l l h o l d i n g s o l i d , but on the b r i n k of g i v i n g up, and t h e r e was no doubt 
t h e union had s u f f e r e d a d e v a s t a t i n g defeat. 
I n t h i s chapter, the p e r i o d s i n c e the s t r i k e i s analysed. With the defeat 
of the s t r i k e , the post war settlement a t both n a t i o n a l l e v e l , and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the c o a l i n d u s t r y , was - to a l l i n t e n t s and purposes -
f i n a l l y l a i d to r e s t . The government was i n t e n t on . inposing a new 
s e t t l e m e n t i n the c o a l i n d u s t r y , c o n p a t i b l e with t h e i r g eneral aims of 
s h a k i n g out supposed labour market r i g i d i t i e s , and i n c r e a s i n g the 
f l e x i b i l i t y of labour. I n the previous two chapters, the l e f t wing s h i f t i n 
Murton's branch p o l i t i c s was l o c a t e d w i t h i n a context of d e s t a b i l i s a t i o n 
which i n many senses favoured l e f t wing a c t i v i s t s . I n t h i s chapter, the 
e x e r c i s e of agency i s l o c a t e d w i t h i n a f a r l e s s favourable context. 
D e s p i t e t h i s context, and w i t h i n a s h r i n k i n g c o a l f i e l d , Murton has 
c o n s o l i d a t e d i t s r e p u t a t i o n as the most l e f t wing p i t i n the North E a s t . I n 
t h e only NUM a r e a t o change d e c i s i v e l y from r i g h t to l e f t s i n c e the s t r i k e , 
Murton pr o v i d e s a r c h e t y p a l exanples of t h i s change a t a branch l e v e l . I n 
both branches t h e s t r i k e a c c e l e r a t e d and brought out i n t o the open th e 
l e f t w a r d s h i f t which had begun i n the e a r l y 1980's. The miners e l e c t e d an 
overwhelmingly l e f t wing committee, dominated by the young s t r i k e l e a d e r s . 
The mechanics' committee was l e d i n c r e a s i n g l y by Dave Tenple and the l e f t , 
and they b u i l t on l i n k s e s t a b l i s h e d during the s t r i k e to c r e a t e a very 
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c l o s e working r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two branches. P o l i t i c a l l y they moved 
l e f t together. 
With the union beaten n a t i o n a l l y , t h i s was a tiniquely h o s t i l e environment 
f o r t h e l e f t t o f l o u r i s h i n . D e s t r o y i n g l e f t wing t r a d e unionism was a f t e r 
a l l one of t h e government's c e n t r a l aims during the s t r i k e . So why d i d the 
union go l e f t so d e c i s i v e l y ? What were the d e c i s i v e l o c a l f a c t o r s , and how 
d i d they i n t e r a c t w i t h events a t a n a t i o n a l l e v e l ? 
With the s t r i k e broken, management pushed hard t o r e - e s t a b l i s h the r i g h t to 
manage, and enact t h e i r s t r a t e g y f o r modernising the i n d u s t r y . T h i s f i t t e d 
i n t o the government's aim of r e s t o r i n g d e - p o l i t i c i s e d market c r i t e r i a at 
t h e c e n t r e of the i n d u s t r y ' s operation. The f i r s t p a r t of t h i s chapter 
( s e c t i o n 7.1) examines the d e t a i l of NCB/BC s t r a t e g y , c o n c e n t r a t i n g on the 
d r i v e t o subordinate labour under a new management regime. I n the second 
p a r t of the chapter ( s e c t i o n 7.2), Murton i s l o c a t e d w i t h i n t h i s s t r a t e g y . 
The s u r v i v a l of the p i t depended fundamentally on i t s a b i l i t y to meet 
f i n a n c i a l t a r g e t s , so i n the immediate post s t r i k e p e r i o d the p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
f o r s u r v i v a l looked bleak. 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , the union s e t about r e b u i l d i n g i t s s t r e n g t h . Branch p o l i t i c s 
were r a d i c a l l y a f f e c t e d by the d e c i s i o n of almost a l l the o l d r i g h t wing 
elements t o take redundancy. T h i s l e f t young miners n u m e r i c a l l y dominant. 
J u s t as i n p o r t a n t l y , i t removed the only p o s s i b l e focus f o r an a l t e r n a t i v e 
approach to t h a t o f f e r e d by the l e f t . The e f f e c t s of post s t r i k e changes i n 
p e r s o n n e l a r e d i s c u s s e d i n s e c t i o n 7.3. Despite these c o n d i t i o n s , the l e f t 
was h e a v i l y c o n s t r a i n e d by management's dominance. I n s e c t i o n 7.4, the 
a b r a s i v e p o s t - s t r i k e i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s s i t u a t i o n a t Murton i s explored, 
v i a a n a l y s i s of the main bouts of s t r i k e a c t i o n to h i t the c o l l i e r y s i n c e 
t h e end of t h e 1984/5 d i s p u t e . T h i s a n a l y s i s shows t h a t t o some extent 
management s t r a t e g y rebounded because i t provided c o n d i t i o n s where s t r i k e s 
were almost i n e v i t a b l e . 
F i n a l l y , having i d e n t i f i e d branch l e a d e r s h i p as the key v a r i a b l e a f f e c t i n g 
t h e d i r e c t i o n of p o l i t i c a l change a t the l o c a l l e v e l , I examine t h i s 
h y p o t h e s i s by a n a l y s i n g the major b a l l o t s i n v o l v i n g the Murton branch s i n c e 
the s t r i k e . T h i s a n a l y s i s confirms t h a t the a b i l i t y of committed and u n i t e d 
branch l e a d e r s h i p s t o wage e f f e c t i v e campaigns i n the p i t i s c r u c i a l i n 
a f f e c t i n g rank and f i l e p o l i t i c s where they matter most - i n a c t i o n . 
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7.1: BRITISH COAL AND THE POST STRIKE ENVIRONMENT 
Chapter four a n a l y s e d the changing p r e s s u r e s on the NCB i n the pe r i o d 
b e f o r e 1984. E s s e n t i a l l y , changes i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l production, t r a n s p o r t 
and communications technology had s e r i o u s l y eroded what was p r e v i o u s l y a 
v i r t u a l n a t u r a l monopoly f o r the NCB w i t h i n the B r i t i s h market f o r c o a l . 
Furthermore, government p o l i c i e s had c o n t r i b u t e d to a dramatic c o n t r a c t i o n 
i n t he market f o r c o a l i n two r e s p e c t s : f i r s t , by inducing a massive 
r e c e s s i o n i n 1980/81, and secondly, by v i g o r o u s l y encouraging adoption of 
non c o a l burning energy options, i n c l u d i n g n u c l e a r power. I n c r e a s i n g 
eicposure t o p r i c e c o n ^ t i t i o n (due t o government p o l i c i e s ) c o n ^ l l e d the 
NCB t o develop and adopt new technologies which provoked job l o s s v i a two 
p r o c e s s e s : higher p r o d u c t i v i t y i n low c o s t p i t s l e a d i n g to displacement of 
c a p a c i t y i n high c o s t a r e a s , and r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of jobs w i t h i n low c o s t 
p i t s . 
F o l l o w i n g the s t r i k e , which represented the NUM's attempt to block the 
i n t r o d u c t i o n of the NCB s t r a t e g y , management and the s t a t e began to pursue 
t h e i r aims w i t h renewed vigour. Having achieved a d e c i s i v e v i c t o r y over the 
NUM, the government pushed hard t o e s t a b l i s h the market as the b a s i c 
c r i t e r i a of economic d e c i s i o n making w i t h i n the i n d u s t r y . I n October 1985 
t h i s determination y i e l d e d the "New St r a t e g y f o r Coal", which was based on 
e l i m i n a t i n g s u b s i d i e s and producing c o a l a t s o - c a l l e d market p r i c e s (NCB, 
1985; MMC, 1988} . New c o n t r a c t s between the NCB and i t s major customer, the 
C e n t r a l E l e c t r i c i t y Generating Board (known as " J o i n t Understandings"), 
r e f l e c t e d the heightened commercial s p i r i t , w i t h annual i n c r e a s e s i n the 
"t r a n c h e s " of c o a l s o l d a t p r i c e s r e f l e c t i n g the p u t a t i v e p r i c e of c o a l i n 
a supposedly " f r e e " i n t e r n a t i o n a l market (CEGB, 1986: NCB & CEGB, 1986; see 
McCloskey, 1986 f o r c r i t i c i s m of the concept of a f r e e market i n world 
t r a d e d c o a l ) . The s u r v i v a l of c o l l i e r i e s was t h e r e f o r e l i n k e d more and more 
t o t h e i r a b i l i t y t o produce a t "market" p r i c e s , w i t h "c o s t per Gig a j o u l e " 
adopted as the key op e r a t i n g c r i t e r i a . Under t h i s new f i n a n c i a l regime, and 
wi t h t h e ev e n t u a l aim of p r i v a t i s a t i o n looming on the horizon, the NCB 
drove on w i t h t h e i r a g g r e s s i v e s t r a t e g y to promote o v e r a l l p r o f i t a b i l i t y . 
T h i s s t r a t e g y had two elements. The f i r s t was a t e c h n i c a l s t r a t e g y which 
aimed - through a major investment programme - t o p r o g r e s s i v e l y modernise 
a l l production u n i t s , equipping them with heavy duty fa c e machinery, 
improved underground t r a n s p o r t systems, e t c . Secondly, t h i s t e c h n i c a l 
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s t r a t e g y was matched w i t h a d r i v e towards new working p r a c t i c e s designed to 
operate t h i s new machinery as i n t e n s i v e l y as p o s s i b l e (see f o r the most 
famous statement. Wheeler, 1986). These i n t u r n were p r e d i c a t e d on a 
f u r t h e r r a d i c a l r e s t r u c t u r i n g of labour r e l a t i o n s , and i n p a r t i c u l a r the 
r e a s s e r t i o n of management's " r i g h t t o manage" (Taylor, 1988). 
7 . 1 . i BRITISH COAL'S^ STRATEGY: TECHNICAL ASPECTS 
Looking f i r s t a t BC's t e c h n i c a l s t r a t e g y , a number of p o i n t s are r e l e v a n t . 
F i r s t , and almost i n e v i t a b l y , investment has been concentrated i n low c o s t 
p i t s w i t h l a r g e r e s e r v e s . I n the North E a s t , which continues t o s u f f e r 
r e l a t i v e investment s t a r v a t i o n (see Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 
1988, 33-34), p i t s such as Murton have s t i l l not been equipped with many of 
t h e MINOS subsystems which were almost standard i n p a r t s of Nottinghamshire 
and Y o r k s h i r e f i v e y e a r s ago. Second, the t e c h n i c a l s t r a t e g y was 
i n d i v i s i b l e from t h e o v e r a l l s t r a t e g y f o r the i n d u s t r y . For example, p i t 
c l o s u r e s combined w i t h the c o n c e n t r a t i o n of production from heavy duty 
f a c e s t o i n c r e a s e p r o d u c t i v i t y , lower u n i t c o s t s , and maintain production 
w i t h a d r a s t i c a l l y reduced workforce (see t a b l e s 5.1, 5.2, 5.3; and graphs 
1, 2 and 3 ) . 
BC's way of l i n k i n g t h e s e p o i n t s was t o r e l a t e investment to a c t u a l and 
p r o j e c t e d production c o s t s when c o n s i d e r i n g investment a t a c o l l i e r y . Hence 
" c o s t per g i g a j o u l e ( G J ) " became the token by which a c o l l i e r y was judged. 
Cost g u i d e l i n e s were i n t r o d u c e d i n an a t t e n p t t o f o r c e production c o s t s 
i n t o l i n e w i t h a n t i c i p a t e d p r i c e c o n p e t i t i o n from overseas i n p o r t s . These 
were summarised by the Monopolies and Mergers Coimnission as follows (1988, 
17) : 
"a) c o l l i e r i e s unable t o produce c o n s i s t e n t l y below 
op e r a t i n g c o s t s of £1.65/GJ t o be c l o s e d as soon as 
p o s s i b l e ; 
b) i n c r e m e n t a l or a d d i t i o n a l output from e x i s t i n g 
c o l l i e r i e s must have o p e r a t i n g c o s t s no g r e a t e r than 
£1.00/GJ - t o prevent investment i n marginal output a t 
h i g h e r c o s t than short-term marginal revenues; and 
^Although the N a t i o n a l Coal Board (NCB) was not renamed B r i t i s h 
C oal (BC) u n t i l 1987, f o r the sake of c o n t i n u i t y I use B r i t i s h Coal f o r the 
r e s t of t h i s chapter. 
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c) major p r o j e c t expenditure would be undertaken only 
a t c o l l i e r i e s w i t h operating c o s t s below £1.50/GJ -
a f t e r t a k i n g account of c o s t s and b e n e f i t s of new 
investment." 
I n t h e North E a s t i n the post s t r i k e e r a , more p i t s f i t t e d i n t o the f i r s t 
c ategory than the l a s t two. 
F o l l o w i n g the "New S t r a t e g y f o r C o a l " i n 1985, BC's f i n a n c i a l framework was 
f u r t h e r t i g h t e n e d w i t h an agreement between S i r Robert Haslam (who r e p l a c e d 
I a n MacGregor as BC Chairman i n September 1986) and the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e 
f o r Energy. T h i s agreement ixapoaed f u r t h e r s t r i n g e n t f i n a n c i a l o b j e c t i v e s , 
i n c l u d i n g an i n s t r u c t i o n t o generate i n c r e a s i n g s u r p l u s on the revenue 
account i n order t o make investment s e l f - f i n a n c i n g a f t e r . 1988/9. I t a l s o 
e x p l i c i t l y r e i t e r a t e d t h a t production should be concentrated a t low c o s t 
u n i t s t o maximise p r o f i t z i b i l i t y ( i b i d , 17-18). Within t h i s framework the 
s o - c a l l e d "Wheeler P l a n " was adopted as the means to achieve s t r i n g e n t 
f i n a n c i a l o b j e c t i v e s (Wheeler, 1986). 
E s s e n t i a l l y t h e r e f o r e , BC's t e c h n i c a l s t r a t e g y was an attenpt to come to 
terms w i t h the f i n a n c i a l c o n s t r a i n t s imposed as a r e s u l t of government 
p o l i c y . However, most - i f not a l l - of the s t r a t e g i e s aspects were 
p r e d i c a t e d upon a d r a s t i c r e f a s h i o n i n g of labour r e l a t i o n s at a l l l e v e l s 
w i t h i n the i n d u s t r y , and a r e a s s e r t i o n of the r i g h t to manage. The NUM's 
def e a t had to be t r a n s l a t e d i n t o day to day c o n t r o l over the workforce. 
7 . 1 . i i BRITISH COAL'S STRATEGY: SOCIAL ASPECTS 
A f t e r t h e s t r i k e , management sought to r e a s s e r t i t s a u t h o r i t y , by 
d i s s o l v i n g the 40 y e a r o l d s t r u c t u r e of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s i n the 
i n d u s t r y (the 1946 C o n c i l i a t i o n Scheme). C o n s u l t a t i o n with the workforce 
v i a one c e n t r a l l y o r g a n i s e d xinion was e f f e c t i v e l y abandoned. The hallowed 
" r i g h t t o manage" demanded t h a t changes be imposed r a t h e r than negotiated, 
and market c r i t e r i a became the s o l e a r b i t e r of what should or should not be 
done. P i t c l o s u r e s - the immediate management pr e r o g a t i v e which 
p r e c i p i t a t e d the s t r i k e - were bulldoz e d through, provoking only f e e b l e 
union r e s i s t a n c e (see t a b l e 4.2 and graph 2 ) . Tens of thousands of miners 
took v o l u n t a r y redundancy, d i s i l l u s i o n e d with the i n d u s t r y , and desperate 
t o pay o f f the debts accumulated during a year long stoppage (see t a b l e 4.1 
and graph 1} . P i t s which had been a t the f o r e f r o n t of the s t r i k e , l i k e 
Cortonwood i n Y o r k s h i r e , and St Johns i n South Wales, voted i n d e s p a i r to 
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accept c l o s u r e without appealing to the independent review body s e t up by 
t h e d e a l which ended the NACODS t h r e a t of s t r i k e , a c t i o n i n September 1984 
(see chapter 6 ) . 
At the n a t i o n a l l e v e l , BC used the c r e a t i o n of the Union of Democratic 
Mineworkers (ODM) as a p r e t e x t to p u l l out of many 40 y e a r o l d 
c o n s u l t a t i o n and c o n c i l i a t i o n agreements w i t h the union. Most d r a m a t i c a l l y , 
t h i s i n v o l v e d u n i l a t e r a l l y withdrawing from the e n t i r e C o n c i l i a t i o n Scheme 
i n June 1986 (NUM Annual Report, 1986, 36) . T h i s new s t y l e was evident a t 
a l l l e v e l s of management, w i t h a r e a Boards and p i t managers pursuing 
s i m i l a r l y a g g r e s s i v e t a c t i c s (Winterton, 1988). A f t e r 1987, BC used the UDM 
t o f u r t h e r u s e f u l e f f e c t , by n e g o t i a t i n g pay r i s e s w i t h the breakaway 
\mion, and then u s i n g t h e s e d e a l s as p a c e s e t t e r s f o r the NUM, and by 
o f f e r i n g membership d e a l s t o the UDM where the NUM has r e f u s e d to accept 
f l e x i b l e working p r a c t i c e s (Taylor, 1988). 
I n order t o e x t r a c t the maximum c o s t b e n e f i t s from i t s c a p i t a l i n t e n s i v e 
investment s t r a t e g y , BC began to push f o r c e f u l l y f o r new, f l e x i b l e working 
p r a c t i c e s to be i n t r o d u c e d (Haslam, 1988) . I n the North E a s t f o r e x a s ^ l e , 
major investment i n the Wearmouth and Westoe complexes was t i e d to the 
acceptance of 9 hour s h i f t s (see report i n Newcastle Journal, May 27th 
1987) . With more than two hours of a seven and a q u a r t e r hour s h i f t 
sometimes spent on t r a v e l l i n g t o and from the c o a l face, 9 hour s h i f t s 
would i n c r e a s e machine u t i l i s a t i o n . But they a l s o threatened s a f e t y , as 
f a t i g u e i n c r e a s e d towards the end of the s h i f t s . I n the c e n t r a l c o a l f i e l d , 
enhanced machine u t i l i s a t i o n would be achieved v i a a move to s i x day 
2 
The UDM was formed i n November 1985, f o l l o w i n g the d e c i s i o n of 
an NUM S p e c i a l Delegate Conference i n J u l y 1985 to introduce a new r u l e 
book which was widely i n t e r p r e t e d as enhancing the c e n t r a l i s e d power of the 
union's NEC (National E x e c u t i v e Committee), and p a r t i c u l a r l y the 
P r e s i d e n t ' s p e r s o n a l power. The new union was formed a f t e r b a l l o t s 
conducted by s e v e r a l unions, w i t h the former Notts Area of the NUM by f a r 
t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t . The other t h r e e who j o i n e d were South Derbyshire (by 
a 51% m a j o r i t y ) , the C l e r i c a l and Surveyors group, and the Durham based 
C o l l i e r y Workers and A l l i e d Trades A s s o c i a t i o n (CWATA) - the l a t t e r formed 
mainly from Durham mechanics e x p e l l e d f o r s t r i k e breaking during the 
d i s p u t e . Membership of the UDM has always been a f i e r c e l y c o n t r o v e r s i a l 
q u e s t i o n - a t i t s peak i n 1985 i t may have topped 30000 (Adeney and Lloyd, 
1986 274), but t h e t r u e f i g u r e was almost c e r t a i n l y much lower. Today t h e r e 
a r e fewer than 16000 members, with a l l but a t i n y ramp concentrated i n 
Nottinghamshire (Taylor, 1988). 
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working. As w e l l as r e f l e c t i n g t e c h n i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , the proposals were 
a l s o p o w e r f u l l y l i n k e d t o a co n t i n u i n g s t r a t e g y to d i s o r g a n i s e r e s i s t a n c e 
w i t h i n the workforce. 
Although Robert Haslam p r o j e c t e d a l e s s a b r a s i v e image than h i s 
predecessor, BC's i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s p o l i c y d i l i g e n t l y pursued the 
o b j e c t i v e s e s t a b l i s h e d during I a n MacGregor's r e i g n . D i v i s i o n s w i t h i n the 
workforce were c o n s c i o u s l y manipulated, en a b l i n g management to c r i p p l e 
r e s i s t a n c e t o i t s p o l i c i e s . I n the aftermath of an e p i c s t r u g g l e , which 
ended i n b i t t e r d e f e a t , the NUM's l e f t wing - dominant s i n c e the e a r l y 
1980s - began t o s p l i n t e r . South Wales and Scotlan d - t r a d i t i o n a l l y two of 
the most l e f t wing a r e a s , i n c r e a s i n g l y opposed Arthur S c a r g i l l and the o l d 
l e f t wing l e a d e r s h i p . BC encouraged these d i v i s i o n s by c o n t i n u a l l y 
atten5)ting t o undermine t h e c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y of the xinion. 
F o r exaitple, the o f f e r t o i n v e s t £90 m i l l i o n i n a small new mine a t Margam 
i n South Wales ( " c r e a t i n g " about 900 jobs) was c a l c u l a t e d to d r i v e a wedge 
between the i n c r e a s i n g l y r e s t l e s s South Wales area l e a d e r s h i p , and the 
n a t i o n a l o f f i c i a l s . South Wales' l e a d e r s chose to support the conditions 
o f f e r e d by BC as p a r t of the Margam d e a l - notably s i x day working at the 
new mine - i n d e f i a n c e of n a t i o n a l union p o l i c y . An Area C o a l f i e l d 
Conference voted to support the move, but was overturned by the 1987 
n a t i o n a l conference, which r e j e c t e d f l e x i b l e working, and c a l l e d f o r a 
n a t i o n a l b a l l o t on the i s s u e . No b a l l o t was held, and i n 1989 the UDM 
agreed n e g o t i a t i n g r i g h t s w i t h BC f o r Margam ( F i n a n c i a l Times, 13th June, 
1989) . 
BC continued t o seek t o undermine the union by a concentrated d r i v e to 
bypass n a t i o n a l agreements and r e p l a c e them with a p r o l i f e r a t i o n of l o c a l l y 
agreed and o f t e n i n f o r m a l "agreements" ( F i n a n c i a l Times, J u l y 1 s t 1988; 
J u l y 14th 1988). I n doing so, they sought t o fragment opposition by 
o f f e r i n g d i f f e r e n t i a l rewards t o d i f f e r e n t groups of workers a t the same 
p i t , and workers a t d i f f e r e n t p i t s . Given the h i g h l y l i m i t e d resources 
a v a i l a b l e t o the n a t i o n a l union , n a t i o n a l c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n to achieve 
\ s w e l l as the heavy burden of defeat, the s t r i k e c r i p p l e d the 
NUM f i n a n c i a l l y . R e c e i v e r s h i p was only l i f t e d i n the summer of 1986, 
(Footnote Continued) 
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c o l l e c t i v e rewards was out of the question. The r e s u l t s were q u i c k l y f e l t . 
Some miners a t high p r o d u c t i v i t y , long l i f e c o l l i e r i e s were able to win 
s i g n i f i c a n t wage i n c r e a s e s . However, t h i s was o f t e n l i m i t e d to faceworkers, 
and wages d i f f e r e n t i a l s w i t h i n c o l l i e r i e s i n c r e a s e d . 
D e s p i t e the obvious f a c t t h a t t h e s e developments i n v a r i a b l y b e n e f i t e d BC 
more than miners ( f o r exanple, p r o d u c t i v i t y bonuses never i n c r e a s e d a t 
remotely the same r a t e as p r o d u c t i v i t y ) , many higher p a i d workers 
c a l c u l a t e d t h a t t h e i r o n l y chance of enhanced earnings l a y i n bypassing the 
\inion, a t n a t i o n a l , a r e a or branch l e v e l . BC encouraged t h i s view with i t s 
uncospromising r e f u s a l t o engage i n any c e n t r a l i s e d bargaining. There was 
an unambiguous d r i v e t o r e p l a c e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g a t every l e v e l of the 
i n d u s t r y w i t h d i r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n s with workers a t the point of production 
(see Winterton, 1988 f o r evidence from Y o r k s h i r e ) . As a r e s u l t , the b a s i s 
f o r any form of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n narrowed d r a s t i c a l l y . Only work group 
m i l i t a n c y i n c r e a s e d , as powerful groups of faceworkers ( f o r exaiif>le a t 
Selby) fought f o r t h e i r own narrowly s e c t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s . 
As f o r more ambitious union a c t i v i t y , the dramatic c o l l a p s e i n eiq>loyment 
f o l l o w i n g the s t r i k e , combined w i t h the heavy burden of defeat, both 
c o n s p i r e d to s t r i c t l y l i m i t the room f o r manoeuvre. The l e f t wing l e a d e r s 
who had formed a dominant a l l i a n c e before the s t r i k e q u i c k l y s p l i t . Arthur 
S c a r g i l l made a v i r t u e out of h i s continuing unconpromising opposition to 
BC and the government. With h i s few a l l i e s - which i n c l u d e d the newly 
e l e c t e d l e f t wing l e a d e r s h i p of the Durham miners, and p a r t of the 
Y o r k s h i r e l e a d e r s h i p - he sought to i s o l a t e the UDM, and to preach the need 
f o r m i l i t a n t a c t i o n t o defend jobs and c o n d i t i o n s . S t i l l with the backing 
of conference d e c i s i o n s , t h i s l e f t wing group fought to maintain the 
c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y of the union i n the f a c e of BC's a t t e i q i t s to fragment 
b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e s . 
(Footnote Continued) 
a l l o w i n g the union's t h r e e new t r u s t e e s ( i n c l u d i n g John Cummings, the 
mechanics' branch s e c r e t a r y a t Murton, and Parliamentary candidate f o r 
Easington) to t a k e c o n t r o l of i t s v a s t l y depleted r e s o u r c e s . Redundancies 
caused a c o l l a p s e i n membership, e x a c e r b a t i n g the f i n a n c i a l c r i s i s , which 
i s s t i l l acute now, i n 1989. 
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But many members of t h e p r e - s t r i k e l e f t - concentrated i n South Wales and 
Sc o t l a n d - argued w i t h i n c r e a s i n g boldness t h a t con^romises were needed 
(Howells, 1987). I n p a r t i c u l a r , they wanted t o ne g o t i a t e w i t h BC over 
f l e x i b l e working p r a c t i c e s , e s p e c i a l l y Margam ( D u t f i e l d , 1987), and to 
accept the presence o f the UDM i n n a t i o n a l n e g o t i a t i o n s ( F i n a n c i a l Times, 
May 7th 1987). I n doing so, they began t o form loose a l l i a n c e s with the o l d 
r i g h t wing. When t h e NUM t r i e d t o organ i s e an overtime ban i n p r o t e s t 
a g a i n s t BC's a u t h o r i t a r i a n new d i s c i p l i n a r y code i n l a t e 1987, both groups 
fought hard t o iindermine the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the ban ( s e c t i o n 7 . 6 . i v ) . 
When Arth u r S c a r g i l l fought f o r r e - e l e c t i o n as P r e s i d e n t of the NUM at the 
beginning of 1988, one r i g h t wing candidate stood a g a i n s t him, with the 
t a c i t support of formerly l e f t l e a d e r s i n Wales and Scotland ( s e c t i o n 
7.6.V). 
Although s p l i t s were u s u a l l y i d e n t i f i e d a t the area l e v e l , these 
g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s concealed i n p o r t a n t d i s s e n t i n g groups w i t h i n areas. For 
example, a t rank and f i l e l e v e l , the South Wales area s t i l l mustered 
c o n s i d e r a b l e support f o r t h e p o l i c i e s represented by Arthur S c a r g i l l , and 
when he stood f o r r e - e l e c t i o n voted f o r him by 61.2% to 38.8% (Taylor, 
1988, 232) . S i m i l a r l y , even though c o n t r o l of the Durham are a s h i f t e d t o 
the l e f t , t h e r e were s t i l l s i g n i f i c a n t pockets of opposition to t h i s l e f t 
wing s t a n c e . T y p i c a l l y , t h e s e pockets were found where l o c a l branch 
l e a d e r s h i p adopted a p o s i t i o n i n opposition to the area l e a d e r s h i p , f o r 
example a t Easington, where the branch l e a d e r s h i p had c l o s e c o ntacts with 
South Wales. 
BC succeeded t h e r e f o r e i n d r i v i n g important wedges i n t o the NUM l e a d e r s h i p . 
But d e s p i t e a l l the advantages they i t i h e r i t e d i n 1985, they were unable to 
t o t a l l y break union r e s i s t a n c e . The UDM stagnated, and then shrank even 
w i t h i n i t s Nottingham boundaries. The NUM organised overtime bans. F l e x i b l e 
working was s t i l l an o b j e c t i v e and not r e a l i t y , as the union r e t a i n e d j u s t 
enough coherence t o f r u s t r a t e attempts t o bypass n a t i o n a l p o l i c y . S t r i k e s 
continued t o plague the i n d u s t r y , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the v o l a t i l e Y o r k s h i r e 
a r e a (see Winterton, 1988 on Y o r k s h i r e w a l k o u t s ) . Within the union, 
moderate "new r e a l i s t s " were f a r from a c h i e v i n g the dominance they sought. 
The i n t e r p l a y of everyday events and the b a t t l e t o win miners t o p a r t i c u l a r 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s and a c t i o n was c l e a r l y v i s i b l e i n Murton i n the post s t r i k e 
e r a . T h e o r e t i c a l l y , the key questions r e v o l v e around the way i n which 
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conscious agents were ab l e t o operate i n a h o s t i l e environment, where i t 
was no longer t e n a b l e t o defend many of the arrangements c h a r a c t e r i s i n g the 
post war indulgency p a t t e r n . How d i d l e f t wing a c t i v i s t s maintain c o n t r o l 
i n the p o s t - s t r i k e e r a ? How d i d the workforce respond t o l e f t wing 
arguments i n t h e i r new s i t u a t i o n ? I n the f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n s , p o l i t i c a l 
developments i n the miners' and mechanics' branches are r e l a t e d to the 
developments d e s c r i b e d above. F i r s t however, Murton i s l o c a t e d w i t h i n the 
changed p o l i t i c s and geography of the Durham c o a l f i e l d . 
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7.2 MURTON UNDER THREAT 
With c o s t parameters now d e c l a r e d as the only c r i t e r i a f o r judging a p i t s 
f u t u r e , the remaining p i t s i n the Durham c o a l f i e l d came under heavy 
p r e s s u r e . F i v e c l o s e d i n two y e a r s , and the workforce was v i r t u a l l y halved. 
For two y e a r s Murton appeared under imminent t h r e a t of c l o s u r e (and now i n 
1989 t h e f u t u r e a g a i n seems u n c e r t a i n ) . T h i s s i t u a t i o n had two p o l i t i c a l 
e f f e c t s . F i r s t , i t l e d t o rock bottom morale a t work and i n the union; but 
secondly i t f a t a l l y undermined the chances of any a l t e r n a t i v e t o the l e f t 
l e a d e r s h i p developing i n the Murton branches. The manner i n which BC c l o s e d 
p i t s i n Durham was a major f a c t o r i n maintaining h o s t i l i t y towards the 
eii?>loyer, and provided th e l e f t w i t h powerful arguments to support t h e i r 
continued o p p o s i t i o n t o management. 
7.2. i DURHAM CLOSES DOWN 
Immediately the s t r i k e ended, s e v e r a l Durham p i t s were p l a c e d under t h r e a t 
of c l o s u r e . S a c r i s t o n , the l a s t of the West Durham c o l l i e r i e s was one of 
the f i r s t t o go. I t had been l i v i n g on borrowed time s i n c e the 1950'a*. 
Although the c o l l i e r y had d e l i v e r e d rock s o l i d support f o r the s t r i k e , 
t h e r e was no caspaign a g a i n s t the c l o s u r e . The men had stayed out because 
of an \ u i y i e l d i n g l o y a l t y t o the union, and they knew t h a t i f they l o s t the 
s t r i k e then t h e r e would be no chance f o r a c o l l i e r y l i k e t h e i r s ' . 
Herrington, although a t t r a c t i n g the t a g of "Durham's Cortonwood" e a r l y i n 
the s t r i k e (because i t was one of the f i v e named p i t s a t the March 1984 
meeting which helped p r e c i p i t a t e the s t r i k e ) , conprehensively broke the 
s t r i k e . I t accepted c l o s u r e i n 1985 wit h h a r d l y a whiii?>er of p r o t e s t (see 
map 1) . 
4 
P a r a d o x i c a l l y , S a c r i s t o n s t a y e d open because f o r y e a r s i t 
s u f f e r e d investment s t a r v a t i o n , which meant t h a t production c o s t s were very 
low. The c o a l produced was a high q u a l i t y coking c o a l which a t t r a c t e d a 
r e l a t i v e l y high p r i c e and t h e r e f o r e enhanced the c o l l i e r y ' s revenue. On 
t h i s b a s i s , t h e c o l l i e r y c a r r i e d on i n a v i r t u a l time warp from the pre-war 
y e a r s . When i t f i n a l l y shut i n December 1985, the men were s t i l l working 18 
i n c h seams, u s i n g "windy p i c k s " t o hammer the c o a l down, s h o v e l l i n g i t 
a c r o s s t h e i r bodies onto conveyor b e l t s , and us i n g p i t poixies f o r 
undergrovind t r a n s p o r t (see K r e i g e r , 1983) . 
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Despite these setbacks, the union fought a grim struggle against the 
closure of the once massive Horden mine. The f u l l story i s told i n graphic 
d e t a i l i n the report commissioned by the NUM to fight the closure (Beynon 
et a l , 1985)^. Despite the NCB's atten5>ts to avoid taking the closure to 
the f i n a l independent appeal stage of the Modified C o l l i e r y Review 
Procedure, t h e i r hand was forced as volunteers for redundancy and transfer 
dried up while the union caicpaign to save the p i t gathered momentum. BC 
were forced to announce Horden's closure. I t was then referred to the 
Independent Review Body (IRB) - set up as part of the settlement which 
persuaded NACODS to c a l l of t h e i r national s t r i k e threat i n 1984 (Feickert, 
1986, 4-9). Despite comprehensive evidence that BC had sabotaged the p i t 
with a se r i e s of c r i t i c a l decisions i n the early 1980's (see Beynon et a l . 
1985, 13-26, 32-34, 77-83) - presumably i n response to the loss of the key 
coking coal market - the IRB found (after hearing the case on January 
14th-16th, 1986) that whatever the h i s t o r i c a l background, Horden was no 
longer a viable c o l l i e r y . I t closed i n 1986. 
North of the Tyne, i n Northumberland, an equally b i t t e r battle was fought 
against closure at Bates C o l l i e r y . A week after the Horden IRB hearing, the 
f i n a l appeal was heard. But to general astonishment, the unions won i t . 
However, despite the verdict of the IRB that the p i t should be given a 
three year t r i a l period to prove i t s e l f , BC acted with calculated 
ruthlessness and announced a few weeks l a t e r that the p i t would close 
anyway. The message was clear. Any attespt to fight closure was doomed. 
Even i f the case was won, the p i t would close. The c r e d i b i l i t y of the IRB 
was f a t a l l y weakened. NACODS (who had cancelled t h e i r own st r i k e i n 1984 i n 
the b e l i e f that IRB decisions would be honoured) were humiliated. 
Meanwhile, the Hawthorn Combine (Murton, Eppleton and Hawthorn) was 
undergoing further reorganisation (following the closure of South Hetton 
before the s t r i k e - see chapter f i v e ) . In September 1985, BC forced the 
amalgamation of the Hawthorn and Murton branches of the NUM (miners and 
Almost as soon as the s t r i k e ended, BC began maneuvering to 
close the c o l l i e r y . I n an atteir?>t to bypass agreed procedures, BC 
designated Horden (along with Bates i n Northumberland) a "manpower 
reservoir". Any man wishing to transfer to a "long l i f e " p i t , or to take 
redundancy would be allowed to do so. I f so many men chose to that the p i t 
became unviable, i t would close. 
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mechanics), by c l o s i n g the Hawthorn s u r f a c e f a c i l i t i e s and announcing t h a t 
henceforward the combined workforce could be represented only by the Murton 
unions. Although the Hawthorn branches prot e s t e d , opposition was 
h a l f h e a r t e d , and the men succumbed to the t e s p t a t i o n of £1500 t r a n s f e r 
money. So the Hawthorn men were bussed from Murton back to t h e i r o l d jobs 
a t Hawthorn, and a t the end of the s h i f t they came r i d i n g back to the 
Murton baths. 
7 . 2 . i i THE END OF EPPLETON 
Even before the c l o s u r e of the Hawthorn s u r f a c e operation, i n August 1985 
BC had announced p l a n s t o r e o r g a n i s e the Hawthorn Combine i n t o a s i n g l e 
u n i t , sending a l l men and m a t e r i a l s down the Murton s h a f t s , and r a i s i n g a l l 
c o a l a t Hawthorn. Eppleton s u r f a c e was t o c l o s e , w i t h the l o s s of some 403 
jobs (Diamond, 1986, 14) . By now, rumours were r i f e t h a t the whole combine 
was f a c i n g imminent c l o s u r e . C e r t a i n l y i t s f i n a n c i a l performance ("the 
h e a v i e s t and most p e r s i s t e n t l o s s maker i n the North E a s t Area") p l a c e d i t 
i n t h e f r o n t l i n e of p i t s f a c i n g c l o s u r e (see t a b l e s 7.1, 7.14 and 7,15; 
and appendix 1 0 ) . 
The propo s a l s f o r Eppleton were h a r d l y new. They had f i r s t been mooted i n 
d i s c u s s i o n s between the union and management i n 1982. I t appeared t h a t i n 
the p r e - s t r i k e e r a BC didn't f e e l able t o push ahead with the plans because 
of the expected s t r o n g o p p o s i t i o n from the unions. T h i s was confirmed by 
the notorious BC pla n n i n g document l e a k e d during the s t r i k e . I t s a i d : 
"Area manpower i s p r o j e c t e d to reduce from the present 
l e v e l of j u s t over 22000 to around 16500 by 1987/8, 
p r o v i d i n g f o r the c l o s u r e of Bates, Brenkley [both i n 
Northumberland], Horden and S a c r i s t o n and a l s o rundown 
a t Hawthorn. By 1995/6 i t i s planned t h a t the t o t a l 
number of men w i l l have f a l l e n t o around 10000 t o serve 
the s i x remaining c o l l i e r i e s . Area a n t i c i p a t e maior 
i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s problems r e l a t e d to c l o s u r e and 
rundown a t the l a r g e c o l l i e r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
Hawthorn." (quoted i n Diamond, 1986, 12-13; enphasis 
added) 
A f t e r the s t r i k e , w i t h union r e s i s t a n c e t o p i t c l o s u r e s broken, BC pushed 
ahead w i t h i t s p l a n s f o r t h e Eppleton p a r t of the Combine. 
During the l a s t weeks of the s t r i k e , Eppleton's once e n e r g e t i c support f o r 
the s t r i k e c o l l a p s e d . The miners' branch l e a d e r s h i p l o s t h e a r t , and the 
demoralised workforce poured back to work. Eppleton's workforce was beaten 
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and a p a t h e t i c . At Murton however, the newly e l e c t e d miners' lodge 
s e c r e t a r y , Frank Duffy, was determined to ensure t h a t the South Hetton 
debacle would never happen again. South Hetton's c l o s u r e had been 
s a n c t i o n e d by the Murton branches, who voted not to cede any of t h e i r c o a l 
t o South Hetton (see c h a p t e r 5} . Having secured the branch committees 
support, Frank c a l l e d a s p e c i a l meeting of the miners' lodge, t o t r y and 
s t i f f e n the weakened Eppleton lodge's r e s i s t a n c e . He proposed a motion t h a t 
the lodge should s t r i k e i f Eppleton men t r a n s f e r r e d without f i g h t i n g t o the 
IRB. The t r a n s f e r e e s would be met by a p i c k e t l i n e . The meeting voted 
unanimously t o support t h e l e a d from the platform^. 
Eppleton miners - under p r e s s u r e from Murton - took t h e i r case a l l the way 
t o t h e IRB. BC argued t h a t without c l o s u r e the whole combine would have t o 
c l o s e . I n the absence of a mining p l a n from the unions promoting the 
v i a b i l i t y of Eppleton as a s e p e r a t e u n i t , the IRB concluded t h a t Eppleton 
should c l o s e t o p r o t e c t the f u t u r e of the p i t as a whole (Diamond, 1986) . 
With the c l o s u r e of Eppleton came the adoption by BC of the mining p l a n 
they o f f e r e d t o the IRB f o r Murton. T h i s envisaged l i f t i n g OMS (output per 
manshift) from 1.76 tonnes t o 3.4 tonnes, and r a i s i n g output to 6000 tonnes 
a day. Manpower would be reduced from 2253 to about 1800 ( i b i d ) . 
7 . 2 . i i i MORALE AT MURTON 
At the time the overwhelming f e e l i n g throughout Murton and the union 
g e n e r a l l y was t h a t the proposed production t a r g e t s were h o p e l e s s l y 
u n r e a l i s t i c , and i t was only a matter of time before Murton was c l o s e d . The 
s e c r e t document quoted e a r l i e r was o f f e r e d as confirmation, because under 
i t Murton was scheduled t o c l o s e before 1995/6. Rumours of imminent c l o s u r e 
abounded as t h e p i t s t r u g g l e d t o recover p r e - s t r i k e production l e v e l s (see 
t a b l e 7.14). At the same time, enormous changes rocked the c o l l i e r y . Miners 
poured i n t o the p i t from Hawthorn, Horden, Eppleton and other p i t s t h a t 
were c l o s i n g ; hundreds of o t h e r s l e f t i n s u c c e s s i v e waves of redundancy. 
Underground, the e x p l o s i v e combination of young m i l i t a n t s and "scabs" 
^Frank a l s o used t h i s opportunity to c a r r y through the i d e a he'd 
had d u r i n g the s t r i k e of t a k i n g branch meetings i n t o the v i l l a g e s . Although 
only a few people attended t h e s e meetings, i t opened up an i n p o r t a n t l i n e 
of communication between t r a v e l l e r s and the branch l e a d e r s h i p . 
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q u i c k l y gave Murton a fearsome r e p u t a t i o n f o r i n t i m i d a t i o n (matched i n the 
North E a s t only by Westoe c o l l i e r y , according t o management sources) . 
Management was r e o r g a n i s e d more than once, but every permutation seemed 
only t o heighten a n x i e t y about the f u t u r e , and to f u e l Murton's reputation 
f o r o p p r e s s i v e management. 
T h i s then was the c l i m a t e which union a c t i v i s t s faced as they s t r u g g l e d to 
r e t r i e v e the union's c r e d i b i l i t y i n the aftermath of the h u m i l i a t i n g defeat 
of March 1985. I t wasn't j u s t the union's c r e d i b i l i t y which was a t stake, 
but the f u t u r e of e f f e c t i v e c o l l e c t i v e o r g a n i s a t i o n and a c t i o n themselves. 
What d i r e c t i o n the union took depended on whether a c t i v i s t s were able to 
win the b a t t l e w i t h miners who were n e i t h e r committed s t r i k e a c t i v i s t s , or 
determined s t r i k e b r e a k e r s . I n t h i s r e s p e c t , t h e r e were two c o n t r a d i c t o r y 
p r e s s u r e s c r e a t e d by BC's hard l i n e . On the one hand, morale plummeted. 
B i t t e r d i v i s i o n s between s t r i k e b r eakers and a c t i v i s t s c r e a t e d a c l i m a t e of 
r e c r i m i n a t i o n and f e a r a t the p i t . Managements r e a s s e r t i o n of c o n t r o l 
d e s t r o y e d the atmosphere underground, and i n t e n s i f i e d the r a t e of work. 
Miners found i t d i f f i c u l t to d i s p l a y the s e r v i l i t y expected of them \mder 
the new regime. The union was c l e a r l y powerless to h a l t the u n i l a t e r a l 
i x c p o s i t i o n by management of wholesale changes i n working c o n d i t i o n s . 
But w h i l s t the union's inqsotence might have f u e l l e d a t t e n p t s to develop a 
more accommodative s t a n c e i n the branches, resentment and d i s t r u s t a t 
management's t a c t i c s rendered any such a t t e n p t f u t i l e . There was simply no 
m a t e r i a l b a s i s f o r t r y i n g t o develop c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s with management 
when they were so c l e a r l y i n t e n t on unambiguously r e a s s e r t i n g c o n t r o l at 
t h e p o i n t of production. The e f f e c t of these two p r e s s u r e s was t h a t 
although confidence and i n t e r e s t i n the union were low, znanagement reaped 
only s u l l e n resentment as a reward f o r t h e i r " v i c t o r y " during the s t r i k e . 
But management s t r a t e g y o f f e r s only the beginning of an explanation f o r the 
development of p o l i t i c s i n the miners' and mechanics' branches a f t e r the 
s t r i k e . Perhaps the d e c i s i v e f a c t o r i n a l l o w i n g the l e f t to c o n s o l i d a t e i t s 
dominance of both branches were the enormous upheavals i n manpower a t 
Murton f o l l o w i n g c l o s u r e s elsewhere i n the c o a l f i e l d . The e f f e c t s of these 
changes a r e examined i n the f o l l o w i n g chapter. 
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7.3 THE STATE OF THE UNION 
When the Murton branches met p i t management a t the s t a r t of March 1985 to 
d i s c u s s arrangements f o r the r e t u r n t o work, they were l e f t i n no doubt 
t h a t management intended t o pursue a tough, anti-tinion s t r a t e g y . One 
moderate miners' branch l e a d e r suggested they put the s t r i k e behind them, 
so they c o u l d work together to r e s t o r e production. The manager wasn't 
i n t e r e s t e d . I n s t e a d , he b r i s k l y withdrew almost a l l the union's concessions 
( f o r exanyle, a guaranteed day s h i f t f o r branch s e c r e t a r i e s , and the 
p r a c t i c e of a l l o w i n g branch o f f i c i a l s t o r i d e e a r l y t o d e a l with problems), 
and inposed an unpopular new s h i f t r o t a without c o n s u l t a t i o n . Furthermore, 
out of 150 miners sacked i n Durham f o r s t r i k e r e l a t e d "offences", 28 came 
from Murton^. At the same time, the Area Board withdrew from the 
a r b i t r a t i o n procedure d e a l i n g w i t h d i s m i s s a l s , thereby avoiding s c r u t i n y of 
i t s d e c i s i o n s by an independent a r b i t e r . Henceforth the union was t o l d to 
t a k e appeals t o non-binding i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s t r i b u n a l s . 
I n t h i s o p p r e s s i v e environment, branch o f f i c i a l s s e t about t r y i n g to win 
back c r e d i b i l i t y , both w i t h management and w i t h many of t h e i r own members. 
At the same time however, they had t o cope with enormous changes i n 
membership, as hundreds of men took redundancy, and hundreds more 
t r a n s f e r r e d i n from p i t s c l o s i n g elsewhere i n the a r e a ( f o r example, 
Horden). What e f f e c t d i d t h e s e manpower changes have on the p o l i t i c s of the 
two branches? 
7 . 3 . i CHANGES IN LEADERSHIP 
I n the miners' branch, t h e post s t r i k e changes i n c l u d e d the r e s i g n a t i o n of 
t h e l e f t wing branch s e c r e t a r y John Dixon. S h o r t l y afterwards he took 
redundancy, and was not seen i n Murton again. He was succeeded by the 
acknowledged l e a d e r of the Murton p i c k e t s , Frank Duffy. At the same time, 
many o t h e r s from t h e Murton " o l d guard" were r e p l a c e d on the committee by 
much younger men, who had been a c t i v e during the s t r i k e . For exaiqple, the 
r i g h t wing branch delegate r e s i g n e d and took redundancy. Alan Young - who 
^Nine mechanics were a l s o sacked i n Durham, but none came from 
Murton. Of the 28 miners sacked from Murton, a l l but two have now been 
r e i n s t a t e d . 
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had played such a c r u c i a l role i n the s t r i k e organisation - was elected i n 
hi s place. I n 1986 Murton became only the second NUM branch i n the country 
(after Philadelphia workshops, also i n Durham) to elect a woman onto a 
branch committee. Pat Curry - a canteen worker at Murton - became a leading 
figure i n national campaigns to win equal pay and equal rights at work to 
her male colleagues. 
Murton miners' lodge became almost the archetypal exanple of a branch that 
was p o l i t i c a l l y transformed by the s t r i k e . Yet as chapter f i v e showed, the 
old order had already suffered considerable destabilisation before the 
s t r i k e . Now, as older, conservative miners f l e d the new regime underground, 
more l e f t wing, mil i t a n t miners assxuned a dominant numerical presence at 
the p i t . However, despite the declining significance of Murton men at the 
p i t (see tables 7.3 and 7.5), the committee was s t i l l dominated by miners 
from the v i l l a g e , with only one or two t r a v e l l e r s elected each year. 
I n the mechanics' branch committee on the other hand, there were fewer 
post-strike changes i n personnel. However, Dave Tenf>le emerged with his 
reputation strengthened, through his t o t a l commitment to the s t r i k e . When 
John Cummings was selected as Labour candidate for Easington - the safest 
of safe Labour seats - Dave began to s l i p into his long-time adversaries 
position, elected f i r s t as assistant secretary, and f i n a l l y replacing 
Cummings when he was elected MP i n 1987. As court cases enveloped the NUM, 
Cummings was nominated as one of the union's trustees, replacing the three 
national o f f i c i a l s who were removed by a court judgement. With his other 
jobs taking him out of Murton more and more of the time, the mechanics' 
leadership gradually f e l l into the hands of the l e f t . 
The mechanics' r e l a t i v e l y stable leadership can be attributed to th e i r 
conparative unity during the s t r i k e . With the old right wing \inited behind 
the s t r i k e on the committee, there was no focus for discontent to 
concentrate on. The miners' branch on the other hand had been characterised 
by a dual leadership, with a l e f t wing group assuming dominance during the 
s t r i k e , whilst facing considerable h o s t i l i t y and resentment from 
s i g n i f i c a n t sections of the workforce and the committee. 
Just as the miners began to build a new committee, BC demonstrated the i r 
new s t y l e of macho management by sacking Frank Duffy, just after he had 
been elected branch secretary, i n May 1985. Management claimed that h i s 
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d i s m i s s a l r e l a t e d p u r e l y to a breach of the Mines and Q u a r r i e s Act, and was 
u n r e l a t e d t o h i s s t r i k e a c t i v i t i e s . I n the immediate post s t r i k e c l i m a t e 
however, t h e r e was no doubt i n most people's eyes t h a t Frank had been s e t 
up by management. A s e n i o r member o£ Murton's management s a i d two y e a r s 
l a t e r t h a t f o l l o w i n g the i n c i d e n t t h a t l e d to the sacking, the manager had 
r e c e i v e d i n s t r u c t i o n s from BC Area HQ a t Team V a l l e y . Although l o s i n g an 
i n d u s t r i a l t r i b u n a l appeal f o r u n f a i r d i s m i s s a l , Frank s t a y e d as branch 
s e c r e t a r y f o r another one and a h a l f y e a r s , before being e l e c t e d branch 
d e l e g a t e (a p o s i t i o n he holds today) - a remarkable testimony t o the 
r e s p e c t he was h e l d i n a t the p i t . Alan Young became A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y , 
and took over the e f f e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p of the lodge a t the p i t . 
At the same time however, a s m a l l branch of the UDM was formed a t Murton. 
Although c o n c e n t r a t e d i n Nottinghamshire, the ODM had a few outposts i n 
Durham, w i t h the main c o n c e n t r a t i o n a t Tursdale workshops and Wearmouth 
c o l l i e r y . Murton's branch numbered 47 j u s t over a y e a r a f t e r the s t r i k e , 
and i t was l e d by a t r a n s f e r e e from Eppleton. However, i n a p i t where 
comparatively few had gone back to work, where d i v i s i o n s were so sharp, and 
where management o f f e r e d not a h i n t of conpromise, the UDM was e f f e c t i v e l y 
squeezed out . I t c o u l d o f f e r no a l t e i m a t i v e l e a d e r s h i p to the NUM. 
7 . 3 . i i DEMORALISATION AND ISOLATION 
I n the aftermath of the most b i t t e r and d i v i s i v e i n d u s t r i a l dispute i n 
B r i t a i n s i n c e 1926, i t was not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t morale among the workforce 
c o l l a p s e d . E v e r y miner I i n t e r v i e w e d commented on the poisonous atmosphere 
underground f o l l o w i n g the end of the d i s p u t e . I t was undoubtedly a 
s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r encouraging redundancy, both among a c t i v i s t s and 
r e t u r n e e s . 
BC promised r e t u r n e e s t h a t they would s u f f e r no l o s s of earnings (because, 
f o r example, s t r i k e r s r e f u s e d t o work w i t h them), and i f they s u f f e r e d 
^Under EC's " m a j o r i t y / m i n o r i t y " concept, only the m a j o r i t y union 
a t a p i t c o u l d n e g o t i a t e w i t h management. Although t h i s i s o l a t e d NUM 
members i n Nottinghamshire, i t a l s o c o n s t i t u t e d a formidable b a r r i e r to the 
UDM's expansion o u t s i d e i t s Nottingham h e a r t l a n d . At Murton, management 
g e n e r a l l y had l i t t l e time f o r the UDM. 
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i n t i m i d a t i o n then t h e p e r p e t r a t o r s would f a c e the sack. But nothing BC s a i d 
c o u l d stop some NUM m i l i t a n t s waging a grim and sometimes d i r t y war a g a i n s t 
t h e people who they f e l t had betrayed t h e i r s t r u g g l e . Conducted i n the 
s e c r e t underground world of the p i t , w i t h a hard and u n r e l e n t i n g hatred, 
a c t i v i s t s s t r u g g l e d t o impose the d i s c i p l i n e they had been unable to 
s u s t a i n during the s t r i k e . According t o management sources, Hurton shared 
w i t h Westoe the worst r e p u t a t i o n f o r i n t i m i d a t i o n of any p i t i n the North 
E a s t , and some of the young p i c k e t i n g m i l i t a n t s were proud of i t . 
Not a l l men who s t a y e d on s t r i k e adopted such a h o s t i l e a t t i t u d e to 
r e t u r n e e s . One Murton mechanic s a i d : 
" A l l I can say t o t h a t Jonathan i s t h a t they made t h e i r 
own minds up, or circumstances made them up. I s t i l l 
speak t o the m a j o r i t y . I n f a c t , I s t i l l t a l k to 
p r a c t i c a l l y everybody." ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
C e r t a i n l y the f i r s t men back were of the opinion t h a t i f i t wasn't f o r a 
t i n y m i n o r i t y of " m i l i t a n t s " who i n t i m i d a t e d the p a s s i v e majority, then 
most n o n - s t r i k e breakers would t r e a t them normally. I n t e r e s t i n g l y however, 
t h e r e was a h i e r a r c h y even among the returnees, with the e a r l i e s t men back 
being t r e a t e d as "scabs" even by men who l a t e r returned to work (Winterton 
and Winterton [1989] r e p o r t a s i m i l a r phenomena i n Y o r k s h i r e ) . 
Looked a t from the p o i n t of view of the returnees, t h e r e i s no doubt t h a t 
many were deeply a f f e c t e d by the way they were t r e a t e d a f t e r the s t r i k e . A 
combination of p r e s s u r e i n the community ( s o c i a l i s o l a t i o n , bannings from 
pubs and c l u b s , " v e n t i l a t i o n " ) , and p r e s s u r e a t work ( s o c i a l i s o l a t i o n and 
o c c a s i o n a l p h y s i c a l harassment) convinced many who broke the s t r i k e t h a t 
they d i d n ' t wish to c r o s s a p i c k e t l i n e again. One man who broke the s t r i k e 
a t Eppleton, became a member of the UDM, and then t r a n s f e r r e d to Murton, 
commented: 
" I know t h i s much, I ' l l never do i t again... I wish I 
hadn't. I ' v e l o s t a l o t of ' f r i e n d s ' . . . I'm never going 
through another p i c k e t l i n e . . . I t h i n k the m a j o r i t y [of 
those t h a t broke the s t r i k e ] a r e of the same frame of 
mind now. . . I n f a c t , a l l the l a d s I've spoken to w i l l 
not go through a p i c k e t l i n e again. Never again!" 
( i n t e r v i e w ) 
T h i s judgement i s bom out by the r e a c t i o n to the s t r i k e s t h a t h i t Murton 
a f t e r 1985 (see s e c t i o n s 7.5 and 7.6), which were v i r t u a l l y s o l i d . C r o s s i n g 
p i c k e t l i n e s i n 1984/5 was only p o s s i b l e because of the a b i l i t y to appeal 
t o a n a t i o n a l stage where the s t r i k e ' s l e g i t i m a c y was under a s s a u l t - and 
even then i t r e q u i r e d an enormous "psyche up" f o r most s t r i k e breakers. 
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However, i t i s a l s o t r u e t h a t a c t i v i s t s found the p o s t - s t r i k e atmosphere 
de m o r a l i s i n g . With management so b l a t a n t l y dominant and the \inion on the 
r e t r e a t , p o l i t i c a l involvement l a c k e d the glamour and excitement of the 
p r e - s t r i k e y e a r s (and the s t r i k e i t s e l f ) . Many a c t i v i s t s - e s p e c i a l l y the 
o l d e r ones - d i d the same. John Dixon - the Murton miners' branch s e c r e t a r y 
has a l r e a d y been mentioned. But t h e r e were others too. The camaraderie - so 
iiqportant i n t h e p i t s i n making the work, i f not enjoyable then bearable 
(and s a f e ) - c o l l a p s e d i n the b i t t e r aftermath of the s t r i k e . "The p i t s 
a r e n ' t what they were." 
F o r some a c t i v i s t s , e s p e c i a l l y o l d e r men, i t was too great a 
d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t t o add to the unbearable d e m o r a l i s a t i o n of l o s i n g the 
s t r i k e . One miners' a c t i v i s t - h i s conscience racked w i t h g u i l t - t r i e d to 
e x p l a i n h i s d e c i s i o n t o t a k e redundancy. 
"To be honest w i t h you, the c a r r o t they dangle f o r 
somebody l i k e me - and the r e s t of the workforce over 
50 - the c a r r o t they dangle t a k e s some r e f u s i n g . I t 
t a k e s some r e f u s i n g . . . To a working man i t ' s a l o t of 
money... I wasn't happy to take my money you know. I 
f e l t I shouldn't. I d i d f e e l I shouldn't, on p r i n c i p l e . 
So I suppose I s o l d my p r i n c i p l e s . I suppose I d i d . But 
the t h i n g s t h a t were going on around, t h e r e wasn't any 
s o l i d a r i t y t o h e l p us out. I f t h e r e ' d been some 
s o l i d a r i t y i n t h e p i t I probably wouldn't have took i t . 
I probably would have stuck i t out and gone to 55. But 
I mean we were r e a l l y beaten, and beaten i n t o the 
bottom. I t h i n k we were f o r c e d to take i t . " ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
Given t h i s v e r d i c t - and i t was by no means uncommon i n the months a f t e r 
th e s t r i k e - t h e t e n a c i t y of those who s t a y e d behind t o continue f i g h t i n g 
BC appears even more remarkable. 
D i s i l l u s i o n and despondency (as w e l l as debt) were t h e r e f o r e r i f e among 
a c t i v i s t s and r e t u r n e e s a l i k e , c r e a t i n g a profound d e s i r e to be out of the 
i n d u s t r y among a broad swathe of the workforce. The widespread r e s o r t to i t 
fundamentally changed the nature of the workforce a t c o l l i e r i e s l i k e 
Murton. 
7 . 3 . i i i REDUNDANCY 
Fo l l o w i n g the NUM's r e t u r n t o work without a negotiated settlement i n March 
1985, BC embarked on a massive manpower rundown. Large redundancy payments 
provided an i n t o x i c a t i n g i n c e n t i v e f o r miners who had wracked up enormous 
debts d u r i n g t h e 12 month d i s p u t e . And w h i l s t redundancy pay-offs 
Chapter 7 (251) 
constituted an inportant " p u l l " factor, the "push" came from the repressive 
atmosphere i n the mine. 
Deta i l s of the f i r s t post s t r i k e redundancy at Murton are contained i n 
9 
tables 7.2 and 7.3 . They show that 56% of over 50's at the c o l l i e r y l e f t 
within three months of the s t r i k e ' s conclusion. 80% of a l l the redundancies 
involved men over 50. And as some men took redundancy, others transferred 
i n , s h i f t i n g the r e s i d e n t i a l base of Murton's workforce yet further away 
from the v i l l a g e . 
a) Analysing redundancy i n 1984 and 1988 
Since demand for redundancy consistently ran ahead of supply, management 
allocated i t according to age and work category. I n other words, the 
manager received a breakdown from Area HQ that he needed to lose - for 
example - 30 powerloaders, 10 e l e c t r i c i a n s , etc. Redundancy would then be 
offered to the oldest men i n each category, and so on down the l i s t u n t i l 
enough had accepted. Because of shortages i n some areas (eg blacksmiths), 
some r e l a t i v e l y old miners were denied redundancy whilst younger men doing 
other jobs l e f t . Decisions on how many men were to go were based on Area's 
knowledge of how many people were transferring from c o l l i e r i e s which were 
closing or being rundown. However, transferees rarely replaced redundancies 
one to one. For example, with the Eppleton closure, Murton's manpower was 
b u i l t up, but every successive redundancy led to incremental f a l l s i n 
ov e r a l l manpower, as management endeavoured to achieve productivity 
increases (see table 7.14). 
Table 7.3 shows that with respect to residence, redundancies were spread 
f a i r l y evenly throughout the various communities supplying Murton's labour 
(conpare the "percentage of a l l leavers" column i n table 7.3 with the 
"percentage of the workforce" column i n table 5.3). For example, 
redundancies from Murton i t s e l f were almost exactly proportional to t h e i r 
9 
These tables were constructed using cosputer readouts of 
Murton's workforce i n 1984, 1985, and 1988. Data for 1985 was r e s t r i c t e d to 
the names of miners, whereas the other two years had date of birth, 
address, work grade and union code. Unfortunately, t h i s data was not 
available for any other periods (see appendix 1 for problems of data 
c o l l e c t i o n ) . 
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r e l a t i v e weight i n the workforce. However, those commimities which were 
represented only by a very few workers, had di f f e r i n g l e v e l s of redundancy. 
At some, everyone working at Murton l e f t ; at others, none did. This 
re f l e c t e d the paramount influence of age and work category i n the 
a v a i l a b i l i t y of redundancy, so that the r e s i d e n t i a l breakdown of 
red\uidancies was e s s e n t i a l l y a by-product of these two factors, combined 
with the desire to take redundancy. 
There were at l e a s t four major batches of redundancies at Murton i n the 18 
months following the s t r i k e . At the same time, a steady t r i c k l e of men l e f t 
outside these main groups. However, the data for A p r i l 1988 show that the 
pattern of redundancies was very different to that i n the immediate 
post-strike environment (graph 14) . Changes were p a r t i c u l a r l y evident i n 
the age structure of those leaving. Table 7.4 shows that the pattern was 
much more evenly spread than i n 1985, with only just over 20% of a l l those 
opting for redundancy i n the over 50 category (see also graph 14) . Partly 
however, t h i s reflected the rapid decline i n those l e f t at the c o l l i e r y who 
were over 50. Although they represented only 20% of a l l those taking 
redundancy, over 40% of the remaining over 50's l e f t i n A p r i l 1988. This 
l e f t j u s t 70 people at the c o l l i e r y over 50, coapared to 270 i n 1984 (see 
graph 12) . 
The figures for 1988 also showed a si g n i f i c a n t spattering of redundancies 
i n a l l other age groups except the very youngest (20-24). P a r t i c u l a r l y 
noticeable were the 10% of 30-34 year olds and 25-29 year olds opting to 
leave. Although t h i s to some extent reflected the increasing opportunity 
for redundancy i n these age groups (as the number of volunteers i n older 
age groups dried up), i t also seemed to r e f l e c t the widespread recognition 
that Murton's days were numbered, the future of the industry i n the North 
East was bleak, and that i t might therefore be better to t r y and make a new 
s t a r t whilst s t i l l r e l a t i v e l y young. 
Analysis of redundancy by residence sheds further l i g h t on the changing 
composition of Murton's workforce (see table 7.5). Many of those taking 
redundancy l i v e d a long way from Murton. This suggested that older miners, 
l i v i n g a long way from Murton were the most l i k e l y to want redundancy. 
Conversely, only seven miners aged 25-29 l i v i n g i n Murton took redundancy. 
The 1988 figures also showed that the Eppleton transferees had a major 
iinpact on the r e s i d e n t i a l conposition of the workforce. Eppleton's core 
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workforce had been drawn from Hetton-le-Hole, Houghton-le-Spring and 
E a s i n g t o n Lane (see map 2 ) . I n 1984, b e f o r e Eppleton's c l o s u r e , only 14% of 
Muzrton's workforce t r a v e l l e d from these communities (229). I n 1988 i t was 
33% (592) - more than the 27% (481) l i v i n g and working a t Murton! Murton's 
workforce was now more s p a t i a l l y fragmented than ever. Only j u s t over a 
q u a r t e r of t h e workforce came from Murton, and the t r a v e l l e r s were 
d i s p e r s e d even f u r t h e r a f i e l d than i n 1984. 
b) Murton'3 new workforce 
The net e f f e c t of t h e s e enormous upheavals i n manpower was to a l t e r the 
workforce even more d r a m a t i c a l l y than i n the p r e - s t r i k e y e a r s . I n essence, 
Murton became dominated by workers who t r a v e l l e d i n t o work each day (see 
t a b l e 7.5). N e l l over h a l f were l e s s than 40 y e a r s o l d (see t a b l e 7.4 and 
graph 12) . And i t was the younger miners who provided the m i l i t a n t c u t t i n g 
edge a t the c o l l i e r y . Most had been h e a v i l y i n v o l v e d i n the s t r i k e . They 
were r e b e l l i o u s . (Many o l d e r miners c a s t i g a t e d them f o r " l a z i n e s s " . ) U n like 
t h e i r f a t h e r s , they had e i t h e r not been s o c i a l i s e d i n t o an e r a of 
consensus, and an ideology of s o c i a l and economic planning f o r the common 
good, or they had c o n s c i o u s l y r e j e c t e d i t . L i k e many young men r e a r e d i n 
t h e masculine, macho environment of the p i t v i l l a g e , they were aggressive, 
and i n a time of t r e n c h a n t s o c i a l d i v i s i o n s , t h i s a ggressiveness could 
p o t e n t i a l l y be d i s p l a y e d i n s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l r e b e l l i o n . 
Frank Duffy summarised the k i n d of p r e s s u r e s young miners were under when 
he responded t o the a c c u s a t i o n t h a t young miners were " l a z y " . 
"Well I would say young miners are no d i f f e r e n t to any 
other young l a d , whether he's unenployed or whether he 
works a t the p i t , or whether he works i n any other 
i n d u s t r y . I would t h i n k the present system, or the 
p r e s e n t government... c e r t a i n l y doesn't convince me I 
have t o work any harder f o r the b e n e f i t of the country. 
The way the mining i n d u s t y ' s being run, t h e r e ' s 
c e r t a i n l y no encouragement f o r a young miner to get 
s t r i p p e d o f f and get s t u c k i n as hard as he can, I ' l l 
t e l l you now. 'Cos men's being robbed b l i n d on bonus, 
t h e i r jobs a r e c o n s t a n t l y under t h r e a t , they f a c e 
d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n f o r the s l i g h t e s t misdemeanour, and 
i t ' s c e r t a i n l y not a c l i m a t e which i d e a l l y s u i t s young 
boys. 
P a r t i c u l a r l y young boys who've been brought up i n t h i s 
community, who are t r a d i t i o n a l l y h i g h l y strung anyway. 
M i l i t a n t j u s t by nature, j u s t the way they've been 
brought up. C e r t a i n l y my generation, the young boys I 
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knock around with, wouldn't kowtow to anybody... Lads 
who I know who went to prison wouldn't knuckle under i n 
prison. They spent a l o t of time i n s o l i t a r y 
confinement... Rebellious just by nature. That's 
something I'm proud of... I dinna' think they're lazy. 
I think i f there's an incentive and a l i t t l e b i t of 
goodwill from both sides, then I think they're capable 
of doing the job they're asked. I wouldn't say they'd 
do any extra. They'll do what's asked of them, and I 
don't think anybody can ask for more than that." 
(interview) 
Young men dominated the workforce. Only a tiny minority were committed 
a c t i v i s t s . But most of the re s t shared a belligerent antagonism to "the 
bosses". The s t r i k e , and management's hard l i n e a f t e r i t , did l i t t l e to 
persuade them to adopt a cooperative attitude to management. As Frank said, 
they were "rebellious j u s t by nature". 
Si g n i f i c a n t l y , the numerical dominance of younger miners was acconpanied by 
the redundancy of most of the old right wing. The miners who had exercised 
such a strong influence on the branch before the early 1980's, dominating 
the weak committee with t h e i r face militancy and right wing attitudes, and 
who had been so h o s t i l e to the s t r i k e , were now out of branch p o l i t i c s . 
This removed the main focus of opposition to the l e f t leaders of the 
branch. But t h i s did not automatically imply that the l e f t would be able to 
achieve control of either branch. With d i s i l l u s i o n so strong, apathy and 
individualism might have taken over. I n the following section I explore the 
extent to which the union was able to organise frustration and anger i n the 
mili t a n t workforce into the application of c o l l e c t i v e pressure against 
management. 
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7.4 STRIKES AND OVERTIME BANS 
Whatever the long term p o l i t i c a l gains of the s t r i k e ( f o r exaople i n terms 
of a p o l i t i c i s e d core of younger workers), most s t r i k e r s went back i n March 
1985 w i t h the s i c k e n i n g weight of defeat l y i n g l i k e b i l e i n t h e i r stomachs. 
Fo r those union a c t i v i s t s who didn't buckle under the p r e s s u r e and take 
redundancy, th e t a s k of r e b u i l d i n g the union i n t o a c r e d i b l e o r g a n i s a t i o n 
capable of s t a n d i n g up t o the eiq>loyer was daiinting. At a n a t i o n a l l e v e l , 
t h e NUM was unable t o r e s i s t BC's remorseless d r i v e t o a c a p i t a l i n t e n s i v e , 
high p r o d u c t i v i t y , c e n t r a l c o a l f i e l d dominated s t r a t e g y ( s e c t i o n 7.1). But 
a t l o c a l l e v e l , t i g h t union o r g a n i s a t i o n o f f e r e d the opportunity t o win 
back s i g n i f i c a n t a r e a s of c o n t r o l . 
I n Murton, both miners' and mechanics' branch l e a d e r s h i p s s e t about 
r e b u i l d i n g the union as a c r e d i b l e f o r c e . I n doing so they were c o n s t a n t l y 
aware of t h e changes s w i r l i n g around them - the dramatic labour turnover, 
t h e f o r t u n e s of the p i t , the n a t i o n a l union's s i t u a t i o n - and i n 
f o r m u l a t i n g t h e i r s t r a t e g i e s they fought to s t a y w i t h i n the r e a l i s t i c 
parameters imposed by t h e s e developments. On some occasions, events ran 
away from them, r e f l e c t i n g the prodigious d i f f i c u l t i e s f a c i n g a union 
t r e a t e d w i t h contempt by management. Reb u i l d i n g the workforces confidence 
i n t h e i r c a p a c i t y t o t a k e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n was an e s s e n t i a l p a r t of the 
union's b a t t l e , because without i t , i n d i v i d u a l s o l u t i o n s (high l e v e l s of 
overtime working, redundancy) would continue t o come before c o l l e c t i v e 
s t r u g g l e . T h i s s e c t i o n examines the c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p between the 
developing s t r a t e g y of branch, area and n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s h i p , and the 
p r e s s u r e s which caused the rank and f i l e to move i n d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s a t 
d i f f e r e n t times. 
7 . 4 . i FIRST STRIKE ACTION 
S h o r t l y a f t e r t h e end of the s t r i k e , t h e r e was a l i g h t n i n g two day s t r i k e 
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a t Murton, prozpted by the s a c k i n g of two miners a t Eppleton . I t was l e d 
by the mechanics, and i n p a r t i c u l a r by Dave Tesple, who saw i t as a v i t a l 
^ ^ I had not begun my r e s e a r c h when t h i s s t r i k e took pla c e , and by 
the time I d i d begin my s t u d i e s i t had been superceded by other events, so 
I have l i t t l e i n f o r m a t i o n on the d i s p u t e . 
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confidence building measure. I t was an attenpt to show the men that the 
union s t i l l functioned, that they could s t i l l s t r i k e together, and that 
s t r i k i n g was s t i l l possible. The miners supported the s t r i k e ^ ^ . Given the 
contempt with which management was treating the union at t h i s time, the 
s t r i k e c e r t a i n l y forced them to take account of the potential strength 
s t i l l contained within the union. But with management rampant, i n practice 
the s t r i k e was l i t t l e more than a tokenistic statement of defiance, 
although sevaral weeks l a t e r one of the two sacked men was reinstated. 
7 . 4 . i i THE UNION STRIKES BACK 
Management continued to pursue a tough strategy throughout the year 
following the s t r i k e . Murton's survival confounded almost every observer, 
although i t s f i n a n c i a l performance continued to be disastrous (see table 
7.14). Clearly management were under massive pressure to iaprove results, 
and the outcome was aggressive, and at times arrogant management behaviour. 
However, t h i s strategy produced a backlash. Low bonuses, oppressive 
management, and an uncertain future combined to increase frustration and 
anger among the workforce. 
By the summer of 1986, tension and resentment i n the Durham c o a l f i e l d was 
reaching a peak. For the f i r s t time since the end of the str i k e , a c t i v i s t s 
were able to contenplate campaigning for a programme of i n d u s t r i a l action. 
However, at area l e v e l the miners' and mechanics' unions were unable to 
coordinate t h e i r plans. Since the s t r i k e the miners' Broad Left had taken 
12 
control of the DMA, but very soon after the BL began to disintegrate 
Relationships between the Area leaders of the miners' and mechanics' unions 
also deteriorated. Therefore two seperate programmes of action emerged from 
the two unions. However, the issues affecting them were the same. 
^^John Ciimmings, the secretary of the branch was furious at what 
he saw as pointless and unnecessary action. 
12 
The reasons are too conplex to engage here. E s s e n t i a l l y the BL 
s p l i t as some members perceived the elected agents as " s e l l i n g out" the 
i d e a l s which had informed the movement since i t s inception i n the late 
1970's. I n l a t e 1988 the BL was reunited (although as a depleted force), 
with the two agents joining the a c t i v i s t s with whom they had been at 
loggerheads for three years. 
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Undoubtedly the most immediate grievance was B r i t i s h Coal's threat to 
withdraw the 1985 pay award unless the NUM agreed that members should pay 
pension contributions for the period they were on s t r i k e i n 1984/5 (Taylor, 
1988, 224-225). I t was t h i s issue above a l l others which provided the 
energy for i n d u s t r i a l action. I t was f e l t to be such blatant victimisation 
that i t was almost boxind to unite miners and mechanics who had stayed loyal 
to the union i n 1984/5. But i t also came on top of widespread anger at BC's 
victimisation of sacked miners. One case i n particular - that of Geoff 
Hartnell, a sacked mechanic from Tursdale workshops - caused widespread 
offence. After BC withdrew from the 40 year old conciliation procedure for 
dealing with dismissal - t e l l i n g men to use i n d u s t r i a l tribunals instead -
Hartnell took h i s case to an i n d u s t r i a l tribunal, where he won an order for 
reinstatement and backpay for the period of his dismissal. But unlike the 
f i n a l stage of binding arbi t r a t i o n which characterised the old appeals 
procedure, i n d u s t r i a l tribiinal rulings are non-binding. BC ignored the 
i n s t r u c t i o n to reinstate Hartnell. 
Of l e s s significance to the rank and f i l e , but of great inportance to the 
union leadership was the issue of BC's abandonment - at a national and area 
l e v e l - of c o n c i l i a t i o n procedures. F i n a l l y , BC chose t h i s time to announce 
the closure (or "merger" with Vane Teii?>est, as they preferred to c a l l i t ) 
of Seaham C o l l i e r y . Together, a l l four issues summed up BC's attenpt to 
redefine management-tinion relations. The "right to manage" was being 
asserted with a vengeance. 
Despite the defeat of the s t r i k e , the membership reacted angrily to the 
management hard l i n e . Bitterness suddenly focused around BC's hard l i n e 
decision to penalise s t r i k e r s by withdrawing t h e i r pay r i s e . By planning 
i n d u s t r i a l action, a c t i v i s t s aimed to channel the anger and frustration 
into meaningful action, and r a i s e the l e v e l of struggle by transforming 
individual action into c o l l e c t i v e , purposive action. 
Within the mechanics' union, the decision was taken by BL a c t i v i s t s 
(including the area leadership) to b a l l o t the membership on a programme of 
r o l l i n g one day s t r i k e s throughout the c o a l f i e l d . The four issues mentioned 
above were l i s t e d on the b a l l o t paper, along with a recomtnendation to take 
action. One day s t r i k e s were seen as more effective i n achieving public 
recognition, and also more l i k e l y to achieve support from the membership 
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than an overtime ban, which was the alternative form of action on the 
agenda (given the mechanics' legendary propensity for overtime). 
However, the miners decided that they were more l i k e l y to get support for 
an overtime ban than for s t r i k e s , because the massive wage d i f f e r e n t i a l s 
among t h e i r membership meant that s t r i k e s were deeply d i v i s i v e , affecting 
low paid workers f a r more than the high earning face workers. In essence 
therefore, both unions balloted t h e i r members on the easiest options. 
However, for both sections, the ball o t s were a considerable success. I n the 
mechanics' vote, Muxrton consolidated i t s reputation as the most progressive 
branch by turning i n an 82% majority for action. Westoe was second, but the 
once l e f t wing Easington branch only scraped a 55% majority, the same as 
right wing Vane Ten^^est. Overall the mechanics voted 68% for action (see 
table 7.7). The miners' ba l l o t for an overtime ban - c a l l e d over the pay 
and p i t closures issue - provided a 61% majority for action. Again Murton 
was top i n the area, with 79% voting i n favour (NUM sources; see also 
section 7 . 6 . i i i ) . 
I n order to cause Tna-giTnnni disruption, the mechanics planned to make a snap 
announcement for each of t h e i r one day s t r i k e s . On Friday 19th November the 
DCMA executive met and decided (to no-one's surprise) that Murton was to be 
13 
the f i r s t of the one day s t r i k e s , on Monday 22nd . The s t r i k e was so l i d . 
Only two of the forty seven UDM members, and perhaps eight men i n a l l 
crossed the picket l i n e s . But even more si g n i f i c a n t l y , 60% of the deputies 
refused to cross the l i n e . The union had stamped i t s authority on the p i t 
with a vengeance. 
On that day, the atmosphere among the a c t i v i s t s was euphoric. There was a 
tremendous sense of pride. After months of being treated with conteopt. 
13 
The delay i n informing the miners' lodge of the action came 
dangerously close to undermining the s t r i k e . To make sure that t r a v e l l e r s 
knew about the Monday s t r i k e , Dave Tesple drove around pubs and clubs on 
the Sunday night spreading the word that there would be a s t r i k e the 
following day. Without t h i s , many miners could have arrived for work at 
5.30am, to fin d that another section of the workforce had stopped the p i t . 
This would have seriously undermined the c r e d i b i l i t y of the union. Thanks 
to t h i s action, only a handful of men made the wasted journey. 
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they c o u l d h o l d t h e i r heads up. Management had t o take them s e r i o u s l y 
again. For exanple, I was on the p i c k e t l i n e a t lunchtime when a deputy 
came over and asked r e s p e c t f u l l y : " I ' v e j u s t been i n to see The Boss, and 
he's hoping y o u ' l l l e t some men i n on the p r e - s h i f t a t 5.00pm t o do s a f e t y 
work f o r tomorrow." A t a n g i b l e murmur of s a t i s f a c t i o n ran through the 
p i c k e t s . The manager was a s k i n g them f o r a favour. For the a c t i v i s t s , t h i s 
r e a s s e r t i o n o f t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e s t r e n g t h and s o l i d a r i t y was a massive 
morale booster. 
F o l l o w i n g the a c t i o n a t Murton, the s t r i k e s r o l l e d on i n t o the winter, a 
d i f f e r e n t u n i t coming out every week. Although not a l l p i t s had the same 
u n i t e d response as a t Murton, t h e r e was overwhelming support f o r the a c t i o n 
throughout t h e c o a l f i e l d . 
T h i s s u c c e s s was due t o s e v e r a l f a c t o r s . On the one hand, the o b j e c t i v e 
s i t u a t i o n provided the p r e c o n d i t i o n s f o r s u c c e s s . A f t e r 18 months of harsh 
d i s c i p l i n e , and v i n d i c t i v e management, the r e f u s a l to award the pay 
i n c r e a s e t o s t r i k e r s c r e a t e d massive anger among the workforce, w h i l s t 
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y p r o v i d i n g a c l e a r o b j e c t i v e t o f i g h t f o r . Also s i g n i f i c a n t 
was the changed composition of the workforce. T r a n s f e r s and redundancies 
had transformed the age c o n p o s i t i o n of the workforce, so t h a t i t was now 
predominantly young. Older, more ca u t i o u s and c o n s e r v a t i v e men had l e f t , to 
be r e p l a c e d w i t h younger miners who tended to be more m i l i t a n t . 
On the other hand, without the " s u b j e c t i v e f a c t o r " - the i n t e r v e n t i o n of 
s e l f conscious, purposive i n d i v i d u a l s - the anger and m i l i t a n c y of the 
workforce would have remained random and undirected. Success was b u i l t upon 
the shrewd and c a r e f u l c h o i c e of a c t i o n which the membership could u n i t e 
around, and the thorough campaigning of a c t i v i s t s i n the p i t s to win the 
menibership around t o t h e i d e a of t a k i n g a c t i o n . 
There were s e v e r a l p o s t c r i p t s t o the one day s t r i k e a t Murton. The manager 
was c l e a r l y r a t t l e d by t h e a c t i o n . Immediately f o l l o w i n g the s t r i k e he 
announced t h a t bonuses were being stopped f o r a week f o r a l l men not 
working a t the p o i n t of production. The b e l t men responded t o t h i s attempt 
t o d i v i d e t h e workforce w i t h a go slow. Around the p i t the slogan "NO 
BONUS, NO BELTS!" was c h a l k e d up on g i r d e r s . I f the manager wasn't going to 
pay them, he wasn't going t o get any c o a l . Conveyor b e l t r e p a i r s dragged 
on. Faces stood. Production plummeted. Once the manager had used h i s weapon 
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- manipulating the bonus scheme to s l a s h wages f o r non-powerloaders - the 
men had nothing t o l o s e by c u r t a i l i n g production. 
N e v e r t h e l e s s t h e r e was a b a c k l a s h e f f e c t when men d i s c o v e r e d the l o s s of 
bonus. One moderate miners' branch o f f i c i a l p r e d i c t e d t h a t many men would 
not support a one day s t r i k e again. Many miners re s e n t e d the l o s s of 
e a r n i n g s . There was c o n s i d e r a b l e confusion over the c l a u s e i n the i n c e n t i v e 
scheme which allowed the manager t o stop bonuses f o r backbye men. The 
c l a u s e allowed t h i s move i n s i t u a t i o n s where the men were r e s t r i c t i n g 
e f f o r t . Many miners hadn't expected the one day s t r i k e t o a t t r a c t t h i s 
p e n a l t y . I t appeared t h a t the c l a u s e was designed to d e a l with the type of 
go-slows which i t s implementation i n t h i s case a c t u a l l y provoked! 
R a t t l e d by t h e s t r i k e s s u c c e s s , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e support i t r e c e i v e d from 
NACODS, the manager responded w i t h a b i t t e r l e t t e r to the workforce. I n i t 
he c laimed t h a t t h e only i n t e r p r e t a t i o n he could put on the s t r i k e was t h a t 
the men wanted t o c l o s e the p i t . Only BACM, he fumed, had any coimnitment t o 
t h e p i t , and were prepared to work long hours f o r i t . Hollow laughs from 
the a c t i v i s t s g r e e t e d t h i s a l l e g a t i o n - overtime a t the p i t among miners 
and mechanics was running a t r e c o r d l e v e l s (see t a b l e 7.14). He was c l e a r l y 
under p r e s s u r e , squeezed from above and below. To Team V a l l e y i t must have 
looked as i f he was i n danger of l o s i n g c o n t r o l of the p i t . Production had 
c o l l a p s e d i n the wake of h i s d e c i s i o n to cut bonuses from non f a c e workers. 
F i n a n c i a l r e s u l t s were a p p a l l i n g , and the men's a c t i o n s were j e o p a r d i s i n g a 
recovery. His own r e p u t a t i o n - i f not h i s c a r e e r - might w e l l have been 
\inder t h r e a t . The miners' overtime ban s t a r t e d the week a f t e r the one day 
s t r i k e , supported by a mechanics' ban on mid week overtime. The s i t u a t i o n 
was d e t e r i o r a t i n g . 
However, the impetus c r e a t e d by the one day s t r i k e s and overtime ban soon 
p e t e r e d out. The mechanics decided t o c a l l o f f the r o l l i n g programme of one 
day s t r i k e s a f t e r one "ro\uid", apparently f e a r f u l of s t r e t c h i n g the success 
too f a r . The miners' overtime ban was a l s o abandoned a f t e r s e v e r a l r a t h e r 
i n e f f e c t u a l months of operation. Lack of support a t a n a t i o n a l l e v e l (due 
t o the b i t t e r d i v i s i o n s between the S c a r g i l l l e f t and the r e f o r m i s t s i n 
S c o t l a n d and Wales) meant t h a t the a c t i o n was l e a d i n g nowhere. At Murton, 
the a c t i o n had c o i n c i d e d w i t h a peak of rank and f i l e resentment and 
f r u s t r a t i o n . However, few of the i s s u e s were r e s o l v e d , l e a v i n g the way 
c l e a r f o r f u r t h e r o u t b u r s t s of p r o t e s t a c t i o n . The NUM e v e n t u a l l y won the 
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pay i n c r e a s e , but only on c o n d i t i o n t h a t i n f u t u r e pension c o n t r i b u t i o n s 
l o s t during s t r i k e s would have to be made up a f t e r the a c t i o n . Geoff 
H a r t n e l l s t a y e d sacked, Seaham p i t c l o s e d , and the c o n c i l i a t i o n i s s u e 
remained unresolved. More s i g n i f i c a n t l y perhaps, the day to day balance of 
power s t i l l l a y h e a v i l y i n management's favour. T h i s was f e l t most s t r o n g l y 
i n r e l a t i o n t o the bonus system. 
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7.5 WILDCAT STRIKE: MAY 1987 
Shortly a f t e r the 1986 one day s t r i k e , Murton's performance began to show 
signs of a dramatic recovery. Despite months of doom laden predictions from 
a c t i v i s t s (centring on repeated allegations that the coal clearance system 
was luable to handle anything approaching the break-even production l e v e l 
of 6000 tonnes a day), by November 1986 the "unachievable" figure was being 
exceeded. For the next s i x months - largely due to one big h i t t i n g face 
(E75) - Murton was profitable, and some of the previous 18 months losses 
were clawed back. This run undoubtedly saved Murton from closure (see table 
7.14). Further redundancies trimmed the operating costs of the mine, and 
a l l available manpower was thrown into coal getting. 
However, instead of the recovery generating smoother i n d u s t r i a l relations 
(via enhanced bonus payments), i n May 1987 anger and frustration again 
erupted i n s t r i k e action. Many miners, especially powerloaders, f e l t that 
the increased output from the c o l l i e r y was not being reflected i n t h e i r pay 
packets. Because of the nature of the incentive scheme, grievances were not 
evenly distributed throughout the workforce. Some face teams were 
aggravated by long-standing disputes going back over many months, and i t 
was one such dispute that f i n a l l y sparked a spontaneous walkout by 
powerloaders on the nightshift on Wednesday May 20th. The particular 
grievance concerned the alleged non-payment of backpay from a s i x week 
"suspense" period (see chapter f i v e for a discussion of the workings of the 
incentive scheme) . The issue had been outstanding for months, and the union 
had f a i l e d to resolve i t i n negotiations with management. According to some 
branch coimnittee men, the dispute had been brewing for weeks, and 
management had been warned that without a solution a s t r i k e was inevitable. 
F i n a l l y the men l o s t patience, and walked out. Their spontaneous action 
p a r t l y demonstrated the limited strength and authority of the branch 
committee to resolve bonus grievances with management. 
Although backpay provided the immediate provocation for the walkout, i t was 
c l e a r that as well as t h i s "immediate trigger", there were a set of 
"underlying causes" (Gouldner, 1955). These were concerned with 
authoritarian management, and the general operation of the incentive 
scheme. The two were related, since the former constrained the 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s for f l e x i b l e negotiation over the l a t t e r . The union was 
simply not strong enough to force management into making the concessions 
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the men wanted. P a r t i c u l a r members of management a t t r a c t e d c onsiderable 
h o s t i l i t y f o r t h e i r a g g r e s s i v e p o s t u r i n g , and one such man - " F i l l h a r d e r " -
p l a y e d a key r o l e i n the d i s p u t e . The walkout occurred j u s t as Murton's 
pr e v i o u s manager - "Dimblunder" - had l e f t the c o l l i e r y to move to a 
management job i n Northumberland, and F i l l h a r d e r had taken over the a c t i n g 
managers r o l e . 
Frank Duffy - a t t h i s stage s t i l l the miners' branch s e c r e t a r y - met the 
s t r i k e r s a t the p i t canteen, and urged them t o r e t u r n t o work, pending a 
union s p e c i a l meeting a t the weekend. But the s e e t h i n g anger of pa s t weeks 
c o u l d not be so e a s i l y d i s s i p a t e d , and the \mion recommendation was 
unanimously r e j e c t e d . The branch committee had l o s t c o n t r o l , and the n i g h t 
s h i f t walked out. However, by the time the tub-loading s h i f t a r r i v e d f o r 
work, the lodge committee thought they'd r e s o l v e d the backpay question 
which l a y a t the h e a r t of the d i s p u t e , and the next two s h i f t s worked 
normally. But when the n i g h t s h i f t c o l l i e r y average men a r r i v e d back the 
next day to f i n d t h a t management had docked t h e i r bonus f o r a week, then 
" a l l h e l l broke l o o s e " . 
Chaos r u l e d i n t h e canteen and o u t s i d e i t as c o l l i e r y average workers 
fought t o persuade powerloaders t o support f u r t h e r s t r i k e a c t i o n . The 
d i v i s i v e n e s s of the i n c e n t i v e scheme was c l e a r l y v i s i b l e , as power loa d e r s 
were only docked bonus f o r the day they s t r u c k . C o l l i e r y average workers 
however now f e l t t h a t they had l i t t l e t o l o s e by t a k i n g f u r t h e r a c t i o n , as 
they had a l r e a d y l o s t t h e i r bonus f o r the week. Again the lodge l e a d e r s h i p 
recommended t h a t the men work normally, pending a s p e c i a l meeting. There 
was pandemonium as the s h i f t t r i e d t o reach a d e c i s i o n . S u c c e s s i v e votes 
were taken, w i t h c o l l i e r y average men r e j e c t i n g the outcome and i n s i s t i n g 
on recounts u n t i l on the t h i r d coiint they achieved a 73-72 vote m a j o r i t y . 
They had decided they were not going down the p i t , come what may. So on the 
s t r e n g t h of one vote, the p i t went out on " i n d e f i n i t e s t r i k e " , pending a 
s p e c i a l meeting on F r i d a y May 22nd. The next two s h i f t s were p i c k e t e d out 
without d i f f i c u l t y , and the mechanics followed the standing orders of t h e i r 
branch, and supported the miners' a c t i o n . 
P r i o r t o the s p e c i a l meetings c a l l e d by both branches, the two committees 
met and agreed a u n i t e d p l a n of a c t i o n t o t r y and r e g a i n c o n t r o l of the 
s i t u a t i o n . R e l a t i o n s h i p s between the two branches had never been so strong, 
and a t both s p e c i a l meetings the recommendation t o "suspend" the a c t i o n , 
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w i t h the p o s s i b i l i t y of an overtime ban i n the f u t u r e was overwhelmingly 
endorsed. F i l l h a r d e r , the a c t i n g manager and a man thoroughly d i s l i k e d a t 
the p i t , was rocked by the d i s p u t e . He was l e f t c a r r y i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
a s t r i k e caused by h i s predecessor, but which he had been warned about 
s e v e r a l times. Union a c t i v i s t s argued p l a u s i b l y t h a t the s t r i k e ended h i s 
s l e n d e r chances of becoming the new manager, and s h o r t l y a f t e r being passed 
over f o r the post, he took redundancy. 
I t was a c l a s s i c w i l d c a t s t r i k e . A host of grie v a n c e s had b u i l t up over a 
long p e r i o d of time; a r e l a t i v e l y t r i v i a l event t r i g g e r e d a walkout by a 
group of faceworkers whose a c t i o n became a c a t a l y s t i n r e l e a s i n g the anger 
and f r u s t r a t i o n of other miners, p a r t i c u l a r l y concerning the operation of 
the i n c e n t i v e scheme. The miners' lodge committee was caught unprepared by 
the a c t i o n , even though they'd known f o r some time t h a t d i s c o n t e n t was 
r i s i n g . Lodge l e a d e r s c o u l d see t h a t the a c t i o n would l e a d nowhere, and 
t r i e d t o persuade men back to work t o allow an o r d e r l y r e s o l u t i o n to the 
di s p u t e , but the anger was too g r e a t . When the second d i s p u t e erupted, many 
miners were so f u r i o u s a t being "cheated" of t h e i r bonus t h a t nothing would 
persuade them to go back t o work. 
The miners' lodge committee were worried about the p o t e n t i a l d i v i s i v e n e s s 
of the s t r i k e , as men a r r i v e d from o u t l y i n g communities to f i n d a p i c k e t 
l i n e , and r e a l i s e d they'd made a wasted journey. Furthermore, the i n i t i a l 
faceworkers walkout heightened d i v i s i o n s between w e l l p a i d faceworkers 
(powerloaders) and low p a i d backbye and s u r f a c e workers. Powerloaders l o s t 
o n l y one s h i f t s bonus, and could e a s i l y recoup t h e i r r e l a t i v e l y high wages 
through overtime, whereas other workers l o s t a weeks bonus from a s m a l l e r 
wage packet, and had fewer o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o make good the d i f f e r e n c e i n 
overtime. 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e u n i t y of the miners' and mechanics' committees f a c e d with 
a p o t e n t i a l l y h i g h l y damaging d i s p u t e was s i g n i f i c a n t . P o l i t i c a l l y , the two 
committees were converging, working together on a l l the main i s s u e s 
a f f e c t i n g both s e c t i o n s of the workforce. T h i s provided a powerful p l a t f o r m 
from which t o organ i s e the membership, and win t h e i r support f o r c o l l e c t i v e 
r e s i s t a n c e t o BC. T h i s was not the end of the s t o r y however, because as 
s e c t i o n s 7.2 and 7.3 made c l e a r , EC's dominance p l a c e d formidable 
c o n s t r a i n t s on what c o u l d be achieved. But w i t h i n t h i s context, the Murton 
branches made c o n s i d e r a b l e headway. I n the f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n , t h i s 
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p o l i t i c a l p rogress i s examined w i t h regard to the b a l l o t r e s u l t s returned 
w i t h i n the Durham Area s i n c e the s t r i k e . 
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7.6 LEADERSHIP AND BALLOTS 
I have a l r e a d y commented on the d i f f i c u l t i e s f a c i n g the union a f t e r the 
s t r i k e . The burden f e l l p a r t i c u l a r l y h e a v i l y on a c t i v i s t s a t p i t l e v e l , who 
fa c e d day i n and day out the consequences of defeat, both i n terms of 
managements' a g g r e s s i v e new s t y l e , and i n terms of a demoralised 
membership. At Murton, the i n f l u e n c e of t h r e e f a c t o r s was c r u c i a l i n 
h e l p i n g r e b u i l d the union i n t o a c r e d i b l e f o r c e . F i r s t , the workforce 
changed d r a m a t i c a l l y , w i t h o l d e r miners q u i t t i n g i n droves, l e a v i n g a 
younger, more m i l i t a n t workforce who d i d not r e l a t e t o the o l d consensus 
p o l i t i c s o f the NUM ( s e c t i o n 7.3). Secondly, BC's con t i n u i n g onslaught on 
the union and on working c o n d i t i o n s was not conducive t o the development of 
c o n c i l i a t o r y i n s t i n c t s among t h e workforce ( s e c t i o n s 7.2, 7.4, 7.5). And 
t h i r d l y , t h e r e were p r e s e n t i n both branches some e x c e p t i o n a l l y committed 
a c t i v i s t s who fought w i t h i n s p i r a t i o n a l t e n a c i t y t o r a i s e the consciousness 
of the workforce. 
I f events i n other branches i n Durham f o l l o w i n g the s t r i k e a r e compared 
w i t h Murton, then the key v a r i a b l e a t Murton emerges as the q u a l i t y of 
l e a d e r s h i p provided by a c t i v i s t s i n the two branch committees. I n d i f f e r e n t 
degrees other c o l l i e r i e s experienced s i m i l a r changes i n personnel, and i n 
management s t y l e over the period. However, both Murton branches stand out 
f o r t h e i r l e f t wing p r o f i l e s i n c e 1985. One way of a n a l y s i n g t h i s p o l i t i c a l 
p r o f i l e i s v i a an a n a l y s i s of v o t i n g p a t t e r n s by the v a r i o u s branches i n 
the post s t r i k e p e r i o d . B a l l o t s provide "snapshots" of p o l i t i c a l 
c o n s c i o u s n e s s . I n t h e way of snapshots, they are r a t h e r s i n g l e and 
i n ^ r f e c t . They c o n c e a l much hidden c o i i p l e x i t y . Nevertheless, o u t l i n e s are 
e a s i l y p i c k e d out, and d e t a i l can be f i l l e d i n from oth^r aspects of xny 
r e s e a r c h . 
7 . 6 . i VOTING IN DURHAM SINCE MARCH 1985 
Branch breakdowns of v o t i n g r e s u l t s s i n c e the end of the 1984/5 s t r i k e 
p r ovide a u s e f u l method of a n a l y s i n g p o l i t i c a l developments a t Murton, 
e s p e c i a l l y i n r e l a t i o n t o other branches i n the a r e a . Unfortunately, w h i l s t 
t h e branch v o t i n g r e c o r d i s r e l a t i v e l y complete f o r the mechanics' 
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branches, t h e ndners' r e c o r d s a r e more d i f f i c u l t t o t r a c k down^^. Tables 
7.6 t o 7.13 summarise the v o t i n g r e s u l t s f o r c o l l i e r y branches of the NUM 
i n Durham as they were a v a i l a b l e 
I n t h e c a s e of the mechanics, they confirm the p o i n t t h a t Murton remains 
th e most l e f t wing and m i l i t a n t p i t i n the a r e a . And although not a l l the 
f i g u r e s a r e a v a i l a b l e , r e s u l t s f o r the miners' branch show t h a t i n every 
b a l l o t f o r a c t i o n s i n c e the s t r i k e , Murton has produced the strongest 
support. Only Westoe c o l l i e r y - i n both miners' and znechanics' s e c t i o n s -
comes c l o s e t o Muirton's record. But these r e s u l t s need c l o s e r examination 
i n order t o unpack the s p e c i f i c f a c t o r s generating such apparently uniform 
t r e n d s . What emerges i s t h e a b s o l u t e l y c e n t r a l r o l e of branch l e a d e r s h i p i n 
determining the v o t i n g r e s t i l t s w i t h i n branches. 
7 . 6 . i i THE BALLOT OVER THE SOP LEVY (MECHANICS BRANCHES^^K APRIL 1985 
C a l l e d immediately a f t e r the s t r i k e , the b a l l o t on a 50p l e v y to r a i s e 
money f o r sacked miners caused c o n s i d e r a b l e controversy i n p i t communities 
(Beynon, 1985b). D e s p i t e long t r a d i t i o n s of mutual help and s o l i d a r i t y , the 
desperate d i v i s i o n s engendered by the s t r i k e persuaded many people t h a t 
sacked miners had b a s i c a l l y got what they deserved. Media and s t a t e 
propaganda d e p i c t e d m i l i t a n t s as mindless thugs, and the a t t a c k s by a small 
m i n o r i t y of p i c k e t s on s t r i k e breakers l e n t c r e d i b i l i t y to t h i s d i s t o r t e d 
view. I n g e n e r a l , the more c o n s e r v a t i v e mining communities were most l i k e l y 
t o t u r n t h e i r backs on the sacked men. Horden was the c l a s s i c example, 
because d e s p i t e having the fewest r e t u r n e e s , the mechanics' branch produced 
the b i g g e s t a n t i - l e v y vote i n the a r e a ! Nearby Easington on the other hand. 
14 
U l t i m a t e l y , a l l v o t i n g r e c o r d s are sent t o NUM headquarters i n 
S h e f f i e l d . However, the NUM r e f u s e d t o r e l e a s e these records. Tables 7.6 -
7.14 were c o n s t r u c t e d u s i n g data gathered i n Durham from l o c a l NUM 
p e r s o n n e l . 
^ ^ I have chosen t o ignore Durham area e l e c t i o n s f o r agents and 
d e l e g a t e s . The p e c u l i a r i t i e s of l o c a l p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s would make a n a l y s i s 
enormously c o n p l i c a t e d . Such l o c a l l y s p e c i f i c f a c t o r s o f t e n outweigh the 
p o l i t i c a l a f f i l i a t i o n of t h e s e c o n p l i c a t e d e l e c t i o n s . 
^ ^ F i g u r e s a r e not a v a i l a b l e f o r the miners' branches. 
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which was one of the most p o l i t i c i s e d branches, had the biggest m a j o r i t y i n 
support of the l e v y (along w i t h Westoe). 
Murton f e l l between the two, j u s t winning a m a j o r i t y f o r the l e v y . T h i s 
r e f l e c t e d c o n t r a d i c t o r y p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s i n the branch. Murton was s t i l l i n 
many r e s p e c t s a t r a d i t i o n a l v i l l a g e , and the o l d e r mechanics who h e l d out 
d u r i n g the s t r i k e d i d not n e c e s s a r i l y agree with the t a c t i c s used i n i t s 
p r o s e c u t i o n . T h e i r l o y a l t y was t o the union, not to maverick elements 
w i t h i n i t . On the other hand, the h i g h l y p o l i t i c i s e d a c t i v i s t s who 
wholeheartedly supported the s t r i k e won c o n s i d e r a b l e support f o r the l e v y 
from m i l i t a n t s i n the branch. But the balance of f o r c e s changed r a p i d l y 
a f t e r t h i s vote w i t h the redundancy of many o l d e r mechanics. 
7 . 6 . i i i THE OCTOBER 1986 BALLOTS IN MINERS' AND MECHANICS' BRANCHES 
S e c t i o n 7 . 4 . i i showed t h a t both miners' and mechanics' branches i n Murton 
topped the p o l l i n the c a l l f o r a c t i o n over the f a i l u r e to backdate the 
1985 pay award i n September 1986 ( t a b l e 7.7). Both examples showed what 
c o u l d be done when u n i t e d branch committees launched determined campaigns 
t o t r y and win t h e memberships support f o r a d e f i n i t e programme of a c t i o n . 
They focused the anger of the rank and f i l e generated by the employer's 
a c t i o n s , g i v i n g i t a d i s c i p l i n e d and coordinated e x p r e s s i o n . I n doing so, 
they took a major s t e p towards r e s t o r i n g the unions' c r e d i b i l i t y and 
s t r e n g t h a t the p i t . 
With the management f o r c e d t o take the union s e r i o u s l y , the union a l s o 
became a more c r e d i b l e f o r c e w i t h i t s own members. And a t a r e a l e v e l , union 
o f f i c i a l s noted an immediate s o f t e n i n g i n BC's a t t i t u d e to the union. They 
were f o r c e d to r e c o g n i s e the vinion as a f o r c e again. Nevertheless, none of 
t h e proximate causes of the s t r i k e s and overtime ban were withdrawn as a 
r e s u l t of the a c t i o n . The v i c t o r y l a y i n the r e a s s e r t i o n of c o l l e c t i v e 
s o l i d a r i t y r a t h e r than the d e f e a t of BC. 
Murton achi e v e d the b e s t r e s u l t s because both miners' and mechanics' 
committees committed themselves t o a l l out campaigns. I n c o n t r a s t f o r 
example, the formerly l e f t l e d Easington branches began t o betray c l e a r 
s i g n s of t h e i r l e a d e r s realignmient w i t h the Welsh and S c o t t i s h "new 
r e a l i s t s " ( s e c t i o n 7.1). Easington's miajority f o r a c t i o n was reduced i n the 
mechanics' branch t o a wobbly 52%-48%. 
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7.6.iv THE DISCIPLINARY CODE AND NATIONAL OVERTIME BAN 
As p a r t of t h e i r a t t e n p t s t o weaken the a b i l i t y of the. union to r e s i s t 
t h e i r production s t r a t e g y and r e a s s e r t the " r i g h t t o manage", BC d e v i s e d a 
new d i s c i p l i n a r y code of conduct i n 1987. Although c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e i r code 
was based on the model ACAS code, most miners immediately understood a t a 
gut l e v e l what i t was a l l about. BC were a t t e n p t i n g to provide formal 
mechanisms f o r d i s c i p l i n i n g and c o n t r o l l i n g union a c t i v i s t s . 
D e s p i t e the p u b l i c pretence, BC's code was not based on the ACAS model. For 
exaaple, the ACAS code s t i p u l a t e s (para 10) t h a t an employee has the r i g h t 
t o be accompanied by a person of t h e i r c hoice t o any d i s c i p l i n a r y meeting. 
The BC code (para 15) i n s e r t e d the c r u c i a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n t h a t t h i s 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e must be a c c e p t a b l e t o BC. The BC code was iaposed 
u n i l a t e r a l l y on NUM members, without c o n s u l t a t i o n of d i s c u s s i o n . The ACAS 
code (para 5) makes i t c l e a r t h a t they should be the s u b j e c t of 
n e g o t i a t i o n , and should be a c c e p t a b l e t o both s i d e s . B i l l y Etherington, the 
g e n e r a l s e c r e t a r y of the Durham Mechanics summed i t up l i k e t h i s : 
" I t i s a t r a v e s t y t o suggest t h a t t h i s p a r t i c u l a r 
document i s i n f l u e n c e d by the ACAS code of p r a c t i c e . I n 
f a c t , about the only t h i n g t h a t i t does comply with i s 
t h a t ACAS recommends t h a t t h e r e be some form of 
d i s c i p l i n a r y procedure." ( l e t t e r to branch s e c r e t a r i e s , 
9-6-87) 
The most c o n t r o v e r s i a l a s p e c t s of the code concerned BC's a t t e n p t s t o 
d r a m a t i c a l l y extend i t s scope f o r s a c k i n g employees. I n p a r t i c u l a r , the 
code allowed BC t o sack someone f o r committing an offence u n r e l a t e d to work 
( c l a u s e s l O . v i i i , 10.ix, 11 and 4 2 . i i i ) , and to sack men when they had been 
charged "with a c r i m i n a l offence connected w i t h a BC's property or 
i n t e r e s t s " , even when thev were subsequently found not g u i l t y of t h i s 
o f f e n c e ( c l a u s e 4 2 . i ) . The ban immediately s t i m u l a t e d i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n , 
c o n c e n t r a t e d i n the s t i l l v o l a t i l e Y o r k s h i r e c o a l f i e l d . When BC suspended 
f i v e miners a t F r i c k l e y c o l l i e r y f o r a l l e g e d l y l e a v i n g work e a r l y , a s t r i k e 
e rupted which spread t o 14 p i t s i n South Y o r k s h i r e , l a y i n g 13000 miners 
i d l e . The s t r i k e r s only agreed t o r e t u r n to work when the n a t i o n a l 
e x e c u t i v e committee agreed to s a n c t i o n a n a t i o n a l b a l l o t on an overtime ban 
(Winterton, 1988). 
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I n Durham, 70% of miiners and miechanics voted to support the c a l l (the 
miechanics' vote was p r e d i c t a b l y lower than the mdners, due t o t h e i r 
h i s t o r i c a l p r e d i l e c t i o n f o r overtimie) . I n the miechanics' branches, only 
Westoe provided a f r a c t i o n a l l y higher vote f o r a c t i o n than Murton (see 
t a b l e 7.8). I n t e r e s t i n g l y , Easington miechanics' vote slvimped to the point 
where they recorded t h e lowest vote f o r a c t i o n among the working c o l l i e r i e s 
( 5 1 . 8 % ) . Amiongst th e miiners' lodges, Murton produced comtfortably the 
l a r g e s t miajority f o r a c t i o n (87,8% a g a i n s t Westoe's 83.4% - see t a b l e 7.9). 
However, w i t h i n the union n a t i o n a l l y , opinions were s h a r p l y p o l a r i s e d over 
t h e ban. Opposition t o A r t h u r S c a r g i l l and h i s l e a d e r s h i p c r y s t a l l i s e d 
around the appropriateness of overtime bans and other formis of i n d u s t r i a l 
a c t i o n as miethods of d e a l i n g w i t h BC. Leaders i n South Wales, Scotland, and 
t h e t r a d i t i o n a l l y mioderate areas i n the Midlands sought t o use the ban as 
an opportunity to d i s c r e d i t S c a r g i l l ' s l e a d e r s h i p . Even i n areas l i k e 
Durham which recorded s t r o n g support f o r the ban, i t s p r a c t i c a l 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s was q u i c k l y undermiined. Because i t was limdted t o a miid-week 
ban, i t had a v e r y l i m i t e d e f f e c t on production, e s p e c i a l l y i n Durham which 
had no t r a d i t i o n of c o a l i n g between s h i f t s anyway. What l i t t l e e f f e c t i t 
mdght have had c o u l d e a s i l y be eroded i f the union cooperated with 
mianagement, f o r example by e n s u r i n g t h a t the maximum amiount of e s s e n t i a l 
s a f e t y work was scheduled f o r overtime. Under these c o n d i t i o n s , support f o r 
the ban began to d i s s o l v e i n a swamp of c y n i c i s m and r e c r i m i n a t i o n . Rank 
and f i l e miners c o u l d see l i t t l e p o int i n miaking p e r s o n a l s a c r i f i c e s f o r no 
obvious e f f e c t , when elsewhere thousands of people were rendering the ban 
i n e f f e c t i v e . 
Although t h e ban l i n g e r e d on i n t o 1988, Murton was amiong miany p i t s 
c o n s i s t e n t l y b r e a k i n g production records throughout i t s operation. With 
S c a r g i l l ' s opponents working hard to ensure t h a t the miid-week ban was not 
i n t e n s i f i e d i n t o something more e f f e c t i v e , a b a l l o t was f i n a l l y c a l l e d i n 
March 1988 on whether or not t o continue with the ban. U n s u r p r i s i n g l y , the 
miemibership voted t o c a l l i t o f f . Within Durham, Murton was the only 
niechanics' branch t o vote (narrowly) to p r e s e r v e the ban ( t a b l e 7.12). The 
miners too voted f o r a c o n t i n u a t i o n , but o v e r a l l the area accepted the 
f u t i l i t y of c o n t i n u i n g w i t h such an i n e f f e c t i v e p o l i c y . 
The whole a f f a i r provided a c l a s s i c example of how to g r a d u a l l y draw the 
s t i n g out of i n t e n s e rank and f i l e anger. The informial a l l i a n c e between 
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r i g h t wing l e a d e r s and l e a d e r s i n South Wales and S c o t l a n d regarded i t as 
iiq>erative t o scupper m i l i t a n t a c t i o n because they saw i t as 
counterproductive a t a time when they were pursuing a c o n c i l i a t o r y l i n e 
w i t h BC. Recognising the extent of rank and f i l e f e e l i n g a g a i n s t the code, 
they needed t o t a k e some a c t i o n . But by l i m i t i n g i t t o an i n e f f e c t i v e 
overtime ban, they manoeuvred t o ensure t h a t t h e i r p o l i c i e s of cosftromise 
would not be j e o p a r d i s e d . 
At Murton and many p i t s aro\ind the country the d i s c i p l i n a r y code provoked 
profound anger among rank and f i l e miners. I t was a n a t i o n a l i s s u e , which 
c o u l d only be d e a l t w i t h a t a n a t i o n a l l e v e l . L o c a l campaigning could 
t r a n s l a t e rank and f i l e anger i n t o massive votes f o r a c t i o n - as happened 
a t Murton. But the l i m i t s to the a c t i o n were s e t w i t h i n the tinion 
n a t i o n a l l y , where powerful f i g u r e s were f i g h t i n g t o move away from what 
they p e r c e i v e d as the p o l i t i c s of i n d u s t r i a l c o n f r o n t a t i o n . I t was i n an 
e f f o r t t o break the apparent deadlock a t n a t i o n a l l e v e l t h a t Arthur 
S c a r g i l l r e s i g n e d as n a t i o n a l P r e s i d e n t to seek r e - e l e c t i o n , hoping a 
d e c i s i v e mandate would g i v e a u t h o r i t y to l e f t wing p o l i c i e s a t a n a t i o n a l 
l e v e l . 
7.6.V ARTHUR SCARGILL'S RE-ELECTION, JANUARY 1988 
A r t h u r S c a r g i l l ' s s u r p r i s e d e c i s i o n t o s t and f o r r e - e l e c t i o n as n a t i o n a l 
P r e s i d e n t f e l l between the two votes over the d i s c i p l i n a r y code overtime 
ban. The t i m i n g was shrewd. None of S c a r g i l l ' s " l e f t " opponents f e l t 
c o n f i d e n t enough t o r i s k t h e i r c a r e e r s by standing a g a i n s t him. Ins t e a d , 
John Walsh, a r i g h t wing ar e a agent from North Y o r k s h i r e , became S c a r g i l l ' s 
o nly opponent. N e v e r t h e l e s s , the e l e c t i o n turned i n t o a b a t t l e over the 
f u t u r e d i r e c t i o n of the union. A Walsh e l e c t i o n l e a f l e t c a s t i g a t e d " s i x 
wasted y e a r s under S c a r g i l l ' s l e a d e r s h i p , c h a r a c t e r i s e d the P r e s i d e n t as a 
"modem day King Canute", and argued t h a t u n i t y was the key t o winning back 
the \jnions' s t r e n g t h . B n p h a s i s i n g the c a l l f o r u n i t y was widely regarded as 
code f o r n e g o t i a t i n g w i t h the UDM t o r e u n i t e the unions. S i m i l a r l y , Walsh's 
p l e a f o r "progress through n e g o t i a t i o n " was understood to i s p l y concessions 
on f l e x i b l e working. 
The campaign was v e r y d i f f e r e n t from S c a r g i l l ' s t r i u s p h a l march to v i c t o r y 
i n 1982. With the union n a t i o n a l l y unable to negotiate wage i n c r e a s e s , an 
i n c r e a s i n g l y unpopular overtime ban dragging on, and no progress apparent 
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i n almiost every sphere of \inion a c t i v i t y , i t was perhaps not s u r p r i s i n g 
t h a t Walsh was a b l e t o win somie support f o r h i s i n t e n t i o n a l l y amibiguous 
notions of change. 
At Murton, the mu.ners' and mechanics' coasnittees campaigned together. They 
i s s u e d a j o i n t l e a f l e t t o t h e i r miemibers, r e p l y i n g t o Walsh's e l e c t i o n 
agenda, and comparing the candidates p o i n t by p o i n t . 
"...One candidate i s f o r n e g o t i a t i n g a six-day week and 
n i n e hour s h i f t s - t h e o t h e r candidate, i n l i n e w i t h 
conference p o l i c y i s opposed t o f l e x i b l e working... 
One candidate wants t o miake peace with the scab union 
l e a d e r s i n Nottinghamishire - the other r e f u s e s to meet 
w i t h the breakaway l e a d e r s and continues to pursue the 
union p o l i c y of r e c r u i t i n g a l l miiners back i n t o the 
NUM. 
One candidate i s supported by the T o r i e s , the UDM, 
B r i t i s h C o a l and the Tory P r e s s - the other candidate 
has by h i s single-miinded defence of miiners earned the 
h a t r e d of a l l t h e s e anti-working c l a s s i n s t i t u t i o n s . . . " 
N a t i o n a l l y , S c a r g i l l only j u s t s c r a p e d a v i c t o r y . Yet i n Durham a c l e a r 
miajority of miiners s t i l l c a s t t h e i r votes a g a i n s t Walsh's "new r e a l i s m " 
(see t a b l e s 7.10 and 7.11). I t was a triumph f o r hard campaigning. Murton 
miiners 70% miajority r e f l e c t e d both the p o l i t i c a l alignment of the lodge 
comnnittee, and the predomiinantly young, b e l l i g e r e n t workforce. The 
arguments a g a i n s t new r e a l i s m were won. Miners accepted t h e i r branch 
l e a d e r s view t h a t , however arduous the t a s k , the f i g h t to r e - e s t a b l i s h an 
e f f e c t i v e , m i l i t a n t union was p r e f e r a b l e to n e g o t i a t i n g away hard won 
c o n d i t i o n s - which i s how they saw new r e a l i s m . 
Much l e s s m i i l i t a n t a t a r e a l e v e l , the Durham mechanics voted f o r Walsh. But 
a t Murton, 64% supported S c a r g i l l . A vote a g a i n s t the area t r e n d l i k e t h i s 
r e f l e c t e d j u s t how l e f t wing the Murton mechanics had become. The vote a l s o 
r e f l e c t e d the cohesiveness of the branch, and the o v e r a l l t r a d i t i o n of 
m i i l i t a n c y and l e f t i s m by now w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d a t the p i t . Also, i n common 
w i t h t h e miiners, the mechanics' branch comrniittee had earned the r e s p e c t of 
t h e nemibers through t h e i r day t o day work on members' b e h a l f . They had won 
t h e miiddle ground. The p o i n t was confirmed i n the b a l l o t one year l a t e r 
over pay n e g o t i a t i o n s . 
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7.6.vi OVERTIME BAN BALLOT OVER PAY NEGOTIATIONS. DECEMBER 1988 
I f e v e r a b a l l o t captured the d e c i s i v e trends i n the NUM's s h i f t i n g 
p o l i t i c a l alignments, then i t was the attempt t o c a l l a n a t i o n a l overtime 
ban over BC's pay o f f e r i n Decemiber 1988. N a t i o n a l l y , the vote went ag a i n s t 
imposing the ban, by a t i n y miajority (29386-28650; F i n a n c i a l Times, 
19-12-88) . The campaign miarked the miost d e c i s i v e break y e t between the 
S c a r g i l l l e f t , and the "new r e a l i s t " l e a d e r s of South Wales, Scotland and 
elsewhere. Although the b a l l o t had been c a l l e d by a n a t i o n a l S p e c i a l 
Delegate Conference of the union, the South Wales and S c o t t i s h Area 
l e a d e r s h i p s took t h e unprecedented s t e p of i s s u i n g a c a l l t o t h e i r nemibers 
t o vote a g a i n s t the ban ( D u t f i e l d , 1987) . T h i s c a l c u l a t e d s t e p deepened 
s p l i t s w i t h i n the union over s t r a t e g y . 
But i n Durham - where the b a l l o t was fought f o r the f i r s t time under the 
l e a d e r s h i p of the new North E a s t Area^^ - a 60% m a j o r i t y was recorded. And 
Murton went over 73%. I t was an a s t o n i s h i n g r e s u l t . And a l s o a very 
d i f f i c u l t one t o ac h i e v e . F o l l o w i n g the previous d i s a s t r o u s overtime ban 
a g a i n s t the d i s c i p l i n a r y code, confidence i n the e f f i c a c y of t h i s measure 
was a t an a l l time low. D i v i s i o n s i n the n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s h i p c o n t r i b u t e d to 
g e n e r a l d e m o r a l i s a t i o n . Newspaper and t e l e v i s i o n r e p o r t s h i g h l i g h t e d the 
dangers o f t a k i n g a c t i o n . And i n Murton, the campaign s t a r t e d with even 
l o y a l a c t i v i s t s e x p r e s s i n g h o s t i l i t y t o the i d e a . 
Y e t hard campaigning t u r n e d the men around. The c e n t r a l argument was t h a t 
without a c t i o n now, t h e union was f i n i s h e d as an e f f e c t i v e n a t i o n a l 
o r g a n i s a t i o n . E s s e n t i a l l y , the overtime ban was an attempt to f o r c e BC to 
18 
e n t e r n a t i o n a l n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h the union l e a d e r s h i p . On the campaign 
The Area was formed i n J u l y 1988 by the amalgamation of f i v e 
n o r t h e a s t e r n s e c t i o n s of the NUM; the Durham Miners, Durham Mechanics, 
Durham Enginemen, Northumberland Miners and Northumiberland Mechanics. 
Although the are a l e a d e r s h i p s amialgamiated, seperate branches continued to 
e x i s t a t p i t l e v e l . 
18 
S i n c e BC u n i l a t e r a l l y termiinated the c o a l i n d u s t r i e s 
c o n c i l i a t i o n machinery i n 1986, they have r e f u s e d t o neg o t i a t e with the NUM 
u n t i l t h e l a t t e r agree t o accept the s o - c a l l e d "miajority/miinority" concept. 
Under t h i s concept, the NUM would only be able to represent men where i t 
had m a j o r i t y union membership a t a u n i t . But t h i s would mean d e s e r t i n g NUM 
(Footnote Continued) 
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t r a i l , A rthur S c a r g i l l and P e t e r H e a t h f i e l d - backed up i n Durham by the 
Area agents and the BL - evoked the images of h i s t o r y and t r a d i t i o n , 
p o r t r a y i n g the b a l l o t as a desperate attenpt t o save the union b u i l t up by 
t h e i r f o r e f a t h e r s . I n Murton they spoke t o a h a l f eapty h a l l . Grand 
r h e t o r i c b a r e l y l i f t e d the c l o a k of gloom enveloping the meeting. Despite 
t h i s , demoralised a c t i v i s t s trudged back t o the p i t , and won the arguments 
w i t h t h e i r workmates. Once again, determined, u n i t e d caitpaigning won 
through. 
I n c o n t r a s t a t Easington, t h e branch l e a d e r s h i p was a l i g n e d with the 
S c o t t i s h and Welsh a r e a s . An u n o f f i c i a l s c a r e campaign played on the 
memberships f e a r s of f u r t h e r job l o s s e s by suggesting t h a t the overtime ban 
would cause f u r t h e r p i t c l o s u r e s . Only 35% supported the ban. And as one 
l e f t winger c a u s t i c a l l y remarked, t h a t 35% would have supported another 
a l l - o u t , i n d e f i n i t e s t r i k e ! I n f i v e y e a r s Easington had s l i d from being 
perhaps the b e s t organised, most m i l i t a n t and l e f t wing p i t t o being seen 
as the most r i g h t r i n g , and a standard b e a r e r f o r the "new r e a l i s m " (see 
c h a p t e r e i g h t ) . 
7 . 6 . v i i CONCLUSIONS ON BALLOT RESULTS 
The b a l l o t r e s u l t s convey two c o n s i s t e n t messages. The f i r s t i s t h a t 
determined, u n i t e d canpaigning by a l e a d e r s h i p which had b u i l t up respect 
over a p e r i o d of y e a r s c o u l d win support - a l b e i t r e l u c t a n t l y sometimes -
f o r a c t i o n which was o f t e n xinpopular. Secondly, the n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l 
s i t u a t i o n p l a c e d t i g h t c o n s t r a i n t s on what a c t i v i s t s a t one p i t could 
a c h i e v e . While Murton r e s i s t e d a s h i f t t o more accommodative i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s , i n the f a c e of a d i v i d e d union and a labour movement s a i l i n g 
d e c i s i v e l y towards a new accommodation w i t h c a p i t a l , t h i s m i l i t a n t stance 
c o u l d not break the p a r a l y s i s a f f l i c t i n g the NUM. 
Murton's b a l l o t r e s u l t s do not of course t e l l the whole s t o r y . High votes 
f o r a c t i o n c o i n c i d e d w i t h d i s i n t e r e s t and apathy i n union a f f a i r s . I t was 
e a s i e r to m o b i l i s e people f o r a b a l l o t vote than i t was i n day to day 
(Footnote Continued) 
l o y a l i s t s a t p i t s where they were i n a minority, which the union r e f u s e d to 
do. The p o l i c y remained, d e s p i t e attempts t o change i t l e d by the S c o t t i s h 
and Welsh Area l e a d e r s h i p s . 
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a f f a i r s . T h i s p o i n t was emphasised by the strong tendency f o r miners to 
vote one way and a c t another. Support f o r overtime bans c o i n c i d e d with 
r e c o r d l e v e l s of overtime ( t a b l e 7.14). Miners were prepared to support an 
overtime ban i f everyone was i n on i t . But they weren't prepared to stop 
working overtime on t h e i r own, because t h a t would be a f i n a n c i a l s a c r i f i c e 
f o r no purpose. 
I n other words, the c o n t r a d i c t i o n between v o t i n g behaviour and i n d i v i d u a l 
a c t i o n can only r e a l l y be e x p l a i n e d by r e f e r e n c e t o events a t a n a t i o n a l 
l e v e l . The s u c c e s s of a c t i v i s t s ceunpaigning i n the p i t l i t e r a l l y depended 
on n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s - the n a t i o n a l outcome of b a l l o t s . 
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7.7 CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS TO LEADERSHIP? 
I n the p o s t - s t r i k e p e r i o d , branch l e a d e r s h i p was c l e a r l y the d e c i s i v e 
f a c t o r a f f e c t i n g t h e p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n s of NUM members a t Murton. But 
l e a d e r s h i p mtust be seen as a product as w e l l as a cause of consciousness. 
L e a d e r s h i p i n t h e miiners' and mechanics' branches r e f l e c t e d the changing 
composition of the workforce, and the oppressive weight of p r e s s u r e s 
generated by BC and the government's s t r a t e g y towards the i n d u s t r y . 
Furthermiore, s t r a t e g i e s chosen by the commi t t e e s a l s o r e f l e c t e d the 
r e a l i t i e s of the s i t u a t i o n i n the i n d u s t r y . Only a li m i i t e d range of options 
p r e s e n t e d themiselves - a c t i v i s t s s t r u g g l e d w i t h i n a narrow s e t of 
parameters. 
Perhaps the s e v e r e s t l i m i i t a t i o n on l o c a l union a c t i v i t y l a y a t the n a t i o n a l 
l e v e l . Here miore than anywhere BC h e l d on to the c r u s h i n g s u p e r i o r i t y i t 
e s t a b l i s h e d a t the end of the s t r i k e . The union's S h e f f i e l d base was 
arguably i t s l e a s t e f f e c t i v e arm. I n t e r - a r e a c o n f l i c t s , a miajor f i n a n c i a l 
c r i s i s and BC's u n r e l e n t i n g h o s t i l i t y a l l but p a r a l y s e d the c e n t r a l union 
o r g a n i s a t i o n . A l l the miore remarkable t h e r e f o r e t h a t areas l i k e Durham, and 
p i t s l i k e Murton were a b l e to r e a s s e r t some elements of s o l i d a r i t y and 
c o n t r o l . 
I t was an u p h i l l b a t t l e though, c h a r a c t e r i s e d by miassive e f f o r t s f o r 
l i m i i t e d rewards. Often d e f e a t i s m swamped the a c t i v i s t s upon whom so much 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f e l l . Many who had e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y supported the union 
befor e the s t r i k e , d r i f t e d away a f t e r i t . Management i n t i m i d a t i o n 
undoubtedly d e t e r r e d p o t e n t i a l a c t i v i s t s from g r e a t e r involvement. With so 
l i t t l e reward, enormious r e s e r v o i r s of s e l f - b e l i e f and comimitment were 
tapped by the few who kept going. 
P o l i t i c a l change i n both the mechanics' and miiners' branches was l e s s 
dramiatic d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d than before and during the s t r i k e . E s s e n t i a l l y , 
i t was a p e r i o d i n which t h e l e f t c o n s o l i d a t e d the somewhat tenuous h o l d i t 
had gained on the branches during the d i s p u t e . Faced w i t h a mianagement 
onslaught which was t h e l o g i c a l e x t e n s i o n of the T h a t c h e r i t e d r i v e t o 
r e s t r u c t u r e t r a d e unionism, workers could e i t h e r buckle down and seek a new 
accomBDodation w i t h mianagement, or they c o u l d r e s i s t . Because the mianagement 
s t r a t e g y was p r e d i c a t e d on breaking c o l l e c t i v e o r g a n i s a t i o n , miaking an 
accomonodation was only p o s s i b l e a t an i n d i v i d u a l or work group l e v e l . The 
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union's f i g h t was a f i g h t t o maintain c o l l e c t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and 
o r g a n i s a t i o n . 
Massive changes i n t h e workforce c o u l d have weakened the l e f t ' s emerging 
h o l d on branch p o l i t i c s by p r o v i d i n g an i n f l u x of h o s t i l e new blood, as i n 
t h e e a r l y 1980's. I n f a c t , the opposite happened. Older miners who had 
formed the core o p p o s i t i o n to the l e f t i n the e a r l y 1980's took redundancy, 
and the new t r a v e l l e r s were dominated by young men g e n e r a l l y a n t a g o n i s t i c 
t o management. BC management's hard l i n e , designed t o a s s e r t the " r i g h t to 
manage", helped prevent the emergence of any opposition to the l e f t . I t 
a l s o c r e a t e d the c o n d i t i o n s f o r a programme of i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n i n Durham 
over pay i n 1986, because rank and f i l e resentment was s u c c e s s f u l l y 
chaxmelled i n t o c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . However, wi t h management so dominant, 
the union c o u l d not always r e s o l v e g r i e v a n c e s , r e s u l t i n g i n b u i l d ups of 
anger and f r u s t r a t i o n . At Murton, t h i s exploded i n t o w i l d c a t s t r i k e a c t i o n 
i n May 1987. I n day to day c o n f r o n t a t i o n s with management, the luiion often 
s t r u g g l e d t o m a i n t a i n i t s r e l e v a n c e t o the workforce. G r a d u a l l y though, 
s i g n i f i c a n t a r e a s of c o n t r o l were won back, earni n g the r e s p e c t of the 
membership. 
Two hard working committees were a l s o able t o m o b i l i s e support f o r l e f t 
wing p o l i c i e s among t h e i r membership through determined campaigning. 
B a l l o t s gave the chance t o organise, and the Murton branches l e d the 
"league t a b l e " on b a l l o t r e s u l t s f o r every one organised s i n c e the s t r i k e . 
T h i s remiarkable performance r e f l e c t e d the a b i l i t i e s of the two committees, 
and showed how miiners and miechanics could be persuaded to support unpopular 
p o l i c i e s such as overtimie bans. Nevertheless, the success over b a l l o t s 
needs t o be s e t a g a i n s t c o n t i n u i n g high l e v e l s of apathy and d i s i n t e r e s t i n 
t h e union, and i n the tendency f o r mien i n t h e i r day to day a c t i v i t i e s to 
undermiine the c o l l e c t i v i s m which they are prepared t o vote f o r . 
What e v e r y t h i n g i n t h i s c h a p t e r i n d i c a t e s i s t h a t w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r 
context, determined campaigning c o u l d win s i g n i f i c a n t advances i n p o l i t i c a l 
c o n s c i o u s n e s s . Agency was d e c i s i v e i n miaintaining a l e f t consciousness 
d e s p i t e formidable o b s t a c l e s . Union p o l i t i c s d i d not simply follow the 
economic and p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n , but remained arenas f o r hard s t r u g g l e . 
Ultimiately, d e s p i t e s t r o n g p r e s s u r e s i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n , union i n c o r p o r a t i o n 
was guaranteed n e i t h e r by the PWS, nor the post miiners' s t r i k e d r i v e to 
c r e a t e a "new r e a l i s m " . R e s i s t a n c e to the T h a t c h e r i t e p r o j e c t continued. 
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The type of unionism which would e v e n t u a l l y emerge to begin c o n s t r u c t i n g a 
new "indulgency p a t t e r n " was s t i l l indetermiinate. 
But what i s the wider s i g n i f i c a n c e of these l e s s o n s ? Has anything r e a l l y 
changed a t Muz±on over the l a s t t en y e a r s ? C o n t r a d i c t i o n s continue to 
b e d e v i l p o l i t i c s a t the branch l e v e l . These c o n t r a d i c t i o n s can only be 
f u l l y e x p l a i n e d by r e l a t i n g developments a t Murton back i n t o t h e i r wider 
p o l i t i c a l context, and reviewing the h i s t o r i c a l background which generated 
them. Chapter e i g h t does t h i s by drawing together the miain conclusions to 
have emerged from the l a s t t e n y e a r s of p o l i t i c a l developments w i t h i n the 
NUM a t Murton. Given the c e n t r a l i t y of the T h a t c h e r i t e programme t o what 
has happened a t Murton, chapter e i g h t a l s o engages the debate on the 
l e s s o n s of Thatcherism f o r t h e t r a d e union miovement - a debate a c t i v i s t s a t 
Murton have f u l l y p a r t i c i p a t e d i n . 
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TABLE 7.1: MURTON'S LOSSES (expressed as the d i f f e r e n c e between s a l e 
proceeds and "avoidable c o s t s " ) 
1980/81 
Loss 
£000 
1981/82 
Loss 
£000 
1982/83 
Loss 
£000 
1983/8it 
Loss 
£000 
ilur ton 902 2590 29'> 961 
Eppleton ^275 7057 5859 5920 
The Combine 5177 96i»7 6153 6882 
Source: Diamond, 1986 
TABLE 7.2: FIRST PD5T STRIKE REDUNDANCY AT MURTON BY AGE 
Year of Age i n Total number Number leaving '/. of a l l '/. of age 
b i r t h 198^* employed 198't by 22/6/85 l e a v e r s group leaving 
1925-29 55-59 58 12.7 41.4 
1930-3^1 50-55 210 126 66.7 60,0 
1935-39 i*5-A9 220 12 6.3 5,5 
19A0-44 '^ O-'^ i* 161 6 3.2 3.7 
35-39 18-4 2 1 .1 1 .1 
1950-5^* 30-3^ 207 6 3.2 2.9 
1955-59 25-29 261 9 4.8 3.4 
1960-6^ 20-24 296 2.1 1 .4 
1965-69 15-19 20 0 0.0 0.0 
T o t a l s 1617 189 100 
Source; Personal sources 
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TABLE 7.3 FIRST POST STRIKE REDUNDANCY AT MURTON BY RESIDENCE 
V i l l a g e Number b e f o r e Number t a k i n g y. of a l l '/, o f v i l l a g e 
5 t r i ke redundancy l e a v e r s l e a v i n g 
!1ur t o n 630 73 37.8 11.6 
South H e t t o n 107 I't 7.3 13.1 
E a s i n g t o n Lane 113 13 6.7 11.5 
H e t t o n l e Hole 90 10 5.2 11.1 
Peter l e e 72 9 ^.7 12.5 
Wheat l e y H i l l 30 6 3.1 20.0 
G i l e s g a t e 13 6 3.1 ^46.2 
B l a c k h a l l 73 6 3.1 8.2 
Th o r n l e y 26 5 2.6 19.2 
Haswel1 25 2.1 16.0 
Deneside 32 2.1 12.5 
Ryhope 13 2.1 30.8 
Durham 9 i» 2.1 
Trimdon C o l l y 12 3 1.6 25.0 
Houghton Le Sp 26 3 1.6 11.5 
Sherburn 12 3 1 .6 25.0 
Wingate 17 2 1 .0 11.8 
Horden 28 2 1 .0 7.1 
Dawdon 7 2 1 .0 28.6 
East l e a 7 2 1.0 28,6 
P a r k s i d e 9 2 1 .0 22,2 
Shiney Row 1 0.5 25,0 
New H e r r i n g t o n 1 1 0.5 100,0 
Tr imdon 33 1 0.5 3,0 
Hendon 3 1 0.5 33.3 
Seaham 1 0.5 2.2 
C a r r v i 1 l e 5 1 0.5 20.0 
Westlea 27 1 0.5 3.7 
S h o t t o n C o l l y 5 1 0.5 20.0 
Great Lumley 3 1 0.5 33,3 
E a s i n g t o n 7 1 0.5 1^.3 
Sunder land 3 1 0.5 33.3 
Mi 1 I f i e l d 2 0.5 50.0 
TOTALS 1617 193 100.0 
Source: Personal sources 
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TABLE 7.^: 1988 REDUNDANCY BY AGE 
Year o f Age i n T o t a l employed Number l e a v i n g •/. o f a l l */. o f age 
b i r t h 1988 s t a r t 1988 by A p r i l 1988 l e a v e r s group l e a v i n 
198't-28 60-6^ 3 2 0.1 66 
19E9-33 55-59 1 0 - -
193A-38 50-5^ 118 49 21.2 42 
1939-^3 ^5-49 2A1 50 21.6 21 
272 28 12.1 10 
19^9-53 35-39 314 26 11.3 8 
195-^-58 30-3^ 311 31 13.4 10 
1959-63 25-29 468 42 18.2 9 
196^-68 20-24 88 3 1.3 3 
T o t a l s 1816 231 100 
Source: Personal sources 
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TABLE 7.5: 1988 REDUNDANCY BY RESIDENCE 
V i 1 l a g e Number a t Number t a k i n g •/. o f a l l '/. o f v i l l a g e 
s t a r t '88 redundancy l e a v e r s l e a v i n g 
Mur t o n 481 48 20.8 10.0 
H e t t o n Le Hole 296 39 16.9 13.2 
E a s i n g t o n Lane 176 16 6.9 9.1 
Houghton Le Sp 120 13 5.6 10.8 
South H e t t o n 106 9 3.9 8.5 
Wheatley H i l l 35 9 3.9 25.7 
Seaham 71 7 3.0 9.9 
Trimdon 21 6 2.6 28.6 
B l a c k b a l l 47 5 2.2 10.6 
Sunder 1 and 21 5 2.2 23.8 
Peter l e e 51 5 2.2 9.8 
Fencehouses 25 4 1.7 16.0 
Ludworth 7 4 1.7 57.1 
Brandon 18 4 1.7 22.2 
Westlea 22 3 1.3 13.6 
Trimdon S t a t i o n 6 3 1.3 50.0 
Meadowfield 6 3 1.3 50.0 
E a s i n g t o n 3 3 1.3 37.5 
G i l e s g a t e 9 3 1.3 33.3 
T h o r n l e y 27 3 1.3 11.1 
N e w b o t t l e 6 3 1.3 50.0 
Haswel1 15 2 0.9 14.2 
W i l l i n g t o n 3 2 0.9 66.7 
Sherburn 8 2 0.9 25.0 
C a r v i l i e 4 2 0.9 50.0 
Hesledon 3 2 0.9 66.7 
East R a i n t o n 12 2 0.9 16.7 
S i I k s w o r t h 3 2 0.9 66.7 
S t a n l e y 3 2 0.9 66.7 
Low W i l l i n g t o n 1 1 0.4 100.0 
S h o t t o n C o l l y 11 1 0.4 9.1 
Hebburn 1 1 0.4 100.0 
Ushaw Moor 4 1 0.4 25.0 
H a r t l e p o o l 3 1 0.4 33.3 
S a c r i s t o n 1 1 0.4 100.0 
High Hesledon 2 1 0.4 50.0 
Horden 20 1 0.4 5.0 
Belmont 7 1 0.4 14.3 
New Brancepeth 6 1 0.4 16.7 
Dawdon 10 1 0.4 10.0 
Chester Le St 5 1 0.4 20.0 
D a l t o n Le Dale 4 1 0.4 25.0 
Albany 
Tr imdon Co 1 1 ^ 
1 1 0.4 100.0 
9 1 0.4 11.1 
West R a i n t o n 3 1 0.4 33.3 
K e l l o e 5 1 0.4 20.0 
Uswor t h 1 1 0.4 100.0 
Shiney Row 4 1 0.4 25.0 
Washington 7 1 0.4 14,3 
Q u a r r i n g t o n H 1 0.4 100.0 
Source: Personal sources 
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TABLE 7.6: DURHAM MECHANICS BALLOT ON SOP LEVY, APRIL 1985 
BRANCH(1) F o r ( 2 ) A g a i n s t TOTAL y. For y. A g a i n s t 
Dawdon 152 153 306 ^•9.8 50.2 
E a s i n g t o n 312 127 it39 71 .1 28.9 
E p p l e t o n 68 83 151 ^5.0 55.0 
Hawthorn 27 69 39.1 60.9 
H e r r i n g t o n 39 175 21-^ 18.2 81.8 
Horden 50 252 302 16.5 83.5 
MURTON 80 69 1^)9 53.7 ^6.3 
Sacr i s t o n 15 25 ^0 37,5 62.5 
Seaham ^0 8A ^7.6 52.A 
Vane Tempest H2 102 29.2 70.8 
Wearmouth 123 118 2^1 51 .0 it9.0 
Westoe 253 103 356 71,1 29.9 
T0TAL(3) 1A^7 1925 3376 
the t i m e o f t h e 
from r e c e n t l y 
b a l l o t 
c l o s e d 
(1) I n c l u d e s a l l w o r k i n g branches a t mines a t 
( e x c l u d i n g workshops), b u t ex c l u d e s branches 
c o l l i e r i e s (eg B l a c k h a l l ) . 
(2) Excludes s p o i l t papers 
(3) I n c l u d e s v o t e s c a s t a t workshops and c l o s e d c o l l i e r i e s , which were 
ex c l u d e d from t h i s t a b l e . 
Source: Durham Mechanics 
TABLE 7,7: DURHAM MECHANICS BALLOT ON ONE DAY STRIKES, SEPT 1986 
BRANCH y, YES y. NO 
Ea s i n g t o n 52 k8 
MURTON (1) 82 18 
Newbott l e 59 41 
T u r s d a l e 87 13 
Va nB Tempest(2) 52 AS 
Wearmouth 71 29 
Westoe 82 18 
(1) Amalgamated w i t h Hawthorn and E p p l e t o n 
(2) Amalgamated w i t h Seaham 
Source: Durham Mechanics 
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TABLE 7.8: DURHAM MECHANICS BALLOT ON OVERTIME BAN, BC CODE OF CONDUCT, AUG 
1987 
BRANCH YES NO TOTAL y. YES y. NO 
Dawdon 137 87 224 61,2 38.8 
E a s i n g t o n 172 160 332 51.8 48.2 
MURTON 186 41 229 81 .2 18.8 
Vane Tempest 87 79 166 52,4 47.6 
Wearmouth 148 56 204 72,5 27.5 
Westoe 273 59 332 82.2 17.8 
TOTAL 1229 573 1802 
Source: Durham Mechanics 
TABLE 7.9: DURHAM MINERS BALLOT ON OVERTIME BAN, BC CODE OF CONDUCT. AUG 
1987 
BRANCH y. FOR y. AGAINST 
Dawdon 71.1 28,9 
E a s i n g t o n 75.8 24.2 
MURTON 87.8 12.2 
Vane Tempest 66.2 33.8 
Wearmouth 71 .9 28.1 
Westoe 83.4 16.6 
Source: Durham Miner, Oct 1987 
TABLE 7.10: DURHAM MECHANICS VOTING FOR NATIONAL PRESIDENT, JAN 1988 
BRANCH SCARGILL WALSH y. SCARGILL y. WALSH 
Dawdon 123 151 44.9 55.1 
Eas i n g t o n 124 232 34,8 65.2 
MURTON 175 98 64,1 35.9 
Vane Tempest 57 135 29.7 70.3 
Wearmouth 106 136 43.8 56.2 
Westoe 185 170 52.1 47.9 
TOTAL 876 1129 
Source: Durham Mechanics 
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TABLE 7.11: DURHAM MINERS VOTING IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, JAN 1988 
BRANCH 7. SCARGILL •/. WALSH 
Dawdon 55 45 
E a s i n g t o n 61 39 
MURTON 70 30 
Vane Tempest 55 45 
Wearmouth 59 41 
Westoe 66 34 
Source: Durham NUM 
TABLE 7.12: DURHAM MECHANICS BALLOT TO CONTINUE OVERTIME BAN, MARCH 1988 
BRANCH YES NO TOTAL •/. YES '/. NO 
Dawdon 80 165 245 32.7 67.3 
E a s i n g t o n 80 259 339 23.6 76.4 
MURTON 109 98 208 52.4 47.6 
N e w b o t t l e 49 122 171 28.7 71 .3 
T u r s d a l e 65 66 131 49.6 50.4 
Vane Tempest 53 129 182 29.1 70.9 
Wesrmouth 84 139 223 37.7 62.3 
Westoe 144 190 334 43.1 56.9 
TOTAL 664 1168 1832 
Source: Durham Mechanics 
TABLE 7.13: DURHAM MINERS AND MECHANICS OVERTIME BALLOT, PAY, DEC 1988 
BRANCH FOR AGAINST •/. FOR •/. AGAINST 
Dawdon 516 643 44.4 35.6 
E a s i n g t o n 453 836 35.0 65.0 
MURTON 789 283 73.6 26.4 
Vane Tempest 472 329 58.7 41.3 
Wearmouth 337 438 65.4 34.6 
Westoe 710 446 61.1 38,9 
Source: Durham NUM 
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TABLE 7.14 BRITISH COAL TREND STATEMENT FOR MURTON COLLIERY 
YEAR SALEABl 
TOTAL 
(1) 
.E OUTPUT 
DAILY 
(2) 
OVER 
TIME 
y. 
MAN 
POWER 
(3) 
O.M.S. 
(4) 
OP.COST 
/TONNE 
£ 
PROFIT 
/LOSS 
(5) 
OP.COST 
PER 6J 
£ 
1984/5 - - - 1629 - - - -
1985/6 655 2764 8.6 1493 2.01 62,76 -13833 2.39 
1986/7 1231 5285 11.6 1796 2.94 44,92 -5469 1.72 
1987/8 1298 5618 12.1 1522 3.47 39,35 -2014 1.55 
1988/9 1350 5819 14.7 1460 3.91 36.21 4535 1.43 
TABLE 7.15: BRITISH COAL TREND STATEMENT FOR NORTH EAST AREA 
YEAR SALEABl 
TOTAL 
(1) 
.E OUTPUT 
DAILY 
(2) 
OVER 
TIME 
./ 
MAN 
POWER 
(3) 
O.M.S, 
(4) 
OP.COST 
/TONNE 
£ 
PROFIT 
/LOSS 
(5) 
OP.COST 
PER GJ 
£ 
1984/5 308 - - 21914 - 636.71 - -
1985/6 9495 38649 10.5 17910 2,23 49.83 -63383 1.95 
1986/7 10219 43184 12.5 14444 3,00 40.91 -9275 1.58 
1987/8 10229 43457 14.0 12168 3,51 38.27 9028 1.48 
1988/9 10323 43637 17.4 11091 3,81 36.80 28508 1.42 
(1) Y e a r l y o u t p u t i n thousand tonnes 
(2) Average d a i l y o u t p u t i n tonnes 
(3) Manpower a t year end 
(4) O v e r a l l Output per Man S h i f t i n tonnes 
(5) Bottom l i n e p r o f i t / l o s s i n £000 
Source: Per s o n a l sources 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
In t h i s chapter I draw together the main conclusions to have emerged from 
analysis of the processes of p o l i t i c a l change i n the miners' and 
mechanics' branches i n Murton between 1978 and 1988. To do t h i s i t i s 
necessary to draw out the linkages between the theoretical and h i s t o r i c a l 
material i n the f i r s t four chapters, and p o l i t i c a l developments i n Murton 
as they are discussed i n chapters f i v e , s i x and seven. These linkages are 
v i t a l because one of the princip l e aims of t h i s thesis i s to explore the 
l i m i t s to conscious action within p a r t i c u l a r places. Those l i m i t s are set 
by the burden of a pa r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l development, and by material 
changes affecting a place over time. 
Hence i n the Murton unions, the relevant constraints were provided by the 
h i s t o r i c a l experience of the post war settlement, and especially the way i n 
which i t came to be experienced i n c o a l f i e l d regions l i k e Durham. 
Constraints were also created by the way i n which the state's strategy to 
restructure capital-laJsour relations i n B r i t a i n , and re-establish the rule 
of the market came to have s p e c i f i c material effects on miners' l i v e s i n 
Murton. However, the burdens of history and material changes carried with 
them some strongly contradictory elements, and these opened up spaces for 
conscious agents to t r y and work out strategies to confront the changes 
affecting t h e i r l i v e s . 
Analysing the leftward s h i f t at Murton within t h i s framework strongly 
suggests that l e f t wing a c t i v i s t s were able to exercise a significant 
influence over the way miners came to landerstand the changes within the 
industry, and within society. Destabilisation was assured by the strategies 
of the state and the NCB, but the understandings people came to about these 
changes, and the actions they took i n response to them, were guided 
s o c i a l l y , by active caspaigning. This reinforces a central point, namely 
that workers experience themselves as a cla s s f i r s t and foremost through 
t h e i r organisation i n trade xinions. Trade union leadership therefore both 
r e f l e c t s and creates s h i f t s i n workers' understandings of th e i r l i v e s . 
Local union organisations are often more sensitive to these periodic 
upheavals i n consciousness, and also therefore more i n f l u e n t i a l i n 
affecting them, than the national organisation. 
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Ultimately however, the stimulus for p o l i t i c a l change came from outside 
Murton, and so too did the most s i g n i f i c a n t constraints on i t s pace and 
y 
direction. This conclusion therefore spends time summarising the main 
points to have emerged from the e a r l i e r h i s t o r i c a l and theoretical 
chapters. I t singly i s not possible to understand and explain events i n 
Murton, or appreciate t h e i r significance, without locating them within t h i s 
wider frame of reference. I t i s es s e n t i a l to know where contradictions 
deriving from the place s p e c i f i c inpact of these wider changes opened up 
space for the development of d i f f e r i n g interpretations and responses among 
agents i n Murton. 
Having established the framework, X then show how, over a ten year period, 
conscious agency played such a decisive role i n shaping the pace and 
direction of p o l i t i c a l change i n the two branches of the NUM i n Murton. 
Whether i t was t r a v e l l e r s from Blaclchall c o l l i e r y , the old right wing i n 
the miners branch, or l e f t wing a c t i v i s t s - each one stanped t h e i r mark on 
p o l i t i c a l events at the p i t . They were "conscious" agents because they 
possessed definite plans. They aimed to achieve something. 
Throughout t h i s t h e s i s , one of the principle l i m i t s placed on the 
development of trade union strategies at the l o c a l l e v e l has been the 
strategies and actions of the wider trade union movement. Chapter seven 
showed i n p a r t i c u l a r the way that developments within the labour movement 
had placed quite severe l i m i t s on the achievements of a c t i v i s t s at Murton. 
The growth of a "new r e a l i s t " movement s p l i t both the NUM and the wider 
labour movement. I r o n i c a l l y , new realism gained enormous strength out of a 
general assessment that the defeat of the miners' s t r i k e showed the need 
for a new kind of p o l i t i c s . Yet new realism remains a f i e r c e l y contested 
ideology. Both Murton NUM branches have b i t t e r l y opposed i t . But at a 
national l e v e l , i t was c l e a r l y the dominant strand within the labour 
movement. 
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8.1 SUMMARISING MY CONCLUSIONS 
I n t h i s s e c t i o n I summarise the main c o n c l u s i o n s to have emerged from the 
preceding seven c h a p t e r s . I do so i n order to o f f e r a c o n c i s e response to 
the r e s e a r c h q u e s t i o n s which were introduced i n the pre f a c e . These 
q u e s t i o n s were t o do with the nature of the p o l i t i c a l changes observed i n 
the two branches of t h e HUM between 1978 and 1988; the r e l a t i o n s h i p of 
th e s e changes t o the broader p o l i t i c a l and economic environment; and the 
ext e n t t o which conscious agents were a b l e t o shape a s t r a t e g y w i t h i n the 
c o n s t r a i n t s imposed by h i s t o r y and wider p o l i t i c a l - e c o n o m i c developments. 
S . l . i THEORETICAL POINTS 
Chapter one j u s t i f i e d the focus on l o c a l p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i n two ways. 
F i r s t , a review of l i t e r a t u r e on the 1984/5 s t r i k e showed t h a t the absence 
of r e s e a r c h on t h e l o c a l dynamics of the s t r i k e , and how these l o c a l 
dynamics grew out of s p a t i a l l y s p e c i f i c h i s t o r i e s , s e r i o u s l y hinders an 
understanding of the most i n p o r t a n t i n d u s t r i a l dispute s i n c e the war. 
T y p i c a l l y , a n a l y s i s of the s t r i k e was based on a n a t i o n a l s c a l e , r e s u l t i n g 
i n r a t h e r crude and s t e r e o t y p i c a l g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s . When attezapts were made 
t o r e o r i e n t a t e r e s e a r c h towards the s p a t i a l s p e c i f i c i t y of the s t r i k e s 
development, they tended to remain a t a r e g i o n a l l e v e l . Inportant though an 
understanding of r e g i o n a l p o l i t i c a l p r ocesses i s , the region cannot be 
f u l l y i n t e r p r e t e d without r e f e r e n c e to the l o c a l s c a l e , f o r i t i s at the 
l o c a l s c a l e t h a t the (often c o n t r a d i c t o r y ) elements of r e g i o n a l i d e n t i t y 
a r e c o n s t r u c t e d . Only i n a very few regions was a r e g i o n a l i d e n t i t y 
c h a r a c t e r i s e d by anything other than profoundly c o n t r a d i c t o r y elements of 
p o l i t i c a l development. I n o t h e r words, the t a s k i s t o understand how a t a 
l o c a l l e v e l , p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g i e s emerge i n preference to 
ot h e r s . 
I n t e r e s t i n g l y , the f a i l u r e t o disaggregate the region i s not p e c u l i a r to 
s t u d i e s of NUM p o l i t i c s . Within s o c i a l s c i e n c e , the recent enphasis on 
i n t e g r a t i n g " p l a c e " i n t o s o c i a l , economic and p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s e s has 
y i e l d e d a coxif>arable r e l u c t a n c e t o disaggregate the region. Where l o c a l i t y 
s t u d i e s have burrowed beneath t h i s l e v e l , they have s t i l l tended to c l u t c h 
a t t h e s e c u r i t y of " o f f i c i a l " data (coirpany r e p o r t s , government 
s t a t i s t i c s ) , r a t h e r than explore the con?>lex s o c i a l worlds which underpin 
b u r e a u c r a t i c data. T h i s i s a strange l a p s e given t h a t one of the key 
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p r e t e n s i o n s of l o c a l i t y s t u d i e s i s the d e s i r e t o i n t e g r a t e p l a c e as an 
a c t i v e element i n the o r g a n i s a t i o n and r e o r g a n i s a t i o n of c a p i t a l i s t 
s o c i e t y . 
P l a c e i n t h i s context can only be understood s o c i a l l y , as the ensemble of 
s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s and l i v e d h i s t o r y which d e f i n e l i f e i n d i f f e r e n t 
l o c a l i t i e s . Some of the only work to attenpt to i n t e g r a t e t h i s notion of 
p l a c e i n t o an a n a l y s i s of c a p i t a l i s t r e s t r u c t u r i n g has looked a t campaigns 
a g a i n s t works c l o s u r e s i n the s t e e l i n d u s t r y . I n chapter two I conpared 
t h e s e g e n e r a l l y u n s u c c e s s f u l caspaigns with the s u c c e s s f u l work-in a t the 
Upper Clyde S h i p b u i l d e r s y a r d on C l y d e s i d e i n Scotlan d i n 1971. 
Research on a n t i - s t e e l c l o s u r e campaigns - e s p e c i a l l y t h a t which developed 
around Consett i n 1979/80 - e s p h a s i s e d t h a t an unintended consequence of 
b a s i n g a can^saign around t h e p r o f i t a b i l i t y of a p l a n t was the r e i n f o r c i n g 
of the wage r e l a t i o n as the b a s i s of c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y . I t a l s o 
e f f e c t i v e l y i s o l a t e d workers i n one p l a n t from those elsewhere because with 
a p e r c e i v e d need f o r c a p a c i t y r e d u c t i o n s , the i s p l i c a t i o n of sav i n g one 
works was the c l o s u r e of another (Sadler, 1985). Nevertheless, workers 
chose t o f i g h t on grounds of p r o f i t a b i l i t y because they p e r c e i v e d t h i s t o 
be the "only f e a s i b l e s o l u t i o n " when faced with c a t a s t r o p h i c works c l o s u r e 
(Hudson and Sad l e r , 1986). T h i s arg\iment r a i s e d the inportant question; why 
d i d workers p e r c e i v e p r o f i t a b i l i t y t o be the only f e a s i b l e b a s i s f o r 
m o b i l i s a t i o n ? 
The answer l a y i n the d e s i r e t o maximise support w i t h i n the community with 
a "lowest common denominator" appeal. Yet t h i s i s only h a l f the st o r y . Why 
f o r exaitple was t h e lowest common denominator so low? And why were other 
options i n v o l v i n g g e n e r a l i s i n g the caspaign w i t h i n the region and/or the 
i n d u s t r y not considered? C l e a r l y p a r t of the answer l a y i n the h i s t o r y of 
t r a d e unionism w i t h i n the s t e e l i n d u s t r y , and i t s p a r t i c u l a r m a n i f e s t a t i o n 
a t Consett. Another c o n t r i b u t i n g f a c t o r was the a t t i t u d e of the s t e e l 
unions' n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s h i p . Yet understanding e x a c t l y why the caspaign 
developed as i t d i d would only be p o s s i b l e by r e c o n s t r u c t i n g the way i n 
which t h e s e f a c t o r s came together w i t h the people o r g a n i s i n g the caiipaign 
a t t h e time. We know a l o t about the e f f e c t s of the Consett caspaign (and 
oth e r s l i k e i t ) , but much l e s s about the dynamics of t h e i r development. 
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I n comparison, F o s t e r and Woolfson (1986) used t h e i r p r i v i l e g e d access to 
a r c h i v a l m a t e r i a l t o r e c o n s t r u c t i n graphic d e t a i l the way i n which the 
campaign to save the UCS s h i p y a r d developed. They focused on the a b i l i t i e s 
of a w i l y and committed shop steward l e a d e r s h i p which was able to use i t s 
e x p e r i e n c e t o m o b i l i s e support a c r o s s S c o t l a n d and the r e s t of the UK. 
However, i t i s a l s o c l e a r t h a t the UCS work-in was helped by a p o l i t i c a l 
and economdc c l i m a t e which allowed i t to become a symbol f o r the defence of 
t h e post war commitment t o s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n i n maintaining en^sloyment. 
T h i s commitment was i n t u r n p a r t of the coaplex network of s o c i a l 
r e g u l a t i o n s guaranteed by the s t a t e which became known as the post war 
s e t t l e m e n t (PWS). F o s t e r and Woolfson's study demonstrated the need t o 
i n t e g r a t e a macro-scale accovint of the changing p o l i t i c a l econony of 
B r i t a i n w i t h the r o l e of conscious agents i n p a r t i c u l a r l o c a l i t i e s . I n 
Murton, the PWS provided the macro-scale context. 
The PWS i s c e n t r a l to the arguments developed i n t h i s t h e s i s . Miners stood 
a t the p i n n a c l e of the PWS - the n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the c o a l i n d u s t r y 
symbolised the b e l i e f i n s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n t o p l a n production f o r the 
common good. But n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n as i t was enacted contained powerful 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n s . F o r c a p i t a l i t allowed s o c i a l i s a t i o n of the c o s t s of 
producing a b a s i c raw m a t e r i a l . And by i n c o r p o r a t i n g the NUM i n t o the 
running of the i n d u s t r y , i t l i m i t e d workers s t r u g g l e s (with a few 
exceptions) t o i s o l a t e d c o n f l i c t s a t the point of production. However, 
i n c o r p o r a t i o n of t h e union d i d not e r a d i c a t e c o n f l i c t between miners and 
t h e NCB. Throughout the 1950's and 60's d i s s e n t was minimised by a 
combination of the union's determination to enforce cooperative i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s , and the s t a t e commitment t o c o a l f i e l d regions, which l e g i t i m a t e d 
p i t c l o s u r e s i n the p e r i p h e r a l c o a l f i e l d s . But although d i s s e n t never 
became orga n i s e d i n t o c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , d i s c o n t e n t a t job l o s s e s and 
d e c l i n i n g wages simmered beneath the s u r f a c e t r a n q u i l i t y . 
At t h e same time, t h i s i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the union w i t h i n a general 
s o c i a l context of s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n to maintain employment and r a i s e 
l i v i n g standards, s o c i a l i s e d miners i n t o the b e l i e f t h a t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s 
c o u l d be met through th e s t a t e . I n other words, i t p o l i t i c i s e d the process 
of economic d e c i s i o n making. T h i s unforseen consequence of the PWS had 
profound i n y l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e way i n which th e s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t p i t 
c l o s u r e s developed i n the 1980's and p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r the way i n which the 
s t r i k e was understood by d i f f e r e n t age groups i n the NUM. 
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The NUM's r o l e i n the PWS grew out of the s t r u c t u r a l r o l e of trade unions 
i n c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y . Because unions organise workers along the contours 
istpoaed by the c a p i t a l i s t system, they f a c e overwhelming p r e s s u r e s towards 
i n c o r p o r a t i o n w i t h i n the system. T h e i r v e r y e x i s t e n c e i n p l i e s acceptance of 
c a p i t a l and of the wage r e l a t i o n . Once they have won t h e i r b a t t l e f o r 
r e c o g n i t i o n , then t h e i r day t o day operation i n c r e a s i n g l y i n v o l v e s 
n e g o t i a t i o n s t o improve and defend t h e i r members i n t e r e s t s . I n order to 
a v o i d r e l y i n g on the \instable t e n s i o n of power generated by depending on 
the memberships " w i l l i n g n e s s t o a c t " , the union l e a d e r s h i p seeks " e x t e r n a l 
guarantees" of i t s power w i t h i n the s t a t e . T h i s l e a d s t o b u r e a u c r a t i s a t i o n 
as r e l i a n c e on " e x t e r n a l guarantees" i n c r e a s e the s e p a r a t i o n of the 
bureaucracy from the membership. 
A f u r t h e r consequence of o r g a n i s i n g along the contours of the c a p i t a l i s t 
system i s t h a t t r a d e unions concentrate on the economic s t r u g g l e to defend 
and inprove workers c o n d i t i o n s . T h i s s t r u c t u r a l tendency towards economism 
c o n f i n e s t r a d e union a c t i v i t y t o the p u r s u i t of in5>rovements w i t h i n 
c a p i t a l i s m , l e a v i n g unchallenged the wage r e l a t i o n which generates changes 
i n working c o n d i t i o n s . T h i s s e p a r a t i o n was i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the PWS, where 
unions l i k e the NUM continued t o r e p r e s e n t t h e i r members economic i n t e r e s t s 
w i t h i n the s o c i a l democratic framework, w h i l s t l i m i t i n g t h e i r p o l i t i c a l 
work t o can^jaigning f o r the e l e c t i o n of a Labour government. Again though, 
t h i s had the e f f e c t of p o l i t i c i s i n g economic d e c i s i o n making, and 
r e i n f o r c i n g the b e l i e f t h a t miners' i n t e r e s t s could l e g i t i m a t e l y be pursued 
through the s t a t e , by the e x e r c i s e of economic power. 
U l t i m a t e l y however, the post war i n c o r p o r a t i o n of labour was an unstable 
phenomenon. Although i t c r e a t e d indulgency p a t t e r n s at both n a t i o n a l and 
l o c a l l e v e l s , t h e i r continued e x i s t e n c e was p r e d i c a t e d upon a p a r t i c u l a r 
s e t of economic c o n d i t i o n s , which began to f a l l apart i n the 1970's. As 
Rosa Luxemburg argued, economic c r i s e s f o r c e c a p i t a l i s t s t o a t t a c k workers 
c o n d i t i o n s ( r o u t i n i s e d i n t o c h a r a c t e r i s t i c indulgency p a t t e r n s ) , which i n 
t u r n t h r e a t e n s t o c o l l a p s e the d i s t i n c t i o n between p o l i t i c a l and economic 
a s p e c t s of workers s t r u g g l e s . I n the 1970's and '80's, as the indulgency 
p a t t e r n s of the PWS came under a t t a c k , new t e r r a i n was opened up f o r 
s t r u g g l e between c a p i t a l and labour. 
The PWS had depended f o r i t s s u c c e s s on the a b i l i t y of c a p i t a l to d e l i v e r 
r i s i n g l i v i n g standards. When t h i s c o n d i t i o n began to cmjmble i n the l a t e 
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1960's w i t h the onset of r e c e s s i o n , the PWS plunged i n t o c r i s i s . For 
c a p i t a l , the c r i s i s was e^>erienced as a c r i s i s of c o n t r o l , because as 
v a r i o u s a t t e o p t s were made t o impose new c o n d i t i o n s on workers, the labour 
movement r e s i s t e d . From the l a t e 1960's, the s t a t e faced mounting 
o p p o s i t i o n a s the economic c r i s i s blew the l i d o f f the d i s c o n t e n t which had 
been contained by the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of the peak r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the 
l a b o u r movement. Trade union l e a d e r s r e f l e c t e d the explosion i n m i l i t a n c y , 
and the s t a t e found t h a t under th e s e c o n d i t i o n s the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of union 
l e a d e r s b a c k f i r e d , because the r a d i c a l i s e d unions were i n a strong p o s i t i o n 
t o defend t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . 
J u s t as t h e miners symbolised the e r a of post war planning, so t h e i r two 
s t r i k e s i n the e a r l y 1970's symbolised the c r i s i s of the PWS. R i s i n g 
unexcployment and f a l l i n g r e a l wages pushed the rank and f i l e i n t o a 
m i l i t a n t stance, which t h e i r l e a d e r s were f o r c e d t o r e f l e c t . The success of 
both the s t r i k e s had c o n t r a d i c t o r y e f f e c t s however. F i r s t , i t pushed the 
s t a t e i n t o even g r e a t e r c r i s i s , because i t problematised to a h i t h e r t o 
unprecedented degree the extent of i t s a u t h o r i t y . Secondly, i t confirmed to 
miners t h a t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s could be advanced through s e c t i o n a l , economic 
stmiggle (backed up w i t h the j u d i c i o u s i n t e r v e n t i o n of other workers at key 
moments), b r i n g i n g p r e s s u r e t o bear on the s t a t e . And t h i r d l y , t h i s point 
was confirmed and expanded by the s i g n i n g under a Labour government of the 
1974 P l a n f o r Coal (PFC). 
P l a n f o r Coal, and the S o c i a l Contract represented the f i n a l attenpt to 
rework the PWS. For the miners, PFC and the o i l p r i c e r i s e s seemed at l a s t 
t o guarantee them a s t a b l e f u t u r e . An aura of conplacency s e t t l e d over the 
union i n the mid 1970's, as p i t c a r parks expanded and miners began t a k i n g 
overseas h o l i d a y s . W h i l s t other workers engaged i n b i t t e r b a t t l e s with the 
Labour government as a u s t e r i t y measures began t o b i t e , the miners were 
e f f e c t i v e l y removed from the b a t t l e f i e l d . Yet the NUM's p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n 
depended on a c o n t i n u i n g commitment by government t o corporate planning and 
s t a t e subsidy, and the acceptance of union power i n the d e c i s i o n making 
pr o c e s s f o r the i n d u s t r y . The Conservative government e l e c t e d i n 1979, was 
i n s t e a d committed t o a fundamental r e d e f i n i t i o n of the r o l e of trade 
unions, and the u l t i m a t e removal of the s t a t e from economic i n t e r v e n t i o n . 
Even, during the p e r i o d of the Labour government, two major developments 
began t o d e s t a b i l i s e t h e apparently secure union p o s i t i o n . I n p o s i t i o n of 
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t h e Area I n c e n t i v e Scheme (AIS) i n 1978 was c a l c u l a t e d t o weaken the \inity 
which the n e g o t i a t i o n of a n a t i o n a l wages s t r u c t u r e i n 1966 had achieved. 
And under PFC the commitment of resources to investment i n mining 
technology s t i m u l a t e d d e s t a b i l i s a t i o n by t h r e a t e n i n g job l o s s through 
i n c r e a s e d production a t low c o s t u n i t s (thereby d e f i n i n g production a t high 
c o s t p i t s "uneconomic"), and through the shaking out of labour at low c o s t 
u n i t s . 
S . l . i i MURTON AND THEORY 
I n Murton, the f i r s t e f f e c t s of t h e s e d e s t a b i l i s i n g f a c t o r s were f e l t 
through th e o p e r a t i o n of t h e AIS. T h i s began t o d i s t u r b the "indulgency 
p a t t e r n " of the p a s t decade, by throwing wages d i s p u t e s back from n a t i o n a l 
t o p i t l e v e l . The change c o i n c i d e d with the retirement i n the miners' 
branch of o f f i c i a l s who had h e l d t h e i r p o s i t i o n s s i n c e the e a r l y 1960's. 
There followed a p e r i o d of l e a d e r s h i p i n s t a b i l i t y , as s u c c e s s i v e branch 
s e c r e t a r i e s and chairman were unable to achieve the confidence of the 
membership. T h i s l e a d e r s h i p i n s t a b i l i t y was a c c e l e r a t e d by t h r e e f u r t h e r 
d e s t a b i l i s i n g f a c t o r s i n branch p o l i t i c s , namely; the changing age 
c o s p o s i t i o n of the workforce; the changing r e s i d e n t i a l c o s p o s i t i o n of the 
workforce, and the i n c r e a s e i n p i t c l o s u r e s . C r u c i a l l y , these d e s t a b i l i s i n g 
i n f l u e n c e s a f f e c t e d d i f f e r e n t s e c t i o n s of the workforce (mechanics/miners, 
young/old, t r a v e l l e r s / n o n t r a v e l l e r s ) i n d i f f e r e n t ways. These cleavages 
had fiindamental i n p l i c a t i o n s f o r the way i n which branch p o l i t i c s developed 
a t Murton. 
F o l l o w i n g the d e s t a b i l i s i n g impact of the AIS, the i n f l u x of t r a v e l l e r s 
f u r t h e r d i s t u r b e d the e s t a b l i s h e d indulgency p a t t e r n a t the c o l l i e r y which 
had grown up during the y e a r s of the PWS. I n 1980/81 the a r r i v a l of over 
100 t r a v e l l e r s from B l a c k b a l l c o l l i e r y s i g n a l l e d the end of j u v e n i l e 
recruit:ment and c r a f t a p p r e n t i c e s h i p s a t the p i t . Furthermore, the 
B l a c k b a l l men brought with them memories of t h e i r own indulgency p a t t e r n , 
which they found c o n s t a n t l y v i o l a t e d a t t h e i r new p i t . B l a c k b a l l t r a v e l l e r s 
t h e r e f o r e began the f i r s t conscious, planned a t t e n p t s to change the miners' 
branch p o l i t i c s . They i n t e r v e n e d t o f o r c e a work t o r u l e i n an attenpt t o 
improve bonus terms. They were i n s t r u m e n t a l i n changing the terms of the 
bonus agreement from a "pooling" system t o a " f a c e by f a c e " agreement. And 
underground a t t h e p i t , t h e i r m i l i t a n t c h a l l e n g e t o management p r e r o g a t i v e s 
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had a profound demonstration e f f e c t on young Murton miners, who began to 
l e a r n how to r e s i s t management t a c t i c s . 
I n t h e e a r l y 1980's th e government preceded c a u t i o u s l y a g a i n s t the NUM. 
S t i b s i d i e s were g r a d u a l l y cut back, but t h e r e was no open a s s a u l t on the 
PFC. When the NCB d i d attempt a d i r e c t a s s a u l t on PFC, a r o l l i n g s t r i k e 
f o r c e d the government to concede e x t r a cash and e f f e c t i v e l y confirm the 
MUM's s p e c i a l s t a t u s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the gradual approach had important 
p o l i t i c a l e f f e c t s i n Murton. As p i t c l o s u r e s i n c r e a s e d , the government made 
a v a i l a b l e e x t r a c a s h t o fund redundancy payments. T h i s was aimed a t 
d i s o r g a n i s i n g a c o l l e c t i v e response to c l o s u r e s , because i t gave ol d e r 
miners (who b e n e f i t e d most under the terms of the redundancy scheme) a 
s t r o n g f i n a n c i a l i n t e r e s t i n a c c e p t i n g c l o s u r e . W h i l s t t h i s e f f e c t was 
achieved, redundancy schemes a l s o a l t e r e d the age composition of the 
workforce a t remaining c o l l i e r i e s , with i i i p o r t a n t i n p l i c a t i o n s f o r the 
dominance of the union's o l d r i g h t wing. As p i t s c l o s e d , o l d e r miners took 
redundancy, and yovmger ones t r a n s f e r r e d to other p i t s . 
Age was t h e r e f o r e a c r u c i a l cleavage i n the workforce a t Murton, made more 
i n p o r t a n t by the o p e r a t i o n of the redundancy scheme. Up u n t i l the 1980's 
both Murton branches had been dominated by men s o c i a l i s e d i n t o the PWS. 
T h i s s o c i a l i s a t i o n i n v o l v e d a commitment to a framework of i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s which the NCB and the s t a t e were r a p i d l y rendering obsolete. 
"Cosy r e l a t i o n s h i p s " between management and union were under a t t a c k . 
I n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s no longer ran themselves on the b a s i s of a shared 
r e l i a n c e on "custom and p r a c t i c e " . I n t e r v i e w s with o l d e r miners repeatedly 
r e v e a l e d a bewilderment a t the NCB's ag g r e s s i v e new posture i n the p e r i o d 
before the s t r i k e . For o l d e r miners i t seemed l i k e an a b e r r a t i o n , and they 
c o u l d r a r e l y conceive of any way of d e a l i n g with i t other than arguing f o r 
a r e t u r n t o the " o l d days". Younger miners on the other hand were 
f r u s t r a t e d by the f o s s i l i s a t i o n of the NCB " c a r e e r s t r u c t u r e " , and 
f r i g h t e n e d by t h e i n c r e a s i n g prospect of unenployment. They f e l t t h a t the 
Board was messing them around. The obvious i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the union at 
a l l l e v e l s i n t h e f a c e of the management o f f e n s i v e weakened t h e i r 
attachment to the formal and informal arrangements of the post war e r a . 
P i t c l o s u r e s , the i n c e n t i v e scheme, and the a r r i v a l of t r a v e l l e r s a l l 
exposed the l e a d e r s h i p of the miners' branch to c o n s i d e r a b l e p r e s s u r e . 
These p r e s s u r e s were a l s o f e l t i n the mechanics' branch. T h i s s m a l l c r a f t 
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o r g a n i s a t i o n was c h a r a c t e r i s e d by a t r a d i t i o n of r i g h t wing p o l i t i c s , and 
c r a f t e l i t i s m a t an a r e a l e v e l . At Murton however, the branch had a 
r e p u t a t i o n f o r being w e l l o rganised and w e l l l e d by i t s s e c r e t a r y - John 
Cunmings - who was a l s o a major f i g u r e i n the l o c a l Labour Party. Because 
he was p o l i t i c a l l y i n v o l v e d i n a much wider context than o f f i c i a l s i n the 
miners' branch, Cummings grew t o a p p r e c i a t e the f u l l extent and s c a l e of 
t h e changes f a c i n g t h e i n d u s t r y before many people i n the miners' branch. 
D e s p i t e h i s own s o c i a l i s a t i o n i n t o the p o l i t i c s of the PWS, he began to 
r e a l i s e t h a t the o l d e r a was under t h r e a t . Furthermore, a c t i v e l e f t wing 
campaigning w i t h i n the branch, b u i l d i n g on the d e s t a b i l i s i n g f a c t o r s 
d e s c r i b e d above, began t o push the branch l e f t . I n order t o r e t a i n c o n t r o l , 
Cummings moved with the t i d e of opinion. Also, he organised c l a s s e s a t 
Durham U n i v e r s i t y f o r branch a c t i v i s t s . His l e a d e r s h i p of Sasington 
D i s t r i c t C o u n c i l meant t h a t Murton was f u l l y i n t e g r a t e d i n t o the Save 
E a s i n g t o n Area Mines (SEAM) canpaign, which r a i s e d awareness of the t h r e a t 
of p i t c l o s u r e s . Murton mechanics became a f o r c e f u l , canpaigning, l e f t wing 
branch. 
I n the miners' branch, the l e f t began to make inroads, but d i d not achieve 
dominance. At an a r e a l e v e l , the growth of the Broad L e f t (BL) o r g a n i s a t i o n 
enhanced the l e f t w a r d d r i f t as the p o l i t i c s of the PWS began to come apart 
n a t i o n a l l y . I n the Murton branch however, the BL was r e l a t i v e l y weak. 
B l a c k h a l l t r a v e l l e r s - the p r i n c i p l e agents of change i n the e a r l y 1980's -
were motivated p r i m a r i l y by p i t i s s u e s (bonus, management 
a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m ) . T h i s p i t consciousness - s i m i l a r to the f a c t o r y 
c o n s c i o u s n e s s d e s c r i b e d by Beynon (1984; see chapter three) - challenged 
the e s t a b l i s h e d l e a d e r s h i p , but d i d not c o n s t i t u t e an attempt to s h i f t the 
branch i n t o a wider p o l i t i c a l t r a n s f ormation. Younger lainers were angry and 
f r u s t r a t e d , but t h e s e f e e l i n g s were not a r t i c u l a t e d to a conscious 
programme of change. The BL began to make s i g n i f i c a n t inroads i n 1983, 
noteably w i t h the e l e c t i o n of John Dixon as the f i r s t non-Murton s e c r e t a r y 
of the union. But the branch was s t i l l i n f l u e n c e d by a group of voluble 
o l d e r , r i g h t wing miners, who f o r y e a r s had e x e r t e d p r e s s u r e on the 
committee a t branch meetings. 
The s e p a r a t i o n between economic s t r u g g l e ( c a r r i e d out by trade unions) and 
p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e ( c a r r i e d out by p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s ) which was endorsed by 
the arrangements surrounding n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n , had the e f f e c t of encouraging 
a l i m i t e d , p i t based consciousness among miners. C o n f l i c t a t the point of 
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production was channeled into l o c a l struggle with management. Many miners 
seemed unable or unwilling to see the p o l i t i c a l context within which the i r 
struggles occurred. The concentration on p i t based struggle was enhanced by 
the incentive scheme, which also had the effect of increasing the 
h i s t o r i c a l tendency for faceworkers (powerloaders) to fight for t h e i r group 
in t e r e s t s separately from the rest of the workforce. The vote to end the 
1980 "teeing out" dispute ( r e s t r i c t e d to faceworkers only) confirmed that 
t h i s group e l i t i s m had a powerful hold i n the Murton miners' branch. This 
kind of p o l i t i c s was ref l e c t e d i n the group of older, right wing miners who 
tended to dominate the rather weak miners' committee. 
Sectional and group consciousness of t h i s kind also grew out of the 
economism which unions insertion into the c a p i t a l i s t system tends to 
generate. The separation of economics and p o l i t i c a l aspects of struggle, 
and union's focus on the "economic g u e r r i l l a war" iwparta a strong tendency 
for unions to pursue t h e i r own short term material interests without much 
regard for t h e i r wider p o l i t i c a l i n y l i c a t i o n s . 
Paradoxically therefore, xaany of the old right at Murton supported Arthur 
S c a r g i l l during h i s 1981 election campaign. They hoped that by electing a 
strong President the NCB would be intimidated into conceding improvements 
i n pay and conditions. I n other words, they thought he would prove a more 
ef f e c t i v e leader i n the "economic g u e r r i l l a war". On the other hand, 
younger miners supported him because he offered a coherent focus for t h e i r 
r i s i n g discontent. I t was t h i s convergence of interests which explained 
S c a r g i l l ' s landslide victory. The right supported S c a r g i l l precisely 
because they thought he would be able to achieve t h e i r aims without the 
need for action, which partly explains why votes for S c a r g i l l were never 
translated into votes for s t r i k e s against p i t closures. 
Meanwhile the state was driving on with i t s strategy to re-establish the 
rule of the market i n economic decision making, and effect a decisive s h i f t 
i n power from Isibour to c a p i t a l . However, the nationalised coal industry 
remained a bastion of the old corporatist consensus. The union was s t i l l 
integrated into the NCB's decision making process at national l e v e l , and at 
p i t l e v e l cosplicated procedures and negotiations acconpanied almost every 
management i n i t i a t i v e . Massive subsidies balanced the NCB's accounts every 
year. As the government atteiqpted to remove the basis for t h i s settlement 
by gradually imposing market c r i t e r i a on the Board, the resulting p i t 
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c l o s u r e s meant t h a t the xinion's r e s i s t a n c e would have to be overcome. Th i s 
c o u l d happen e i t h e r i f the imion was unable t o m o b i l i s e support i n defence 
of jobs, or i f the xinion's m o b i l i s a t i o n was defeated i n open b a t t l e . With 
the c l o s u r e of Cortonwood and the Y o r k s h i r e walkout, open c o n f l i c t began. 
Immediately however the d i v i s i o n s which had c h a r a c t e r i s e d the unions' ranks 
before the s t r i k e were apparent. N a t i o n a l l y , the d i f f e r e n t i a l impact of the 
NCB's s t r a t e g y combined with long t r a d i t i o n s of moderation helped l a y the 
foundations f o r Nottinghamshires r e s i s t a n c e t o the s t r i k e c a l l . But 
r e g i o n a l g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s obscured c o n p l i c a t e d p o l i t i c a l developments a t the 
l o c a l l e v e l . C e r t a i n l y , although Murton ended up as one of the most s o l i d 
p i t s i n Durham, the workforce i n the n u m e r i c a l l y dominant miners' branch 
i n i t i a l l y voted t o r e j e c t the s t r i k e c a l l . T h i s vote c r y s t a l l i s e d 
p r e - s t r i k e d i v i s i o n s i n t o a r i g i d p a t t e r n . Younger miners saw the s t r i k e as 
a chance t o f i n a l l y e xpress t h e i r anger a t the NCB and the government, and 
they voted e a g e r l y t o s t r i k e . The younger miners t h e r e f o r e were beginning 
t o c o n s c i o u s l y c h a l l e n g e the acceptable l i m i t s of t r a d e unionism as they 
had been e n s h r i n e d i n the PWS. They saw the t r a d i t i o n a l indulgency p a t t e r n 
as i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e i r p r e s e n t c r i s i s . 
F o r t h e o l d e r miners however, a n a t i o n a l s t r i k e a g a i n s t p i t c l o s u r e s was a 
t h r e a t e n i n g event. I n s t i n c t i v e l y they f e l t t h a t i t c r o s s e d the boundary of 
l e g i t i m a t e t r a d e vuiion a c t i v i t y . T h i s was not an econoioistic s t r i k e f o r 
more pay, but u l t i m a t e l y an a t t e n p t t o change goveriunent p o l i c y . W h i l s t 
t h a t may have been ac c e p t a b l e with regard to pay - a l e g i t i m a t e sphere of 
union i n t e r e s t - i t was problematic with regard to a s t r a t e g i c question 
such as the s i z e of the i n d u s t r y . Acceptance by the union of p i t c l o s u r e s 
i n the 1960's seemed t o c l e a r l y concede t h i s p o i n t . Among older miners 
t h e r e f o r e the s t r i k e provoked c o n t r a d i c t o r y f e e l i n g s . T h i s i n t u r n d e r i v e d 
from i t s c o n t r a d i c t o r y elements. 
On one l e v e l the s t r i k e was an a t t e n ^ t to defend the s t a t u s quo. I t was 
about p r e s e r v i n g p i t s , jobs and communities. Yet on the other i t was a 
r a d i c a l c h a l l e n g e t o the s t a t e . Because the s t a t e was i n t e n t on a r a d i c a l 
r e s t r u c t u r i n g of c a p i t a l - l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s i n B r i t a i n , and because the NUM's 
defence of the t r a d i t i o n a l stood i n the way of t h i s programme, the s t r i k e 
was a h i g h l y p o l i t i c a l c h a l l e n g e to the a u t h o r i t y of the s t a t e . As chapter 
t h r e e ' s d i s c u s s i o n of the s i g n i f i c a n c e of s t r i k e s showed, i t i s f r e q u e n t l y 
the s t a t e i t s e l f whose a c t i o n s widen the s i g n i f i c a n c e of an o r i g i n a l l y 
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l i m i t e d demand. But i t was only the young p i c k e t s who were t r u l y 
r a d i c a l i s e d i n a way which Rosa Luxemburg's theory of the "mass s t r i k e " 
might suggest (chapter t h r e e ) . The s t a t e ' s onslaught on a defensive s t r i k e 
t u r n e d i t i n t o a potent s t r u g g l e over the o r g a n i s a t i o n of an i n d u s t r y , and 
the p r e s e r v a t i o n of hard won gains i n c o n d i t i o n s . Yet the experience of the 
PWS l e f t c o n t r a d i c t i o n s deeply embedded i n many s e c t i o n s of the workforce, 
p r e v e n t i n g the f u l l r a d i c a l i s a t i o n which might have been expected given the 
ex t e n t of s t a t e x n o b i l i s a t i o n a g a i n s t the s t r i k e . To the extent t h a t the 
s t a t e was abl e t o p o r t r a y the s t r i k e as an a t t a c k on democratic government, 
i t was abl e t o e x p l o i t the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n many miners ideology. Older 
miners were hap p i e s t with the de f e n s i v e elements of the s t r i k e . Most d i d 
not p i c k e t , because t h i s a g g r e s s i v e s i d e of the disp u t e they saw as 
hovering dangerously c l o s e t o the boundary of l e g i t i m a t e union a c t i v i t y . 
Yet the other s i d e of t h i s c o n t r a d i c t i o n was t h a t because miners were used 
under the PWS t o pursuing t h e i r i n t e r e s t s through the s t a t e , they regarded 
i t as l e g i t i m a t e t o attempt to f o r c e the s t a t e to change i t s p o l i c y . What 
they d i d not l i k e was the way i n which the s t r i k e seemed to challenge the 
v e r y b a s i s of s o c i e t y - by f o r exan^sle the v i o l e n c e on the p i c k e t l i n e , or 
the r e f u s a l to have a b a l l o t . For most miners t h e r e f o r e , the s t r i k e c r e a t e d 
massive t e n s i o n s . They stubbornly and openly supported the l i m i t e d , 
d e f e n s i v e aims of the s t r i k e , and could not understand why they should be 
seen as so s u b v e r s i v e . But the s t a t e ' s a b i l i t y t o t u r n the s t r i k e i n t o a 
c o n t e s t over fundamental i s s u e s such as democracy and v i o l e n c e a l i e n a t e d 
them from the way i n which the s t r i k e was pursued. 
One s m a l l group of o l d e r miners a t Murton d i d p i c k e t . They were the ex 
branch o f f i c i a l s - men with a powerful l o y a l t y to the NUM. T h e i r misgivings 
about the conduct of the s t r i k e were outweighed by what they f e l t as t h e i r 
simple duty to defend the union. I t was t h i s d e f e n s i v e aspect which they 
i d e n t i f i e d w i t h most s t r o n g l y . They were oft e n a p p a l l e d a t the v i o l e n c e 
i n f l i c t e d by the s t a t e , but they were e q u a l l y condemnatory of the 
" e x c e s s e s " of the young p i c k e t s . 
F o r younger miners on the other hand, without the weight of h i s t o r i c a l 
s o c i a l i s a t i o n i n t o t h e PWS, or the complications of high redundancy pay t o 
weaken t h e i r r e s o l v e , the s t r i k e provided an o u t l e t f o r a l l the conpressed 
f r u s t r a t i o n and anger t h a t had b u i l t up i n the e a r l y 1980's. They l e a p t 
i n t o the s t r i k e , becoming the most a c t i v e p i c k e t s . They took e f f e c t i v e 
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c o n t r o l of t h e Murton miners' committee a t the s t a r t of the s t r i k e . They 
experienced the s t r i k e as a p o w e r f u l l y r a d i c a l i s i n g experience. But they 
were separated both from the a n t i - s t r i k e diehards and the d e c i s i v e middle 
groiind by massive d i f f e r e n c e s i n vuiderstanding. 
I n p r a c t i c a l terms, the s t r i k e was f i n a l l y defeated when the middle ground 
began t o take the l e a d i n r e t u r n i n g to work. S t r i k e breakers came mainly 
from the o u t l y i n g v i l l a g e s , because the i s o l a t i o n was g r e a t e s t away from 
the s t r i k e c e n t r e s i n p i t v i l l a g e s . T h i s weakness of the s t r i k e was a 
c r u c i a l one, because i t undermined one of the s t r i k e s c e n t r a l c l a i m s - t h a t 
of defending the community. What i t showed was t h a t the community as 
conce i v e d by t h i s slogan was b a r e l y r e l e v a n t t o thousands of miners. The 
t i e s of p i t , community and c l a s s were a l r e a d y weakened by the e f f e c t of 
p a s t p i t c l o s u r e s . S t r i k e r s s t a r t e d going back when hopelessness f i n a l l y 
overcame l o y a l t y t o the union. Going back d i d not s i g n i f y the f i n a l 
e x p r e s s i o n of long r e p r e s s e d support f o r the NCB and government p o l i c y , but 
a pragmatic r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t the s t r i k e stood no chance of a c h i e v i n g i t s 
aims. They were defeated, but not converted to Thatcherism. T h i s gave l e f t 
wing a c t i v i s t s some purchase when they t r i e d t o r e b u i l d the union a f t e r the 
s t r i k e . But the wider s i g n i f i c a n c e of the d r i f t back to work was to 
l e g i t i m a t e the s t a t e ' s arguments t h a t m i l i t a n t t rade unionism was f u t i l e 
and counter-productive i n the new e r a . 
The exceptions t o t h i s p a t t e r n were the m i n o r i t y of a n t i - s t r i k e diehards, 
who opposed the s t r i k e from the s t a r t . They had i n t e r n a l i s e d the 
government's arguments aJoout the s t r i k e s i l l e g i t i m a c y . But i t was only a 
m i n o r i t y who r e j e c t e d c o l l e c t i v i s m i n such a s t r o n g way. Most of those who 
went back were not i d e o l o g i c a l l y h o s t i l e to the s t r i k e . T h e i r negative 
f e e l i n g s about i t were i n the context of the t e n s i o n s and c o n t r a d i c t i o n s 
d e s c r i b e d above. 
D e s p i t e the d i v i s i o n s , f o l l o w i n g the s t r i k e , the l e f t c o n s o l i d a t e d i t s 
dominance i n both miners' and mechanics' branches. B a l l o t r e s u l t s 
throughout t h e p o s t - s t r i k e p e r i o d confirmed t h a t Murton a c t i v i s t s were able 
r e p e a t e d l y t o m o b i l i s e support f o r l e f t wing p o l i c i e s . My a n a l y s i s i n 
chapter seven showed t h a t branch l e a d e r s h i p was the d e c i s i v e f a c t o r i n 
e x p l a i n i n g Murton's c o n s i s t e n t showing a t the "top" of b a l l o t s f o r a c t i o n . 
T h i s was due to a mixture of hard can5>aigning, EC's s t r a t e g y , and the 
redundancy of much of the r i g h t wing opposition. There were however 
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c o n t r a d i c t o r y elements i n t h e s e f a c t o r s . BC's s t r a t e g y r e i n f o r c e d the 
s t r e n g t h of the union i n some ways, but undermined i t i n many others. 
S i m i l a r l y , a c t i v e can^jaigning by the branch was a f f e c t e d by the d i v i s i o n s 
w i t h i n the xinion a t n a t i o n a l l e v e l . These c o n t r a d i c t o r y elements are 
s i g n i f i c a n t , because they c o n t r i b u t e t o an \inderstanding of the r e l a t i v e 
i n y o r t a n c e of "the l o c a l " i n the p o l i t i c a l development of the Murton 
branches. 
Hundreds of miners took redundancy a f t e r t h e r e t u r n t o work. They in c l u d e d 
most of Murton's o l d r i g h t wing. Although some l e f t wing a c t i v i s t s a l s o 
l e f t , redundancy e f f e c t i v e l y ensured the dominance of s t r i k e a c t i v i s t s i n 
both branches because i t removed t h e i r main opponents. The young miners who 
had formed the backbone of the p i c k e t i n g operation were s t i l l not a 
m a j o r i t y of the workforce, but they were c e r t a i n l y the dominant p o l i t i c a l 
f o r c e . They achieved t h i s because t h e r e was s i n p l y no organised opposition. 
They maintained t h i s p o s i t i o n p a r t l y because hard l i n e management t a c t i c s -
r e a s s e r t i n g the " r i g h t t o manage" - provided no purchase f o r any 
a l t e r n a t i v e l e a d e r s h i p . Y e t w h i l s t the management hard l i n e c o n s o l i d a t e d 
the l e f t i n power, i t a l s o rendered the union in^jotent a c r o s s a broad 
swathe of a c t i v i t y . Union a c t i v i s t s had to f i g h t hard t o achieve relevance 
i n the l i v e s of workers a t the p i t . That they g r a d u a l l y began to claw back 
some ar e a s of c o n t r o l r e f l e c t e d l i t t l e more than sheer determination and 
hard work. 
Yet even w i t h c r e e p i n g s u c c e s s e s , the union's power was h e a v i l y 
c i r c u m s c r i b e d . Many of the l i m i t s l a y outside the d i r e c t c o n t r o l of branch 
a c t i v i s t s . BC's s t r a t e g y t o r e a s s e r t the r i g h t t o manage, and impose s t r i c t 
f i n a n c i a l c r i t e r i a on c o l l i e r y operations, was e f f e c t i v e l y unchallengeable 
once the s t r i k e had been defeated. Management's hard l i n e a t l o c a l l e v e l 
c o u l d only be c h a l l e n g e d r e a l i s t i c a l l y by c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n a t area and/or 
n a t i o n a l l e v e l s . But here l o c a l a c t i v i s t s faced a second ( r e l a t e d ) problem 
- the d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n the NUM. 
The d e f e a t of the s t r i k e had profound i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the NUM and f o r the 
labour movement. For the union, i t c r e a t e d strong p r e s s u r e s f o r a change i n 
d i r e c t i o n . Formerly l e f t wing NUM l e a d e r s i n S c o t l a n d and South Wales began 
t o support a s o f t e r l i n e with management. They argued t h a t t h e r e was no 
p o i n t i n m a i n t a i n i n g c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l postures a g a i n s t management i n the 
l i g h t of t h e new balance of power i n the i n d u s t r y . The f i r s t p r i o r i t y was 
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to t a l k to management, which was impossible while the union maintained i t s 
intransigent re f u s a l to recognise the UDM. Conpromises were needed i n order 
for the union to achieve a stronger bargaining position. The l e f t on the 
other hand argued that BC would not negotiate concessions to the union 
unless placed under pressure to do so. Accordingly, they t r i e d to win 
support for national action - an overtime ban - to t r y and force BC to the 
negotiating table. Murton stood s o l i d l y behind the l e f t wing position^. 
Nationally however, the l e f t was defeated. 
The s p l i t i n the union was a fundamental one. I t c r y s t a l l i s e d a struggle 
over the future direction of trade unionism which was being fought out i n 
unions across the country. I t was a l l the more intense within the NUM 
because the union's defeat i n 1984/5 was used by many as de f i n i t i v e proof 
that the "old s t y l e " trade unionism was finished. Murton miners and 
mechanics s t i l l stood on the l e f t , searching for a way forward which b u i l t 
on the new r e a l i t i e s without conpromising on what were regarded as basic 
p r i n c i p l e s , but the way forward was very unclear. 
S . l . i i i SUMMARY 
In short, t h i s t h e s i s has demonstrated that at a l o c a l l e v e l , agency 
exerted a decisive influence over the process of p o l i t i c a l change i n two 
branches of the Murton NUM. However, a c t i v i s t s could only work within the 
constraints deriving from the place s p e c i f i c experience and interpretations 
permeating the consciousness of miners and mechanics working at Murton. At 
a time of massive i n s t a b i l i t y , where the contradictions of trade unions 
role i n c a p i t a l i s t society were (p a r t i a l l y ) exposed, and a long established 
indulgency pattern was under threat, then the room existed for conscious 
agents to shape a new understanding of society. The 1984/5 str i k e was a 
massive rupture with the past, and threatened to tear down the separation 
between economic and p o l i t i c a l aspects of workers struggles. Certainly the 
younger a c t i v i s t s to whom the PWS bore l i t t l e relevance began to grope 
However the wea)cness of the union at l o c a l l e v e l was i l l u s t r a t e d 
by the tendency for miners' day to day actions to contradict t h e i r ballot 
support for national p o l i c i e s . For exasple, many men who supported a 
national overtime ban continued to work large amounts of overtime. They 
could see no point i n engaging i n individual acts of s a c r i f i c e without 
c o l l e c t i v e support. 
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towards a coit?>letely d i f f e r e n t conception of l e g i t i m a t e trade union 
a c t i v i t y than t h a t which had p r e v a i l e d s i n c e the l a s t war. 
Yet a t the same time i t c l e a r l y was not p o s s i b l e to throw out a l l the 
p o l i t i c a l baggage of the p a s t , and p o l i t i c a l changes a t Murton t h e r e f o r e 
r e f l e c t e d the background from which they emerged - not l e a s t i n the 
d i v i s i o n s and confusions which c h a r a c t e r i s e d the post s t r i k e period. 
C o n t r a d i c t i o n s continued t o underly the p o l i t i c a l l i f e of both branches, 
j u s t as they had i n the p r e - s t r i k e e r a when the o l d r i g h t wing l e a d e r s 
found t h e i r i d e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n s were no longer tenable. Miners knew they 
c o u l d not r e t u r n t o the "cosy r e l a t i o n s h i p s " of the PWS, but on the other 
hand i t was not a t a l l c l e a r where t h i s l e f t the union. The l e f t could hold 
t h e l i n e a t Murton a g a i n s t what was p e r c e i v e d as the a b j e c t surrender 
preached by new r e a l i s t s , but a g e n e r a l s t a t e of confusion e x i s t e d over the 
most ap p r o p r i a t e response t o the c r i s i s the NUM (and indeed many other 
unions) found themselves i n . 
T h i s confusion i s not unique to Murton. I t i s p a r t of an i n t e n s e debate 
r a g i n g i n the labour movement over the most appropriate d i r e c t i o n to take 
i n the l i g h t of the changes wrought by Thatcherism. T h i s i n t u r n r e l a t e s to 
t h e whole q u e s t i o n of t r a d e union's r o l e i n c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y . One of the 
p r i n c i p l e consequences f o l l o w i n g from trade unions tendency to organise 
along the contours of c a p i t a l i s t development (which I i d e n t i f i e d i n chapter 
t h r e e ) , was the tendency towards economism and s e c t i o n a l i s m . These 
t e n d e n c i e s were entrenched i n the PWS, which d i d however allow some room 
f o r union's p o l i t i c a l involvement because of the high degree of s t a t e 
involvement i n economic d e c i s i o n making, both i n d i r e c t l y through macro 
economic pl a n n i n g and d i r e c t l y through s t a t e c o n t r o l of Lasportant s e c t o r s 
of t h e economy. 
Under Thatcherism, the s t a t e has been d i s t a n c e d - a t l e a s t f o r m a l l y - from 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i n economic d e c i s i o n making. T h i s p o l i c y has been matched with 
an a g g r e s s i v e d r i v e t o r e d e f i n e the r o l e of t r a d e unions along s t r i c t l y 
e c o nomistic l i n e s , and t o i n t e r p r e t the l e g i t i m a t e p u r s u i t of members 
economic i n t e r e s t s i n s h o r t term, u t i l i t a r i a n terms. I n other words, i t i s 
an a t t e n p t t o impose "monological" c r i t e r i a f o r d e c i s i o n making and a c t i o n 
i n t r a d e \inions, so t h a t unions judge t h e i r i n t e r e s t s p u r e l y w i t h i n the 
c a p i t a l i s t economic system, and never challenge b a s i c managerial 
p e r o g a t i v e s . 
Chapter 8 (304) 
Within the labour movement, the success of Thatcherism i n defeating a l l 
attempts to defend the old settlement between c a p i t a l , labour and the state 
has pronpted new ideas for dealing with the changed p o l i t i c a l and economic 
situation. The dominant strand of thinking has been termed "new realism". 
New r e a l i s t s seek a new accomodation with c a p i t a l and the state, which 
accepts some of the major changes Thatcherism has imposed on the labour 
movement. In the coal industry, new realism has been encapsulated by 
attempts to change NUM policy to accept greater labour f l e x i b i l i t y . BC have 
t r i e d hard to increase f l e x i b i l i t y i n order to increase machine 
u t i l i s a t i o n , thereby boosting productivity. Opponents have argued that 
increasing productivity at low cost units i n an e s s e n t i a l l y s t a t i c market 
can only lead to job loss at r e l a t i v e l y high cost units. New r e a l i s t s argue 
that the changes are inevitable, and that the union should negotiate for 
the best possible deal. 
More broadly, new r e a l i s t s have argued that confrontational cl a s s p o l i t i c s 
are no longer appropriate for the trade unions, and that negotiations and 
con5>romise should replace aggressive posturing. This can be seen as an 
attempt to carve out a new role for unions, based on the premise that the 
decade of confrontation which followed economic destabilisation i n the 
1970's, i s now e f f e c t i v e l y over. I examine these arguments i n appendix 
three, arguing that whilst Thatcherism has ce r t a i n l y fundamentally altered 
the balance of power between c a p i t a l and organised labour, t h i s does not 
j u s t i f y the abandonment of " t r a d i t i o n a l " trade union values to the extent 
that new r e a l i s t s suggest. I n particular, using the defeat of the miners' 
s t r i k e to herald the death of c l a s s p o l i t i c s seriously misreads the 
situation. The pri n c i p l e s the miners' s t r i k e was fought on - defence of 
jobs, trade unions and communities - are s t i l l fundamental. to any effective 
working c l a s s p o l i t i c s . Workers experience themselves as a c l a s s f i r s t and 
foremost through t h e i r organisation i n trade unions. New r e a l i s t rejections 
of c l a s s p o l i t i c s undermines the very basis of working cl a s s consciousness. 
The b a t t l e over "new realism" i s not yet over. This thesis has demonstrated 
that many of the sinqplistic assuicptions made to j u s t i f y a new p o l i t i c s for 
the working c l a s s are at the very l e a s t premature, and at the worst 
dangerous. 
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8.3 CONCLUDING COMMEaTTS 
In t h i s t h e s i s I have moved from the l e v e l of restructuring within the 
international energy c i r c u i t down to the nationally s p e c i f i c resolution of 
the contradictions posed by both changes i n energy supply and demand, and 
the emergence of a heightened l e v e l of c l a s s c o n f l i c t i n B r i t a i n i n the 
l a t e 1970's and 1980's. From t h i s national context I have shown how the 
state and NCB strategy had s p a t i a l l y variable effects, and how t h i s 
provoked different responses and strategies i n different places. Crucially, 
I have argued that a decisive (although limited) sphere ex i s t s for the 
exercise of human agency i n l o c a l i t i e s as people struggle to resolve the 
contradictions posed by the place-specific Inpact of ultimately global 
restructuring processes. 
Following on from t h i s , i t i s important that l o c a l i t y i s reassessed to 
include more than s i a p l y a dissection of the economic/gender relations 
working through a p a r t i c u l a r place. Rather, i f l o c a l i t y i s to be understood 
as having a causal in^jact on broader s o c i a l relations, then i t i s v i t a l to 
study the processes of p o l i t i c a l involvement and transformation at the 
scale at which most people experience them. My study of the processes of 
p o l i t i c a l change i n the Murton branches of the NUM has shown the conditions 
under which a s h i f t from right wing to l e f t wing union p o l i t i c s took place. 
I t has interpreted t h i s s h i f t within the national p o l i t i c s of the NUM and 
the p o l i t i c a l economy of B r i t a i n within which the union was operating over 
the period from 1978 to 1988. 
This analysis does not permit general conclusions to be drawn about the 
inyortance of l o c a l activism i n p o l i t i c a l change. What i t does do i s show 
that under p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l conditions, l o c a l activism played a 
decisive role i n influencing the pace and extent of p o l i t i c a l change i n two 
branches of the NUM at Murton. At the same time, factors external to Murton 
placed powerful constraints on that p o l i t i c a l development. I have shown -
for one case study - how agency at the l o c a l l e v e l was able to exploit the 
room available for p o l i t i c a l action within national constraints to engineer 
a fundamental break with the p o l i t i c s of the post war settlement. 
F i n a l l y , the wider point that needs to be enphasised i s that c l a s s 
relations provide the fundamental driving force behind l o c a l i t y s p e c i f i c 
developments. Class power underpins almost every facet of work and l i f e -
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and not just i n Murton. Acknowledged or not, c l a s s i s s t i l l the controlling 
p r i n c i p l e i n society. Not u n t i l strategies are demised and in^Jlemented with 
the aim of overthrowing that c l a s s power w i l l men and woman - to paraphrase 
Marx - be free to make history i n circumstances of t h e i r own choosing. 
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APPENDIX ONE: METHODOLOGICAL STRATEGY 
APPENDIX 1: METHODOLOGICAL STRATEGY 
A 1.1 PREFACE 
Research i n the s o c i a l sciences i s not easy. Two close friends of mine who 
have done PhD's i n genetic engineering never t i r e of poking fun at the 
iaprecision, the s u b j e c t i v i t y and the shallowness they perceive i n what 
they disbelievingly r e f e r to as s o c i a l science. Notwithstanding standard 
riposte concerning the uncertain status of certainty i n natural sciences, 
i t i s c e r t a i n l y true that some of what passes for research i n the s o c i a l 
sciences i s not d i f f i c u l t to c r i t i c i s e . I n particular, the tendency to make 
spurious claims about the a p p l i c a b i l i t y and certainty of research 
conclusions opens up the f i e l d for armchair c r i t i c s . But part of the 
problem concerns the sinple fact that the s o c i a l world i s enormously 
coioplex, and simply not amenable to the kind of rigorous laboratory 
investigation which characterises "hard" science (Sayer, 1985) . 
A second problem however l i e s with s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s (and marzists) 
tendency to skate over the process by which they have reached t h e i r 
conclusions. Cloaking highly controversial research methods i n a cover of 
s c i e n t i f i c techniques and terminology represents either misplaced 
confidence i n the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of s c i e n t i f i c method, or lack of confidence 
i n alternative methods of data collection. Instead, we should be clear and 
open about our research techniques. Where ambiguity ex i s t s , i t should be 
admitted. I f personal factors have intruded on the conduct of the research, 
why not say so? Only by concealing the process of data collection do 
"personal" factors invalidate conclusions. We have nothing to lose by 
eiDphasising the d i f f i c u l t y of what we are trying to do! 
I n many ways i t seems odd to be relegating a discussion of methodology to 
an appendix of t h i s t h e s i s . With the current enphasis on PhD's as an 
exercise i n research t r a i n i n g (Renouf, 1989), i t might have been better to 
integrate methodology into the main body of t h i s t h e s i s . Nevertheless, I 
chose not too, for two reasons. F i r s t , I decided that the prime aim of my 
t h e s i s was to construct a thorough and coherent narrative explaining 
p o l i t i c a l developments within the Murton branches of the NUM. Second, 
within an 80000 word l i m i t , decisions had to be taken about thesis content. 
P r i o r i t i s i n g narrative consistency and fluency required considerable 
attention to d e t a i l , which inevitably ate up space. I t also suggested that 
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discussion of methodology might unduly d i s t r a c t attention from the 
unfurling account. For these reasons, methodology i s considered here i n a 
seperate appendix. 
I t i s by now a truism that the aims and methods of PhD research evolve 
continually throughout the three (or more) years of study. (One lecturer 
recently suggested to me that you only r e a l l y become aware' of what your PhD 
i s about a year a f t e r i t i s finished!) This process of development was 
evident from the beginning of t h i s PhD, exaggerated by stubborn (and 
somewhat i l l - a d v i s e d ) r e f u s a l to define too t i g h t l y the central questions 
of the research. Naively, I expected both cjuestions and answers to "emerge" 
from tOY interviews, and r e f l e c t i o n on them. Unsurprisingly, there are times 
when t h i s weakness shows through, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the uneven and 
inconsistent nature of the evidence Z collected. In my defence, at le a s t 
some ambivalence related to the d i f f i c u l t i e s of toowing exactly what "data" 
was l i k e l y to be available to answer any s p e c i f i c question f u l l y . In t h i s 
s i t u ation, i t was dangerous to become too addicted to any single l i n e of 
inquiry. These - and other - problems need to be discussed so that 
research can be judged i n the l i g h t of decisions I made about data 
c o l l e c t i o n . 
Having made these prefatory comments, t h i s appendix considers methodology 
v i a a four part structure. F i r s t , the choice of the Durham coal f i e l d , and 
within i t Murton, i s explained. Secondly, the strategy and techniques 
applied to the p r a c t i c a l task of carrying out research " i n the f i e l d " are 
discussed, and c r i t i c i s e d . Thirdly, I make some b r i e f comments about the 
way I chose to present my research material. F i n a l l y , some i n ^ l i c a t i o n s of 
my research strategy for the relationship between theory and evidence are 
broached. 
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A 1.2 CHOOSING DURHAM AND MURTON 
In chapter one I explained that the focus of my thesis was l o c a l processes 
of p o l i t i c a l change. Because when I began my research the miners' had just 
engaged i n the most dramatic i n d u s t r i a l struggle of the post war years i n 
Br i t a i n , an MUM case study offered the opportunity to integrate an 
understanding of the assault on the Post War Settlement from the l a t e 
1970's with an analysis of p o l i t i c a l change at the l o c a l l e v e l . I wanted to 
study c l a s s action, and to unpack the processes which created i t , and the 
factors important i n controlling i t s content and direction. Within the coal 
industry however, there were s t i l l a number of options available. 
Conparisons between p i t s i n different areas, between p i t s i n the same area, 
a combination of both, or even an international comparison between B r i t i s h 
and European p i t ( s ) were a l l p o s s i b i l i t i e s . 
Conparitive research has a number of well known advantages. In terms of the 
questions posed i n t h i s research topic, i t offered the chance to compare 
the v a l i d i t y of d i f f e r i n g explanations of p o l i t i c a l change. Carefully 
chosen case studies could have suggested how different processes created 
s i m i l a r outcomes, or perhaps how apparently similar processes created 
different outcomes! The effects of di f f e r i n g regional (or national) 
h i s t o r i e s could be investigated. At the very least, conparisons force 
allowances to be made for the unique c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of one particular 
place. I n time however, a l l these temptations were rejected i n favour of an 
intensive case study of one c o l l i e r y - Murton. Why? 
On one l e v e l , I didn't have to make a choice. Not only did I find Murton to 
be an exceptionally rewarding (and convivial) place to study when I began 
data c o l l e c t i o n , i t also proved to be an exceedingly cosplex case study. 
Gradually I began to r e a l i s e that i n order to glispse the s o c i a l processes 
behind the everyday explanations of p o l i t i c a l change i n the xinion branches, 
I would have to commit more than j u s t a few months to the task. I t became 
increasingly c l e a r that the quality of information I required was not 
available to breathless researchers who "dropped i n " to a union office p i t , 
flou r i s h i n g a long shopping l i s t of questions. 
Furthermore, I began to wonder to what extent i t would be possible for me 
to make meaningful comparisons between different places. Given the demands 
of research i n Murton, would i t be possible to develop such a thorough 
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understanding of another place i n the time available? As I dri f t e d further 
and further into an intensive study, I r e a l i s e d that a coxoparison was not 
e s s e n t i a l to t h i s type of research. Murton's uniqueness was exactly the 
point. A conparison would offer only another unique conjunctural exanple of 
the relationship between objective changes and subjective agency. I t would 
be undeniably useful, i n that i t would generate inportant signals on the 
r e l a t i v e iii5>ortance of different subjective and objective elements, but i t 
would not change the conclusions emerging from analysis of Murton. Given 
the p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s , I decided conparative work was a luxury I could 
not afford. 
But why did I s e t t l e on the Durham co a l f i e l d , and within i t Murton? 
Answering t h i s question requires reference to the central issues t h i s 
t h e s i s set out to address. Although many different types of p o l i t i c a l 
change could have formed the basis for investigation, I wanted to study the 
change from "right wing" to " l e f t wing" (and within t h i s , to unpack exactly 
what the changes meant i n p r a c t i c e ) . At a c o a l f i e l d l e v e l , Durham remains 
the only area to have shifted d e c i s i v e l y leftwards since the miners' 
s t r i k e . Both leadership and rank and f i l e have been transformed, with 
b a l l o t votes confirming Durham's movement to the l e f t . In coziparison, areas 
such as Scotland and South Wales have shifted dramatically to the "right", 
whilst Yorkshire has retained i t s l e f t wing profile'''. 
One further s i g n i f i c a n t advantage i n studying the Durham c o a l f i e l d was the 
s p l i t union structure which characterised the area from the 1870's. Whereas 
miners i n almost a l l other areas of the NUM are represented by just one 
constituent union (eg the South Wales or Yorkshire Areas), i n Durham the 
mining workforce was s p l i t between three constiturent Assiciations. The 
two largest of these - the Durham Miners (representing most non cra f t 
workers) and the Durham Mechanics (represent craftsmen) - offered a unique 
These bald regional generalisations obviously conceal the subtelties of 
p o l i t i c a l change i n each area. Despite t h i s , Durham does emerge c l e a r l y as 
the only c o a l f i e l d to move dec i s i v e l y l e f t , whatever the disputes about the 
true content and variation of p o l i t i c s i n other c o a l f i e l d s . 
2 
"Was" i s used here advisably, since 1988 witnessed the 
amalgamation of the three Assocaitations, along with the three couparable 
organisations i n Northumberland, into a single North East Area of the NUM. 
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opportunity to study d i f f e r i n g p o l i t i c a l developments within two branches 
at the same workplace . 
Within Durham, p o l i t i c a l changes within miners and mechanics have been 
s p a t i a l l y uneven. Easington has moved rightwards. Wearmouth - although 
known as a l e f t p i t - has pursued an uneven path, the r e a l nature of i t s 
p o l i t i c a l development remaining elusive, and conplicated by a significant 
UDM presence. The Seaham p i t s (Dawdon and Seaham-Vane Teopest) have i n the 
main remained stxibbomly "moderate". Since I wanted to follow ary research 
into the post s t r i k e period, that l e f t j u s t two c o l l i e r i e s , Westoe and 
4 
Murton . Both have idiosyncratic reputations within the co a l f i e l d . 
Indefinable q u a l i t i e s such as "bloody-mindedness" are often mentioned with 
respect to both. Of the two however, Murton represented a better exasple of 
the processes I wanted to study, because i t summed up the stereotypical 
change I wanted to examine. 
Despite the emergence of a young, ra d i c a l group of miners at c o a l f i e l d 
l e v e l i n the pre-strike years (Lloyd, 1985), Murton remained a formidable 
for t r e s s for the old s t y l e Durham NUM p o l i t i c s . Known throughout the 
c o a l f i e l d as the most right wing p i t i n the county, Murton ended the 1970's 
with branch leaders whose terms of o f f i c e were measured not i n years, but 
i n decades! But such apparent s t a b i l i t y was deceptive. Bu the end of the 
1984/5 s t r i k e , Murton had been transformed into one of the most militant 
and progressive p i t s i n the county - a reputation since consolidated. This 
then was the stereotypical description of Murton I was confronted with when 
I began my research. As chapter 5 shows, i t glosses over the uneven 
For the purposes of t h i s thesis the small Enginemen's 
Association (consisting of the winding enginemen at each c o l l i e r y ) i s 
ignored. I t i s perhaps not being too \inkind to suggest that i t s 
contribution to union p o l i t i c s i n t h i s period was r e l a t i v e l y minor. 
4 
At the time when I chose Murton, i t s continued existence was in 
jeopardy. However, i f i t were to be threatened with closure, I knew that I 
would have the opportunity to study at f i r s t hand the p o l i t i c a l struggle 
that t h i s would inevitably precipitate. Of the other c o l l i e r i e s s t i l l open 
i n 1985, Horden was about to close, as was Eppleton. Herrington and 
Sacriston had already agreed to closure. Seaham was a noteably moderate p i t 
(merged with Vane Ten¥>est i n 1987). Although I could also have studied an 
NCB workshop (eg Tursdale or Philadelphia), these were manned entirely by 
mechanics, and I wanted a more "mainstream" case study. 
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development of the Murton branches i n the pre-strike years, and the extent 
to which change was already d e s t a b i l i s i n g t r a d i t i o n a l relationships. 
Nevertheless, since I wanted to investigate j u s t t h i s type of stereotype, 
Murton emerged as the best case study i n the Durham c o a l f i e l d - a once 
right wing p i t that was now unmistakeably transformed. 
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A 1.3 CHOICE OF RESEARCH TECHNIOXraS 
Again, the choice of research techniques reflected both the requirements of 
the research topic, and also p r a c t i c a l limitations inposed by working 
within Murton i n the immediate post-strike era. My definition of the 
research topic determined that my main data source would be people 
associated with Murton Co l l i e r y , ( o f f i c i a l data on the developntent of class 
consciousness being rather t h i n on the ground!) Given t h i s situation, the 
two problems were c l e a r l y who to t r y and seek information from, and how 
best to extract i t . Before discussing the resolution of these problems 
however, a few words are necessary on other sources of information. 
A 1.3.i DOCUMENTARY SOURCES 
I am acutely aware that the argrunents i n t h i s thesis are not bolstered by 
much "objective" data. Perhaps I could have spent more time trawling 
through p i t and area consultative committee minutes, fishing out a staple 
diet of " o f f i c i a l " figures on manpower, output and productivity, coupled 
with " o f f i c i a l " pronouncements on the state of Murton c o l l i e r y . I chose not 
to because I took the view that i t was more important to explore subjective 
experience than capture a l l the nuances of objective r e a l i t y . For me, i t 
was more inportant to know that "Murton was under threat", or that 
"productivity had lept i n the l a s t 12 months", than i t was to track down 
the o f f i c i a l data sources that spelt out the s t a t i s t i c a l parameters of 
these statements. 
Despite t h i s reluctance to spend too much time chasing " o f f i c i a l " data, I 
recognised the strengthening effect of certain types of documentary 
evidence. Perhaps the most inportant of these were the miners and mechanics 
branch minute books. They offered the most complete h i s t o r i c a l record of 
a c t i v i t i e s i n both branches. However, they also suffered from some serious 
drawbacks. The mechanics minute books are conprehensive, and stretch back 
to the pre-war era. After John Cummings election as secretary i n 1968 they 
became extraordinarily copious, r e f l e c t i n g - as one mechanic put i t - that 
John was self-consciously "writing for history". But th e i r very length 
precluded the p o s s i b i l i t y of reading them a l l . Instead, I r e l i e d on 
interviews to bring out the key developments within the branch, and turned 
to the minute books for d e t a i l s of these events. 
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Unfortunately, the xainers minute books constituted a far l e s s cosplete 
record. They are available only for the period since 1980 - the e a r l i e r 
volumes having disappeared. Furthermore, a c r u c i a l volume dealing with 
1983-84 i s also missing. I have therefore r e l i e d more heavily on interviews 
to construct my account of events i n the miners branch than was necessary 
for the mechanics. 
Gaining access to minute books, l i k e most data collection for t h i s 
research, was not something which I could simply assume would happen. 
Relationships of t r u s t had to be b u i l t up. To t h i s extent - and i t i s a 
point which deserves i t s repetition l a t e r i n t h i s appendix - there i s a 
very r e a l sense i n which subjective factors, l i k e the friendships the 
researcher makes, can exercise a decisive influence over the type of 
evidence available to him/her. As w i l l become clearer l a t e r , I was 
p a r t i c u l a r l y fortunate to s t r i k e up highly rewarding relationships, which 
were also of great benefit to my research. 
Subjective factors also led to the acquisition of some of most inqportant 
data - that concerning the age and residence of Murton's workforce. The NCB 
wrote to t e l l me that t h i s information was not available. I was able to 
gain access to i t only because of the generosity of certain people (who of 
course have to remain anonymous) connected with Murton c o l l i e r y . No amount 
of research planning could have guaranteed such good fortune. 
I n other areas however, I was not so fortionate. In particular, I would have 
l i k e d to e s t a b l i s h the voting r e s u l t s , broken down by branch, for a l l the 
national b a l l o t s held i n the Durham area since 1978. Unfortunately, only 
the mechanics union kept t h i s data, and then only since the s t r i k e . 
Otherwise, the data was held only by the NUM's national office, and i n the 
absence of connections there, my request (via the Durham Area General 
Secretary, Dave Hopper) to see the data was met with a polite refusal. 
These exanples show the iaportance of the subjective, human element in data 
c o l l e c t i o n for research of t h i s type. The inplications, and potential 
weaknesses they introduce into the research, are discussed l a t e r . But 
whilst subjective factors are isportant i n gaining access to the data 
described above, when i t comes to col l e c t i n g primary evidence, they 
permeate the very quality of the data i t s e l f . Given that main source of 
primary data was people connected with Murton, two key problems emerge. 
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namely; how to gather information, and who to gather i t from. Each i s 
discussed i n turn. 
A l . S . i i QUESTIONNAIRES VERSUS INTERVIEWS 
E s s e n t i a l l y , there are two methods of co l l e c t i n g detailed information from 
people - questionnaires and interviews. These methods are related to two 
different research strategies; extensive and intensive respectively (see 
the discussion i n Massey and Meegan, 1985). This research i s based on the 
l a t t e r . I rejected questionnaires (and therefore extensive research) for 
two main reasons. In the f i r s t place, I did not believe that they could 
y i e l d the quality of information I required. In the second, i t was clear 
that I did not have the basic information necessary to undertake a 
meaningful questionnaire survey. 
With regard to the quality of information, there are a number of points to 
make. F i r s t , questionnaires are b a s i c a l l y i n f l e x i b l e . They are designed to 
e l i c i t the same type of information from a large number of people. As such 
they depend on a common frame of reference among the respondents. However, 
since one of my main aims could be interpreted as an attempt to understand 
differences between the frames of reference of the respondents, 
questionnaires appeared inappropriate. Put more singly, how do you design a 
questionnaire to apply equally to a 55 year old miner who has worked a l l 
hi s l i f e at Murton c o l l i e r y , and a 25 year old who transferred from Boldon 
c o l l i e r y a few months before the 1984/5 st r i k e ? How many questions that 
were relevant to an active picket during the s t r i k e would also be 
meaningful to a man who broke the s t r i k e before Christmas 1984? 
One possible response would be to design several different questionnaires. 
However, t h i s r a i s e s the second p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t y with survey research, 
namely the paucity of an adequate data base upon which to base a sasple. As 
became c l e a r above, access to a comprehensive workforce l i s t was only 
achieved by good fort tine, and only then towards the end of nr^ period of 
data c o l l e c t i o n . There was sinply no p r a c t i c a l basis for undertaking a 
questionnaire survey, even of the most rudimentary type. Targetting 
different questionnaires at different groups was therefore out of the 
question. 
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Choosing interviews was not however based primarily on the d i f f i c u l t i e s of 
undertaking questionnaire research. Rather, i t reflected a positive -
although wary - b e l i e f i n the need to gather information through sensitive, 
in-depth questioning. The fundamental problem with questionnaires i s the 
type of information they y i e l d . Crudely, they are designed to extract 
answers to "what?" questions, rather than the "why?" questions which were 
the preoccupation of nty research. Even f l e x i b l e questionnaires tend to 
close down options for answering, which i s a part i c u l a r problem i n 
answering "why" questions. Even many "what" and "how" questions require 
more subtle and sen s i t i v e exploration than questionnaires can provide. My 
research depended on the a b i l i t y to probe with open ended questions. 
Interaction i s the key to teasing out the understandings and b e l i e f s hidden 
behind the cloak of everyday generalisations. 
A l . S . i i i ONE-OFF INTERVIEWS 
How then did 1 approach my interviews? Basically, they can be divided into 
two categories, although with an inevitable gradation between them. F i r s t , 
there were "one-off" interviews, and secondly "repeated" interviews. 
"One-off" interviews occurred with the majority of interviewees. Typically 
with t h i s type of interview, I arrived at someone's home, having usually 
made contact by phone, and interviewed them for between one and three 
hours. Since I knew that I would probably not return, I used basic 
questionnaire type questions as a framework for the interview (an exaaqjle 
i s included i n table A 5.1). However, I t r i e d to remain sensitive to the 
pa r t i c u l a r preoccupations of each respondent. For example, i f an 
interviewee was c l e a r l y hung-up on the "incon5>etence" of the branch 
leadership, then I pursued the issue further. 
Nevertheless, a balance had to be struck between alertness to the 
interviewees i n t e r e s t s , and the need to explore issues behind his/her 
everyday formulations. Just as inportant as the issues which the 
interviewee c l e a r l y had strong opinions over were the ones which s/he had 
not considered very deeply. For exan?>le, the fact that an active picket 
during the s t r i k e could say almost nothing about the atmosphere within 
Murton during the police "occupation", was as signifi c a n t as his own 
detailed observations on the same event. Needless to say, the choice of 
issues which were probed despite the interviewees lack of response to them 
c l e a r l y r e f l e c t e d decisions I made about what the significant issues were. 
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Such decisions were based on theoretical considerations, which were 
modified during the course of the research. 
F l e x i b i l i t y was a key concept i n my interviewing. One of the advantages 
interviews offer over questionnaires i s the p o s s i b i l i t y of adapting 
questions over the research period. This was necessary because interviews 
revealed information not only about what people thought, but about what the 
important events were that affected what they thought. Beginning 
interviewing inevitably short on the de t a i l s of l o c a l history, I was 
r e l i a n t on general questioning to draw out h i s t o r i c a l d e t a i l . Obviously 
t h i s meant that, i n general, l a t e r interviews contributed greater rewards 
than the e a r l y ones. But I t r i e d to minimise t h i s effect by interviewing 
"key informants" at the s t a r t , i n order to is o l a t e the principle events on 
which to base l a t e r questions. (The basis on which I chose "key informants" 
i s discussed l a t e r . ) 
Paradoxically perhaps, t h i s problem of incon?>lete knowledge was 
p a r t i c u l a r l y acute with respect to the post s t r i k e period. Put singly, many 
of the events discussed occurred a f t e r I had conducted some of 
interviews! This leads on to an important point, namely that the research 
strategies used for each of chapters 5, 6 and 7 were s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
different. In chapter 5, I used interviews with key informants to direct me 
towards my main documentary source, the minute books of the miners and 
mechanics branches. I also used other interviews to probe further behind 
the issues I id e n t i f i e d . 
For chapter 6 - on the s t r i k e - there was almost no documentary evidence 
available. Fear of providing the police with incriminating material 
prompted the destruction of the limited documentation that was kept. So I 
r e l i e d heavily on interviews to reconstruct events, feelings and attitudes 
from as wide a variety of viewpoints as possible. 
Chapter 7 - on the post-strike period - was far more susceptible to 
participant observation. I was conducting my research when many of the key 
events - l i k e the 1987 bonus s t r i k e - happened. By the same token however, 
many one-off interviews occurred before these events took place.- In 
practice therefore, I t r i e d to use recent inportant events as a way of 
exploring the wider attitudes of an interviewee. In t h i s way I gathered 
information i n two different dimensions. Strangely perhaps, I found that 
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interviewees recollections of recent events - other than the most immediate 
past - was often hazier than t h e i r more distant memories. This r e f l e c t s the 
tendency for distant events to become part of a c o l l e c t i v e memory, 
reinforced by "oral history" (Francis, 1985) . More recent events - other 
than those a c t u a l l y happening - have not yet been so codified, and they 
tended to be swamped by the urgency of the present. 
A 1.3.iv REPEATED INTERVIEWS 
When I f i r s t crossed the l e v e l crossing which miarks Murton's Westward 
boundary, I f e l t almost as i f I was entering a foreign land. Even the 
language was different! Finding feet, and miaking any sense of t h i s 
strange and complicated new world presented miassive p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
So, l i k e any explorer, I r e l i e d on guides. There were so miany new things to 
Biake sense of, I needed people who could help mie abstract what was 
si g n i f i c a n t for my research from the r i o t of new inpressions confronting me 
every time I encountered Murton. Developing "key informants" was however 
not a process open to rational choices. I n the end, i t was a very personal 
thing. 
There were two people who I ended up relying on i n t h i s respect. Without 
them, t h i s research could not have happened. But there were also other 
people who repeatedly gave of t h e i r time, allowing mte to discuss 
research over and over again, i n t h e i r homies, i n pubs, or after mieetings. 
These "repeated" interviews helped me interpret informiation collected from 
many other sources. They also prodded me along the road to some sort of 
\inderstanding of the changes I was grappling with. But how did these 
interviews work? 
Repeated interviews offer two sig n i f i c a n t advantages over one-off 
interviews. F i r s t , they allow extended coverage of events and attitudes. As 
new questions bubble up from the process of data collection, the 
interviewer can return to add miore d e t a i l to an enierging picture. 
Similarly, as new events occur, attitudes can be covered across time, and 
changes of opinion recorded. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, 
repeated interviews allow much more intensive investigation. As a 
relationship develops between interviewer and interviewee, so i t becomes 
possible to drop below the l e v e l of everyday, routinised responses, and 
explore i n t e r a c t i v e l y the complexity underlying da i l y commonplaces. 
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One example sums up the point. Early on when I interviewed Frank Duffy, he 
suggested that the leadership of the Murton miners' branch before the 
1984/5 s t r i k e had been too scared to address branch meetings on 
controversial issues. Armed with t h i s provocative assessment, I began to 
focus on the leadership of the branch. Questioning t r a v e l l e r s , trawling 
through minute books, and conparing the miners with the mechanics branch, 
a l l yielded a web of (sometimes contradictory) information, on t h i s 
question. Returning to Frank, I was able to re-examine his assertion, 
refining the point, and drawing out wider iitplications (see chapter five) . 
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A 1.4 THE CHOICE OF INTERVIEWEES 
E v e r y t h i n g I have s a i d so f a r has emphasised the importance of who I spoke 
t o f o r the outcome of t h i s r e s e a r c h . J u s t i f y i n g my choice of "informants" 
t h e r e f o r e becomes c r u c i a l . T h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y so because t h e r e i s no doubt 
t h a t t h i s was an a c t i v i s t based r e s e a r c h p r o j e c t . Three questions assume 
paramount s i g n i f i c a n c e . Who d i d I speak t o ? How d i d I choose them? On what 
b a s i s were so many people excluded from the process of data c o l l e c t i o n ? 
A 1 . 4 . i WHO WERE THE INTERVIEWEES? 
I n order t o guarantee anonymity to the respondents to whom i t was promised, 
c e r t a i n s m a l l d e t a i l s have had t o be changed i n t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n which 
f o l l o w s . C l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s i n any case a c o s p l i c a t e d I s s u e . I t i n t e r a c t s 
w i t h t h e o r e t i c a l d e c i s i o n s about the appropriate f a c t o r s on which t o d i v i d e 
up the workforce. I n p r a c t i c e , two fundamental p r i n c i p l e s guided my 
i n t e r v i e w i n g s t r a t e g y : f i r s t , a d e s i r e t o speak t o as many d i f f e r e n t people 
as p o s s i b l e ( d i f f e r e n t i n p o l i t i c a l terms, t h a t i s ) , and secondly, a 
r e c o g n i t i o n of the importance of r e t u r n i n g repeatedly to key informants. 
I n t o t a l I f o r m a l l y i n t e r v i e w e d j u s t 47 people, although I conducted a t 
l e a s t 60 i n t e r v i e w s . I n pubs and cl u b s I spoke to many more people, some 
ve r y r e g u l a r l y . Below my i n t e r v i e w s a r e broken down according to four 
d i f f e r e n t dimensions: miners/mechanics/management; s t r i k e breakers/non 
s t r i k e b r e a k e r s ; Murton/travellers-to-Murton/no d i r e c t connection with 
Murton; a c t i v i s t / n o n a c t i v i s t . Because the in t e r v i e w e e s are chosen from 
such a wide range o f i n t e r - l o c k i n g f a c t o r s , the only way to f u l l y d e s c r i b e 
t h e coverage of my i n t e r v i e w s would be to d e s c r i b e each interviewee i n 
d e t a i l (eg a miner from B l a c k h a l l who t r a n s f e r r e d t o Murton i n 1980, 
supported the s t r i k e but was a n o n - a c t i v i s t , and took redundancy i n 1985) . 
However, I am u n w i l l i n g t o t h i s s i n c e i t would r i s k p r e j u d i c i n g anonymity 
which I guaranteed t o many i n t e r v i e w e e s . Below a r e 4 t a b l e s l i s t i n g the 
nuinber of i n t e r v i e w e e s i n a s e r i e s of c a t e g o r i e s . 
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Miners who work/have worked a t Murton: 20 
Miners working elsewhere: 5 
Mechanics who work/have worked a t Murton: 5 
Mechanics working elsewere: 4 
Management: 3 
S t r i k e b r e a k e r s working a t Murton: 3 
Other s t r i k e b r e a k e r s : 3 
Non s t r i k e b r e a k e r s : 23 
Miners from Murton v i l l a g e : 10 
Mechanics from Murton v i l l a g e : 4 
Miners t r a v e l l i n g t o Murton: 8 
Mechanics t r a v e l l i n g t o Murton: 1 
Miners/mechanics w i t h no Murton connection: 7 
6 , c L e f t wing a c t i v i s t s : 15 
Right wing a c t i v i s t s : 5 
T h i s f i n a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n - based so h e a v i l y on s u b j e c t i v e judgement, and 
the t h e o r e t i c a l c a t e g o r i e s adopted i n chapter 5 - a l s o b r i n g s i n t o focus 
another c l a s s i f i c a t o r y problem, namely the p r e d i l e c t i o n of some 
i n t e r v i e w e e s t o change t h e i r p o l i t i c s over the ten year p e r i o d of t h i s 
r e s e a r c h . These developments a re d i s c u s s e d i n chapters 5, 6 and 7. The 
5 
s t r i k e . 
Two of the s e t h r e e t r a n s f e r r e d from Eppleton to Murton a f t e r the 
D i v i d i n g i n t e r v i e w e e s along a c t i v e / n o n - a c t i v e l i n e s i s almost 
inqpossible. I n c a t e g o r i s i n g i n t e r v i e w s along these dimensions, I have 
d e f i n e d " a c t i v i s t " r e l a t i v e l y l o o s e l y , t o r e f e r t o anyone who has become 
c o n s c i o u s l y i n v o l v e d i n union p o l i t i c s , w ith such involvement extending 
beyond s h o r t term involvement i n the s t r i k e . S t r i k e involvement i s excluded 
as a d e f i n i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c because t h e r e i s a sense i n which the s t r i k e 
made a c t i v i s t s of everybody. I want to de f i n e a c t i v i s m as a longer term 
p o l i t i c a l involvement. 
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t a b l e s above should t h e r e f o r e be regarded as guides only, and not as r i g i d 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s . 
A l , 4 , i i CHOOSING THE INTERVIEWEES 
Conducting my r e s e a r c h i n the immediate aftermath of the most b i t t e r , 
d i v i s i v e and p a s s i o n a t e i n d u s t r i a l d i s p u t e s i n c e 1926 posed unique problems 
f o r g a i n i n g a c c e s s t o i n t e r v i e w e e s . These d i f f i c u l t i e s c l o s e d down many 
options, and v i r t u a l l y d i c t a t e d t h a t my i n i t i a l encounters would be with 
the a c t i v i s t s who c o n t r o l l e d both miners and mechanics branches. My f i r s t 
c o n t a c t s came from Huw Beynon, then a t Durham U n i v e r s i t y ' s Sociology 
Department, who suggested I c o n t a c t John Ciunmings, Dave Temple, and Frank 
Duffy. Because t h e s e t h r e e men were a c t i v i s t s , i t was i n e v i t a b l e t h a t I 
would begin my r e s e a r c h w i t h the a c t i v i s t network. 
A f t e r p r e l i m i n a r y i n t e r v i e w s w i t h my t h r e e i n i t i a l c o n t a c t s , I proceeded by 
a s k i n g them t o suggest other people I could i n t e r v i e w . I n the tense and 
c o n p l i c a t e d p o s t - s t r i k e environment, t h e i r suggestions were perhaps not as 
ambitious as they might have been before the s t r i k e . The elemental c o n f l i c t 
of the d i s p u t e hacked out unbridgeable chasms between some people. Core 
a c t i v i s t s s t i l l tended to r e l a t e s t r o n g l y to t h e i r own a c t i v i s t group, and 
I began t o r e a l i s e t h a t i t would be extremely d i f f i c u l t t o break out of 
t h e s e dense i n t e r l o c k i n g networks. 
There were however c o n s i d e r a b l e advantages i n c o n c e n t r a t i n g on a c t i v i s t s . 
By t h e i r v e r y nature, a c t i v i s t s were more l i k e l y to have considered the 
q u e s t i o n s my r e s e a r c h addressed. They had made a s e l f - c o n s c i o u s e f f o r t to 
get t o g r i p s w i t h h i s t o r i c a l i s s u e s ; and they were used to d e a l i n g with 
a b s t r a c t q u e s t i o n s and g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s . P o l i t i c a l motivation s t i m u l a t e s an 
a c t i v e memory of p a s t events. I n c o n t r a s t , n o n - a c t i v i s t s were not a b l e t o 
r e f l e c t over p a s t events i n the same way. For example, asking a 
n o n - a c t i v i s t what he thought of the 1980 " t e e i n g out" d i s p u t e may r a i s e no 
more than a f l i c k e r of r e c o g n i t i o n . I t was not something t h a t would have 
been consigned t o memory, because i t was not seen as important. I n a l l 
p r o b a b i l i t y , i t would have been lumped together with other minor disputes 
as an "aggravation". Even i f i t was remembered, the n o n - a c t i v i s t would not 
have r e l a t e d i t t o a p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y - s/he would not see i t as p a r t of a 
p r o c e s s of p o l i t i c a l development. 
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T h i s i s not t o s a y however t h a t the p o l i t i c s of the n o n - a c t i v i s t a r e 
uninportant. Rather, i t i s t o aclcnowledge t h a t when i t comes to f i n d i n g out 
about h i s t o r i c a l events, and a t t e n p t i n g to p l a c e them i n a coherent 
framework, i t i s more u s e f u l t o t a l k t o p o l i t i c a l l y aware people who have 
c o n s i d e r e d the I s s u e s themselves. When i t comes t o e x p l o r i n g the p o l i t i c s 
o f n o n - a c t i v i s t s , a more i n d i r e c t approach i s necessary. Because p o l i t i c a l 
o r i e n t a t i o n i s not a primary p a r t of t h e i r i d e n t i t y , then t h e i r p o l i t i c a l 
p hilosophy has t o be p a r t l y i n f e r r e d . Many people are u n w i l l i n g to c a l l 
themselves " p o l i t i c a l " , but t h i s cannot hide the r e a l p o l i t i c a l c h o ices 
which everybody i n modem s o c i e t y i s c o m p i l e d t o make - miners no l e s s 
than anybody e l s e . I used a range of questions t o t r y and get behind an 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s s t a t e d " n e u t r a l i t y " . For exair?>le, what were t h e i r a t t i t u d e s to 
Joe Gormley and Arthur S c a r g i l l ? Because these i n d i v i d u a l s a c t e d as 
p o l a r i s e d r e p o s i t o r i e s of p a r t i c u l a r i d e o l o g i e s , questions l i k e these could 
t e a s e out i d e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n s which were not amenable to d i r e c t 
q u e s t i o n i n g . 
However, a fiuidamental problem of a c c e s s remained f o r n o n - a c t i v i s t miners. 
As my i n t e r v i e w s w i t h a c t i v i s t s of v a r i o u s hues continued, I r e a l i s e d with 
mounting astonishment, t h a t many a c t i v i s t s s i i i p l y d i d not know people 
o u t s i d e t h e i r group w e l l enough t o be a b l e to put me i n touch with anyone. 
I n t h e absence of a l i s t of people en^sloyed a t the c o l l i e r y - p a s t or 
p r e s e n t - t h i s was a s e r i o u s blow. However, a c t i v i s t s from o u t l y i n g 
v i l l a g e s proved t o belong to more permeable s o c i a l networks than the 
p o l a r i s e d , entrenched, and o f t e n mutually e x c l u s i v e , groups w i t h i n Murton. 
I was t h e r e f o r e a b l e t o break i n t o my f i r s t n o n - a c t i v i s t c i r c l e s i n 
v i l l a g e s l i k e Trimdon. 
Even once t h i s had been achi e v e d however, problems remained. Some of the 
most i n t e r e s t i n g n o n - a c t i v i s t s were c l e a r l y those who had gone back to 
work. But people who had been h o s t i l e to the s t r i k e were u s u a l l y extremely 
r e t i c e n t about t a l k i n g t o anyone about t h e i r experiences. Many more who d i d 
not break th e s t r i k e had s i n c e l e f t the i n d u s t r y , and wanted to bury the 
whole exper i e n c e out of s i g h t , as deeply as they could. Unlike the 
a c t i v i s t s , whenever I h e s i t a n t l y asked a n o n - a c t i v i s t t o suggest another 
c o n t a c t , the r e a c t i o n was i n v a r i a b l y one of such u n c e r t a i n t y and 
t r e p i d a t i o n , t h a t I immediately withdrew the request. 
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Only r i g h t a t t h e end of my r e s e a r c h d i d a l i s t of the workforce a t Murton, 
coxoplete w i t h addresses, come i n t o my p o s s e s s i o n . By t h i s time, I judged i t 
too l a t e t o embark on another massive rovmd of i n t e r v i e w s . Before then, I 
had a c c e s s t o a l i s t of the 1984 workforce, but without addresses. I made 
two attempts t o use t h i s as a base f o r my i n t e r v i e w s . For the f i r s t , I 
chose t e n names a t random and looked them up i n the telephone d i r e c t o r y . I 
s e n t out 10 t r i a l l e t t e r s w ith s.a.e.'s enclosed, a s k i n g i f i t would be 
p o s s i b l e t o i n t e r v i e w them. I r e c e i v e d two r e p l i e s , one from a gentleman 
who had never had anything t o do with Murton c o l l i e r y , and another from a 
miner who I subsequently i n t e r v i e w e d . 
However, expe r i e n c e s with my second attempt t o use the l i s t dissuaded me 
from attempting t o f o l l o w up the l e t t e r approach. Because of the poor 
response t o my l e t t e r s , I decided to telephone people a t random from the 
l i s t . The t h i r d o f t h e s e c a l l s s o l i c i t e d such an angry and emotional t i r a d e 
from the r e c i p i e n t t h a t I decided ( a f t e r one or two more r e j e c t i o n s ) to 
abandon the t a c t i c . During t h i s b r i e f c a l l , the unknown miner became zoore 
and more worked up as he r e c a l l e d h i s connections with Murton, repeating 
over an over again t h a t he'd hated the p l a c e . He mentioned having to see a 
doctor s i n c e he r e t i r e d from the c o l l i e r y , and then began t o get very 
angry. He accused me of s e r i o u s l y d i s t u r b i n g h i s r e t u r n to h e a l t h , before 
suddenly hanging up. Perhaps I o v e r - r e a c t e d t o t h i s jagged t o r r e n t of 
emotion, but I decided then (and s t i l l f e e l now) t h a t I had no r i g h t to 
b u r s t i n t o people's l i v e s without warning, p o s s i b l y t e a r i n g open o l d wounds 
and d e s t a b i l i s i n g someone's l i f e . The whole experience was a s a l u t a r y 
remi nder t h a t the s t r i k e was not j u s t a convenient t o o l f o r studying c l a s s 
s t r u g g l e , but a l s o (and p r i m a r i l y ) a c o l o s s a l c o n f l i c t , with v e r y r e a l 
human c a s u a l t i e s on a l l s i d e s . Treading a path through the bloody aftermath 
of b a t t l e r e q u i r e d g r e a t e r wariness and s e n s i t i v i t y than I sometimes 
showed. 
From then on, I abandoned attempts t o i n t e r v i e w people without some s o r t of 
i n i t i a l i n t r o d u c t i o n . My c a u t i o n was rewarded however by a development so 
b i z a r r e t h a t I almost allowed i t t o s l i p away from me. I t was during the 
1987 bonus s t r i k e (see chapter seven), a t about 5.30am, t h a t the 
breakthrough occurred. I had gone t o the p i c k e t l i n e a t the c o l l i e r y gates 
t o see how t h e s t r i k e was proceeding, but the l a s t t h i n g I , or the t h i r t y 
or so NUM l o y a l i s t s huddled i n the c h i l l morning wind expected, was f o r the 
UDM (Union of Democratic Mineworkers) t o put i n an appearance. Four or f i v e 
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a r r i v e d i n a c a r , and n e r v o u s l y took up p o s i t i o n s a c r o s s on the other s i d e 
o f t h e gate from th e p i c k e t s , who regarded them with r e p r e s s e d l o a t h i n g . 
There was no c o n t a c t between the two groups. S h i v e r i n g with a f r i e n d from 
t h e mechanic's branch, I agonised over what to do. I f e a r e d t h a t i f I 
c r o s s e d over t o t h e other gate, then I would be f o r e v e r damned by the 
p i c k e t s . I a l s o f e l t c o n s i d e r a b l e l o y a l t y to the people I was with. F i n a l l y 
xay mind was made up by the mechanic next to me, who t o l d me to stop 
d i t h e r i n g and t a k e the opportunity - not l e a s t because he wanted to know 
what the "scabs" were t h i n k i n g ! 
Maybe because of t h e i r i s o l a t i o n , the UDM men were g l a d to t a l k to me, 
notwithstanding e a r l i e r attachment t o the p i c k e t s 15 metres away. I n the 
end, t h i s t o t a l l y u n p r e d i c t e d meeting y i e l d e d i n t e r v i e w s with two key r i g h t 
wing a c t i v i s t s , and two o t h e r men who broke the s t r i k e . My only other 
c o n t a c t w i t h a r i g h t wing a c t i v i s t came from a l e t t e r I wrote t o a miner 
who had been mentioned i n i n t e r v i e w s with l e f t wing a c t i v i s t s . These 
examples show j u s t how i j i p o r t a n t l u c k i s i n d e f i n i n g the p r a c t i c a l 
parameters of i n t e n s i v e r e s e a r c h i n t o a s u b j e c t as emotionally charged as 
t h e miners' p o l i t i c s i n the p o s t - s t r i k e e r a . There i s however at l e a s t some 
sense i n the o l d adage t h a t you make your own luck, because to an extent 
t h e s e c o n t a c t s were the r e s u l t of p e r s i s t e n t l y pursuing c e r t a i n o b j e c t i v e s . 
No doubt i f I had been ab l e t o spend more time i n Murton i t s e l f , f u r t h e r 
c o n t a c t s would have opened up. 
W h i l s t broadening t h e scope of my i n t e r v i e w s posed c o n s i s t e n t problems, and 
i n v o l v e d many d i f f i c u l t d e c i s i o n s , i n t e n s i f y i n g the depth of my i n t e r v i e w s 
w i t h "key informants" proved one of the e a s i e s t (and most rewarding) 
a s p e c t s of my r e s e a r c h . There i s a v e r y r e a l sense i n which my "choice" of 
"key informants" was no c h o i c e a t a l l . I t i s in^sossible to plan f o r the 
type of r e l a t i o n s h i p s which develop with "key informants". (Indeed, the 
term i t s e l f i s f o r me sinqply a cumbersome academic g l o s s f o r the everyday 
term " f r i e n d " . ) Whether or not r e l a t i o n s h i p s develop, and who they develop 
with, i s e s s e n t i a l l y not a process amenable to planning. I n my research, I 
was e x c e p t i o n a l l y f o r t u n a t e to meet s e v e r a l people whose patience at my 
e n d l e s s , o f t e n p a i n f u l l y n aive, q u e s t i o n i n g f r e q u e n t l y d e f i e d the bounds of 
human t o l e r a n c e . 
My two p r i n c i p l e "key informants" were Dave Ten?>le and Frank Duffy; the 
former a l e f t wing mechanic, the l a t t e r a l e f t wing miner. I n a d d i t i o n , my 
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r e g u l a r Sunday lunchtime v i s i t s to the "Inn of Seventh Happiness" produced 
hours of d i s c u s s i o n w i t h s e v e r a l more mechanics, a t l e a s t some of which was 
a c t u a l l y r e l a t e d t o r e s e a r c h ! One v e r y s e r i o u s o b j e c t i o n emerges however 
from t h i s p a t t e r n of i n t e n s i v e c o n t a c t s . My two key informants are a l s o 
i d e n t i f i e d i n c h a p t e r s f i v e , s i x and seven as two of the key agents of 
p o l i t i c a l change i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e branches. Even the most sympathetic 
read e r i s l i k e l y t o b l a n c h a t such a "coincidence". I s t h i s "coincidence" 
a c c e p t a b l e ? 
N a t u r a l l y , I was h a r d l y unaware t h a t I was r e l y i n g h e a v i l y on two of the 
most promiinent f i g u r e s i n Murton p o l i t i c s over the p a s t ten y e a r s . I made 
strenuous e f f o r t s t h e r e f o r e t o seek out secondary confirmation of t h e i r 
r o l e and a n a l y s e s . T h i s was not because I doubted t h e i r (or anyones e l s e s ) 
word, but simply because I knew t h a t people i n d i f f e r e n t p l a c e s see t h i n g s 
i n d i f f e r e n t ways. Not a few of my i n t e r v i e w s outside Murton were i n s p i r e d 
by attempts t o e s t a b l i s h the a u t h e n t i c i t y (or e c c e n t r i c i t y ) of views 
generated by i n t e r v i e w s i n Murton (not j u s t with key informiants) . 
Using a f a i o i l i a r mtarxist mietaphor, m^ i n t e r v i e w s i n Murton were l i k e 
l o o k i n g a t r e a l i t y through a s e r i e s of windows. The view, although va r y i n g 
through each, was s t i l l r e c o g n i s a b l y of the same landscape. Each d i f f e r e n t 
view intr o d u c e d new o b j e c t s , and a t the same timie o f f e r e d d i f f e r e n t 
p e r s p e c t i v e s on miore f a m i l i a r scenes. J u s t o c c a s s i o n a l l y i t was necessary 
t o s t e p o u t s i d e the house and look back a t the whole e d i f i c e , to ensure 
t h a t the s t r u c t u r e of the b u i l d i n g , and the shape of the g l a s s i n the miost 
f r e q u e n t l y used windows, were not i n t r o d u c i n g u n w i t t i n g d i s t o r t i o n s t o the 
u n f o l d i n g image. 
What a l l t h i s i s s a y i n g i s t h a t I made the b e s t e f f o r t s I could to counter 
any p o s s i b l e " b i a s " c r e a t e d by r e l y i n g on these p a r t i c u l a r key informants. 
Once t h i s had been taken i n t o accoxmt, then the informiation I was able to 
g a i n from t h e i r enormious knowledge and experience was i n c a l c u l a b l e . 
N a t u r a l l y the sam>e problemis arose with other "repeated i n t e r v i e w s " , but 
p a r t of t h e p r o c e s s of repeated i n t e r v i e w s was t o check v a r i o u s accounts 
a g a i n s t each other, again t o t r y and a s s e s s why someone, should have one 
account, and another person see the samie event d i f f e r e n t l y . 
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A 1 . 4 . i i i PEOPLE I DID NOT INTERVIEW 
I t must by now be c l e a r t h a t my i n t e r v i e w coverage was f a r from exhaustive. 
Not only was t h e r e no a t t e n ^ t a t s a n ^ l i n g , but I have r e a d i l y admitted to 
an a c t i v i s t b i a s . Who then were the main groups I d i d not i n t e r v i e w , and 
why were they excluded? E s s e n t i a l l y the gaps are (as ever) the r e s u l t of 
two i n t e r l o c k i n g s e t s of f a c t o r s , one p r a c t i c a l , the other t h e o r e t i c a l . 
Below, I use t h e s e f a c t o r s t o examine and e x p l a i n each of the main gaps i n 
my evidence. 
Although I i n t e r v i e w e d t h r e e people connected with the management of Murton 
c o l l i e r y , I have not attempted t o o f f e r "management's s i d e of the s t o r y " i n 
t h i s t h e s i s . T h i s was a d i f f i c u l t d e c i s i o n , and one I was g u i l t y of l a r g e l y 
a l l o w i n g t o make i t s e l f . Although the manager of Murton from 1983 u n t i l 
1987 r e f u s e d t o be i n t e r v i e w e d , I could no doubt have made g r e a t e r e f f o r t s 
t o e s t a b l i s h c o n t a c t s on the management s i d e . A r e l u c t a n c e to pursue t h i s 
option e v e n t u a l l y l e f t me without enough m a t e r i a l , or time to gather 
m a t e r i a l . There were, of course, formidable p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s i n 
attempting t o pursue c o n t a c t s with management - not l e a s t the h i g h l y 
p o l a r i s e d and a n t a g o n i s t i c r e l a t i o n s between union and management a t the 
p i t . I n the dense, sometimes c l a u s t r o p h o b i c , Murton world, i t was 
i i q j o s s i b l e t o keep two l i n e s of r e s e a r c h seperate. Management would 
i n e v i t a b l y d i s c o v e r my c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p with the NUM. I n t h i s s i t u a t i o n I 
f e l t unable t o adopt the chameleon p e r s o n a l i t y n e c e s s a r y to e n t e r two such 
p h y s i c a l l y c l o s e and y e t s o c i a l l y h o s t i l e worlds. 
I t would \inquestionably have been advantageous to e s t a b l i s h management's 
view of the events surro\inding my r e s e a r c h . But only a very few members of 
management had a long enough h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e to cover the ten years 
r e s e a r c h p e r i o d ( I i n t e r v i e w e d two of them), and f o r the reasons above, I 
l a c k e d the enthusiasm t o t r y and overcome the enormous p r a c t i c a l 
d i f f i c u l t i e s of e x h a u s t i v e r e s e a r c h i n t h i s area. 
A l s o m i s s i n g from my account i s the s u p e r v i s o r y union, NACODS (National 
A s s o c i a t i o n of C o l l i e r y Overmen, Deputies and S h o t f i r e r s ) . B a s i c a l l y , t h i s 
ommission was s i n p l y a r e f l e c t i o n of the questions my r e s e a r c h sought to 
address. S i n c e I was concerned with the changing p o l i t i c s of the NUM i n 
Murton, MACODS assumed only p e r i p h e r a l Inportance. Once again, t h e r e i s no 
doubt t h a t my p e r s p e c t i v e would have been broadened had I a t l e a s t spoken 
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t o one or two r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from NACODS. However, my one s e r i o u s attempt 
t o achieve t h i s c o n t a c t with a NACODS r e p r e s e n t a t i v e was not re c i p r o c a t e d , 
and I l e t the i s s u e l i e . 
Without doubt the miost s e r i o u s ommission from my i n t e r v i e w s i s the womien of 
the miining commninities. T h i s can only be defended i n terms of the re s e a r c h 
focus of t h i s t h e s i s , which i s to examine the p o l i t i c a l development of two 
branches of the NUM. Ne v e r t h e l e s s , i t i s c l e a r t h a t miiners' a t t i t u d e s 
towards womien c o n s t i t u t e s a c r u c i a l dimension of t h e i r p o l i t i c s . Wherever 
p o s s i b l e I t r i e d t o address t h e s e questions, by observing interviewees 
a t t i t u d e s i n speech and p r a c t i c e . However, although I in t e r v i e w e d s e v e r a l 
womien a c t i v i s t s from Murton and elsewhere, I was unable t o emibark on a 
programsne of i n t e r v i e w i n g womien as I d i d mien. The t a s k was beyond mie, both 
i n terms of timie, but a l s o i n termis o f my p e r s o n a l c a p a c i t i e s . I r e a l i s e d 
q u i t e e a r l y on t h a t I was not equipped t h e o r e t i c a l l y or p r a c t i c a l l y t o 
d e v i s e and c a r r y through a mieaningful programsne of i n t e r v i e w questions with 
womien. 
I n s t e a d , I have t r i e d ( i n appendix f i v e ) t o provide a sense of the gen e r a l 
way i n which s e x u a l p o l i t i c s a r e i n s e r t e d i n t o the general p o l i t i c a l 
p r a c t i c e s p r e v a l e n t i n Murton (and other s i m i i l a r miining comsnunities) . With 
a shortage of my own r e s e a r c h miaterial, I have not attempted to recount the 
s p e c i f i c s of t h e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n Murton. I n s t e a d my aim has simply been 
t o show t h a t t h e r e i s another dimension t o the p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e i n 
Murton, and t o suggest the ways i n which t h i s second dimension has 
important i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the o v e r a l l question of the s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t 
oppression i n mining communities. D i s c o v e r i n g the p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
between the two dimiensions of s t r u g g l e , and i n p a r t i c u l a r , according 
womien's s t r u g g l e f o r l i b e r a t i o n the e q u a l i t y i t deserves, i s somiething I 
was unable t o ac h i e v e . I t miay be t h a t only a womian (or womien) can pursue 
t h e s t o r y of women's stiruggle a g a i n s t miale oppression with the honesty, 
openness, and thoroughness neces s a r y . 
W i t h i n the range of miiners and mechanics interviewed, c e r t a i n groups were 
e i t h e r completely miissing, or s e r i o u s l y under-represented. Within the 
siechanics, I miissed out t r a v e l l e r s , which perhaps p a r t i a l l y accounts f o r nry 
f a v o u r a b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t r a v e l l e r s i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o the mechanics' 
branch, compared t o the miiners. I n ge n e r a l , I was unable t o achieve such a 
wide coverage a c r o s s the p o l i t i c a l spectirum i n the mechanics branch as I 
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was i n the miners. T h i s r e f l e c t e d d i f f i c u l t i e s of a c c e s s r a t h e r than 
c h o i c e . 
P u t t i n g so much time and enphasis i n t o Murton l e a v e s me exposed to charges 
of i n s u l a r i t y , and m i s t a k i n g the p a r t i c u l a r f o r the g e n e r a l . To counter 
t h e s e charges, I took s e v e r a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o i n t e r v i e w people not 
d i r e c t l y connected with Murton, but whose a c t i v i t i e s had, f o r v a r i o u s 
reasons, brought them i n t o contact with the p l a c e . There i s no doubt t h a t 
t h e s e i n t e r v i e w s s e r v e d t o put Murton's uniqueness i n t o p e r s p e c t i v e . But i t 
i s a l s o t r u e t h a t t h e r e a r e some obvious ommissions concerning 
i n t e r v i e w s w i t h "non-Murtonians". I n p a r t i c u l a r , I made no attenpt to 
c o n t a c t the l e a d e r s h i p - piast or present - of the DMA (Durham Miners 
A s s o c i a t i o n ) . I n r e t r o s p e c t , I t h i n k t h i s was a mistake. At the t i n e , I 
f e l t t h a t I would l e a r n l i t t l e more than was a l r e a d y common knowledge from 
p r e s s and other r e p o r t s . Faced with d i f f i c u l t d e c i s i o n s about how to 
a l l o c a t e time, I chose t o concentrate on developing l i n k s with Murton. 
But m i s s i n g the DMA agents o f f my l i s t of "non-Murton" i n t e r v i e w s was 
b a s i c a l l y an a r b i t r a r y and \ i n j u s t i f i e d d e c i s i o n . 
Other people were not i n t e r v i e w e d f o r more s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d reasons. 
E v e n t u a l l y my r e l a t i o n s h i p with the core a c t i v i s t groups a t Murton were 
s t r o n g enough t o have permitted me t o i n t e r v i e w many, many more than I 
f i n a l l y chose t o . My r e t i c e n c e was due t o a d e s i r e t o a v o i d an account t h a t 
was too a c t i v i s t c e ntred. I f e l t a f t e r a while t h a t I could go on adding to 
( r i g h t and l e f t ) a c t i v i s t accounts f o r e v e r , with inumerable v a r i a t i o n s i n 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n being thrown up by each i n t e r v i e w . I n s t e a d I chose to s t i c k 
a t a c e r t a i n p o i n t , and t r u s t t h a t I had captured most of the competing 
accounts of events. 
On t h e o t h e r hand, some people siaply r e f u s e d t o speak t o me. I n many cases 
- as exaaples above make c l e a r - t h i s was understandable. 
Of t h e "key agents" i n Murton during the p e r i o d of my study, t h e r e are two 
n o t i c e a b l e absentees. One i s the former miners' branch s e c r e t a r y - John 
Dixon - who took redundancy a f t e r the s t r i k e , and was never seen again i n 
Murton. He d i d not respond to a l e t t e r I wrote. The second absentee was the 
miners' former branch chairman - Rop Naylor - who r e s i g n e d during the 
s t r i k e , and then became one of the f i r s t four men from Murton to go back to 
work. I d e l i b e r a t e l y d i d not t r y and contact him. Faced with a v i l l a g e 
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s t i l l deeply s p l i t , and w i t h Rop an i s o l a t e d and d e s p i s e d c h a r a c t e r , I 
decided t h a t t r y i n g t o i n t e r v i e w him could damiage miy c r e d i b i l i t y miore than 
the r i s k was worth. 
I t c o u l d be argued t h a t I "took s i d e s " with the a c t i v i s t s , and t h a t i n 
doing so I allowed rsy r e s e a r c h t o be d e f l e c t e d from some of i t s p o t e n t i a l l y 
miost probing c o u r s e s . I f r e e l y admiit t h a t my sympathies l a y with the l e f t 
wing a c t i v i s t s , but i t i s a l s o tirue - as i s miade c l e a r above - t h a t 
developing r e l a t i o n s h i p s i s i n t r i n s i c t o any i n t e n s i v e r e s e a r c h s t r a t e g y . 
J u s t l i k e any other r e l a t i o n s h i p s , r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n Murton commanded 
adaptations and l o y a l t i e s , as w e l l as d e l i v e r i n g rewards. Within the scope 
of a one person r e s e a r c h p r o j e c t , t h e r e were r e a l l i m i i t a t i o n s to what could 
be a c h i e v e d (Renouf, 1989). U l t i m a t e l y , t h e s e l i m i i t a t i o n s were p e r s o n a l 
l i m i t a t i o n s . A l l I can do f a c e d with such shortcomiings, i s e x p l a i n how they 
came t o i n f l u e n c e miy r e s e a r c h f i n d i n g s . 
A 1 . 4 . i v USING THE MATERIAL 
I n c h a p t e r s f i v e , s i x and seven, I present the primiary r e s e a r c h miaterial I 
c o l l e c t e d through 1986 and 1987. I n t r u t h however, only a f r a c t i o n of the 
m a t e r i a l I gathered s u r f a c e s i n t h e s e chapters. I n e v i t a b l y , the s e l e c t i o n 
p r o c e s s was a d i f f i c u l t one, which a l s o had important i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the 
e v e n t u a l r e s e a r c h c o n c l u s i o n s . When I f i n i s h e d my i n t e r v i e w i n g i n l a t e 
1987, I had c o l l e c t e d such an enormious s t a c k of i n t e r v i e w notes t h a t before 
I c o u l d begin c o m p i l i n g them i n t o a t h e s i s , I f e l t I needed t o a s s e s s 
e x a c t l y what i t was I now knew. 
Accordingly, I s e t about w r i t i n g t h r e e r e p o r t s - one each on Murton before, 
d u r i n g and a f t e r the s t r i k e - which i n c o r p o r a t e d a l l the r e l e v a n t r e s e a r c h 
data I had. They were immense - put together they were about the same 
le n g t h as t h i s e n t i r e t h e s i s . W r i t i n g them was a c a t h a r t i c as w e l l as 
academiic e x e r c i s e . They contained elements of polemiic, a n a l y s i s and 
s t r a i g h t r e c o r d i n g . Pouring out my knowledge and thoughts about Murton i n 
t h i s way began the long process of o r d e r i n g and t h e o r i s i n g what I had 
d i s c o v e r e d . G r a d u a l l y , the t o r r e n t of miaterial began to s e t t l e i n t o 
d i s t i n c t p a t t e r n s . Chapters f i v e , s i x and seven e v e n t u a l l y emerged from 
t h i s p r o c e s s . 
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When w r i t i n g , I decided my primary aim was to c r e a t e a coherent n a r r a t i v e , 
i l l u s t r a t i n g and e x p l a i n i n g t h e developments which I f e l t had emerged from 
data c o l l e c t i o n . To t h i s end, I used m a t e r i a l - i n c l u d i n g quotes -
s e l e c t i v e l y , i n order t o b u i l d up arguments. T h i s does not mean I ignored 
c o n t r a d i c t o r y evidence. On the c o n t r a r y , I was always p a i n f u l l y aware of 
such c o n t r a d i c t i o n s . Given t h a t I c o u l d not reproduce my most important 
data sources ( i n t e r v i e w t a p e s ) , the reader has to take on t r u s t t h a t I have 
t r i e d s c r u p u l o u s l y t o maintain my i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t e g r i t y when pr e s e n t i n g my 
evidence. I accept however, t h a t i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y I have u n w i t t i n g l y 
missed important p o i n t s , and made f a l s e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . I can see no way 
around t h i s i n so s o l i t a r y a p i e c e of work as a PhD. 
Only one other a m e l i o r a t i v e measure was a v a i l a b l e . I could have attempted 
t o d i s t r i b u t e d r a f t s of my r e p o r t s among "key informants" i n Murton. But 
even i f people had been w i l l i n g t o read and respond to such massive 
r e p o r t s , I was extremely r e l u c t a n t t o r e l e a s e them, f o r s e v e r a l reasons. 
F i r s t , they were raw and unrefined. Some statements might have provoked 
s t r o n g emotions. Secondly, i n order to " s e t t h i n g s s t r a i g h t " i n my own 
mind, I used r e a l names throughout. Breaches of c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y would have 
abounded i f t h e s e r e p o r t s had enjoyed g e n e r a l c i r c u l a t i o n . T h i r d l y , w h i l s t 
s p r a y i n g r e p o r t s around Murton would vindoubtedly have s t i m u l a t e d f u r t h e r 
m a t e r i a l , t h i s c o u l d have delayed the w r i t i n g process by many months. 
A 1.4.V PRESENTATIONAL NOTES 
Using tape recorded i n t e r v i e w s i n a w r i t t e n t h e s i s i s not easy. Where 
quotes appear, they are the a c t u a l words used by the interviewee, except 
f o r s l i g h t changes made t o t i d y up sentences ( f o r example, "you know" - a 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c phrase i n the spoken word - i s u s u a l l y dropped) . I have a l s o 
t r a n s l a t e d v e r n a c u l a r Geordie i n t o " s t r a i g h t " E n g l i s h , to improve 
r e a d a b i l i t y . I have used conventional square b r a c k e t s to enclose own 
words of e x p l a n a t i o n , said t h r e e dots to mark a break i n the t e x t . I n some 
ca s e s I have changed names and made s m a l l a l t e r a t i o n s to b i o g r a p h i c a l 
d e t a i l s t o p r e s e r v e anonymity. Although space l i m i t a t i o n s precluded u s i n g 
more than a s m a l l f r a c t i o n of my i n t e r v i e w m a t e r i a l i n the main body of the 
t h e s i s , I have p l a c e d c o n s i d e r a b l y more i n t e r v i e w m a t e r i a l i n the 
appendices. The appendices should t h e r e f o r e be read as supplements to the 
c h a p t e r s they a r e r e f e r e n c e d f o r . 
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Various p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s intruded on the process of actually writing 
the t h e s i s . I n par t i c u l a r , the need to find a career and earn some mioney 
af t e r s i x years on student grants, followed by s i x mionths on income 
support, led me to take a seven mionth job i n te l e v i s i o n before finishing 
writing up. I completed t h i s thesis during a three mionth break from my job. 
I n practice t h i s meant that my cut-off point for research and for 
considering new published miaterial was the end of 1988. Increasingly PhD's 
are going to be completed under t h i s kind of intense pressure as research 
students struggle to miake ends meet f i n a n c i a l l y , and are consequently 
compelled to jump at opportunities i n the labour miarket. 
A 1.5 METHODOLOGY AND THEORY 
I have provided t h i s f a i r l y exhaustive account of the process of data 
c o l l e c t i o n because I recognise that my research findings could be seen by 
some people as a simple consequence of a flawed research strategy. I have 
shown that t h i s i s not the case. Instead, I have demionstrated the c r u c i a l 
interaction between theory and methodology. My research questions were 
defined by the theoretical constructs I brought to the thesis. (Nowhere i s 
t h i s miore c l e a r than i n the choice of Murton i t s e l f as the single case 
study.) At the samp time however, theory was miodified as I reflected on the 
outcomes of data collection, and discussed them with people i n Murton and 
elsewhere. 
Also, my the o r e t i c a l approach directed me towards an intensive research 
methodology (see discussion i n Massey and Meegan, 1985), which at the same 
time had implications for the further development of m^  theoretical 
position. Defining the central question of my research as the processes 
detennining p o l i t i c a l change i n two union branches pushed me towards 
f l e x i b l e , intensive research methods which would allow sensitive 
investigation of a wide range of sometimes nebulous factors which impinged 
on the p o l i t i c a l process. This approach then provided the raw miaterial upon 
which I subsequently based my interpretation of what happened at Murton 
over the period of study. Had I used questionairres then t h i s would have 
refl e c t e d (for example) a theoretical framework which was predicated upon 
f a i r l y mechanistic l i n k between different factors and p o l i t i c a l change. At 
the same time, the re s u l t s would have miissed the continual interaction 
between events, and the actions and understandings of different agents, 
thereby tending to reinforce the orginal theoretical assumptions. 
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My purpose i n the f i r s t four chapters of t h i s thesis was to set up the 
theo r e t i c a l space i n which to locate my analysis of Murton. Since the exact 
object of my study - i n terms of the questions I sought to address -
changed throughout sty three years of research, so did the nature of 
theo r e t i c a l excursions. Establishing the relationships between theory and 
evidence i s often the hardest task i n research, as the analysis moves from 
abstract generalisations to the confusion of the particular. I found the 
sane d i f f i c u l t i e s as I attenpted to track from movements i n the 
international Bconomy, through national h i s t o r i c a l resolutions of cla s s 
struggle, down to the l e v e l of one small mining settlement i n County 
Durham. 
More inportantly, I wanted to move i n the other direction too. Now t h i s i s 
d i f f i c u l t , because Murton i s c l e a r l y only one part of the cumulative 
pressures exerted by miners - and by the working c l a s s i n general - on the 
B r i t i s h state, which i n turn i s only one of many nation states affecting 
the t r a j e c t o r y of c a p i t a l i s t development globally. By the tine the l e v e l of 
international capitalism i s reached, the s p e c i f i c influence of Murton i s -
to put i t mildly - rather diffuse. Therefore, only by situating Murton 
within these broader struggles can any relationship between levels be 
sustained. Murton has no spec i a l significance i n the miners' struggle, but 
i s o l a t i n g the way i n which i t changed can say important things about the 
extent to which conscious agents are able to influence the direction of 
cl a s s struggle i n a pa r t i c u l a r place. At the same time, l i m i t s imposed by 
h i s t o r i c a l conditions can be explored i n practice. Understanding - and 
ultimately changing - the course of c a p i t a l i s t development depends on 
making conscious and purposive the actions of workers engaged i n struggle. 
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Table A 1.1: SAMPLE OF BASIC DUE5TI0N5 FOR "ONE-OFF" INTERVIEUS 
Personal d e t a i l s 
Where born? When? 
Fa m i l y background: 
- P a r e n t a l o c c u p a t i o n 
- F a m i l y home 
Work h i s t o r y 
Where and when s t a r t e d work? 
Work o t h e r t h a n c o a l m i n i n g ? 
(reasons f o r r e t u r n i n g t o t h e p i t s ? ) 
What s o r t o f work done a t t h e p i t ? 
Other c o l l i e r i e s worked a t ? 
Working a t Murton ( p r i o r t o t h e s t r i k e ) 
A t t i t u d e s t o work - a "pitman"? 
What were w o r k i n g c o n d i t i o n s l i k e ? 
How tough was management? 
(overmen, undermanagers, manager) 
Involvement i n d i s p u t e s ? 
( s t r i k e s , r e s t r i c t i o n s , o v e r t i m e bans) 
(over what?) 
The u n i o n a t Murton 
Involvement i n t h e union? 
Did you a t t e n d u n i o n meetings? 
What was t h e u n i o n l e a d e r s h i p l i k e ? 
( e f f e c t i v e n e s s i n d e a l i n g w i t h management) 
Was t h e r e a c a v i l l i n g system? 
How d i d you r e a c t t o 1966 i n t r o d u c t i o n o f NPLA? 
1972 and 197^ s t r i k e s 
Did you s u p p o r t t h e 197S s t r i k e ? 
D i d you go p i c k e t i n g ? 
(What were t h e p o l i c e l i k e ? ) 
What d i d you t h i n k o f t h e NUM l e a d e r s h i p ? 
(Same q u e s t i o n s f o r 197^) 
"^This t a b l e c o n s t i t u t e s a k i n d o f composite o f cor e q u e s t i o n s . I t 
does not. l i s t a l l the q u e s t i o n s I asked i n an i n t e r v i e w e . S i m i l a r l y , t he 
way t h e q u e s t i o n s were framed d i f f e r e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i n t e r v i e w e e . 
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The i n c e n t i v e scheme 
Did you v o t e f o r t h e i n c e n t i v e scheme? 
Do you t h i n k i t has been a good t h i n g ? 
What do you t h i n k about t h e way i t was i n t r o d u c e d ? 
Did i t lead t o more d i s p u t e s ? 
E x p e r i e n c e / i m p a c t o f t r a v e l l e r s / t r a n s f e r e e s 
What e f f e c t d i d t h e t r a n s f e r e e s have? 
eg K e l l o e 
B l a c k h a l l EXPAND 
South H e t t o n 
(Why d i d you d e c i d e t o t r a n s f e r ? 
- r a t h e r t h a n t a k e redundancy? 
- r e a c t i o n t o Murton? 
- would you make t h e same d e c i s i o n a gain?) 
Immediate background t o t h e s t r i k e 
Q u e s t i o n s about: 
- S c a r g i l l ' s e l e c t i o n 
- High unemployment 
- impact o f T h a t c h e r i s m 
- appointment o f MacGregor 
- t h r e e b a l l o t s 
- S c o t t i s h and South Wales p r o t e s t s 
( K i n n e i l and Lewis M e r t h y r ) 
- 1983 o v e r t i m e ban 
- changing atmosphere a t the p i t ? 
S t a r t o f t h e s t r i k e 
R e a c t i o n t o Cortonwood? 
What sh o u l d t h e u n i o n have done? 
B a l l o t ? 
Which way would you have voted? 
Attendance a t Murton meetings? 
Why d i d you j o i n t h e s t r i k e ? 
How l o n g d i d you t h i n k i t would be? 
The s t r i k e 
What d i d you do d u r i n g t h e s t r i k e ? 
( I f p i c k e t i n g , t h e n a s e r i e s o f q u e s t i o n s about e x p e r i e n c e s ) 
What e f f e c t s d i d t a l k s and breakdowns have? 
What was s t o p p i n g a s e t t l e m e n t ? 
What s h o u l d t h e government have done? 
How d i d you cope f i n a n c i a l l y ? 
Where d i d you g e t s u p p o r t from? 
( f a m i l y , f r i e n d s , community, u n i o n ) 
Who d i d you spend your t i m e w i t h d u r i n g t h e s t r i k e ? 
What were t h e i r a t t i t u d e s t o t h e s t r i k e ? 
What d i d you t h i n k o f media coverage? 
Did you c o n s i d e r g o i n g back t o work? 
( I f yes. t h e n a s e r i e s o f q u e s t i o n s about t h i s . I f no, why not? ) 
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A f t e r t h e s t r i k e 
What was t h e atmosphere l i k e a t t h e p i t ? 
Did you c o n s i d e r redundancy? 
What were your a t t i t u d e s t o t h e union? 
Q u e s t i o n s about r e c e n t e v e n t s a t t h e p i t 
(1986 day o f a c t i o n , 1987 bonus s t r i k e , e t c ) 
A t t i t u d e s now? 
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APPENDIX TWO: THE COAL INDUSTRY 1947-1974 
APPBaroiX 2: THE COAL INDUSTRY 1947-1974 
This appendix expands on the post-war history of the coal industry up u n t i l 
1974. I t explains i n more d e t a i l bow nationalisation served the interests 
of c a p i t a l (for example i n smoothing p i t closures), but how at the same 
time, the consensus arrangements of the 1940's, '50's and '60's contained 
t h e i r own contradictions for the KUM and the state. An incorporated union 
could not d e l i v e r i n d u s t r i a l peace at the point of production, which was 
one stimulus behind the development of a national wages structure. The 
National Power Loading Agreement aimed (among other things) to remove wage 
bargaining from the p i t to the more accomodative l e v e l of national 
negotiations. But t h i s had the effect of channeling militancy away from the 
face and into p o l i t i c a l canpaigning i n the xinion. 
A 2.1 NATIONALISATION AND THE POST WAR CONSENSUS 
By the end of the war, the clamour for nationalisation of the coal industry 
had reached i r r e s i s t i b l e proportions. But nationalisation was on the way to 
assuming the status of a consensus policy even before the war. In 1938 coal 
r o y a l t i e s were e f f e c t i v e l y nationalised by a Conservative government, which 
forced through conpulsory amalgamation powers for a new Coal Commision i n 
the same B i l l (Eldon Barry, 1965) . At issue was the inefficiency of the 
industry. 
"[T]he B i l l . . . had the backing of the Government and 
The Times, both acting on behalf of what may be c a l l e d 
the fourth vested interest - the body of i n d u s t r i a l i s t s 
i n general, who regarded the inefficiency of the 
coalmining industry as a drag on the whole economy." 
(Eldon Barry, 1965, 356) 
By the end of the war, nationalisation was seen by B r i t i s h c a p i t a l as the 
only solution to the seemingly intractable inefficiency of the coal 
industry. The wartime Reid Report had c l i n i c a l l y and r e l e n t l e s s l y 
documented the i n e f f i c i e n c y and wasteage predominating i n the industry 
(Heinemann, 1944) . For c a p i t a l therefore, d r a s t i c reorganisation of the 
coal industry was e s s e n t i a l . Nationalisation became the only solution to 
these problems because the wartime effort had consolidated a firm consensus 
around the slogan "Never again!". 
"'Never again!' meant, above a l l , no return to mass 
unetnployment, distressed areas, malnutrition, and the 
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other i l l s of c a p i t a l i s t anarchy. In 1945 no p o l i t i c a l 
party dared to suggest dismantling of state controls 
such as happened i n 1919." (Eldon Barry, 1965, 370) 
For the working c l a s s , the post war era heralded the enactment of a long 
cherished dream. On January I s t 1947 - Vesting Day - private ownership of 
the coal mines ended. 
Yet i t quickly became cl e a r that nationalisation represented considerably 
l e s s than the miners' long cherished dream. Despite repeated exhortations 
from t h e i r union leaders, miners r e a l i s e d that fundamentally things hadn't 
changed. The work was s t i l l the same, and the same bosses enforced the same 
d i s c i p l i n e (see Dennis et a l , 1969) . For the state the problem was how to 
deal with a potentially militant and very powerful workforce. The state 
aimed to blunt that militancy and power by incorporating the (newly formed) 
NUM leadership i n a corporatist consensus. NUM leaders urged d i s c i p l i n e and 
e f f o r t on t h e i r members i n order to make nationalisation work, but the new 
regime was working for c a p i t a l , not the miners. 
Throughout the 1940's and 50's, at a time when the shortage of coal and 
high market prices would have enabled the NCB to make a comfortable profit, 
pay off i t s debts and finance i t s own investment (eg the 1950 Plan For 
Coal), the NCB was forced by the government to keep the price of coal well 
below the market value (Allen, 1981, 104). During t h i s period demand for 
coal consistently outstripped supply (Hall, 1981) . As well as refusing to 
allow the NCB to exploit i t s market position, the government instructed the 
NCB to buy expensive isports and s e l l them at UK prices, forcing the NCB to 
bear the loss (NCB Annual Report, 1965/6 i n Allen, 1981, 104) . At the same 
time as f u e l shortages persisted at home, the NCB was also required to 
continue to export coal, to help shore up Bri t a i n ' s balance of payments 
situation. This was consistent with the concept of nationalisation which 
emerged from the limited programme of takeovers i n i t i a t e d by the 1945 
Labour government. The implications - accepted by Conservative and Labour 
governments, and s i g n i f i c a n t sections of the trade unions - were that 
nationalisation was aimed at supporting the con^jetitiveness of the economy 
as a whole (Hudson, 1986, 13). 
Furthermore, opposition from the only major opponent of nationalisation -
the coal owners - was reduced to tokenism when the con^nsation terms 
became known. In the end a staggering £394 million t o t a l coiq>ensation was 
Appendix 2 (375) 
paid (Ashworth, 1986, 28) - at a time when loiners were paid around £300 a 
year! To meet the b i l l the NCB were conpelled to borrow the money necessary 
to pay back the owners (from the government), anld the interest payment on 
t h i s loan helped turn an operating p r o f i t into an overall loss i n 5 of the 
f i r s t 10 years following nationalisation (NCB annual reports). 
As well as these f i n a n c i a l r e s t r i c t i o n s , after 1950 the NCB embarked on an 
ambitious investment programme to modernise the industry. Interest charges 
therefore further increased as the NCB t r i e d to reconstruct the hopelessly 
backward industry bequeathed by the private owners with further borrowing 
from the government. In 1950, a f t e r two years of maximising output from 
e x i s t i n g resources to meet endemic f u e l shortages, the NCB began to plan 
i t s long term strategy. A "Plan For Coal" was published i n 1950, envisaging 
£486 m i l l i o n of investment (at 1950 p r i c e s ) , i n order to begin reducing 
production costs (RPRU, 1979, 15-19). I n f l a t i o n pushed the costs higher 
than anticipated, and by the f i r s t revision of the Plan ("Investing i n 
Coal") i n 1956, estimated c a p i t a l costs were £1000 million. These were 
reduced i n 1959 to £825 m i l l i o n (NCB, 1959, 15). 
Throughout the period 1947-57 the formal labour relations of the industry 
remained placid. The NUM was dominated by an authoritarian right wing 
leadership which stair5>ed on dissent, and maintained a r i g i d loyalty to the 
concept of nationalisation long after disillusionment had set t l e d over the 
membership. The state aimed for incorporation, and succeeded with the 
leaders of the NUM. But as chapter three showed, t h i s strategy risked 
dis l o c a t i n g the leadership from the rank and f i l e to such an extent that 
the membership rebelled. This i s what eventually happened i n the coal 
industry. 
Despite o f f i c i a l labour relations tranquility, u n o f f i c i a l disputes 
dominated the industry throughout the 1950's and 60's. In 1956, 78.4% of 
a l l s t r i k e s i n Great B r i t a i n occurred i n coal mining (Allen, 1981, 90) . 
This spectacular militancy was concentrated almost exclusively at the point 
of production. Most disputes were over wages and conditions, and were 
highly l o c a l i s e d , sometimes only involving a small section of the workforce 
within one p i t . Only r a r e l y did disputes f l a r e up into major s t r i k e s (see 
Slaughter, 1958 for an example) . When they did, the o f f i c i a l union 
leadership offered only unwavering opposition to the s t r i k e r s . Confronted 
with such h o s t i l i t y , most s t r i k e s quickly petered out. Yet the biggest were 
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i n e f f e c t s t r i k e s by the rank and f i l e against t h e i r own leadership - they 
were atteii5>ts by the membership to force the leadership to take t h e i r 
grievances seriously ( i b i d ) . 
A 2.2 WAGES, MILITANCY AND CHANGES IN TECHNOLOGY 
Rank and f i l e militancy therefore continued despite o f f i c i a l \inion 
h o s t i l i t y ^ . At the root of t h i s militancy lay two common factors. F i r s t , no 
matter what the technology, mining remained an appallingly dangerous and 
oppressive job (see P i t t , 1979; Douglass, 1972 and Krieger, 1983 for some 
h i s t o r i c a l descriptions). To combat both aspects, miners devised 
conplicated work rules and eff o r t norms (Krieger, 1983), enforced by strong 
peer group pressure, and int e r n a l i s e d within a powerful ideology reproduced 
through "tradition". This involved trespassing on managements sacred "right 
to manage", and ensured that a continual battle for control was waged 
imderground. Acting as combatants for management were deputies and overmen 
- f i r s t l i n e supervision. The nature of coal mining conferred significant 
advantages on miners i n t h e i r struggle to maintain control of th e i r working 
environment (see Douglass, 1972). Such advantages were boosted by 
technological factors - miners were a c l a s s i c example of the pattern Marx 
i d e n t i f i e d whereby s k i l l e d workers are able to defend considerable 
autonomy, and build up resistance to management control. 
Secondly, the coal industry was dominated by piece rates. Piece rates were 
cl o s e l y related to the (backward) technology of coal getting. Without them, 
managers feared that workers would sinply not apply themselves to such 
arduous work. They offered several advantages to management. In particular, 
piece rates obstructed the development of anything more than a narrow 
sectional consciousness. They were d i v i s i v e , often p i t t i n g workers i n the 
same p i t against each other. Piece rates also functioned as a powerful 
d i s c i p l i n i n g tool, ensuring work effort without direct supervision - an 
^ I t should be noted that l e v e l s of militancy varied markedly 
between regions, with Yorkshire, South Wales and Scotland t r a d i t i o n a l l y 
recording the highest l e v e l s of s t r i k e a c t i v i t y . I n contrast, the Midlands, 
North East and North West were r e l a t i v e l y peaceful (McCormick, 1979, 
158-159). 
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e s p e c i a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i n the dark and secret world of 
Tinderground mining where supervisors could not see most of what went on. 
But piece rates had several disadvantages for management. Under piecework, 
each group of workers bargained seperately over a host of allowances and 
extras (see Dennis et a l , 1969 and Slaughter, 1958). This encouraged 
militancy at the coal face, as wages were d i r e c t l y affected by such action. 
In turn, t h i s l e f t the NCB wages b i l l susceptible to "wages d r i f t " (or 
"drive"), as well organised groups of workers were able to extract material 
concessions from managements which wanted to avoid breaks i n production. 
By the 1960's, wages "drive" had been i d e n t i f i e d as a major problem for 
B r i t i s h c a p i t a l (see Donovan, 1968, Hyman, 1975). The state was seeking 
ways to curb the problem. And technological development intervened to 
further increase pressure on the NCB to r a t i o n a l i s e i t s wages system. By 
the early 1960's. Plan For Coal investment had dramatically increased the 
amoxint of power loaded coal (from 3.8% i n 1950 to 85.7% i n 1966/7 - Kelly, 
1969, 137). The Anderton Shearer Loader (ASL) was revolutionising 
underground mining, leading to prodigious leaps i n productivity (Kelly, 
1969) . Increasingly production was "machine led", and the NCB f e l t that a 
wages system based on "payment by r e s u l t s " was inappropriate when the major 
factor controlling production was r e l a t i v e l y independant of individual 
ef f o r t (Ashworth, 1986, 292-293; Krieger, 1983; Rutledge 1977) . 
Ending piece rates had been an objective of the NUM for years, but i t 
wasn't u n t i l the NCB started showing an interest that progress was made. 
The unions aim was to unify workers across the country and ensure that 
whatever the conditions, men doing the same job would get the same pay. The 
National Power Loading Agreement (signed i n 1966) appeared to achieve just 
t h i s . Accomodative national union leadership enabled the NCB to s t r i c t l y 
control annual wage negotiations, and l o c a l disputes withered to a tiny 
frac t i o n of pre NPLA days. 
Technological changes therefore led to a revolution i n the process of coal 
mining, and t h i s revolution s t i u l a t e d a complete reorganisaiton of the 
wages structure. Investment i n new and reconstructed mines began producing 
r e s u l t s j u s t at the time when demand was f a l l i n g due to coopetition from 
inported o i l i n the e l e c t r i c i t y generating market. Other factors also 
contributed to declining markets; the 1956 Clean A i r Act reduced domestic 
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consumption, railway useage f e l l sharply as cheaper d i e s e l locomotives 
replaced steam, o i l replaced coal i n the chemical industry. P i t s began to 
close at an unprecedented rate (see tables 4.1 and 4.2). In the peripheral 
c o a l f i e l d s l i k e Durham, Scotland, Northumbria and South Wales, contraction 
was p a r t i c u l a r l y acute. 
A 2.3 PIT CLOSURES 
Patterns of closure were not however purely a ref l e c t i o n of unfavourable 
geological " f a c t s " . Instead, they represented the effects of conscious 
technological decisions taken by the NCB. In the 1950's the NCB decided on 
a strategy of maximising output from the most geologically favourable 
locations to create a modem, e f f i c i e n t , low unit cost industry (Tomaney, 
1988). Technological investment reflected these c r i t e r i a , as no serious 
e f f o r t was made to develop and apply machinery that would have improved 
working conditions i n t h i n seam conditions. E f f e c t i v e l y therefore the NCB 
strategy heaped further economic advantages on the most geologically 
favoured c o l l i e r i e s and areas (RPRU, 1979). Throughout the 1960's t h i s led 
to a concentration of closures i n the oldest coal mining d i s t r i c t s of the 
country. Many miners trekked i n to the s t i l l buoyant "Central" coalfields 
of Yorkshire and Nottinghamshire, forming a new generation of "ind u s t r i a l 
gypsies". Countless millions of tonnes of coal were s t e r i l i s e d i n the 
"peripheral" c o a l f i e l d s . 
Although there were sporadic, isolated attempts to oppose closures the 
union leadership took firm action to crush rank and f i l e opposition (Allen, 
1981, 68-69). Instead union leaders placed t h e i r f a i t h i n the election of a 
Labour govenunent. In opposition, Labour proaiised to restore the flagging 
fortunes of the industry. But when Harold Wilson took power i n 1964, his 
govemmient continued Conservative policy towards the industry (Taylor, 
1984, 54) . E s s e n t i a l l y t h i s involved a l a i s s e z f a i r e approach, where coal 
could only survive i f i t becamie cost competitive with other fuels. Labour's 
manifesto cotnmi ttment to aim for an annual output of 200 Mt was 
xinceromioniously abandoned, to be replaced with the 1965 National Plan 
figure of 170/180 Mt (Taylor, 1984, 54) . And the r e a l agenda seemted to be 
the t o t a l demolition of the domestic coal industry i n favour of o i l and 
nuclear power (Sweet, 1985). In the years 1965/6-68/9, 200 p i t s closed down 
- about one a week for four years! (Hall, 1981). 
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The NCB'8 f i n a n c i a l situation was precarious, miainly because of the 
i n t e r e s t burden, and also due to govemmient price r e s t r i c t i o n s i n the 
1950's which prevented the NCB from building up f i n a n c i a l reserves to help 
i t through d i f f i c u l t timies (NCB, 1966; quoted i n Allen, 1981, 104). In 1965 
the govenuoent agreed to a massive f i n a n c i a l reconstruction for the NCB. At 
t h i s timie the NCB s t i l l owed £339.1 miillion of the original £394 miillion 
load i t needed to pay off the old coal owners (Ashworth, 1986, 276)! A 
variety of other factors comibined to create a miassive debt burden, which in 
turn f u e l l e d escalating i n t e r e s t paymients (see Ashworth, 1986, 274-279). 
The govemmient wrote off £415 miillion of the t o t a l debt, which reduced 
in t e r e s t paymients by £21.5 miillion. Other mieasures further eased the 
f i n a n c i a l situation, and the goverxunent also offered state sxibsidies on 
redundancy payments (Ashwoirth, 1986, 278-279). But the f i n a n c i a l package 
was dependant on p i t closures continuin. 
As demand for coal continued to decline, and wages slipped below the 
r e l a t i v e l y high l e v e l s of the 1950's, miorale i n the industry - p a r t i c u l a r l y 
the peripheral c o a l f i e l d s - collapsed. Once i t becamie clear that the xmion 
hierarchy was acquiescing to the closure programmie, resistance to closures 
proved impossible to sustain (Allen, 1981, 68-69) . Men l e f t the industry in 
thousands, convinced that i t was racing to complete extinction (Hall, 
1982) . Cleaner, better paid jobs beckoned as the govemmient attempted to 
counter the worst e f f e c t s of p i t closures with regional aid. 
However, although i n d u s t r i a l relations i n the industry appeared tranquil, 
the enormious changes of the preceding 10 years had created the foundations 
for the growth of "mass militancy" (Rutledge, 1977), as miiners had f a l l e n 
behind the wages achieved by plant bargaining i n the mianufacturing sector 
(Winterton, 1985a). By the l a t e 1960's, the NCB was . forced to miake 
thousands of miners redundant (rather than relocating them) as 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s for relocation dried up (Allen, 1981, 136-137) Unemployment 
outside the coal industry was r i s i n g , so leaving the industry for 
al t e r n a t i v e employment becamie d i f f i c u l t . 
"Those who were d i s s a t i s f i e d with t h e i r conditions of 
work l o s t the option of leaving the industry e a s i l y and 
had to stay and tolerate them or to struggle 
c o l l e c t i v e l y to improve them." (Allen, 1971, 137) 
A 2.4 NATIONAL STRIKE ACTION 
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A collaborative NUM leadership had accepted derisory wage increases, and 
miners had f a l l e n well down the pay league (Allen, 1981, 100-101) . I n 
Yorkshire, a mi l i t a n t workforce was beginning to rebel against the 
authoritarian right wing area leadership (Allen, 1981, 137-140). The 
national wages structure (which had i t s roots i n the s h i f t to power 
loading) was a major factor, since i t forced miners to direct t h e i r 
militancy away from l o c a l management towards the national arena (Rutledge, 
1977; Krieger, 1983). Increases i n wages could no longer be won by 
sectional action at the point of production. The NPLA also united miners to 
a hitherto unprecedented degree, since i t equalised wages across the 
country. Wages grievances were now inherently national issues, affecting 
a l l workers s i m i l a r l y . And since the NPLA's method of equalising wages was 
to hold down wage increases i n well paid areas to enable miners i n lower 
paid areas to catch up, normally "moderate" areas such as Nottingham were 
also infected by the new militancy, as they saw t h e i r standards of l i v i n g 
declining rapidly (Ashworth, 1986, 305) . 
This new militancy was both expressed and advanced with the successful 
canpaign to e l e c t Lawrence Daly as W i l l Paynter's replacement as General 
Secretary of the NUM i n 1968. Anger i n the coalfields boiled over for the 
f i r s t time i n 1969, over the unlikely issue of surface workers hours. A 
chaotic, unplanned s t r i k e over surface workers hours and wages spread from 
Yorkshire to Scotland, South Wales, Derbyshire, Nottingham, Kent and the 
Midlands, involving 130000 miners from 140 p i t s (Allen, 1981, 152-159). 
Although unsuccessful i n s t r i c t l y material terms, i t marked the beginning 
of a new phase i n the NUM's history. The rank and f i l e were fighting back. 
Yorkshire again proved the powerhouse i n 1970, when a second xinofficial 
s t r i k e threatened to envelop the industry (Ashworth, 1986, 302-303). For 
four weeks sporadic and b i t t e r action spread and then receded i n reaction 
to a 55% rej e c t i o n of the NCB's pay claim (66.6% was required for a st r i k e 
mandate) . But by now one further ingredient had changed. The Labour Party 
had been replaced i n government by a v i r u l e n t l y anti-trade union 
Conservative administration. Right wing leaders no longer f e l t constrained 
not to s t r i k e out of lo y a l t y to "th e i r " government. I n 1971 the NUM annual 
conference changed the union rules so only a 55% majority was required i n 
ba l l o t s over s t r i k e action. Later that year the NCB's response to the 
unions pay claim provoked an overtime ban, followed by a ballot, which 
achieved a 58.8% majority for s t r i k e action. On January 9th 1972 the miners 
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began t h e i r f i r s t national and o f f i c i a l s t r i k e since 1926. Seven weeks 
l a t e r they retumed to work triumphant after one of the most significant 
working c l a s s v i c t o r i e s of the century (see P i t t , 1979 for a graphic 
account of the s t r i k e ) . 
I n 1974 the miiners struck again. United as never before, they stmck to 
regain the wages status they f e l t t h e i r job demanded. Caught i n an economiic 
c r i s i s , the Heath govemmient appeared to panic, and l o s t the general 
election which i t c a l l e d (in the hope of c a p i t a l i s i n g on anti-union 
sentiment - see Crouch, 1982, 83) . At the same timie, the l e f t wing miade 
noteable advances within the union, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the previously right 
wing Yorkshire area (Taylor, 1984) . However, the success of the l e f t wing 
e:^losion contained contradictions, carrying with i t the r i s k that the l e f t 
would prove susceptible to the samie structural pressures towards 
incorporation which engulfed the union's right wing. 
In the events leading up to the 1972 s t r i k e there are important points of 
contact with arguments established i n chapter three. During the 1950's and 
60's, the union leadership pursued collaborative p o l i c i e s , simiilar to those 
discussed by Offe and Wiesenthal (1980). They were driven to secure 
"external guarantees" as a miethod of resolving the contradiction between 
the need to have a membership which i t could miobilise, and one which i t 
could at the samie time control. The state encouraged t h i s process by 
proving accomiadative to providing t h e i r extemal guarantees. Also however, 
somie of the contradictions of t h i s strategy are revealed, as the leadership 
struggled throughout the 1960's to pursue p o l i c i e s which maintained 
c r e d i b i l i t y with t h e i r miembership. Their demobilised membership s t i l l 
experienced exploitation, and although miany reacted by pursuing individual 
solutions - for example, leaving the industry or transferring - those that 
were l e f t were forced to develop c o l l e c t i v e strategies to cope. 
Furthermiore, as the NCB attempted to cope with h i s t o r i c problemis of wages 
drive (and constant l o c a l s t r i k e disruption) promioted by an archaic wages 
system of byzantine complexity, they unknowingly sowed the seeds for a 
united union (Krieger, 1983). Technological changes suggested solutions to 
sectional wages militancy, but contained unforeseen contradictions. And i n 
a more diffuse manner, technological change contributed to the breakdown of 
NUM/NCB consensus by stimulating massive p i t closures. This i n tum helped 
create a growing swell of b i t t e m e s s and resentmient, which f i n a l l y found 
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expression i n wages militancy. These changing material circumstances called 
forth a new brand of leadership i n the union - the l e f t won significant 
advances, e s p e c i a l l y i n Yorkshire. In other words, union bureaucracies 
proved themselves susceptible to pressure from the rank and f i l e . But the 
way that the rank and f i l e rebelled against the p o l i c i e s of conpromise was 
structured by h i s t o r i c a l circumstances - i t was a rebellion embedded with 
i t s own h i s t o r i c a l l y derived contradictions. This was seen p a r t i c u l a r l y in 
the different ways that the 1972 and 1974 s t r i k e s developed. 
The 1972 s t r i k e was s i g n i f i c a n t for the extent to which grass roots 
mobilisation dominated proceedings. I n areas l i k e Yorkshire the s t r i k e was 
e f f e c t i v e l y run by informal grass roots committees, centred on the "Panel" 
system (Taylor, 1984, 176-179). This reflected the "unfinished revolution" 
then underway. The NPLA redirected faceworkers militancy away from 
sectional disputes at the point of production to putting f i e r c e pressure on 
the union's national leadership (Rutledge, 1977, 421). This pressure led to 
the f o r c e f u l wage demands pushed through NUM conferences i n the early 70's, 
and also sustained a militant determination to prosecute s t r i k e action in 
t h e i r support. Vigorous and uninhibited picketing, combined with an 
uncoapromising attitude to safety cover i n many areas, demonstrated the 
extent to which rank and f i l e anger and determination had b u i l t up. 
With such pressure from below, national and area leaders were compelled to 
organise the s t r i k e e f f e c t i v e l y . They re a l i s e d that success depended on 
blacking alternative fuels, and set about organising the picketing of power 
stations and other major coal users. Given t h i s support from thei r 
leadership, the rank and f i l e quickly evolved t h e i r own picketing 
organisation, exceeding a l l expectations i n t h e i r committment and 
resourcefulness. Where right wing leaders s t i l l held office, they found 
t h e i r authority bypassed as pickets took u n o f f i c i a l control of the s t r i k e . 
Yorkshire was the engine house of the s t r i k e , and of the changes then going 
on. Although nominally s t i l l controlled by the right, the explosion of 
militancy made a l e f t wing takeover inevitable. 
By 1974, t h i s takeover had occurred. Arthur S c a r g i l l had been elected 
President of the Yorkshire Area i n 1973, following his e a r l i e r election as 
Compensation Agent, and as an NEC oiember (in 1972) . Owen Briscoe was 
elected General Secretary, and Peter Tait an NEC member, completing a 
d r a s t i c reversal of p o l i t i c a l leadership i n the previously right domiinated 
Appendix 2 (383) 
area. The example of Yorkshire i s worth quoting, because there are certain 
noteable s i m i i l a r i t i e s with what happened i n Durham over 10 years l a t e r . 
Here too, a deeply entrenched right wing leadership camie under increasing 
pressure as rank and f i l e anger b u i l t up. U n o f f i c i a l l e f t wing organisation 
succeeded i n pushing the right wing into action, and after the st r i k e , 
succeeded i n replacing them with t h e i r own nomiinees. 
Changed leadership was one of the factors that created a markedly different 
climiate around the 1974 s t r i k e . This timie the imion leadership attempted to 
demobilise the mpmbership as mtuch as possible, trying hard not to emibarrass 
the Labour Party i n the throes of a general election campaign. 
" I t was c l e a r that on t h i s occassion they wanted to 
avoid the spontaneity of 1972, the r e l a t i v e autonomy of 
l o c a l s t r i k e committees and the confrontations. This 
time they wanted to control the s t r i k e from the 
national centre so that they could determiine t a c t i c s 
and regulate i t s sdope. They planned from the outset to 
contain the s t r i k e and, i n so far as i t was possible, 
to give i t a respectable image." (Allen, 1981, 140) 
Victory i n 1974 was l e s s dependant on the actions of rank and f i l e miiners, 
and miore related to higher l e v e l p o l i t i c a l mianeuverings. In the short term, 
these were successful, as a highly p o l i t i c a l l y miotivated govemmient lo s t an 
election over a s t r i k e which i t s actions had provoked, and which i t had 
then attempted to p o l i t i c i s e . 
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A 2.5 CONCLUSION 
Up u n t i l 1974 the coal industry was firmly established at the centre of the 
PWS. The union leadership looked to the state to secure i t s interests, and 
the memibership were encouraged to believe that i t s interests could be miet 
within the state. Even the 1972 and 1974 s t r i k e s did not seriously 
challenge t h i s view, because they resulted i n substantial v i c t o r i e s for the 
union, and led to the PFC which further consolidated the bel i e f that mdners 
int e r e s t s lay i n securing "deals" thought the state, rather than 
challenging the wage relat i o n i t s e l f . This corporatist legacy had strong 
implications for the way i n which the miiners l a t e r fought to defend t h e i r 
jobs. 
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APPENDIX 3 WHAT FTTTURE FOR CLASS POLITICS? 
In 1983, writers on the l e f t were struggling to comie to terms with two 
successive NUM ba l l o t rejections for s t r i k e action over p i t closures. I f 
the shock troops of the labour miovement couldn't be miobilised i n defence of 
jobs, then who could? 
"To imagine that people w i l l s a c i f i c e t h e i r livelihoods 
on the un-evidenced assurances of t h e i r leadership i s 
to misread the relationship between leaders and troops 
and to miisunderstand the r a t i o n a l i t y of working-class 
action... The miiners were offered three reasons for 
voting for a s t r i k e [ in 1983] : i n miemory of those who 
had b u i l t the union; for t h e i r famiilies; and 'as sien', 
who have a duty to stand up and fight. Glowing 
sentimients. And yet, i n t h e i r backward trajectory, 
t h e i r f a m i l i a l and miasculinist assumptions, those words 
f a l l on miy ears as archaic. The cause i s correct. The 
langauage i s a dying one." (Hall, 1983, quoted in 
Miliband, 1985, 23) 
Writing at the same time, Dave Temple - a p i t a c t i v i s t at Murton - offered 
a different interpretation. 
"The miiners have l o s t a battle, but i n no way have they 
l o s t the war... The miajor struggle i s only i n i t s 
beginning. The important lessons from the ballot have 
nothing to do with whether miiners w i l l fight or not. 
Whatever the mioods of t h i s or that group of 
individuals, they have no alternative... 
"Miners and other workers are going to have to struggle 
because B r i t i s h capitalism intends to cut i t s costs of 
labour to the bone and break the working c l a s s 
organisations. I t has steadily prepared the am^, the 
police and i t s other state organisations for t h i s and 
i t i s setting i t s l e g a l framiework i n the Police B i l l 
and anti-union laws." (Temple, 1983; 56) 
These two quotes sum up a f i e r c e debate which was already raging on the 
l e f t between "new real i s t s " ' ^ and those who - from a variety of perspectives 
- rejected the new philosophy. Because of t h e i r symibolic association as 
archetypes of both the post war settlemient and proletarian c l a s s 
consciousness, NUM p o l i t i c s attracted attention beyond t h e i r material 
^ I use the term here to describe a broad swathe of opinion from 
Neil Kinnock through to the Communist Party - people who share a be l i e f i n 
the need to reorientate Socialism away from i t s t r a d i t i o n a l c l a s s base to a 
s h i f t i n g assemiblage of non c l a s s based a l l i a n c e s . See the rest of t h i s 
chapter for further discussion. 
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significance. Anyone proclaiming the end of an era or the beginning of a 
new one searched for somie semiinal change i n NUM fortunes to offer 
d e f i n i t i v e proof of the miost fundamental changes. I t i s i n t h i s context 
that Stuart Hall's cossnents above should be located. 
For Hall, old c l a s s p o l i t i c s were dying. Not only were they dying, but 
there was no hope of resurrection. Defeatism prevailed. Then - out of the 
blue - came the 1984/5 s t r i k e . As Dave Temple and other a c t i v i s t s i n the 
p i t s had predicted, the miiners had no choice i n the end but to fight. But 
how did the new r e a l i s t s see the mtost epic struggle i n B r i t a i n since 1926? 
2 
For the miost part they were strangely s i l e n t . The s t r i k e seemied to an 
emibarrassmient to them. I t contradicted t h e i r clean cut theories about the 
decline of c l a s s p o l i t i c s . So heads stayed down. When they f i n a l l y started 
bobbing above the parapet again - a decent i n t e r v a l after the end of 
h o s t i l i t i e s - i t was to begin the arduous task of appropriating the s t r i k e 
to t h e i r own ideology. 
I n fact, i t turned out to be not so d i f f i c u l t . After a l l , the miiners were 
defeated. To the new r e a l i s t s , the miiners were a sad remainder that i n 
Thatcher's B r i t a i n , miass working c l a s s s t r i k e action was doomied to 
inevitable f a i l u r e . I f a miiners' s t r i k e couldn't beat the govemmient, then 
i t proved that no s t r i k e could. With the working c l a s s fragmented and 
divided, no longer t i e d to notions of c o l l e c t i v e s o l i d a r i t y , the old ways 
of mobilising would have to be replaced. Locally based campaigns organised 
on non-class l i n e s mioved to the forefront. In the workplace, new r e a l i s t s 
urged accomiodation and f l e x i b i l i t y on workers. Positive aspects of 
c a p i t a l i s t i n i t i a t i v e s - l i k e " f l e x i b l e s p e c i a l i s a t i o n " - should be 
supported. 
"New realism" i s a d i f f i c u l t philosophy to t i e down. Because i t has become 
almiost a pejorative term, many people are unwilling to be ide n t i f i e d with 
2 
Apart from those whose leadership roles i n the NUM compelled 
them to take up miilitant positions i n an attempt to put themiselves back at 
the head of the rank and f i l e explosion which generated the s t r i k e . The 
general s i l e n e was t y p i f i e d by Marxism Today - the theoretical joumal of 
the Communist Party, and a leading organ of new r e a l i s t thought - which 
mianaged j u s t one round table discussion on the s t r i k e during i t s 12 mionth 
duration. 
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I t ( N e i l Klimock i s a noteable e x c e p t i o n ) . I n union terms, new r e a l i s m i s 
a s s o c i a t e d with the b u s i n e s s unionism of the EEPTU and the AEU (Bass e t t , 
1986). But many other unions a r e now engaging i n ' s u b s t a n t i a l reassessments 
of s t r a t e g y , which i n v o l v e elements of "new r e a l i s m " . Within the NUM the 
i s s u e s have p o l a r i s e d around attempts by Communist P a r t y l e a d e r s i n the 
South Wales and S c o t t i s h a reas to accept g r e a t e r f l e x i b i l i t y i n the union's 
approach t o management (chapter seven). 
I n t e l l e c t u a l l y , new r e a l i s m has i t s r o o t s i n the Communist P a r t y ' s a t t e n p t s 
3 
t o a n a l y s e the s u c c e s s of Thatcherism i n the l a t e '70'a and e a r l y '80's 
(see i n p a r t i c u l a r H a l l and Jacques, 1983). They saw Thatcherism as a novel 
p o l i t i c a l phenomena which had been able to generate a new "common sense" 
around p a r t i c u l a r i d e o l o g i c a l i s s u e s . As such, i t needed t o be t a c k l e d on 
the same i d e o l o g i c a l plane. T h i s theme has been coupled with an economic 
debate which has he r a l d e d the end of Fordism, and the t r a n s i t i o n t o a 
4 
" p o s t - f o r d i s t " e r a . T h i s supposedly epochal change f u r t h e r s i g n a l l e d the 
end of "old-fashioned" c l a s s s t r u g g l e , because some aspects of post-fordism 
brought b e n e f i t s to workers and were t h e r e f o r e worth embracing. 
Perhaps the most d e f i n i t i v e and r a d i c a l statement of the "new r e a l i s m " i s 
provided by the Communist P a r t y ' s (CP) "Manifesto f o r New Times" (CPGB, 
1989). D e s p i t e the numerical i n s i g n i f i c a n c e of the CP, the document i s 
iitp o r t a n t as the d i s t i l l a t i o n of a determined atteiqpt over the l a s t 10 
y e a r s by those on the l e f t who have sought to r e o r i e n t a t e the labour 
movement away from i t s o l d c l a s s base. I t i s a l s o important because the CP 
r e t a i n s a p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e out of proportion t o i t s s i z e . 
The CP's argranent r e s t s on the need to c r e a t e a broad popular a l l i a n c e to 
def e a t Thatcherism. T h i s a l l i a n c e should m o b i l i s e people v i a a m u l t i p l i c i t y 
of s h i f t i n g agendas and movements. These movements should i n t u r n r e f l e c t 
the renewal of r a d i c a l thought i n the l a t e 1980's, moving with the g r a i n of 
the "new times", r a t h e r than s e a r c h i n g f o r the i l l u s o r y s e c u r i t y of the 
^Although the bu s i n e s s unionism of Hammond, Jordan e t a l was 
rooted more i n o p p o r t u n i s t i c pragmatism than i n t e l l e c t u a l i n q u i r y . 
4 
See f o r example; A g l i e t t a , 1979; Leborgne and L i e p i t z , 1988; 
Schoenberger, 1988; S c o t t , 1988. For a c r i t i q u e see Tomaney, 1988; Cl a r k e , 
1988. 
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o l d . The peace movement/ the green movement, gay r i g h t s and women's 
s t r u g g l e s have a l l m o b i l i s e d people i n new ways, a c r o s s c l a s s d i v i s i o n s . 
A l l i e d w i t h a transformed Labour P a r t y and modernised trade union movement, 
th e s e are the f o r c e s which can tr a n s f o r m s o c i e t y (CPGB, 1989) . 
But nowhere does the manifesto t a c k l e the d e c i s i v e questions of s t a t e power 
and c a p i t a l i s t ownership. The questions which have loomed so l a r g e not only 
d u r i n g the miners' s t r i k e but i n a s e r i e s of diputes during the Thatcher 
y e a r s - f o r ezanple, Wapping, the seamen a t Dover, the docks - are l e f t not 
o n l y unanswered, but even unasked. Time and again the document p a i n t s a 
b o l d and a t t r a c t i v e v i s i o n of the f u t u r e , without ever suggesting how 
c a p i t a l i s t c o r p o r a t i o n s and s t a t e opposition are to be overcome. There i s a 
l o t of t a l k about what should be, but not how t o get t h e r e . As a 
consequence i t i s a g l o r i o u s l y Utopian v i s i o n of how t h i n g s might be, i f . . . 
I n the document's only statement on the means of a c h i e v i n g t h e i r proposed 
economic tr a n s f o r m a t i o n , t h r e e ways of overcoming opposition are o u t l i n e d . 
F i r s t by b u i l d i n g t h e "broadest p o s s i b l e popular consensus around the need 
f o r those changes" (26). Secondly by u s i n g the " i n i t i a t i v e and c o n v i c t i o n 
of people", p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the labour movement. T h i r d l y , economic change 
w i l l be acconpanied by p r o g r e s s i v e democratisation of other areas of 
s o c i e t y , l i k e the s t a t e and the media, "which w i l l help to d i s e r s e power 
though s o c i e t y and break up e x i s t i n g undemocratic co n c e n t r a t i o n s of power" 
(26) . But a l l of t h e s e suggestions presuppose t h a t the r e a l l y d i f f i c u l t 
b a t t l e s have a l r e a d y been won - enployers are on the defensive and s t a t e 
power has been shackled. E v e r y goal the CP suggests, every p o l i c y they 
advocate i s p a i n t e d w i t h a yawning hole i n the c e n t r e of the a n a l y s i s -
what t o do i f change i s r e s i s t e d . 
Nobody on the l e f t can s e r i o u s l y argue a g a i n s t the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t 
S o c i a l i s t p o l i t i c s needs t o take more s e r i o u s l y emerging s o c i a l movements 
such as t h e Greens, feminism and a n t i - r a c i s m . Few would dispute t h a t what 
we aim f o r i s a s o c i e t y which "widens and deepens the the q u a l i t y of l i f e " 
( 2 ) ; which i n v e s t s i n " s k i l l s , s c i e n c e and technology and the s o c i a l 
environment, through mutual support f o r c h i l d r e a r i n g , education, and 
h e a l t h " ( 2 ) ; and which encourages c r e a t i v i t y "through g r e a t e r involvement 
of people i n t a k i n g t h e d e c i s i o n s which a f f e c t them" (3) . What i s so 
d i s t u r b i n g about the CP's argument i s the i l l u s i o n s i t peddles about the 
a v a i l i b i l i t y of t h e s e aims. 
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To t a k e j u s t one eacanple, p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l e v a n t t o t h i s t h e s i s . Arguing 
t h a t t r a d e union b a r g a i n i n g i s one of s i x areas where the means e x i s t to 
ach i e v e t h e i r g o a l s , the Manifesto goes on to argue t h a t : 
"A major agenda f o r the unions should be to p r e s s f o r 
production t o be o r i e n t e d more around the needs of 
women and domestic work, through c h i l d - c a r e f a c i l i t i e s , 
more f l e x i b l e working time, c a r e e r breaks with 
guaranteed jobs a t the end, women's t r a i n i n g and c a r e e r 
a d v i c e . " (26) 
Amen t o t h a t ! Furthermore, w i t h p r e s s u r e from enployers t o reorganise 
production t o make t h e b e s t use of new technology, 
"the unions must meet the einployers' agenda with 
p r e s s u r e t o reduce and r e o r g a n i s e working time t o s u i t 
workers' needs. Unions c o u l d f o r i n s t a n c e , p r e s s f o r 
long-term d e a l s t o i n c l u d e enployment s e c u r i t y c l a u s e s 
i n exchange f o r more f l e x i b l e working p r a c t i c e s . " 
(26-27) 
But what i f employers r e f u s e t o accede t o these o s t e n s i b l y reasonable 
r e q u e s t s ? They a re a f t e r a l l not new i d e a s . When the NUM t r i e d to negotiate 
a new technology agreement with the NCB along j u s t such l i n e s i n the l a t e 
1970's, management r e f u s e d even t o d i s c u s s the NXm's p r o p o s i t i o n . S i m i l a r l y 
the p o r t employers a r e busy t e a r i n g up the dockworkers "eoployment s e c u r i t y 
c l a u s e s " with some gusto even as I w r i t e . For the CP, i n the same way t h a t 
the miners' s t r i k e was a " h e r o i c " r e l i c of a byegone age ( i b i d , 11), any 
i n d u s t r i a l s t r u g g l e t o defend hard won r i g h t s i s an embarrassment because 
i t f o c u s s e s a t t e n t i o n on the hole a t the c e n t r e of t h e i r a n a l y s i s - power! 
Undoubtedly Thatcherism has been s u c c e s s f u l i n reshaping the experience of 
c l a s s i n B r i t a i n today. C l a s s d i v i s i o n s are more a n t a g o n i s t i c than f o r a 
generation, but workers consciousness of themselves as a c l a s s i s weak. 
Changes w i t h i n c a p i t a l i s t o r g a n i s a t i o n , combined with the a c t i v e s t r a t e g i e s 
of t h e s t a t e (chapter 2) have fundamentally decoirposed the working c l a s s i n 
B r i t a i n , opening up s t r o n g d i v i s i o n s between d i f f e r e n t types of workers, 
and weakening the base f o r s o l i d a r i t y even among t r a d i t i o n a l manufacturing 
employees. The miners' s t r i k e was an at t e n p t to defend a p a r t i c u l a r notion 
of c l a s s , and i t s d e f e a t e f f e c t i v e l y brought the c u r t a i n down on t h a t kind 
of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d c l a s s p o l i t i c s . But w h i l s t t h a t means the end of a 
p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e guaranteed c l a s s consensus, i t by no means s i g n i f i e s the 
end of the s t r u g g l e t o defend and advance workers r i g h t s . And t h a t s t r u g g l e 
i n v o l v e s many elements which were t o the f o r e f r o n t i n the miners' s t r i k e -
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f o r example, the defence of hard won co n d i t i o n s , the need f o r a c o l l e c t i v e 
i d e n t i t y , and f o r m o b i l i s a t i o n to embrace the whole community. 
New r e a l i s t s response t o t h e s e changes i s t o argue t h a t c l a s s no longer 
p r o v i d e s the fundamental cleavage i n s o c i e t y , and t h a t the working c l a s s i s 
t h e r e f o r e no longer the major agent of s o c i a l change i n advanced c a p i t a l i s t 
s o c i e t i e s (see f o r example Cohen, 1982 and Gorz, 1982 and f o r opposing 
views Miliband, 1988 and Wood, 1986) . Furthermore, they tend to be h o s t i l e 
t o s t r i k e s and other forms of i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n . Yet t h e i r a t t enpts to 
i d e n t i f y other agents of s o c i a l change a r e unconvincing - s h i f t i n g 
a l l i a n c e s between a p l u r a l i t y of p r e s s u r e groups does not sound l i k e a 
s t r a t e g y c a l c u l a t e d t o put the f r i g h t e n e r s on the Conservative P a r t y (never 
mind i n t e r n a t i o n a l c a p i t a l i s t s ) . They are d e f e a t i s t s t r a t e g i e s because i n 
the end they a r e not designed t o a t t a c k c a p i t a l i s m - only to make i t work 
b e t t e r f o r t h e u n d e r p r i v i l e g e d . Quite apart from the i n p l i e d abandonment of 
workers elsewhere i n the world who are excluded from t h i s p u r e l y n a t i o n a l 
s e t t l e m e n t , the s t r a t e g y says nothing about why c a p i t a l and/or the s t a t e 
s hould f e e l minded t o make such f a r reaching concessions. 
R e j e c t i n g c l a s s s t r u g g l e e f f e c t i v e l y disarms workers. When the CP promote 
c o n s t r u c t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s over i n d u s t r i a l c o n f r o n t a t i o n they t a l k as i f the 
two were mutually e x c l u s i v e . By a l l means l e t us have the most c o n s t r u c t i v e 
n e g o t i a t i n g p o s s i b l e . But l e t us a l s o do e v e r y t h i n g i n our power t o ensure 
t h a t i f those n e g o t i a t i o n s f a i l , then the power e x i s t s t o defend and 
advance working c l a s s i n t e r e s t s . Strong working c l a s s o r g a n i s a t i o n i s 
ne c e s s a r y f o r any type of n e g o t i a t i o n - as the post s t r i k e experience a t 
Murton c o l l i e r y demonstrates on a m i c r o - s c a l e . Achieving t h i s means 
b u i l d i n g s o l i d a r i t y w i t h i n the working c l a s s , because i n the end i t i s only 
the working c l a s s who have the power t o cha l l e n g e the power of c a p i t a l and 
the s t a t e . By f i g h t i n g shy of t h i s s t r u g g l e , the CP embrace the powerfully 
c o r r o s i v e c a p i t a l i s t s e p e r a t i o n of workers from "the p u b l i c " , when workers 
make up the m a j o r i t y of the p u b l i c . I n doing t h i s they l e g i t i m a t e a b a s i c 
s t r a n d of c a p i t a l i s t ideology which s e r v e s to make t h e i r other arguments 
over the s e c t i o n a l i s m of t r a d e union a c t i o n s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g . I f workers a r e 
se p e r a t e from the p u b l i c , then the way i s open f o r a d i v i s i o n of i n t e r e s t s 
between workers and the p u b l i c , which no amount of a t t e n p t s t o r e j o i n v i a 
j o i n t canpaigns of workers and consumers (CPGB, 1989, 27) can overcome (see 
a l s o Murray, 1988 f o r an e x p l i c i t statement about t h i s s e p e r a t i o n ) . 
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F a i l u r e t o t a c k l e t h e c e n t r a l q u e s t i o n of power i n a c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y has 
fundamental d u p l i c a t i o n s f o r the a c t u a l p r a c t i c e of the CP s t r a t e g y . I t 
means t h a t - f a c e d with an i n t r a n s i g e n t employer or unresponsive s t a t e -
workers i n s t r u g g l e are e f f e c t i v e l y urged to g i v e up. I n s t e a d of t a c k l i n g 
t h e hard, hard t a s k s of re-estZLblishing working c l a s s u n i ty, working 
towards i n t e r n a t i o n a l working c l a s s s o l i d a r i t y , and b u i l d i n g a s t r a t e g y to 
r e s t economic and p o l i t i c a l power from the r u l i n g c l a s s , new r e a l i s t s are 
peddling i l l u s i o n s about the p o s s i b i l i t y of winning fundamental s o c i a l 
change w i t h i n c a p i t a l i s m ^ . By f a i l i n g t o come up with a s t r a t e g y f o r 
d e a l i n g w i t h r e j e c t i o n of t h e i r demands, the CP says t o workers, "change 
your demands". The only other hope i t o f f e r s workers i s the e l e c t i o n of a 
Labour government. But so committed a r e they t o t h i s o b j e c t i v e , t h a t they 
a r e unable t o r e s i s t t h e Labour P a r t y ' s c o l l a p s e i n t o a T h a t c h e r i t e p a r t y 
w i t h a m i l d s o c i a l conscience, because t o do so might j e o p a r d i s e Kinnock's 
e l e c t i o n chances. T r u l y t h e p o l i t i c s of d e s p a i r ! 
And where the Manifesto - along with Labour and some tr a d e union l e a d e r s -
t a l k about s e i z i n g the opportunity provided by new developments w i t h i n 
i n d u s t r y , they make another s e r i o u s e r r o r . I n t h e i r haste to move with the 
t i d e of the "new times", they take an e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y o p t i m i s t i c view of 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s i n the f i e l d of production. I n p a r t i c u l a r , the idea t h a t 
"post-fordism" i s d e s t i n e d to b r i n g major improvements i n working 
c o n d i t i o n s mtust be challenged. Not only i s the evidence f o r post-fordism 
v e r y cloudy (Tomaney, 1989), but f o c u s s i n g on " f l e x i b l e team working w i t h i n 
much sm\aller, more s k i l l e d workforces" (CPGB, 7) obscures B r i t i s h 
c a p i t a l i s m i s p r i n c i p l e "modernising" s t r a t e g y - i n c r e a s i n g the r a t e of 
e x p l o i t a t i o n of workers (Tomianey, 1989). On i t s own, urging workers to seek 
t r a d e - o f f s over f l e x i b l e working a l s o adds to d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n the working 
c l a s s because even i n the few c a s e s where r e s k i l l i n g occurs, i t u s u a l l y 
does so a t the expense of other workers who becomte m a r g i n a l i s e d 
(sub-contracted and p a r t - t i m e employees). Trade-offs may be a v a i l a b l e f o r a 
c o r e of e l i t e workers, but the t a s k f o r s o c i a l i s t s i s t o b u i l d s o l i d a r i t y 
between powerful core workers and r e l a t i v e l y powerless, miarginalised 
employees. 
^ I n t h i s r e s p e c t , new r e a l i s m i s s t r i k i n g l y s i m i i l a r to the s o c i a l 
demiocratic i d e a s which infonned the post war settlement. 
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Where does the new r e a l i s t road lead? Perhaps the most i n t e r e s t i n g 
comparison i s w i t h the USA. I n a thought provoking a r t i c l e comparing the 
USA a i r t r a f f i c c o n t r o l l e r s s t r i k e i n 1981 with the B r i t i s h miners' s t r i k e 
i n 1984, G h i l a r d u c c i (1986) argues t h a t B r i t i s h labour law i s moving 
d e c i s i v e l y towards the American model (see a l s o the response from Northrup 
[1988], and G h i l a r d u c c i ' s r e p l y [ 1 9 8 8 ] ) . Since the 1935 passage of the 
N a t i o n a l Labour R e l a t i o n s Act (NLRA), US law has been i n t i m a t e l y i n v o l v e d 
i n t r a d e union a f f a i r s . U n l i k e i n B r i t a i n , where union r i g h t s s i n c e 1906 
were d e f i n e d i n terms of s p e c i f i c immunities, i n the USA the NLRA together 
w i t h powerful subsequent ammendments, have p o s i t i v e l y s p e c i f i e d the scope 
of l e g i t i m a t e union a c t i v i t y . 
The 1947 T a f t - H a r t l e y Ammendment was p a r t i c u l a r l y e f f e c t i v e i n t h i s 
r e s p e c t . I t banned unions from " s t r i k i n g , boycotting, or t a k i n g any 
c o n c e r t e d a c t i o n a g a i n s t an enployer with whom the union has no c o n t r a c t " 
( G h i l a r d u c c i , 1986, 118). Workers engaging i n any secondary a c t i o n could be 
sacked. I n B r i t a i n , t h e 1980 Enployment Act a l s o p r o s c r i b e d secondary 
a c t i o n , but aimed p e n a l t i e s a g a i n s t the union r a t h e r than the i n d i v i d u a l . 
Under US l e g i s l a t i o n , to secure n e g o t i a t i n g r i g h t s a workforce must 
p e t i t i o n t h e N a t i o n a l Labour R e l a t i o n s Board, who may then approve 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . 
"The American law has c r e a t e d a s i t u a t i o n where, 
r e g a r d l e s s of workers' d e s i r e s f o r s e l f o r g a n i s a t i o n , 
the boundaries of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n are e s t J i b l i s h e d by 
the eii5>loyer's s i z e and o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e . T h i s 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c r e p r e s e n t s the d i f f e r e n c e between the 
l i b e r t y and the p o s i t i v e r i g h t to organise and s t r i k e . " 
( i b i d , 119) 
As w i t h r e c e n t B r i t i s h l e g i s l a t i o n , the law d e f i n e s the scope of l e g i t i m a t e 
union a c t i v i t y before workers. 
J u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h i s l i e s i n the s e p e r a t i o n of unions from the p u b l i c - a 
s e p e r a t i o n e n s h r i n e d i n t h e Taft-Hazrtley Act. 
"The A c t ' s preamble d e c l a r e s t h a t i t s purpose i s to 
promote the f u l l flow of commerce and t o p r o t e c t the 
r i g h t s of the p u b l i c i n connection with labour 
d i s p u t e s . American unions were f u r t h e r seperated from 
t h e i r members even though workers are the l a r g e s t 
p o r t i o n of the ' p u b l i c ' ; once the p u b l i c was i d e n t i f i e d 
as an e n t i t y seperate from workers, unions became 
another bureacracy c o n f l i c t i n g with one's l i f e as a 
member of the ' p u b l i c ' . " ( i b i d , 118) 
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Simiilar p a t t e r n s have been followed by the B r i t i s h s t a t e , and i m p l i c i t l y 
endorsed by new r e a l i s t advocates. L e g i s l a t i o n has miade secondary a c t i o n 
i l l e g a l ; f o r c e d unions t o mieet s t r i n g e n t b a l l o t i n g c o n d i t i o n s before 
c a l l i n g l e g a l s t r i k e s ; banned " p o l i t i c a l " s t r i k e s ; and i n t r u d e d on the 
i n t e r n a l workings of union a f f a i r s . J u s t as "the T a f t - H a r t l e y and 
Landrum-Griffin A c t s miade c l a s s conscious unions i l l e g a l " ( i b i d . 119) i n 
t h e USA, so the saaie could be s a i d of Conservative anti-\inion l e g i s l a t i o n 
i n B r i t a i n . 
Amterican l e g i s l a t i o n e f f e c t i v e l y i n c r e a s e s the tendency towards 
b u r e a u c r a t i s a t i o n w i t h i n unions, which i n t u r n enhances the s e p e r a t i o n of 
miemibers from t h e i r unions . Gramsci's point - noted i n chapter t h r e e - t h a t 
unions o r g a n i s e workers according t o t h e "contours of the c a p i t a l i s t 
system" has becomie entrenched i n law. As a consequence, s e c t i o n a l i s m has 
becomie i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d . And i t i s here t h a t new r e a l i s m comies back i n t o 
f o c u s . I n urging accomiodation to the "new times", new r e a l i s t s - w i t t i n g l y 
o r u n w i t t i n g l y - l e n d added c r e d i b i l i t y t o the d r i f t towards s e c t i o n a l i s m 
and d i v i s i o n w i t h i n the workforce. They don't only comment on i t , they 
encourage i t . 
Overcomiing b a r r i e r s t o c l a s s s o l i d a r i t y r e q u i r e s a long term s t r a t e g y to 
ov e r t u r n C o n s e r v a t i v e l e g i s l a t i o n and b u i l d l i n k s between workers across 
i n d u s t r i e s and between c o u n t r i e s . Accepting both the l e g i s l a t i o n and the 
p r i n c i p l e s underpinning i t o f f e r s no chance of r e v e r s i n g the balance of 
power between c a p i t a l and labour. I n the USA - where the trade union 
movemient accepted the l e g a l r e g u l a t i o n of t h e i r a f f a i r s - unions have 
becomie l a r g e l y i r r e l e v a n t , with only one i n s i x workers vmionised. 
Furthermiore, even where t h e r e are \inions they are often remiote from t h e i r 
miemibers and r e s t r i c t e d t o l i m i t e d s e c t i o n a l b a r g a i n i n g r o l e s . One response 
t o t h i s - t y p i f i e d by Amierican miiners - i s an a s t o n i s h i n g l y high l e v e l of 
w i l d c a t t i n g . Throughout the 1970's an u n o f f i c i a l w i l d c a t miovemient fought 
For example, throughout the 1970's Amierican miiners fought a 
s e r i e s of b a t t l e s a g a i n s t t h e i r union - the United Mineworkers (UMW). I n 
th e e a r l y 1970's rank and f i l e miiners formed the "Miners f o r Demiocracy" 
(MFD) miovement t o r e p l a c e a c o r r u p t and a u t o c r a t i c union l e a d e r s h i p . 
W ildcat s t r i k e s a c c e l e r a t e d , and i n 1978 a n a t i o n a l s t r i k e l e d to miiners 
r e p e a t e d l y r e j e c t i n g t h e l e a d e r s h i p s attempts t o g a i n acceptance f o r 
compromiises on mianagemients terms (see Cleaver, 1975 and Green 1978) . 
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t h e c o a l owners over wages, s a f e t y and the s o c i a l wage. L o c a l a c t i v i s m 
r e p l a c e d c e n t r a l o r g a n i s a t i o n (Cleaver, 1975; Green, 1978). 
The w i l d c a t movement opened up new t e r r i t o r y f o r m o b i l i s a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i n the way i t was a b l e t o broaden i t s demands out to i n c l u d e community 
i s s u e s . As one c o a l conpany o f f i c i a l s a i d "They're s t r i k i n g over anything. 
T h e y ' l l s t i k e i f t h ey don't l i k e the l o c a l s h e r i f f . How can normal 
labour-management r e l a t i o n s d e a l with t h a t ? " (Quoted i n Cleaver, 1975, 
125) . I t i s c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t we might see s i m i l a r developments i n B r i t a i n , 
where t r a d i t i o n a l l y m i l i t a n t workers l i k e miners r e a c t to the l e g a l 
r e s t r a i n t s by t a k i n g x i n o f f i c i a l a c t i o n , d e f y i n g court orders and so on. 
Indeed, u n o f f i c i a l a c t i o n i s l i k e l y to become f a r more widespread as union 
o f f i c i a l s b u i l d l e g a l r e s t r a i n t s i n t o t h e i r mode of operation, l e a v i n g 
workers f r u s t r a t e d , t h e i r demands u n s a t i s f i e d . 
A l r e a d y t h e r e a r e some s i g n s t h a t t h i s i s the case. On the London 
Underground, NUR members organised a s e r i e s of h i g h l y s u c c e s s f u l u n o f f i c i a l 
one day s t r i k e s throughout A p r i l and May 1989, f i n a l l y c o s ^ l l i n g t h e i r 
union to b a l l o t f o r o f f i c i a l s t r i k e a c t i o n . London bus crews have a l s o 
taken u n o f f i c i a l a c t i o n . I n the North Sea, o i l r i g workers have organised 
s t r i k e a c t i o n , surmounting formidable o r g a n i s a t i o n a l b a r r i e r s i n the 
p r o c e s s . I n a l l c a s e s , the inpetous f o r a c t i o n has come from below - from 
rank and f i l e a c t i v i s t s - r a t h e r than c a u t i o u s union l e a d e r s . 
Undoubtedly t h e r e are powerful arguments which suggest t h a t the l e f t i n 
B r i t a i n needs new d i r e c t i o n s . The CP and other new r e a l i s t s are r i g h t to 
i d e n t i f y new agendas and new movements which o f f e r elements of a new 
m o b i l i s i n g v i s i o n f o r t h e l e f t . Old fashioned t r a d e union values are 
unpopular, and t h i s needs to be t a c k l e d head on. Trade union membership i s 
f a l l i n g , and stands today a t l e s s than 40% of the esoployed labour f o r c e 
( B a s s e t t , 1989). The working c l a s s i t s e l f i s being transformed as work 
s h i f t s from male dominated manufacturing to more i n d i v i d u a l i s e d s e r v i c e 
j o b s , f r e q u e n t l y p a r t time, fe m i n i s e d and low paid. Within the d e c l i n i n g 
manufacturing s e c t o r , the nature of work i s changing (although not as 
p o s i t i v e l y as new r e a l i s m s u g g e s t s ) . Combined with developments i n consumer 
l i f e s t y l e s and d e l i b e r a t e s t a t e s t r a t e g i e s , most of these changes have 
indeed weakened the b a s i s f o r c o l l e c t i v e s o l i d a r i t y w i t h i n the working 
c l a s s . 
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But t h e new r e a l i s t ' s response t o t h e s e changes i s the p o l i t i c s of dreamiers 
c l o a k e d i n d e s p a i r . T h e i r t h e o r i e s are not new, any miore than the 
predicamient which the working c l a s s f i n d s i t s e l f i n i s new. I n the 1920's 
and 30's the t r a d e union miovemient was demoralised f o l l o w i n g the defeat of 
t h e mtiners, and the samie p o l i c i e s of " r e a l i s m " and cooperation were urged 
on workers as are o f f e r e d up again today as "new" r e a l i s m ( S c a r g i l l , 1988). 
There i s nothing wrong with being r e a l i s t i c . But w h i l s t r e a l i s m should 
guide t a c t i c s and temper s h o r t term amibition, i t should do nothing to 
mioderate the ultimiate g o a l . 
Being r e a l i s t i c mieans s t a r t i n g with a frank assessmient of strengths and 
weaknesses, and then b u i l d i n g s t r a t e g y around the s t r e n g t h s . For example, 
new r e a l i s t s have c o r r e c t l y i d e n t i f i e d one area of s t r e n g t h - the i n c r e a s e 
i n m i o b i l i s a t i o n of people i n l o c a l l y based campaigns over a v a r i e t y of 
i s s u e s . However, c e l e b r a t i n g t h i s r e s i s t a n c e i s not enough. Great dangers 
a r e c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n i t , as Urry and others have pointed out (Urry, 1981, 
and chapter one) . Campaigns t o defend or promiote one p l a c e can q u i c k l y 
becomie campaigns a g a i n s t another. The competition to "win" the Nissan 
investment i n the UK i s a good example (Garrahan, 1986) . S i m i i l a r l y , Ford 
was a b l e t o p l a y on c o i r p e t i t i o n w i t h i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l p l a c e miarket 
d u r i n g 1987 and '88 before d e c i d i n g t o l o c a t e i t s new e l e c t r i c a l p l a n t i n 
Spain r a t h e r than Dundee ( F o s t e r and Woolfson, 1989). 
W h i l s t r i g h t wing new r e a l i s t s i n the Amalgamiated Engineering Union (AEU) 
argued openly f o r the unions to accept Ford's c o n d i t i o n s f o r the Dundee 
p l a n t (a s i n g l e union d e a l o u t s i d e Ford's UK n e g o t i a t i n g framiework), or 
e l s e " l o s e " the p l a n t t o a f o r e i g n country, " l e f t " new r e a l i s t s agonised 
over the d i f f i c u l t d e c i s i o n s posed by the case (see Leadbeater, 1988) . I n 
r e a l i t y . Ford's d e c i s i o n was only miarginally a f f e c t e d by the union d e a l i t 
c o u l d (or c o u l d not) get a t Dundee ( F o s t e r and Woolfson, 1989) . And few 
union l e a d e r s seem t o have a p p l i e d themselves t o the t a s k of winning 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l cooperation between unions t o undennine the b a s i s f o r Ford's 
d i v i s i v e s t r a t e g y . I n the c a s e of C a t e r p i l l a r ' s d e c i s i o n to c l o s e i t s 
S c o t t i s h p l a n t a t Uddington, the AEU's b u s i n e s s unionism was exposed as 
powerless t o prevent a mtultinational c a r r y i n g out i t s r e s t r u c t u r i n g plans 
d e s p i t e t h e union's cooperation with the i n t r o d u c t i o n of Japanese 
production miethods t o improve p r o d u c t i v i t y ( i b i d ) . 
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What both t h e s e exanples p o i n t to i s the need to m o b i l i s e a t the l o c a l 
l e v e l , but b u i l d a n a t i o n a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t r a t e g y . Business xinionism 
does not work. I t does not even keep e x i s t i n g jobs, never mind c r e a t e new 
ones. Furthermore, i t corrodes workers s o l i d a r i t y by entrenching d i v i s i o n s 
w i t h i n t h e l a b o u r movement c r e a t e d by dual labour markets. I n s t e a d of 
jxia^ing through hoops t o compete f o r the a t t e n t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
c a p i t a l i s t s , unions need t o b u i l d i n t e r n a t i o n a l l i n k s t o "bargain up" 
c o n d i t i o n s i n m u l t i n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n s . I t i s here t h a t the r e a l scope 
e x i s t s f o r p o l i t i c a l m o b i l i s a t i o n a t the l o c a l l e v e l . 
Y e t i t cannot stop t h e r e - with a k i n d of rejuvenated s y n d i c a l i s m . Although 
t h i s t h e s i s has c o n c e n t r a t e d throughout on the p o l i t i c s of trade unions, 
t h i s i s not meant t o ixaply t h a t unions are the p r i n c i p l e agents of s o c i a l 
change f o r t h e working c l a s s . Rather, workers s o l i d a r i t y should be seen as 
t h e e s s e n t i a l foundation from which hegemonic s t r a t e g i e s can be b u i l t . New 
r e a l i s t s a r e wrong t o argue a g a i n s t t r a d i t i o n a l c l a s s s t r u g g l e f o r t h r e e 
reasons. F i r s t , workers do not engage i n t h i s k i n d of . st r u g g l e out of 
c h o i c e . They do so when they have no a l t e r n a t i v e . Secondly, new r e a l i s t s 
a r e a t t a c k i n g not o n l y the b u r e a u c r a t i c unionism c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the PWS, 
but a l s o the p r i n c i p l e s on which any e f f e c t i v e t r a d e unionism i s b u i l t . I n 
doing so, t h e y a r e throwing the bucket out with the water. T h i r d l y , these 
b a s i c union p r i n c i p l e s a r e e s s e n t i a l i f workers are to have any r e a l i s t i c 
defence a g a i n s t c a p i t a l i s t s i n t e n t on e x p l o i t i n g labour. 
I n suimnary t h e r e f o r e , because workers experience themselves as a c l a s s , 
defence of union r i g h t s i s fundamental to working c l a s s p o l i t i c s . 
Thatcherism i s an atteinpt to r e d e f i n e the r o l e of unions, e f f e c t i v e l y 
outlawing c l a s s conscious t r a d e unions, and r e c o n s t i t u t i n g them as 
v o l u n t a r y p r e s s u r e groups. T h i s s t r a t e g y i s a response to the PWS 
i n c o r p o r a t i o n of the unions which although i t c o n s t i t u t e d a powerful 
d i s c i p l i n i n g f o r c e on the working c l a s s , f a i l e d to isomunise the s t a t e and 
c a p i t a l from upsurges i n worker m i l i t a n c y . U l t i m a t e l y Thatcherism aims to 
r e d e f i n e the e x p e r i e n c e of c l a s s through the combined e f f e c t of 
r e o r g a n i s i n g work, a t t a c k i n g c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , and d e - p o l i t i c i s i n g 
economic d e c i s i o n making through the withdrawal of the s t a t e from d i r e c t 
economic i n t e r v e n t i o n . 
New r e a l i s m e f f e c t i v e l y concedes t h a t Thatcherism has "won" because i t 
r e j e c t s the c h a l l e n g e of r e c r e a t i n g working c l a s s u n i t y . T h i s t h e s i s has 
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shown t h a t l o c a l a c t i v i s m can be v e r y powerful i n r e s i s t i n g the c r e a t i o n of 
a new consensus. However, i f l o c a l a c t i v i s m i n a broader sense i s to form 
the b a s i s f o r a r e j u v e n a t e d p o l i t i c s of opposition to Thatcherism, then i t 
must be a l l i e d t o a s t r a t e g y which avoids the weaknesses of the o l d post 
war s e t t l e m e n t . I n p a r t i c u l a r , i t mnist seek to r e u n i t e the economic aspect 
of t r a d e union s t r u g g l e w i t h the s t r u g g l e f o r p o l i t i c a l transformation i n 
s o c i e t y . 
L o c a l s t r u g g l e can form an important elemient i n a more responsive and miore 
e f f e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l m o b i l i s a t i o n , but t o r e a l i s e i t s f u l l p o t e n t i a l , i t 
must work i n harmiony with a n a t i o n a l and u l t i m a t e l y i n t e i m a t i o n a l s t r a t e g y 
f o r change. O r g a n i s a t i o n w i t h i n the Murton branches of the NUM over the 
p e r i o d 1978-88 confirmis the s i g n i f i c a n c e of l o c a l o r g a n i s a t i o n and l o c a l 
a c t i v i s t s i n i n f l u e n c i n g p o l i t i c a l consciousness and a c t i o n . The defeat of 
t h e s t r i k e miay miark t h e e f f e c t i v e end of the post-war, s t a t e guaranteed 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r c a p i t a l - l a b o u r settlement. But i t 
should not miark the end of attempts to e s t a b l i s h n a t i o n a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
working c l a s s o r g a n i s a t i o n s which can begin to challenge the power of 
c a p i t a l . 
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APPENDIX FOUR: LABOUR UNREST 1978-1984 
APPENDIX 4: LABOUR UNREST 1978-1984 
I n t h i s appendix I o f f e r more d e t a i l r e l a t i n g to the i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s 
problems encountered a t Murton between 1978 and the s t a r t of the 1984/5 
s t r i k e . As chapter f i v e makes c l e a r , t h i s was a p e r i o d of d e s t a b i l i s a t i o n 
i n management-union r e l a t i o n s , as the i n c e n t i v e scheme, t r a v e l l e r s , and p i t 
c l o s u r e s a l l began to c h i p away a t the post war "indulgency p a t t e r n " . I t 
was the i n c e n t i v e scheme around which open c o n f l i c t was s i t u a t e d , and t h i s 
appendix looks i n d e t a i l a t the v a r i o u s d i s p u t e s which i t threw up. ( I t 
should be read i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h chapter f i v e , to which i t a c t s as a 
supplement.) 
A 4.1 THE FIRST STRIKE 
On May 17th 1978, powerloaders on E51 r e f u s e d to descend i n t o the p i t i n a 
p r o t e s t a t the depressed l e v e l of bonus payments. They were immediately 
supported by the r e s t of the miners lodge. The mechanics however were 
unhappy a t the s t r i k e c a l l , and t h e i r minute book records the lodges 
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h t h e i r l a c k of involvement i n bonus neg o t i a t i o n s . 
"The s e c r e t a r y had r e c e i v e d the assurance t h a t i f the 
mechanics remained a t t h e i r posts, then f u l l bonus 
would be p a i d . No i n f o r m a t i o n was forthcoming from the 
miners s e c r e t a r y , and as the mechanics had no pa r t to 
p l a y i n bonus n e g o t i a t i o n s , the s e c r e t a r y saw no reason 
why the mechanics should l o s e money over an i s s u e they 
knew nothing about." (mechanics minute book) 
Breakdowns i n communication between miners and mechanics were a feature of 
t h i s p e r i o d. The miners went back to work the next day a f t e r a S p e c i a l 
Meeting a t which the committee recommendation t h a t they work under p r o t e s t 
was passed, a c t i v a t i n g t h e c o n c i l i a t i o n machinery. 
The spikey response to the miners s t r i k e from the mechanics l e a d e r s h i p came 
only a week a f t e r a meeting of the F e d e r a t i o n Board, a t which the mechanics 
had expressed t h e i r c o n t i n u i n g concern over t h e i r e x c l u s i o n from bonus 
n e g o t i a t i o n s . The mechanics minute book reported on t h a t meeting i n the 
f o l l o w i n g terms. 
"The branch a t t h i s meeting s t a t e d t h a t there were many 
aspe c t s of the agreement which were causing the 
mechanics concern, and a suggestion of the forming of a 
l i a s o n committee was made. The miners were of the 
opinion t h a t the agreement was t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , 
however they would a t f u t u r e F e d e r a t i o n Board meetings 
give a r e p o r t on any progress which had been made. . . 
Appendix 4 (402) 
The t a r g e t s and standard t a s k s at the v a r i o u s l o c a t i o n s 
were being looked at and r e n e g o t i a t e d frequently, and 
the agreement f o r C seam was the s u b j e c t of an APM 
[Adjourned P i t Meeting] . The agreement f o r the C seam 
DOSCO had not been signed. The mechanics s t a t e d t h a t 
they were prepared to a s s i s t the miners i n t h e i r 
c l a i m s , and suggested t h a t the mining Federation Board 
meet management, t h i s would have the e f f e c t of a 
combined e f f o r t . The miners r e p l i e d t h a t only they were 
enpowered t o n e g o t i a t e . The mechanics then suggested 
t h a t i f a t any time i n the f u t u r e they wished f o r our 
a s s i s t a n c e , then we would be only too p l e a s e d to advise 
and a t t e n d any meeting which could be arranged." 
For the next 2 y e a r s the operation of the i n c e n t i v e scheme caused constant 
minor aggravations and d i s p u t e s . F a i l u r e to r e s o l v e d i s p u t e s through the 
agreed procedures meant a b u i l d up of f r u s t r a t i o n and anger as a s e r i e s of 
i s s u e s b u i l t up i n mens' minds. For exaitple, on December 1 s t i t was 
reported to the miners lodge t h a t a deputation would i n c l u d e the s u b j e c t of 
E 8 0 ' S bonus. On June 14th 1 9 8 0 a l e t t e r was r e c e i v e d by the lodge from the 
manager concerning a " r e s t r i c t i o n of e f f o r t " on E52. The problem was a 
manning d i s p u t e . 
A 4.2 THE 1 9 8 0 WALKOUT. 
F i n a l l y matters came to a head on September 2nd 1980. Men on E80 walked 
out, and the r e s t of the p i t followed. The walkout was apparently a c t i v e l y 
encouraged by two of the lodge o f f i c i a l s , who persuaded d i f f e r e n t d i s t r i c t s 
to come out by t e l l i n g each d i s t r i c t t h a t a l l the others were already out! 
I t q u i c k l y emerged t h a t the d i s p u t e was a focus f o r a l l the simmering 
d i s c o n t e n t a t the p i t . At l e a s t four i s s u e s were involved. The spark seems 
to have been the p r a c t i c e of " t e e i n g out" men from a f a c e to a l e s s e r p a i d 
job^. Complaints about " t e e i n g out" had s u r f a c e d r e g u l a r l y over the past 
year. For exairple, on November 20th 1979 i t was agreed to see the manager 
wit h r e s p e c t to " ' t e e i n g out' of f a c e men when doing i n c i d e n t a l work, 100% 
[bonus] being t h e o b j e c t i n mind." On the 19th of August t e e i n g out was 
^Teeing out i s the p r a c t i c e of removing a man from fa c e work to 
another type of work i f t h e r e i s no more work f o r him on the f a c e . 
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again on the agenda f o r a deputation. Despite complaints t h e r e f o r e , the 
lodge had f a i l e d t o r e s o l v e the problem through the c o n c i l i a t i o n machinery. 
Another spark was provided by an undermanager who c a l l e d one face team 
" l a z y b a s t a r d s " , and threatened to r e p l a c e two powerloaders with men about 
to be t r a n s f e r r e d i n from B l a c k h a l l . But the energy behind the dispute came 
from the c o n s i s t e n t f a i l u r e to earn high bonusses. Argiiments over t a s k s 
being s e t too high had continued s i n c e the i n c e p t i o n of the scheme. The 
f a i l u r e of d e c i s i v e l e a d e r s h i p u s i n g u n i t e d a c t i o n to f o r c e management i n t o 
changes meant t h a t t a s k r e n e g o t i a t i o n r a r e l y y i e l d e d s a t i s f a c t o r y r e s u l t s . 
The mechanics minute book i d e n t i f i e d the four demands which emerged from 
th e miners s p e c i a l meeting c a l l e d a f t e r the walkout. 
" i ) Men not t o be t r a n s f e r r e d or 'teed out'. 
i i ) Mr Nelson to be t r a n s f e r r e d away from the c o l l i e r y . 
i i i ) E80 t a s k t o be renegotiated. 
i v ) A l l t a s k s a t the mine to be re-examined." 
The miners minute book i s l e s s i n f o r m a t i v e . I t reports t h a t the i s s u e s 
behind the walkout were Mr Nelson's comments and men being teed out. But i t 
i s c l e a r from l a t e r minutes t h a t t h e s e were j u s t the sparks t h a t l i t a very 
inflammable s i t u a t i o n i n which bonus d i s p u t e s provided the combustible 
m a t e r i a l . The minute book records a unanimous vote to withdraw s a f e t y 
cover, remove Mr Nelson and stop t e e i n g out. T h i s was backed by an 
i n d e f i n i t e s t r i k e . 
I n f a c t the s t r i k e l a s t e d u n t i l the weekend, when the committee voted 11-3 
t o r e t u r n to work on the f o l l o w i n g Monday. T h i s was backed unanimously by 
the s p e c i a l meeting. They went back to work pending a s p e c i a l deputation 
with management. The f o l l o w i n g weekend i t was reported t h a t t h i s deputation 
had d i s c u s s e d e l e v e n matters, which had been r a i s e d a t the e a r l i e r s p e c i a l 
meeting. Nine of t h e s e concerned the i n c e n t i v e scheme, and they a l l f i t t e d 
i n t o the four c a t e g o r i e s reported to the mechanics lodge. Neither minute 
book re c o r d s the outcome of t h i s deputation. 
The mechanics r e a c t e d to t h i s d i s p u t e much as they had done to the 1978 
s t r i k e . When the miners walked out, John Cummings and the Chairman Bobby 
Armstrong went to the p i t and recommended t h a t the mechanics continue 
working. "This was based on the f a c t t h a t mechanics, not being party to any 
n e g o t i a t i o n s a r i s i n g out of the i n c e n t i v e bonus agreement, were not i n 
d i s p u t e w i t h the board." Again t h e r e was a breakdown i n communication with 
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the miners. "At no time d i d the miners o f f i c i a l s i n d i c a t e the scope of the 
problem, or seek the support of the mechanics." 
F o l l o w i n g t h e i r s p e c i a l ineeting, the miners asked the mechanics f o r support 
and withdrew s a f e t y cover. I n i t i a l l y the manager had provided s a f e t y work 
f o r mechanics, but when he t r i e d to get them undergound with under BACM 
s u p e r v i s i o n , they refu s e d . At t h e i r own s p e c i a l meeting the mechanics 
t h e r e f o r e decided to support the miners. The mechanics again suggested 
s e t t i n g up a l i s o n committee, which the miners f i n a l l y agreed to. I t was to 
be a c t i v a t e d by any d i s p u t e a t the p i t . 
A 4.3 THE 1981 WORK TO RULE 
Problems w i t h the bonus continued a f t e r the September 1980 dispute. I n 
March 1981 E53 r e f u s e d t o s i g n t h e i r agreement, and went to method study. 
They accepted the method study 24-21, but by June they were ne g o t i a t i n g 
another t a s k . They r e j e c t e d an o f f e r , but a few weeks l a t e r an agreement 
was accepted. Three weeks l a t e r the committee was d i s c u s s i n g the question 
of f i v e weeks backpay on E53. And i n August E81 and F20 both e l e c t e d to go 
t o method study. 
At a s p e c i a l meeting on 25th October the committee recommended a work to 
r u l e i n p r o t e s t a t the low bonus a t the p i t . F i v e days l a t e r the committee 
recommendation t o c a l l o f f the work t o r u l e was defeated 85-65. On November 
8th i t was r e p o r t e d t h a t management had agreed to reduce the t a s k s on E63, 
E80 and F20. I f men s t i l l couldn't earn a decent bonus, then t a s k s could be 
ren e g o t i a t e d . The committee voted 10-6 to recommend r e t u r n to normal 
working. At the s p e c i a l meeting however, t h i s recommendation was 
overwhelmingly r e j e c t e d . 
On 15th November a committee meeting heard t h a t E63 had voted 34-8 against 
a c c e p t i n g a r e d u c t i o n from 26 to 25 shears a week, w h i l s t F20 had voted 
28-11 f o r a c c e p t i n g a r e d u c t i o n from 19 to 18.75 shears a week. The 
committee t h e r e f o r e voted 13-7 t o recommend a r e t u r n to normal working. But 
the f u l l meeting again r e j e c t e d t h i s advice, and by 62 to 55 decided to 
continue the work t o r u l e . Four days l a t e r however, a f t e r i n t e r v e n t i o n from 
the a r e a union ( i n the shape of a l e t t e r from the P r e s i d e n t , Harold 
M i t c h e l l ) , the men decided unanimously to r e t u r n to work. 
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T h i s seems to have been a c l a s s i c case of a c t i o n a g a i n s t the union as much 
as a g a i n s t the eit^sloyer. The men act e d i n p r o t e s t at the low bonus, but 
when the l e a d e r s h i p wanted to back down they determined to continue 
f i g h t i n g . They knew t h a t backing down would get them nowhere. They f i n a l l y 
ended the a c t i o n a f t e r t h e i r stand had brought the problem to the a t t e n t i o n 
of the area union. A c r u c i a l r o l e was played i n t h i s dispute by the 
t r a v e l l e r s from B l a c k h a l l . They were the d e c i s i v e f o r c e behind the ac t i o n , 
and t h e i r d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the l e a d e r s h i p of the Murton lodge was both 
demonstrated and enhanced by the comnu-ttees conduct of the work to r u l e . 
The l i a s o n committee c r e a t e d a f t e r the 1980 dispute was not a c t i v a t e d u n t i l 
two weeks i n t o the work t o r u l e . There was c r i t i c i s m of the s e c r e t a r y 
w i t h i n the miners lodge f o r f a i l i n g to convene the emergency committee, 
showing a concern on the p a r t of some rank and f i l e miners about the l a c k 
of cooperation with the mechanics. The s e c r e t a r y e x p l a i n e d t h a t he had been 
s t r u g g l i n g with f a m i l y i l l n e s s and had t h e r e f o r e forgotten to contact the 
mechanics. 
The mechanics minute book reported on the l i a s o n committee meeting i n the 
f o l l o w i n g manner. 
" D e t a i l s were presented i n r e s p e c t of F20, E81 and E63 
and a l s o why the i n c e n t i v e agreements had not been 
signed. On more than one o c c a s s i o n the advice of the 
[miners] committee had been r e j e c t e d . The lodge had 
s i n c e imposed a work to r u l e and output had d e c l i n e d to 
such a degree t h a t both the area union, the Area Board 
and indeed the n a t i o n a l Board were e x p r e s s i n g grave 
concern. Informal t a l k s had been held, but as yet no 
s o l u t i o n s had been agreed." 
Throughout the r e s t r i c t i o n management apparently r e f u s e d to negotiate 
u n l e s s the men resumed normal working. I n the end NCB Area management and 
the NUM's Area agents were c a l l e d out to Murton to s o r t i t out. 
U n s u r p r i s i n g l y arguments over the i n c e n t i v e scheme continued to surface 
r e g u l a r l y a t lodge meetings. On May 11th 1982 E81 went to method study, and 
on September 2 1 s t the men on the same fac e asked f o r a reduction i n the 
t a s k . 
A 4.4 PIT MILITANCY IN THE MECHANICS 
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One f u r t h e r dispute i s worth quoting, as an exait^ile of the way t h a t union 
b u r e a u c r a c i e s sometimes a c t as u s e f u l adjuncts to management's personnel 
f u n c t i o n . I t concerns a s m a l l d i s p u t e i n the l a t e 1970's over manpower 
deployment among a small group of mechanics. A mechanic at the centre of 
the d i s p u t e t a k e s up the s t o r y . 
"'Under p r o t e s t ' i s j u s t noted u n l e s s you take i t up 
l a t e r . . . I ' v e known on two occasions a whole s h i f t of 
mechanics walk out the p i t , and g e t t i n g wronged o f f the 
union f o r doing i t . . . 
I ' l l g i v e you an i n s t a n c e r i g h t . Happened i n my s h i f t 
once. There's about f i v e f i t t e r s and seven 
e l e c t r i c i a n s . Now the Yard seam, E to C, was j u s t 
s t a r t i n g up... We were coming i n from our own d i s t r i c t . 
There was nobody i n p a r t i c u l a r to do i t [go to the new 
seam] , and i t had become very r e g u l a r , very convenient 
[ f o r management] to j u s t take a man out of North. 
I'm not t a l k i n g about j u s t walking from here to the 
t e r r a c e you know, I'm t a l k i n g about huirping a gear bag 
to Dalton Le Dale. . . And they were j u s t g r a d u a l l y 
g e t t i n g away wi t h i t . . . 
[ I ] kept f e t c h i n g i t up with the union. 'Whey, we can't 
do anything about i t . We've got to wait t i l l the boss 
decides t h a t he wants a team of men t h e r e . ' 
I t comes to my s h i f t once, and he [the deputy] says 'Go 
out t h e r e [to t h e new Yard seam]'. I says 'I'm not 
going out t h e r e , I'm f e d up with t h i s . . . ' He says 
'You've got t o ' . I s a y s ' I haven't got to do owt'. . . 
The deputy engineer gets on. He says '- are you going 
out t h e r e ? ' He s a y s 'Looka; i f you don't go out there, 
as from now your time's stopped'. I says 'Well, I'm not 
going out t h e r e ' . He says 'Well, your times stopped, 
you're not g e t t i n g p a i d from now'. I says ' F a i r 
enough'. 
So I gets on the tannoy system, and I t e l l the l a d s . 
And the next t h i n g I know i s they've a l l come out. 
They're a l l s i t t i n g a t the sub s t a t i o n . I says [to 
management] 'I'm coming out the p i t and t h e r e ' s some 
l a d s coming out w i t h us.' 'You can't do t h a t ' . I says 
'Well, watch us!' We came out the p i t . . . 
And who should we meet a t bank. . . but John Cummings, 
Tom P a r r y and a few o t h e r s . The deputy manager and 
e v e r y t h i n g . 'You can't j u s t do t h i s you know. We 
e x p l a i n e d to them the s i t u a t i o n . The deputy manager 
went out, and John Cummings was s i t t i n g , and a l l of us 
were s i t t i n g . He says 'You t h i n k you're c l e v e r , coming 
out l i k e t h a t ? ' 'How's t h a t man?' He says 'You know 
what the procedure i s . You do t h i n g s under p r o t e s t and 
we get t h i n g s done'. 
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But the next week t h e r e was a s h i f t r o t a f i x e d up f o r 
t h a t d i s t r i c t . . . and i t got s o r t e d out. P o s i t i v e 
a c t i o n . P o s i t i v e a c t i o n gets r e s u l t s every time." 
( i n t e r v i e w ) 
Because the c o n c i l i a t i o n procedure provided a means f o r management to 
c o n t r o l d i s p u t e s , i f the union bureacracy supported the procedure, i t 
e f f e c t i v e l y c o l l a b o r a t e d i n t h a t c o n t r o l . T h i s was c e r t a i n l y the case when 
union o f f i c i a l s shared a d i s t a s t e f o r i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n , b e l i e v i n g t h a t 
d i s p u t e s should be s o r t e d out by formal or informal n e g o t i a t i o n between 
management and union. Safe i n the knowledge t h a t the union was not going to 
do anything so r a s h as to c a l l a s t r i k e , management could s t a l l or block 
u n t i l the union gave up or accepted a compromise. 
A 4.5 CONCLUSIONS 
This appendix has expanded on some of the di s p u t e s during the period 
between 1978 and 1984. The miners' branch was c h a r a c t e r i s e d by weak 
l e a d e r s h i p which l e d to the men t r y i n g to take the i n i t i a t i v e on a number 
of o c c a s i o n s . I n the mechanics' branch, r e l a t i v e l y strong l e a d e r s h i p 
sometimes f a i l e d t o c o n t r o l m i l i t a n t members. Yet both branches were 
c l e a r l y s o c i a l i s e d i n t o an indulgency p a t t e r n , which was now coming under 
t h r e a t as management groped t h e r e way towards the implementation of a new 
s t r a t e g y f o r the p i t . 
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APPENDIX FIVE: WOMEN AND THE STRIKE 
APPENDIX 5: WOMEN AND THE STRIKE''" 
T h i s t h e s i s asks q u e s t i o n s about the changing p o l i t i c s of the two main NUM 
branches a t Murton. But the d e f i n i t i o n of p o l i t i c s has been a t r a d i t i o n a l 
one - a d e f i n i t i o n which says t h a t union p o l i t i c s i s what the union does 
and t r i e s to do. However, NUM p o l i t i c s extend w e l l beyond the sphere of 
production r e l a t i o n s a t the p i t . I n d i r e c t l y (and ofte n d i r e c t l y ) , the 
a c t i o n s and a t t i t u d e s of miners have f a r r e a c h i n g in^^acts on the l i v e s of 
non-mining members of the community, and i n p a r t i c u l a r on women. Therefore 
i t i s impo s s i b l e to t r u l y c o n s i d e r the p o l i t i c s of the union without 
c o n s i d e r i n g the iir^sortance of the union i n d e f i n i n g women's r o l e . To do 
t h i s , i t i s n e c e s s a r y to a s s e s s what t h i s r o l e i s , and how i t has 
developed. Only when t h i s has been done i s i t p o s s i b l e to consider the 
phenomenal impact of the s t r i k e i n c h a l l e n g i n g t r a d i t i o n a l female r o l e s , 
and how miners r e a c t e d to the s e c h a l l e n g e s . 
A 5.1 HISTORICAL DOMINATION 
A l l e n (1981, 74-84)) argues p l a u s i b l y t h a t the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c form of 
women's oppression i n mining communities d e r i v e i n l a r g e measure from the 
s t r u c t u r a l requirements c r e a t e d by the h i s t o r i c a l development of c o a l 
mining . S p e c i f i c a l l y , women became r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the s o c i a l reproduction 
of the male labo u r f o r c e w i t h i n the fami l y . P a t r i a r c h y and c a p i t a l i s m 
r e i n f o r c e d each other, as the employer b e n e f i t e d from f r e e s o c i a l 
reproduction, and the male worker enjoyed a home s i t u a t i o n geared towards 
meeting h i s emotional and p h y s i c a l needs. B e a t r i x Cait^ibell put i t l i k e 
t h i s : 
"His woman's labou r was f o r him. I t was a personal 
c o n t r o l over the labour and time of women. For the 
eit^sloyers, t h a t s t a k e i n per s o n a l power a l s o provided, 
at no c o s t , the work t h a t made miner's work p o s s i b l e . " 
(Campbell, 1984, 107: enphasis i n o r i g i n a l ) 
^Appendix one e x p l a i n s the r e s e a r c h focus of t h i s t h e s i s , and why 
I have not concentrated more f u l l y on the r o l e of women. 
2 
T h i s i s not t o say t h a t the s o c i a l r e l a t o n s of c o a l mining 
c r e a t e d women's oppression i n mining communities; only t h a t t h e i r 
p a r t i c u l a r form d e r i v e s from these r e l a t i o n s . The o r i g i n s of the 
over a r c h i n g domination by men of women i s a debate I cannot enter here. 
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Nevertheless, w i t h i n the community s t r u c t u r e , women played a v i t a l but 
l a r g e l y hidden r o l e . Recent work has emphasised t h a t w i t h i n mining 
communities women have carved out t h e i r own h i s t o r i e s , by f i g h t i n g t h e i r 
own p o l i t i c a l b a t t l e s , as w e l l as t a k i n g an a c t i v e p a r t i n male cairpaigns 
(John, 1984). However, h i s t o r i c a l s t u d i e s have a l s o explored the cr u s h i n g l y 
r i g i d sex r o l e s t y p i c a l of mining communities. Murton was no d i f f e r e n t i n 
t h i s r e s p e c t from hundreds of other c a s e s , some of which have been 
documented (Dennis e t a l . , 1969) . I n a l l c a s e s , p u b l i c l i f e was 
overwhelmingly male. 
"For the men, the communities a r e b u i l t around them. 
They have a women a t home l a b o u r i n g and c a r i n g f o r 
them. The p i t i t s e l f o f t e n dominates a v i l l a g e with i t s 
s i z e , n o i s e and sheer p h y s i c a l presence and the towns 
are f i l l e d w i t h miners' c l u b s and meeting p l a c e s which 
dominate l e i s u r e a c t i v i t i e s . E v e r y t h i n g r e v o l v e s round, 
and i s turned towards them." ( M i l l e r , 1985, 357) 
The s o c i a l f a b r i c of the v i l l a g e was organised f o r men. Pubs and clubs 
c a t e r e d f o r t h e i r l e i s u r e a c t i v i t i e s . Women st a y e d a t home. An unyiel d i n g 
ideology confirmed women's r o l e i n l i f e as being w i t h i n the home. Within 
p o l i t i c s , women were s i m i l a r l y excluded. 
Male s o c i a l a c t i v i t y was a l s o s eparate from women's. Furthermore, t h i s 
s e p a r a t i o n was r e i n f o r c e d by a l l the trappings of a " s e c r e t s o c i e t y " 
(Dennis e t a l . , 1969) . Women were excluded from the meeting p l a c e s (pub and 
c l u b ) . S p e c i a l r u l e s a p p l i e d w i t h i n t h e s e meetings, p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l a t i n g 
to language. Swearing, an endemic f e a t u r e of pub conversation, was 
forbidden i n any mixed group. Men d i d not d i s c u s s t h e i r l i v e s with t h e i r 
wives. So much so t h a t Dennis e t a l . concluded t h a t husbands and wives i n 
Ashton t y p i c a l l y l i v e d s e p a r a t e and s e c r e t l i v e s . 
Perhaps most s i g n i f i c a n t l y of a l l i n a c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y , women were 
economically imprisoned i n the home. Even with the spread of female 
eit5)loyment to mining a r e a s , women's o p p o r t u n i t i e s to e x p l o i t t h e i r wage 
ear n i n g p o t e n t i a l were l i m i t e d , both i n number and q u a l i t y . Sometimes 
women's earnings s i i r ^ j l y allowed miners to pocket a higher proportion of 
t h e i r own wages. Dennis e t a l . recorded the s o c i a l pressure which 
c h a n n e l l e d women towards t h e i r housekeeping r o l e , poignantly d e s c r i b i n g the 
way i n which o r i g i n a l i t y and ambition were squeezed out as the demands f o r 
conformity mounted ( i b i d ) . S i g n i f i c a n t l y however, the v a s t m a j o r i t y of 
women i n t e r n a l i s e d the ideology of t h e i r menfolk, and c e l e b r a t e d command of 
t h e i r own en:5)ire w i t h p r i d e . Previous s t r i k e s ( i n 1972 and 1974 f o r 
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exair5>le) d i d l i t t l e t o c h a l l e n g e these r i g i d r o l e d e f i n i t i o n s . Miners 
s o l i d a r i t y remained as much a s o l i d a r i t y of sex as a s o l i d a r i t y of c l a s s 
( M i l l e r , 1985, 358) . 
A 5.2 WOMEN AND THE MINERS STRIKE: AN OVERVIEW 
I t i s i n t h i s context t h a t the s p e c t a c u l a r development of womens' support 
groups (WSG's) during the 1984/5 s t r i k e needs to be placed. I n the same way 
t h a t the s t r i k e l e a p t out of the blue ( i n d e f i a n c e of repeated attentats to 
w r i t e o f f the miners' c a p a c i t y to f i g h t ) , so nobody expected women to 
become the dynamic new f o r c e which ended up s u s t a i n i n g the s t r i k e , adding a 
new dimension to working c l a s s s t r u g g l e . They began to organise e a r l y -
w i t h i n weeks of the s t a r t . I n E a s t Durham the SEAM campaign had introduced 
a novel development before the s t r i k e by a l l o w i n g women to organise a 
s e p a r a t e s e c t i o n . T h i s meant t h a t Easington D i s t r i c t produced some of the 
f i r s t support groups i n the country. 
I n Murton i t began about f i v e weeks i n t o the s t r i k e , when volunteers went 
to the Welfare H a l l to p e e l potatoes which had been c o l l e c t e d by the 
mechanics' branch. Within days they had more v o l u n t e e r s than they needed. 
Most worked as f u l l time housewives, although two had p a r t time jobs. About 
15 women s e t t l e d i n t o the r e g u l a r p a t t e r n of p r e p a r i n g one cooked meal a 
day. Women from Murton j o i n e d the p i c k e t l i n e s too, although they d i d not 
t r a v e l t o other a r e a s . T h e i r experiences were as powerfully r a d i c a l i s i n g as 
those reported by women throughout the country (see Stead, 1987; Parker, 
1986, 171-172 and Beaton, 1985). I n p a r t i c u l a r , a concentrated l o a t h i n g f o r 
the p o l i c e developed i n response t o t h e i r e xperiences of p s y c h o l o g i c a l and 
p h y s i c a l abuse. 
Male a c t i v i s t s i n Murton c e l e b r a t e d the involvement and commitment of the 
women. They understood and acknowledged t h a t without them, the s t r i k e could 
not have continued f o r a y e a r . On the day the s t r i k e ended, i t was the 
women who c a r r i e d the lodge banner proudly up the Terrace, l e a d i n g the 
remaining s t r i k e r s on t h e i r emotional march back to work (Stead, 1987, 
156). Yet t h e r e was a l s o ambivalence from the men about the women's r o l e . 
Many echoed responses from around the country, t h a t p i c k e t l i n e s were no 
p l a c e f o r women. Miners recounted w i t h p r i d e the way i n which Murton women 
had r e s i s t e d f e m i n i s t s from Greenwich who t r i e d to encourage a r e b e l l i o n 
a g a i n s t s e x - s t e r e o t y p i n g i n the home. I t seemed t h a t women's a c t i v i t y was 
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f u l l y a p p r e c i a t e d so long as i t was r e s t r i c t e d to supporting men - so long 
as i t didn't c h a l l e n g e the e s s e n t i a l d i v i s i o n of labour which s u s t a i n e d 
mens l i v e s . 
B e a t r i x Carrpbell p e r c e p t i v e l y a n a l y s e d some of the c o n t r a d i c t o r y themes to 
emerge from womens' involvement i n the s t r i k e . For her, the s t r i k e was 
c r u c i a l i n beginning to break down the male monopoly of the community, and 
a l l i t s s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
" I t was [the womens's] i n t e r v e n t i o n which exposed the 
p o l i t i c a l vacuum i n the community. They exposed i t s 
absence by c r e a t i n g i t s presence. The very e x i s t e n c e of 
the women's movement, i t s i n s i s t e n c e on the r i g h t to 
p a r t i c i p a t e , r e presented more than something s p e c i f i c 
about t h i s s t r i k e - i t represented a break with the 
h i s t o r i c s e x u a l d i v i s i o n of labour which has 
c h a r a c t e r i s e d c o a l f i e l d p o l i t i c s . (Carcpbell, 1986, 261; 
eitphasis i n o r i g i n a l ) 
Even though - as a t Murton - much of the womens' involvement c o n s i s t e d of 
doing the same work they normally d i d i n the home, t h e i r support kitchens 
posed fundamental c h a l l e n g e s to male domination i n the v i l l a g e s . "The Women 
Against P i t C l o s u r e s movement c o l l e c t i v i s e d the work of women, and i n so 
doing, c o n s t i t u t e d the women as a s o c i a l f o r c e , a f o r c e the NUM had to 
reckon w i t h " ( i b i d , 275; eirphasis i n o r i g i n a l ) . 
Cairpbell acknowledges s t r o n g t e n s i o n s between miners' a c t i v i s t s and women. 
But only only v e r y b r i e f l y does she address the t e n s i o n between women who 
were i n v o l v e d i n the s t r i k e , and those who were e i t h e r not involved, or 
p o s i t i v e l y a g a i n s t i t . A women from Hetton (whose husband broke the 
s t r i k e ) , provided eloquent testimony to the b i t t e r n e s s of these d i v i s i o n s 
when she spoke about the women i n v o l v e d i n the Hetton support group (which 
many Murton miners attended). 
" I know a few of them, and I wouldn't say h e l l o to one 
of them. They've had nothing i n t h e i r l i v e s and when 
t h i s [ s t r i k e ] came on, a l i t t l e power went to t h e i r 
heads. And they t h i n k t h e y ' r e l i t t l e gods... They 
i n v o l v e themselves i n anything, but where they are, 
t h e r e ' s t r o u b l e . . . Both them and t h e i r husbands, they 
l i k e d t r o u b l e . They were the lowest of the low 
r e a l l y . . . I mean, I don't t h i n k I'm any b e t t e r than 
anyone e l s e , but they s o r t of p u l l e d themselves down 
more. They didn't t r y . " ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
These comments r e f l e c t a break with the ideology of community s o l i d a r i t y 
which dominated p i t v i l l a g e s . But as Caxt^bell p o i n t s out, community 
s o l i d a r i t y r a r e l y extended to women anyway - so i f women were more 
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r e a c t i o n a r y than t h e i r husbands, men reaped the rewards f o r excluding women 
from the p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s e s which c r e a t e d m i l i t a n c y (Campbell, 1986, 261). 
The m a j o r i t y of women - l i k e the m a j o r i t y of men - were not inv o l v e d i n the 
s t r i k e . At Murton, most sin5>ly supported t h e i r husbands. Some however 
e x e r c i s e d d i r e c t p r e s s u r e t o t r y and fo r c e t h e i r husbands back. Given the 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s e p a r a t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s w i t h i n miners homes, such 
p r e s s u r e was to be expected. Women t r a d i t i o n a l l y c a r r i e d s o l e 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r managing household f i n a n c e s and c h i l d r e a r i n g , and were 
excluded from the p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s e s c r e a t i n g and s u s t a i n i n g m i l i t a n c y , so 
t h e i r i n t e r e s t l a y i n en s u r i n g t h a t s u f f i c i e n t resources e x i s t e d to 
dis c h a r g e t h e i r s i d e of the marriage bargain. When they were unable to 
c a r r y on, they r e a c t e d by seeking a r e t u r n to normality. Without 
involvement i n the s t r i k e , they might w e l l see i t as s e n s e l e s s . Out of 
l o y a l t y , some might t r u s t t h e i r husbands, but others could be l e s s 
supportive, and more f o r t h r i g h t i n demanding t h a t a husband ineet h i s s i d e 
of the marriage bargain. 
One f u r t h e r aspect of womens' involvement i n the dispute concerns the r o l e 
of the mi n o r i t y of women NUM members (mainly canteen workers). These 
workers are the only remaining women i n the i n d u s t r y , f o l l o w i n g the f i n a l 
"purging" of " p i t brow l a s s e s " i n the 1950's, f o l l o w i n g an agreement 
3 
between the NUM and NCB (Cambell, 1986; John, 1984) . At Murton, canteen 
workers remained s o l i d l y on s t r i k e throughout the dispute. And a f o r c e f u l 
Murton woman - Pat Curry (working a t the l i n k e d Hawthorn canteen) - had 
begun to cha l l e n g e the entrenched male o r i e n t a t i o n of the branch by 
i n i t i a t i n g an "equal v a l u e " c l a i m f o r canteen workers pay. Women had been 
w r i t t e n out of many of the NCB-NUM agreements i n the 1950's, but now Pat 
and others l i k e her began t o f i g h t back. Womens' importance to the s t r i k e 
meant t h a t she cou l d not be ignored. Her involvement took on even gre a t e r 
s i g n i f i c a n c e a f t e r the s t r i k e (see a l s o chapter 7 ) . 
^Before then, the f e m i n i s a t i o n of women i n V i c t o r i a n times 
spawned a s u c c e s s f u l czxapaign to remove women from underground work. 
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A 5•3 WOMEN AFTER THE STRIKE 
Follo w i n g the s t r i k e , t h e r e was an i n e v i t a b l e d e c l i n e i n women's ac t i v i s m , 
as the immediate m o b i l i s i n g i s s u e disappeared. At a n a t i o n a l l e v e l , the 
o r g a n i s a t i o n "Women Aga i n s t P i t C l o s u r e s " a t t r a c t e d c o n s i d e r a b l e c r i t i c i s m 
f o r b u r e a u c r a t i s i n g the movement, and f o r i t s d y n a s t i c overtones (Betty 
H e a t h f i e l d and Ann S c a r g i l l both played prominent r o l e s ) . Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , 
most of the l o c a l women's support groups broke up a f t e r the s t r i k e . The 
l o c a l groups which s u r v i v e d tended to be those t h a t d i v e r s i f i e d away from 
f i g h t i n g p i t c l o s u r e s t o embrace r e l a t e d i s s u e s , l i k e the a n t i - n u c l e a r 
movement, or ( p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Durham) f i g h t i n g the expansion of open c a s t 
c o a l mining. Other groups c a r r i e d on on a l a r g e l y s o c i a l b a s i s , with 
o c c a s i o n a l f o r a y s i n t o p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y ( b a s i c a l l y the case at Murton). 
What then were the l a s t i n g i n p l i c a t i o n s of the WSG's? What impact d i d they 
have on women's consciousness, and how have men r e a c t e d i n the longer term 
to t h e i r appearance? 
I n Murton one of the f i r s t and most s i g n i f i c a n t developments prompted by 
the WSG's was the confidence i t gave women a c t i v i s t s l i k e Pat Curry, 
working w i t h i n the NUM, t o pursue canteen workers f i g h t f o r e q u a l i t y . So 
long the poor r e l a t i o n s of the i n d u s t r y , canteen workers had been excluded 
from many of the agreements a v a i l a b l e t o miners. Curry became a le a d i n g 
a c t i v i s t w i t h i n the miners' branch, and one year a f t e r the s t r i k e became 
only the second woman i n the country to be e l e c t e d onto an NUM branch 
committee . She fought t i r e l e s s l y i n support of the canteen workers "equal 
v a l u e " pay cl a i m ^ , which i s s t i l l outstanding a t the c o u r t s . 
Within the union h e r e l e c t i o n and her campaigning have a t t r a c t e d some 
h o s t i l i t y , even from the branch committee i t s e l f , with c o n s e r v a t i v e members 
lamenting the c h a l l e n g e t o the o l d order. But she has had i n f l u e n t i a l 
support too, both w i t h i n the branch and at a n a t i o n a l l e v e l . When Arthur 
S c a r g i l l addressed a packed meeting of miners i n Durham i n 1986, Curry rose 
*The f i r s t was a l s o i n the North E a s t , a t the P h i l a d e l p h i a 
workshops. 
^The c l a i m c e n t r e s around the women's a s s e r t i o n t h a t they do work 
of equal v a l u e t o male s u r f a c e workers who get p a i d more. Women should 
t h e r e f o r e get the same r a t e of pay as the men. 
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to question the union's committment to the equal value claim, and received 
a r i n g i n g pledge of support from the n a t i o n a l p r e s i d e n t , to the v i s i b l e 
annoyance of some s e n i o r NUM f i g u r e s ! Despite the r e f u s a l of the NUM 
conference to i n c o r p o r a t e the WSG's as honourary members of the NUM, 
women's i s s u e s were not being allowed to d i e w i t h i n the union. The equal 
v a l u e c l a i m s t i l l awaits a hearing. 
I n Murton the WSG has continued to f u n c t i o n s i n c e the s t r i k e as a more 
in f o r m a l network of c o n t a c t s and f r i e n d s h i p s . The women who were most 
i n v o l v e d experienced a l a s t i n g p o l i t i c i s a t i o n . But they c o n s t i t u t e d only a 
m i n o r i t y of women w i t h i n the v i l l a g e s , and t h e i r o v e r a l l impact seems to 
have been l i m i t e d i n scope. Perhaps the r e a l gains are l e s s t a n g i b l e , and 
only to be f u l l y a p p r e c i a t e d i n the longer term as women begin to use the 
confidence the s t r i k e gave them to g r a d u a l l y a s s e r t themselves more. 
Without experience of the p r e - s t r i k e s i t u a t i o n i t i s d i f f i c u l t to as s e s s 
how much male a t t i t u d e s have been changed by the s t r i k e . C e r t a i n l y however, 
Murton i s s t i l l a community dominated by men, and by male v a l u e s . Even 
a c t i v i s t s appear remarkably untouched by b a s i c " f e m i n i s t " ideas - and when 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of women working underground was mooted i n a government 
b i l l p u b l i s h e d i n November 1988, i t was almost u n i v e r s a l l y condemned "on 
p r i n c i p l e " . Some younger miners a r e apparently more disposed to undertake 
household chores, but f o r the ma j o r i t y , a woman's p l a c e i s s t i l l seen as 
e s s e n t i a l l y i n the home. C e r t a i n l y t h e r e has been no fundamental change i n 
male a t t i t u d e s t o women. 
Any v i s i t o r t o Murton cannot help but be s t r u c k by the extent to which men 
dominate the s o c i a l space of the community. Pubs and clubs are 
overwhelmingly populated by men. I n conversation, women i n v a r i a b l y defer to 
men. When p r e s s e d to j u s t i f y the obvious s o c i a l segregation of the sexes, 
men argue t h a t women have as much - i f not more - power than men, but th a t 
t h i s power i s l o c a t e d i n the home, where women r u l e unchallenged. 
Furthermore, they c l a i m t h a t t h i s i s the way t h e i r wives p r e f e r i t . 
C e r t a i n l y many wives have i n t e r n a l i s e d the ideology of t h e i r own 
containment w i t h i n the home, no doubt r a t i o n a l i s i n g t h a t t h e i r best chance 
i n l i f e l i e s i n c r e a t i n g space w i t h i n the system. However, i t i s a l s o t r u e 
t h a t women - e s p e c i a l l y younger women - seem to be l e s s ready to accept 
male domination. When t h i s r e b e l l i o u s n e s s meets a defender of male 
domination, then the r e s u l t can be wife b a t t e r i n g and abuse. 
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A 5.4 CONCLUSIONS 
Women's involvement i n the 1984/5 s t r i k e was the most unexpected and 
e x c i t i n g aspect of the di s p u t e . Although - as with male a c t i v i s t s - only a 
mi n o r i t y of the women were organised, t h e i r c e n t r a l i t y t o the maintenance 
of the s t r i k e ensured t h a t the i n t a c t of t h e i r involvement r i p p l e d 
throughout the community. Ne v e r t h e l e s s , i t i s a l s o important to r e a l i s e 
t h a t some women were v e r y h o s t i l e to the support groups. And my own 
r e s e a r c h has a l s o i n d i c a t e d t h a t many miners' a c t i v i s t s s t i l l hold deeply 
p a t r i a r c h a l a t t i t u d e s t o women i n genera l . There i s a need f o r more 
r e s e a r c h on these c o n t r a d i c t o r y elements of women's involvement i n the 
miners' s t r i k e , and i t s subsequent iit^sact. 
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APPENDIX STX: THE BALLOT AND THE START OF THE STRIKE 
APPENDIX 6: THE BALLOT AND THE START OF THE STRIKE 
I n the f i r s t months of the s t r i k e , the i s s u e of a n a t i o n a l b a l l o t dominated 
d i s c u s s i o n of the s t r i k e . The r e j e c t i o n of a b a l l o t continued to serve as 
an i d e o l o g i c a l sledgehammer f o r the government, the media and the NCB 
throughout the d i s p u t e . So what were the arguments e i t h e r way, how d i d 
miners i n Murton r e a c t t o them, and how d i d these r e a c t i o n s r e l a t e to 
h i s t o r i c a l developments o u t l i n e d i n e a r l i e r chapters and appendices? 
A 6.1 THE LEFT AND THE BALLOT 
As Beynon makes c l e a r , i n what i s s t i l l the b e st d i s c u s s i o n of the b a l l o t 
i s s u e (Beynon, 1985a, 6-13), by 1984 strong p r e s s u r e s had b u i l t up to 
r e s i s t another b a l l o t over p i t c l o s u r e s . I n order to understand how these 
p r e s s u r e s became dominant, i t i s important t o understand how the s t r i k e 
s t a r t e d and developed w i t h i n the f i r s t t u r b u l e n t days. 
Two days a f t e r the NCB's March 6th announcement on c a p a c i t y reductions, the 
NUM's NEC voted 21-3 to s a n c t i o n any area s t r i k e a c t i o n taken under 
n a t i o n a l r u l e 41 (Adeney and Lloyd, 1986, 85) , e f f e c t i v e l y endorsing a no 
b a l l o t t a c t i c f o r a s t r i k e . On March 27th the remnants of the NUM r i g h t 
wing h e l d a v e r y pxjblic " s e c r e t " meeting at the Brant Inn, near L e i c e s t e r , 
to d i s c u s s how they might f o r c e a n a t i o n a l b a l l o t . The meeting b a c k f i r e d 
badly, undermining the c r e d i b i l i t y of the r i g h t , who appeared to be t r y i n g 
to stop the a c t i o n , not strengthen i t (Adeney and Lloyd, 1986; 88: Wilsher 
e t a l . , 1985, 73-4) . 
At the NEC meeting on A p r i l 12th, a m a j o r i t y of NEC members were mandated 
to vote f o r a b a l l o t . But Arthur S c a r g i l l r u l e d the motion proposing a 
b a l l o t out of order on the grounds t h a t the matter had been voted on at a 
previous meeting (March 8 t h ) , and the S p e c i a l Delegate Conference to be 
h e l d on A p r i l 19th would d i s c u s s the b a l l o t question, and whether or not to 
lower the percentage r e q u i r e d i n a b a l l o t to endorse s t r i k e a c t i o n (from 
55% to 5 0 % ) . The r i g h t c h a l l e n g e d t h i s r u l i n g , but NEC members were f r e e d 
of t h e i r mandate on t h i s i s s u e , and voted 13-8 with the President (Adeney 
and Lloyd, 1986, 89: W i l s h e r e t a l . , 1985, 79-80: Lloyd, 1985, 24). 
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Although the A p r i l 19th S p e c i a l Delegate conference voted to reduce the 
m a j o r i t y r e q u i r e d f o r s t r i k e a c t i o n , i t a l s o resoundingly endorsed the 
d e c i s i o n not to b a l l o t . What then caused t h i s d e c i s i o n ? 
Chapter four showed how and why by March 1984 the no b a l l o t option had 
gained a strong currency among l e f t wing a c t i v i s t s . I n the f i r s t few days 
of the s t r i k e , an i n c r e d i b l e momentum b u i l t up among the young a c t i v i s t s 
who provided i t s energy, t h a t t h i s was the time to f i g h t . As soon as the 
s t r i k e began, the media, the government and the NCB s t a r t e d to push f o r a 
b a l l o t . And they were j o i n e d by known r i g h t wingers i n the union. To the 
a c t i v i s t s who f e l t t h a t t h i s was t h e i r l a s t chance to r e s i s t the onslaught 
of market f o r c e s i n the i n d u s t r y , i t was c l e a r t h a t the b a l l o t had l i t t l e 
t o do with a ge n e r a l d e s i r e to enhance democratic d e c i s i o n making, and 
ev e r y t h i n g to do wi t h stopping the s t r i k e . 
T h i s view gains currency when the development of the s t r i k e i n the f i r s t 
few weeks i s examined. Even establishment commentators such as Wilsher e t 
a l • (1985) and Adeney and L l o y d (1986) r e c o r d how the union's l e a d e r s h i p 
l o s t c o n t r o l of the s t r i k e i n the f i r s t few days. The York s h i r e area t r i e d 
d e s p e r a t e l y to stop the p i c k e t s going i n to Nottinghamshire, but they went 
anyway. 
"An emergency meeting of the Y o r k s h i r e area executive 
had a l r e a d y r e s o l v e d the day before [March 7th] that 
' p i c k e t i n g must be r e s t r i c t e d to c o l l i e r i e s i n the 
Y o r k s h i r e area, w i t h numbers of p i c k e t s r e s t r i c t e d to 
no more than 6' . But i t was the i n a b i l i t y of the 
Y o r k s h i r e l e a d e r s to c o n t r o l t h e i r members and s t i c k to 
the agreement which many miners l e a d e r s now c l a i m cost 
them any chance of a u n i t e d a c t i o n and was a f a t a l blow 
to t h e i r chances of s u c c e s s . . . Jack T a y l o r ' s words 
appealing t o members t o continue the ' d i g n i f i e d and 
r e s p o n s i b l e approach' of r e s t r i c t i n g p i c k e t i n g to t h e i r 
own c o a l f i e l d f e l l on deaf e a r s . . . The York s h i r e 
e x e c u t i v e met to review the s i t u a t i o n and backed the 
f a i t accompli." (Adeney and Lloyd, 1986, 95, 96, 97: 
emphasis added). 
The p i c k e t s s e t a f u r i o u s pace, and normally more cautious l e a d e r s were 
p r e s s u r e d i n t o adopting m i l i t a n t postures. With rank and f i l e a c t i v i s t s i n 
the l e a d , the emergence on the r i g h t of c a l l s f o r a n a t i o n a l b a l l o t were 
seen by the a c t i v i s t s as t r e a c h e r y . The view t h a t i t was the young 
a c t i v i s t s who didn't want a b a l l o t was r e i n f o r c e d by "Mick", a young Murton 
p i c k e t . He s a i d : 
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"The young 'uns didn't want i t . I t was more the young 
'uns who didn't want i t . Young 'uns j u s t wanted to get 
on with i t . The o l d e r ones - a l o t of the older ones 
mind were the same as us - some of the older ones, some 
middle aged, s a i d we shoud have gone f o r i t then l i k e 
[ f i v e or s i x weeks i n t o the s t r i k e ] . And looking back 
on i t , maybe we should have. At the time i t was j u s t 
the young 'uns t h a t pushed i t . I n my opinion." 
( i n t e r v i e w ) 
A 6.1.i The S p e c i a l Delegate Conference. 
At the NEC meeting on A p r i l 12th, and the S p e c i a l Delegate conference a 
week l a t e r , the extent of a c t i v i s t c o n t r o l over the dispute was c l e a r . 
W i l s h e r e t a l . d e s c r i b e d t h e lobby of these two c r u c i a l meetings i n terms 
a k i n to a l y n c h i n g mob (Wilsher e t a l , 1985, 77, 82: see a l s o MacGregor, 
1986, 182) . I n doing so they missed the chance to understand the 
development of the s t r i k e , i n favour of easy s l o g a n i s i n g . The mass lobbies 
were a key e x p r e s s i o n of the way i n which rank and f i l e a c t i v i s t s had taken 
c o n t r o l of the s t r i k e . I f the union was to a c t on i t s p o l i c y of f i g h t i n g 
c l o s u r e s , i t c o u l d not defy the wishes of the a c t i v i s t s who were leading 
the f i g h t . 
At the S p e c i a l Delegate Conference on A p r i l 19th, the arguments f o r and 
a g a i n s t a b a l l o t were put. Those arguing f o r a b a l l o t i n s i s t e d t h a t i t was 
a b a s i c democratic r i g h t . Furthermore they argued t h a t they were j u s t as 
determined as the a n t i b a l l o t f a c t i o n to f i g h t c l o s u r e s , but t h a t i n order 
to be e f f e c t i v e t h i s f i g h t needed a n a t i o n a l b a l l o t which alone had the 
a u t h o r i t y n e c e s s a r y to p u l l out the miners s t i l l working. 
Consider t h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n from Roy Lynk. 
"The Notts Area i s committed to f i g h t p i t c l o s u r e s l i k e 
anybody e l s e , and every l e a d e r i n Notts, every branch 
o f f i c i a l i n Notts, have cairpaigned f o r over a year to 
f i g h t the c l o s u r e s . " 
T h i s from David Prendergast. 
"This b a l l o t i s to u n i t e our people i n our f i g h t , 
because we i n Notts, the l e a d e r s h i p are opposed to p i t 
c l o s u r e s . We are opposed to the l o s s of jobs." 
And t h i s from Ken Toon. 
" I want t o say t h i s , t h a t what we should be doing i s to 
be u n i t i n g o u r s e l v e s . We can only u n i t e o u r s e l v e s by 
u s i n g the n a t i o n a l r u l e 43 and b a l l o t the membership, 
and i f we b a l l o t the membership, I have no doubt as the 
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Rule has been changed we w i l l get the r e q u i r e d m a j o r i t y 
f o r s t r i k e a c t i o n . " ( A l l quotes from: Report of 
Reconvened S p e c i a l Conference, 19-4-84, pub l i s h e d by 
um.) 
A l l t h r e e men l a t e r l e d the breakaway Union of Democratic Mineworkers. 
The l e f t had s e v e r a l arguments to deploy i n response. The gut r e a c t i o n , 
which was probably d e c i s i v e i n shaping peoples views, was expressed 
d i r e c t l y by Jack T a y l o r . 
" I w i l l t e l l you what worries me about b a l l o t s , and I 
do not want to be o f f e n s i v e to anybody because we have 
got enough problems. I w i l l t e l l you what i s up. We 
don't r e a l l y t r u s t vou. We don't r e a l l y t r u s t you. That 
i s the reason (applause) . You come up every year with 
16%, you come up w i t h 32%. That i s the problem we have 
got. We want t o be united, but we are not r i g h t sure 
t h a t you do. We a r e not r i g h t sure whether you want to 
go back t o work. You want to go back to work and you 
w i l l l e a v e the d i r t y work to Owen B r i s c o e , Ken Homer 
and me, when we go down to Cortonwood t h a t Sunday 
morning and say, ' I am s o r r y l a d s . I am s o r r y . There 
are 800 jobs have gone down the road'." ( i b i d : eit^shasis 
added.) 
As evidence, the l e f t looked no f u r t h e r than the debate e a r l i e r at the same 
conference over whether or not to reduce the m a j o r i t y r e q u i r e d i n a b a l l o t 
f o r s t r i k e a c t i o n from 55% to 50%. The same people who argued f o r 
democracy, and f o r a b a l l o t to achieve a s u c c e s s f u l s t r i k e , a l s o argued 
a g a i n s t lowering the m a j o r i t y f o r a c t i o n to 50%. I t seemed c l e a r t h a t f a r 
from t r y i n g to strengthen a c t i o n by having a b a l l o t , they were a c t i n g to 
undermine a c t i o n by doing a l l t h a t they could to make sure i t would be as 
d i f f i c u l t as p o s s i b l e to achieve a b a l l o t m a j o r i t y f o r s t r i k e a c t i o n . 
T h i s f e e l i n g was strengthened by the p a s t r e c o r d of the pro b a l l o t f a c t i o n . 
The l e f t b i t t e r l y r e c a l l e d the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the i n c e n t i v e scheme i n 
1978, d e s p i t e a n a t i o n a l b a l l o t r e j e c t i n g i t (chapter f o u r ) . The areas and 
i n d i v i d u a l s now arguing f o r the s a n c t i c i t y of a b a l l o t had been the leaders 
i n d e f y i n g the i n c e n t i v e scheme b a l l o t . They were seen by the l e f t as 
speaking with f o r k e d tongues. A Durham a c t i v i s t e x p l a i n e d t h i s view. 
"The s o r t of people who were shouting f o r a b a l l o t , I 
was i n s t i n t i v e l y a g a i n s t them, you know? P o s s i b l y we 
made a mistake, I don't know. But i f we d i d make a 
mistake, I know the road to h e l l i s paved with good 
i n t e n t i o n s ! We made a mistake f o r the r i g h t reasons. 
When you see S i d Vincent [a known r i g h t winger] wants a 
b a l l o t . . . " ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
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A S . l . i i Opposing the b a l l o t on p r i n c i p l e and i n p r a c t i c e 
There were p r i n c i p l e d reasons too f o r opposing a b a l l o t . The most commonly 
c i t e d was t h a t i t was not r i g h t f o r men with secure f u t u r e s i n long l i f e 
a reas and p i t s t o be a b l e to stop other men f i g h t i n g to save t h e i r own 
jobs. 
"Peter H e a t h f i e l d has argued p a s s i o n a t e l y and with 
great c o n v i c t i o n t h a t ' i t cannot be r i g h t f o r one man 
to vote another man out of a job'; t h a t a b a l l o t on 
wages i s a b a l l o t which everyone e n t e r s on an equal 
b a s i s and everyone i s a f f e c t e d by e q u a l l y ; on jobs i t 
i s a d i f f e r e n t matter, e s p e c i a l l y when the jobs are at 
r i s k i n some areas and not o t h e r s . " (Beynon, 1985a, 13) 
John L l o y d expanded t h i s coir^Jlex argument i n h i s 1985 pan^shlet. 
"The l i n e t h a t no n a t i o n a l b a l l o t was taken because of 
d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s by d i f f e r e n t a reas i n job 
p r e s e r v a t i o n was d i s m i s s e d by the Government, the Board 
and much of the p r e s s as a phoney argument. I t was 
not... I n essence, the NUM l e a d e r s h i p ' s argument was 
the o l d one of the tyranny of the m a j o r i t y over the 
m i n o r i t y with a s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t , one t o which t h e r e i s 
no i n p r i n c i p l e answer [ s i c ] . " (Lloyd, 1985, 23: 
enphasis added) 
But, as Howell p o i n t s out (1987, 397) t h i s argument disappeared from the 
l a t e r book authored by L l o y d with Martin Adeney. Howell argues t h a t 
a c c e p t i n g Lloyds e a r l i e r a n a l y s i s , would have compelled Adeney and Lloyd to 
"move from c o n s p i r a c y theory and u l t e r i o r p o l i t i c a l motives to an awareness 
of the d i v e r s e p r e s s u r e s on the NUM." I n s t e a d , t h e i r i n t e r e s t i s to 
c o n s t r u c t an orthodoxy of p o l i t i c a l c o n s p i r a c y ( i b i d ) . 
I n f a c t , as Howell and Beynon (1985a) i r t ^ l y , the l e f t l e a d e r s h i p of the NUM 
was p r o p e l l e d i n t o the no b a l l o t s t r a t e g y by a con^ilex s e t of i n t e r a c t i n g 
p r o c e s s e s . The e x p l o s i o n of rank and f i l e m i l i t a n c y - concentrated i n 
Y o r k s h i r e but s i g n i f i c a n t i n p l a c e s l i k e Durham a l s o - made i t almost 
i n ^ o s s i b l e f o r l e f t l e a d e r s t o argue f o r a b a l l o t . I t would have meant 
d e f y i n g the wishes of the a c t i v i s t s who had given the s t r i k e i t s energy. 
Given t h a t most l e a d e r s i n the NUM were e i t h e r e l e c t e d on openly l e f t wing 
pl a t f o r m s , or came from p l a c e s where the l e f t h e l d c o n t r o l , defying them 
would have destroyed t h e i r own c r e d i b i l i t y . (Hence f o r example the 
remarkable s h i f t i n Tom C a l l a n ' s p o s i t i o n evident i n h i s speech at the 
delegate conference.) To an extent many l e a d e r s were p r i s o n e r s of t h e i r own 
r h e t o r i c once the membership had c a l l e d t h e i r m i l i t a n t b l u f f , and taken 
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a c t i o n i n support of words. I n order f o r these l e f t l e a d e r s to put 
themselves back a t the head of a s t r i k e movement which had rocketed out of 
t h e i r c o n t r o l , they had t o adopt the m i l i t a n t r h e t o r i c of the young p i c k e t s 
who were making the riinning. 
Furthermore, the a c t i v i s t s view had been formed by the experience of the 
l a s t few y e a r s . I t looked l i k e i t was impossible to win a b a l l o t majority 
f o r a c t i o n i n support of the threatened minority. But the union p o l i c y was 
to oppose c l o s u r e s , and i f workers were prepared to take a c t i o n i n support 
of t h a t p o l i c y then they should not be stopped by a s e l f i n t e r e s t e d 
m a j o r i t y . Indeed, they had a r i g h t to demand support i n l i n e with union 
p o l i c y . Such a view was strengthened when a c t i v i s t s saw t h a t the people who 
shouted loudest f o r a b a l l o t were the ones whose t r a c k record showed 
d i s d a i n f o r democracy, and a r e l u c t a n c e t o f i g h t f o r anything. 
The S p e c i a l Delegate Conference voted 69-54 f o r the Kent motion which 
endorsed the NEC d e c i s i o n t o s a n c t i o n a c t i o n under r u l e 41. A n a t i o n a l 
b a l l o t was never again d i s c u s s e d f o r m a l l y by the NUM. But the i m p l i c a t i o n s 
of the union's d e c i s i o n were never allowed to d i e . The following s e c t i o n 
c o n s i d e r s the way the b a l l o t i s s u e was understood i n Durham, and then i n 
Murton. 
A 6.2 THE BALLOT AND DURHAM. 
A 6.2.i Durham i n the n a t i o n a l p i c t u r e . 
I n the f i r s t week of the s t r i k e , Scotland, South Wales and Durham jo i n e d 
Y o r k s h i r e on s t r i k e . T r a d i t i o n a l l y m i l i t a n t South Wales miners i n i t i a l l y 
voted by 18 branches t o 13 not to j o i n the s t r i k e . Undoubtedly t h i s r e l a t e d 
to the l a c k of support i n Y o r k s h i r e when South Wales s t r u c k to save Lewis 
Merthyr. But p i c k e t s from the m i n o r i t y 13 p i t s q u i c k l y persuaded the 
r e l u c t a n t branches - without any s t r u g g l e - to j o i n the s t r i k e (Adeney and 
Lloyd, 1986, 96) . I n S c o t l a n d too t h e r e was i n i t i a l opposition to a s t r i k e , 
concentrated a t B i l s t o n Glen. But p i c k e t s soon overcame r e s i s t a n c e here 
too. For the f i r s t few days of the s t r i k e men a t the t r a d i t i o n a l l y moderate 
Durham p i t s i n Seaham worked on. P i c k e t i n g q u i c k l y b u i l t up, and Dawdon -
the l a s t r e b e l p i t - f i n a l l y bowed to the i n e v i t a b l e a few days i n t o the 
s t r i k e . 
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I t was c l e a r from the f a t e f u l March 6th meeting between the NCB and the 
unions t h a t Durham would be p a r t i c u l a r l y s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t e d by the planned 
c a p a c i t y reductions. Out of a t o t a l 4.0 Mt ( m i l l i o n tonnes) planned 
reduction, the North E a s t would c o n t r i b u t e 1.4 Mt, or over a t h i r d (see 
t a b l e 6.1). At a meeting on March 9th between a l l North E a s t mining unions 
and the NCB, the D i r e c t o r - David A r c h i b a l d - sought to pla y down the 
s i g n i f i c a n c e of the planned r e d u c t i o n s . 
I n h i s report of t h i s meeting, w r i t t e n f o r the branches, B i l l y Etherington 
(General S e c r e t a r y of the Durham Mechanics), t h e r e were i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t 
the NCB were t r y i n g to s t a v e o f f a c t i o n , or undermine i t , by port r a y i n g the 
reducti o n s i n the best p o s s i b l e l i g h t . A r c h i b a l d 
" s t a t e d t h a t a t t h i s j u n c t u r e t h a t the 1.4 Mt were 
i n a c c u r a t e . He s t a t e d t h a t the a c t i o n t h a t had been 
taken during the pre s e n t f i n a n c i a l y ear 83/84 had s e t 
thing s w e l l on the way to g e t t i n g down to the budgetted 
f i g u r e without too much hardship. He s t a t e s t h a t the 
NCB i n s i s t s on o p e r a t i n g p r o p e r l y and informing people 
of what's going on and he s t a t e d c a t e g o r i c a l l y t h a t 
t h e r e a r e no pre s e n t p l a n s f o r any new p i t c l o s u r e s . " 
(emphasis added) 
The NCB's argument was t h a t t h e r e had been reductions of 75000 tonnes from 
Bearpark, 50000 tonnes from E a s t Hetton, 150000 tonnes a t Hawthorn, 100000 
tonnes a t Horden, 250000 tonnes from Lynemouth, 200000 tonnes at Wearmouth 
and 250000 tonnes of p i t c o a l during 1983/4, so the a c t u a l need f o r f u r t h e r 
reductions i n 1984/5 was minimal. 
Dennis Murphy from Northumberland kept on eitf)hasizing the d i f f e r e n c e 
between t h i s message and the " e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t p i c t u r e " which had been 
p a i n t e d i n London. With r e c e n t NCB a c t i o n s f r e s h i n t h e i r minds ( f o r 
exan^sle over Horden - see Beynon e t a l . , 1985), most NUM l e a d e r s didn't 
b e l i e v e the Board's bland assurances. But i n any case, as i n other areas, 
the a c t i o n s of the a c t i v i s t s had taken over. 
A f t e r p i c k e t s had brought the c o a l f i e l d to a s t a n d s t i l l , the miners' lodges 
adopted a unanimous p o s i t i o n . They were on s t r i k e "pending a n a t i o n a l 
b a l l o t " . An Area Conference passed the f o l l o w i n g r e s o l u t i o n on March 21st 
(subsequently confirmed by County Lodge Vote conpleted on A p r i l 6th by 
96-0) : 
"The d e c i s i o n of the Area C o a l f i e l d Conference h e l d on 
Wednesday 21st March, unanimously decided to request an 
Appendix 6 (423) 
emergency meeting of the NEC f o r t h w i t h and an 
i n d i v i d u a l b a l l o t vote by implementation of NUM r u l e 43 
without delay." 
Nobody denies t h a t the rank and f i l e i n Durham overwhelmingly favoured a 
n a t i o n a l b a l l o t . 
A 6 • 2 . i i The A c t i v i s t s and the B a l l o t . 
At the s t a r t of the s t r i k e , almost every a c t i v i s t r e j e c t e d the c a l l f o r a 
b a l l o t . T h i s was i n l i n e with the arguments advanced above; th a t a b a l l o t 
was an i n v a l i d procedure f o r d e c i d i n g on a c t i o n over p i t c l o s u r e s , and that 
i f workers were s t r i k i n g i n l i n e with union p o l i c y , they should be 
supported. The most s o p h i s t i c a t e d v e r s i o n of t h i s argoiment was advanced by 
Dave Terrple, u s i n g the t h e o r e t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e of a revolutionary 
s o c i a l i s t . He argued on p r i n c i p l e t h a t i t i s wrong to b a l l o t on p i t 
c l o s u r e s , as i t i s wrong to b a l l o t on any b a s i c human r i g h t . 
"The r i g h t t o work, u n l i k e the i s s u e of a wage r i s e , i s 
not a question of expediency but a b a s i c democratic 
r i g h t . I t i s not negotiable and t h e r e f o r e not 
b a l l o t a b l e . I t must be defended by e x e c u t i v e a c t i o n . 
(Temple, 1983, 29: enchases i n o r i g i n a l ) 
I n a s i t u a t i o n of continuous c l a s s s t r u g g l e , he argued t h a t xinion 
l e a d e r s h i p s should have the power t o c a l l s t r i k e s without having to b a l l o t 
f i r s t . 
" I would f a r r a t h e r t h e r e had been a t r a d i t i o n w i t h i n 
the NUM t h a t you e l e c t an e x e c u t i v e and the executive 
l e a d s , and the e x e c u t i v e has the power to c a l l s t r i k e 
a c t i o n without going to a b a l l o t . Now t h a t i s a f a r 
more combative o r g a n i s a t i o n than one which has to be 
t i e d down to a b a l l o t before you take s t r i k e a c t i o n . 
Now i f I was an eiiployer, and I was n e g o t i a t i n g with 
the union and the union I was n e g o t i a t i n g with. . . had 
the power to immediately c a l l a s t r i k e , I would be 
very, v e r y wary of t h a t o r g a n i s a t i o n . " ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
I n t h i s system, the u l t i m a t e democratic s a n c t i o n i s a p p l i e d by the e l e c t i o n 
and t r u e a c c o u n t a b i l i t y of the union l e a d e r s h i p . 
Having j u s t i f i e d the r e j e c t i o n of a b a l l o t on p r i n c i p l e , Dave argued that 
the combination of a v a c c i l a t i n g l e a d e r s h i p l a c k i n g confidence i n i t s 
a b i l i t y to p u l l the membership out, and a committment t o b a l l o t s , 
demonstrates the t a c t i c a l f a u l t i n r e l y i n g on b a l l o t s . He o f f e r e d t h i s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of events i n South Wales i n 1983 (see chapter f o u r ) . 
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"They had a b a l l o t on s t r i k e a c t i o n i n Wales i n 
January, and they decided they would s t r i k e - they gave 
a date f o r the s t r i k e - u n l e s s there was investment i n 
the Welsh p i t s . They got a m a j o r i t y f o r doing f o r i t . 
About a month l a t e r ( f i r s t of a l l , my dates and timings 
w i l l be wrong, but i t went something l i k e t h i s ) they 
decided t o postpone the s t r i k e a c t i o n . That was [Emlyn] 
Williams [ P r e s i d e n t of the South' Wales area of the 
NUM] . Then the c o l l i e r y a t Lewis Merthyr, the c l o s u r e 
was announced. 
"They took a c t i o n t h e r e . Now i n s t e a d of saying, i n s t e a d 
of the l e a d e r s h i p saying: 'Well, we've got a mandate, 
we've never been beaten on a b a l l o t f o r s t r i k e 
[ a c t i o n ] , we have t h a t mandate, w e ' l l c a l l people out 
because we've got t h a t mandate', they s a i d : 'No, we've 
got to seek another mandate' ... So they went and had 
another b a l l o t . 
"And each time we go f o r a b a l l o t the a c t u a l numbers 
are being reduced t h a t are v o t i n g f o r s t r i k e a c t i o n . 
Because men are s a y i n g - obviously s a y i n g - are we ever 
going to, you know? I t d i s s i p a t e s a l l the impact of the 
t h i n g . . . A l l the time, time's t i c k i n ' over you know. 
Days are p a s s i n g . Men are g e t t i n g themselves psyched up 
t o e x p e c t i n g the p i c k e t s to be there, and t o come out 
on s t r i k e , and they don't a r r i v e . Or they do a r r i v e , 
and say: 'We're not p i c k e t i n g , we're arguing f o r you to 
vote i n a n a t i o n a l b a l l o t f o r s t r i k e a c t i o n ' . And the 
whole in^sact i s l o s t . 
I mean,.. these are b a s i c questions of human 
behaviour. . . T h i s i s how people - when they move i n t o 
a c t i o n - t h i s i s how they move. They don't move i n a 
s o r t of f i x e d p a t t e r n , l o g i c a l l y agreed, going through 
v a r i o u s q u e stions. Men f i g h t on t h e i r [ i n s t i n c t s ] . " 
( i n t e r v i e w ) 
Many othe r a c t i v i s t s r e j e c t e d a b a l l o t on more pragmatic grounds. Some 
thought they might l o s e i t . But these pragmatic reasons were s t a t e d because 
of a b a s i c premise s i m i l a r to the one o u t l i n e d by Dave Temple above. I n a 
s i t u a t i o n of c l a s s stmiggle, the l e g i t i m a t e t a c t i c s are the ones which best 
allow you to defend your i n t e r e s t s . As Frank Duffy s a i d , i n a s l i g h t l y 
d i f f e r e n t context, "the c o n s t i t u t i o n ' s only got a s m a l l r o l e to p l a y " when 
you're f i g h t i n g the c l a s s war. Workers may not l i k e s t r i k i n g without a 
b a l l o t , but so long as they s t r i k e anyway, the t a c t i c i s j u s t i f i e d . I f the 
union had not stood and fought over Cortonwood, i t would have been reve a l e d 
as a paper t i g e r . 
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Yet t h e r e were a l s o some d i v i s i o n s i n Durham over the b a l l o t question. With 
a r e l a t i v e l y weak l e f t wing o r g a n i s a t i o n concentrated on only a few p i t s , 
the miners' BL l a c k e d the confidence to c a l l e x p l i c i t l y f o r a no b a l l o t 
s t r i k e . I n s t e a d , they softened t h e i r c a l l f o r s t r i k e a c t i o n by arguing f o r 
men to s t r i k e before having a b a l l o t . Although s u c c e s s f u l i n persuading 
miners to come out, the l e g a c y of t h i s t a c t i c was f e l t l a t e r i n the s t r i k e 
as b i t t e r n e s s about the promised b a l l o t t h a t never m a t e r i a l i s e d continued 
to undermine support f o r the s t r i k e . I n the mechanics, the weakness of l e f t 
wing o r g a n i s a t i o n l e d to a voted a g a i n s t s t r i k e a c t i o n at area l e v e l (see 
chapter s i x ) , and the s t r i k e was only d e c l a r e d o f f i c i a l a f t e r e f f e c t i v e l y 
b eing enforced by the miners'. 
A 6.3 THE PRO-BALLOT MAJORITY 
The overwhelming m a j o r i t y of rank and f i l e miners and mechanics i n Durham -
and Murton was no exception - wanted a n a t i o n a l b a l l o t . So d i d many older 
and more " r i g h t wing" lodge o f f i c i a l s . T h i s was u s u a l l y a r t i c u l a t e d as "we 
wanted t o have our say". One Murton miner - a t r a v e l l e r from B l a c k h a l l who 
l i v e d i n Trimdon and went back to work i n the l a s t week - a r t i c u l a t e d h i s 
f r u s t r a t i o n a t h i s l a c k of say i n the d e c i s i o n . He hadn't even gone to the 
two meetings i n Murton a t the s t a r t of the s t r i k e . 
"Murton p i t you know voted not t o go on s t r i k e . " 
(miner) 
"The f i r s t week." (me) 
"That's r i g h t . " 
"And then you were shamed out by the mechanics?" 
"That's r i g h t . And we didn't even know nothing about i t 
u n t i l we got to work." 
"You didn't go t o t h a t f i r s t meeting where you 
voted..?" 
"No. We didn't even know i t was on! We didn't even know 
i t was on. And then the f o l l o w i n g week, when we went 
back to Murton on the Monday, they s a i d t h a t they'd 
voted not to go on s t r i k e . They says, 'Oh, we're going 
to g i v e i t another week or so' . And then the F r i d a y 
came..., they s a i d they were having another vote. And 
they voted f o r s t r i k e a c t i o n . [They'd] sent t h e i r 
delegate down to S c a r g i l l and them, hadn't they. I 
f o r g e t who i t was. Well, I says, we never even, got a 
vote." 
"Did you not go through to t h a t second meeting?" 
"No. Nobody did. Because they didn't know i t was on... 
Everybody w i l l t e l l you 'round here. There wasn't even 
a bus provided, or nothing. I t was j u s t chaos man!" 
( i n t e r v i e w ) 
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And indeed even Dave Tensile t a c i t l y acknowledged the t a c t i c a l iit5>ortance of 
the b a l l o t when he s a i d : "There i s no doubt t h a t what helped keep us s o l i d 
was the a u t h o r i t y from the i n d i v i d u a l b a l l o t we had [ i n the Murton 
mechanics]". Unlike the miners, the mechanics branch had the legitimacy of 
the b a l l o t r e s u l t i n favour of a c t i o n to s u s t a i n them through the s t r i k e . 
The miners had only come out "pending a n a t i o n a l b a l l o t " , because they had 
been p i c k e t e d out. 
Yet on one i s s u e surrounding the b a l l o t , t h e i r i s a s t r i k i n g degree of 
agreement between r i g h t and l e f t , miners and mechanics. Most people i n 
Murton and i n Durham thought a b a l l o t would have given a majority f o r 
a c t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y i f i t had been h e l d a f t e r the A p r i l 19th delegate 
conference reduced the r e q u i r e d m a j o r i t y to 50%. T h i s c o n t r a d i c t s the 
opinion of the government, the media, and Arthur S c a r g i l l . However, i t 
gains c r e d i b i l i t y from the only opinion p o l l s t h a t were ever done at the 
s t a r t of the s t r i k e to see how miners would vote i n a b a l l o t . On A p r i l 13th 
f o r example, a MORI p o l l f o r the Sunday Times showed 68% f o r the s t r i k e , 
26% a g a i n s t , and 6% uncommitted (Wilsher e t a l . , 1985, 78). 
A t t i t u d e s about the r e s u l t of a b a l l o t might have been a f f e c t e d by such 
p o l l s . But a f a r more l i k e l y i n f l u e n c e was the widespread a p p r e c i a t i o n t h a t 
i n Durham at l e a s t , the s t r i k e had a deep groundswell of support. A 
Wearmmouth mechanic who supported the s t r i k e s a i d t h i s : 
" I couldn't understand them not having a b a l l o t at the 
time of the s t r i k e . . . I couldn't understand why they 
didn't j u s t say, w e l l l e t s j u s t have a b a l l o t . Because 
even people here - and you knew what type of men they 
were - were t a l k i n g about they would vote f o r a s t r i k e . 
I know i t ' s d i f f e r e n t behind c l o s e d doors l i k e , but I 
t h i n k they'd have walked a b a l l o t a t t h a t p a r t i c u l a r 
time... Looking back i n h i n d s i g h t , I'm s t i l l amazed, 
because I t h i n k they'd have won i t . " ( i n t erview) 
A Murton mechanic who never r e a l l y supported the s t r i k e agreed that the 
b a l l o t would have been won a f t e r the r u l e change. And the man who i s now 
Chairman of the UDM a t Murton thought t h a t i f the b a l l o t had been held i n 
the summer, with the men out and "the sun on t h e i r backs", then there would 
have been a m a j o r i t y f o r a s t r i k e . Once out, people weren't t a l k i n g about 
going back. They may not have l i k e d being on s t r i k e , but they knew th a t i f 
they were going t o f i g h t , t h i s was the time they had to make a stand. 
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The question then a r i s e s to what extent the l a c k of a b a l l o t i n f l u e n c e d the 
course of the s t r i k e even a f t e r a l l the Durham miners were on s t r i k e 
anyway? Even s i x months i n t o the s t r i k e , r i g h t wingers were approaching 
union men i n pubs and cliabs, and a s k i n g a t union meetings when the b a l l o t 
was going to m a t e r i a l i s e . F o r the f i r s t people back, the f a i l u r e to b a l l o t 
was the c r u c i a l reason they gave f o r being prepared to break the s t r i k e . 
But t o many l e f t wingers, once men had come out on s t r i k e , then the b a l l o t 
was a dead i s s u e , j u s t an excuse. I f they didn't agree with being on s t r i k e 
because t h e r e was no b a l l o t , why d i d i t take them nine months to go back? 
A 6.4 POSTSCRIPT: A CHANGE OF HEART BY THE ACTIVISTS? 
Since the s t r i k e many a c t i v i s t s have c l e a r l y had doiJ^ts about the no-ballot 
s t r a t e g y . Those who saw i t as an opportunist move have r e v i s e d t h e i r 
opinions on the b a s i s t h a t i t didn't work. And even many of those who were 
wholeheartedly caught up i n the momentum of the s t r i k e movement have had 
second thoughts. 
One man who has gone f u r t h e r than most i n renouncing h i s o l d views was a 
s e c r e t a r y of one of the Durham miners' lodges. He says now 
"There should d e f i n i t e l y have been a n a t i o n a l b a l l o t on 
the i s s u e . . . At the time I thought i t [the no b a l l o t 
s t r a t e g y ] was r i g h t , but when I went on t h a t platform 
t h a t Saturday morning and got our members out on 
s t r i k e , I wasn't happy. You know, the gut f e e l i n g was 
wrong." ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
A committed a c t i v i s t from the West of the c o a l f i e l d agonised over the 
que s t i o n 3 y e a r s a f t e r the event. 
" I t may w e l l be t h a t t h e r e should have been a b a l l o t . I 
don't know. I'm i n two minds. I'm not sure... 
P e r s o n a l l y I was o u t s i d e the c i t y h a l l i n S h e f f i e l d [on 
A p r i l 19th] when they made the announcement, and there 
was thousands of people c l a p p i n g and dancing. And I 
didn't f e e l l i k e c l a p p i n g and dancing, you know? I 
didn't f e e l l i k e c e l e b r a t i n g t h a t there wasn't a 
b a l l o t . 'Cos I b e l i e v e we'd have won the b a l l o t . I a l s o 
b e l i e v e t h a t Nottingham wouldn't have come out. But a t 
l e a s t they couldn't have s a i d they hadn't had a 
b a l l o t . . . 
" I shouldn't r e a l l y c r i t i c i z e because I never s a i d i t 
at the time, and you sound a b i t l i k e George Bolton you 
know? - 'There should have been a b a l l o t ' . I was 
v i o l e n t l y opposed t o the b a l l o t , 'cos t h a t ' s what I was 
s a y i n g a t the time. But I was opposed to a b a l l o t 
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because they wanted a b a l l o t f o r a r e t u r n to work, and 
fo r t h a t reason I didn't want a b a l l o t . When i t came to 
changing the r u l e s a t the S h e f f i e l d conference seven 
weeks i n t o the s t r i k e , I wouldn't have been broken 
hea r t e d i f t h e r e ' d been a b a l l o t then. But the r e wasn't 
one, and we made the best of i t . . . " ( i nterview) 
Not a l l a c t i v i s t s have come to t h i s view. Dave Teii:5>le f o r example remains 
a b s o l u t e l y committed to a t a c t i c a l view of b a l l o t s . I n other words, the 
d e c i s i o n on whether or not to b a l l o t i s a t a c t i c a l question, not a matter 
of absolute moral p r i n c i p l e . The only r e l e v a n t p r i n c i p l e i s th a t there i s 
no requirment i n p r i n c i p l e to b a l l o t before t a k i n g s t r i k e a c t i o n . I n the 
cas e of the s t a r t of the 1984/5 s t r i k e , a b a l l o t would have been a f i a s c o 
because i t would have drawn the energy out of the s t r i k e which therefore 
might never have happened. Many other people have been so sa t u r a t e d with 
what has become the r i g h t and l e f t orthodoxy - t h a t the l a c k of the b a l l o t 
was a t the ve r y l e a s t a t a c t i c a l d i s a s t e r - t h a t they have almost l o s t 
touch w i t h the f e e l i n g s and arguments t h a t p r o p e l l e d them i n the f i r s t few 
weeks of the s t r i k e . 
A 6.5 CONCLUSIONS 
Most a n a l y s e s of the b a l l o t i s s u e have ignored or played down the 
h i s t o r i c a l background to the development of the "no b a l l o t " s t r a t e g y . I n 
p a r t i c u l a r , they have tended to d i s c u s s the b a l l o t i n a vacuxim, hence 
n e g l e c t i n g the ve r y r e a l p r e s s u r e s which b u i l t up on the NUM l e a d e r s h i p i n 
the p e r i o d immediately before and a t the s t a r t of the 1984/5 dispute. Many 
a c t i v i s t s were determined t o f i g h t p i t c l o s u r e s , and evolved an argument 
which appealed t o fundamental t r a d e union p r i n c i p l e s i n an atterrpt to 
circumvent what was seen as an i n h e r e n t l y d i v i s i v e convulsion to b a l l o t . 
They a s s o c i a t e d c a l l s f o r a b a l l o t not with a commitment to the highest 
p r i n c i p l e s of democracy, but with a shabby attenpt to betray miners who 
were f i g h t i n g to defend union p o l i c y . On the other hand, the long t r a d i t i o n 
of b a l l o t i n g i n the NUM s e t up an i n e v i t a b l e t e n s i o n between the a c t i v i s t s 
and the mass of the membership, which the government and the media 
e x p l o i t e d during t h e s t r i k e . 
Appendix 6 (429) 
APPENDIX SEVEN: PICKETING EXPERIENCES 
APPENDIX 7: PICKETING EXPERIENCES 
T h i s appendix recounts some of the most important p i c k e t s t h a t Murton 
miners and mechanics p a r t i c i p a t e d i n . ( I t should be read as a supplement to 
s e c t i o n 6.3 of chapter s i x . ) I t i s i n e v i t a b l y p a r t i a l , r e f l e c t i n g the 
experiences of the people interviewed, who were by no means a comprehensive 
sait5>le of the a c t i v i s t s . N evertheless, t h e i r d e s c r i p t i o n s capture much of 
the atmosphere of the time. Also i n t h i s appendix I review i n d e t a i l s t a t e 
p r e p a r a t i o n to d e a l with p i c k e t i n g , and t h i s to the e v o l v i n g s t a t e s t r a t e g y 
f o r d e a l i n g with organised labour (see chapter two). 
A 7.1 EARLY DAYS: WINNING EVERYTHING? 
As soon as the Murton mechanics decided to s t r i k e , p i c k e t s from Murton 
began t o spread out to seek support elsewhere i n the c o a l f i e l d . They were 
j o i n e d by a small number of miners who acted d e s p i t e the lodge vote to defy 
the s t r i k e c a l l . One of the f i r s t stops was the n o t o r i o u s l y conservative 
T u r s d a l e workshops, near F e r r y h i l l . A dozen men turned away hundreds of 
mechanics. "They were bloody unhappy about i t , but they wouldn't cros s our 
p i c k e t l i n e . " P i c k e t i n g a t Dawdon C o l l i e r y was the most i n t e n s e of those 
f i r s t few days. V i o l e n c e f l a r e d , but u n l i k e i n Nottinghamshire, the p i c k e t s 
soon imposed t h e i r w i l l , and the p o l i c e were unable to stop the men f i n a l l y 
d e c i d i n g to stop work. 
I n those e a r l y days, the p o l i c e weren't geared up to deal with the 
p i c k e t i n g . As another mechanic s a i d about the famous Tursdale p i c k e t (when 
a handful of mechanics t u r n e d back hundreds of r e l u c t a n t s t r i k e r s ) : "That 
was where the p o l i c e s a t i n a van and watched i n case we were a s s a u l t e d ! " A 
miners' a c t i v i s t argued t h a t the l a c k of p o l i c e r e a d i n e s s gave the l i e to 
those who argued t h a t the whole s t r i k e was s e t up from day one. 
"The s t a t e wasn't ready to defeat the miners. I t took 
them a month t o get c o n t r o l . . . The p o l i c e became 
organised g r a d u a l l y . . . They c e r t a i n l y weren't e f f e c t i v e 
i n t h i s a rea. We stopped e v e r y t h i n g i n the West of 
Durham. Turned e v e r y t h i n g we wanted away. Turned every 
waggon away... brought e v e r y t h i n g to a s t a n d s t i l l . Then 
a l l of a sudden, a f t e r a month or s i x weeks, the p o l i c e 
came." ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
I n those e a r l y weeks, the p o l i c e operation was concentrated i n 
Nottinghamshire. A f t e r the p i c k e t s were beaten i n Notts, the p o l i c e spread 
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out, and the t a c t i c s developed and l e g i t i m i s e d there were deployed i n 
p l a c e s l i k e Durham. 
Follow i n g these e a r l y s u c c e s s e s , the going got tougher. A v i c i o u s (and 
b a r e l y reported) l i t t l e war developed around the p r i v a t e opencast s i t e s 
near Tow Law. The f i r s t a r r e s t of a Murton man came only a couple of weeks 
i n t o the s t r i k e , a t the P h i l a d e l p h i a workshops. I t l e f t a b i g impact. L a t e r 
on a r r e s t s became commonplace, but t h i s f i r s t one was greeted with outrage. 
The mechanics formed up behind t h e i r banner and marched to the p o l i c e 
s t a t i o n i n p r o t e s t . One mechanic s a i d "We demanded - because i n March we 
d i d demand - we demanded h i s r e l e a s e . " 
The a r r e s t e d man gave me h i s account of the event, two and a h a l f years 
l a t e r . 
"You got to P h i l l y , and you saw loads and loads of 
policemen. You're confused. Hadn't been on TV y e t about 
a l l t h i s mass p i c k e t i n g , p o l i c e presence and 
everything. See about 15 people walking up, surrounded 
by p o l i c e . These people are going i n to work! 
[ d i s b e l i e f ] . They mustn't r e a l i s e what's going on. 
That's when the a d r e n a l i n s t a r t s to flow. I f e l t very 
s t r o n g l y about people l i k e t h a t l i k e . Weren't t h i n k i n g 
about the long term f u t u r e , they were t h i n k i n g about 
the shor t term. Cash." (i n t e r v i e w ) 
He was a r r e s t e d under s e c t i o n 5 - d i s o r d e r l y conduct. 
He r e c a l l e d : 
"Being a r r e s t e d , being demoralised. S i t t i n g i n the c e l l 
t h e r e w i t h your handcuffs on, f e e l i n g l i k e a c r i m i n a l , 
s a y i n g "What the h e l l . What have I done wrong? You 
know? I t didn't s i n k i n what I was doing wrong. What I 
was doing wrong was shouting 'Scab!'. That was wrong. 
Well, i t i s n ' t wrong. I t ' s p a r t of being a trade 
u n i o n i s t , which I had to e x p l a i n i n c o u r t . " (interview) 
Some Durham p i c k e t s a l s o began to t r a v e l to other c o a l f i e l d s . Even now, 
many miners are r e l u c t a n t t o d i s c u s s these experiences, because of a f e a r 
t h a t they could s t i l l be prosecuted under conspiracy law. Rather than 
t r y i n g to catalogue every p i c k e t , and the s p e c i f i c experience t h a t each one 
brought, t h i s appendix c o n c e n t r a t e s on two b i g demonstrations which have 
become p a r t of the c o l l e c t i v e memory of the s t r i k e f o r Murton a c t i v i s t s 
(and miners n a t i o n a l l y , i n the case of Orgreave). 
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A 7.2 THE SHEFFIELD TRADES AND LABOUR CLUB. 
On A p r i l 19th, the day of the lobby of the s p e c i a l delegate conference to 
decide on the b a l l o t question, an i n c i d e n t occurred which was f o r some 
miners more in^jortant even than Orgreave. Wilsher e t a l . described i t l i k e 
t h i s . 
"Outside [the meeting] the p o l i c e paraded i n s e l f 
c o n c i o u s l y d i s c i p l i n e d ranks, and were almost 
immediately c a l l e d upon to suppress a savage pub f i g h t . 
For an hour they, p r e s s photographers, t e l e v i s i o n crews 
and anyone who could be remotely i d e n t i f i e d as 'a 
l a c k e y of the c a p i t a l i s t media' had to negotiate a h a i l 
of b r i c k s , blows and s t r i d e n t v e r b a l abuse. There were 
68 a r r e s t s , and dozens of minor i n j u r i e s . " (1985, 82) 
But the a c t u a l events of the day were d i f f e r e n t , and as one miner s a i d : 
" A f t e r what happened a t S h e f f i e l d , we shouldn't have been s u r p r i s e d by 
Orgreave." Below, a j o u r n a l i s t and s e v e r a l mechanics giv e t h e i r v e r s i o n of 
two of the 68 a r r e s t s . 
Gerry Marron, a Northern Echo r e p o r t e r , t r a v e l l e d down to S h e f f i e l d with 
the Murton men. His report of the i n c i d e n t was published - under the t i t l e 
"Why the f u r y flowed a f t e r a q u i e t p i n t " - on A p r i l 21st. 
"Trouble s t a r t e d around 3.15 pm. I was one of the f i r s t 
out of the c l u b and saw only a handful of miners 
standing and c h a t t i n g on the g r a s s e d area outside. Then 
q u i c k l y s e v e r a l vans of p o l i c e a r r i v e d . Moments l a t e r 
miners were being pushed around by the p o l i c e . P o l i c e 
on the spot were s a y i n g t h a t they had been c a l l e d by 
the pub a c r o s s the road which claimed t r o u b l e makers 
had run i n t o the Labour c l u b t o hide. 
"Arguments began between p o l i c e and pitmen and some 
miners i n s i d e the club, incenced at what was happening 
outside, urged t h a t the p o l i c e be s o r t e d out. But 
others kept the doors shut, l e a v i n g only a handful 
s t i l l o u t s i d e . More p o l i c e a r r i v e d by the minute. A 
convoy of seven or e i g h t blue vans p u l l e d up, the doors 
were f l u n g open and p o l i c e charged up the bank i n a 
m i l i t a r y f a s h i o n towards the club. They outnumbered 
miners about 3 t o one - 400 to 500 p o l i c e f a c i n g about 
150 miners. 
" I saw s e n i o r union o f f i c i a l s , i n c l u d i n g n a t i o n a l 
e x e c u t i v e member B i l l y Stobbs and Wearmouth s e c r e t a r y 
Dave Hopper, who asked why a l l the p o l i c e were there, 
being pushed away. Other miners who questioned p o l i c e 
t a c t i c s were sworn a t by o f f i c e r s . 1 saw one man who 
didn't seem to be doing anything h i t across the l e g s 
with a truncheon by an o f f i c e r . I saw s e v e r a l miners 
a r r e s t e d who moments e a r l i e r had been standing around 
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p e a c e f u l l y . Miners s a t down i n the road blocking 
t r a f f i c i n a b i d to get p o l i c e to r e l e a s e t h e i r 
c o l l e a g u e s . " 
T h i s account t a l l i e s almost e x a c t l y with those given s e v e r a l y ears l a t e r by 
Murton men who were t h e r e . One s a i d : 
"The p o l i c e more or l e s s surrounded the cliJb you know. 
And i t was e x a c t l y round about quart past, h a l f past 
three, when everybody was coming out... I t was mayhem 
outside the club. I t was the f i r s t time I ' d ever seen a 
policeman i n my l i f e w i t h h i s truncheon out, swiping a t 
people l i k e t h a t . I t was t o t a l l y u n c a l l e d f o r . . . There 
was a l l h e l l l e t l o o s e . We s a t on the road and a l l 
kinds. We blocked the t r a f f i c o f f . " (interview) 
Two Murton men were a r r e s t e d - Steven Vardy (who was charged with being 
drunk and d i s o r d e r l y ) and l a t e r Tommy Parry (who was charged with 
a s s a u l t i n g a p o l i c e o f f i c e r ) . Evidence submitted i n defence of the two men 
d e s c r i b e d how the Murton men, along with other miners, had emerged from the 
c l u b a t about 3.15, to be confronted by a massive f o r c e of p o l i c e with 
truncheons drawn. Some p o l i c e were a l r e a d y a t t a c k i n g miners. One Murton 
mechanic - Stewart - became angry, and Steven t r i e d with Tomn^ Wilson to 
calm him down. Stewart's evidence f o r Steven's t r i a l e xplained how i t a l l 
s t a r t e d . 
"When we came out, t h e r e was a massive p o l i c e presence, 
and s c u f f l e s were going on. I suppose I saw three or 
four seperate i n c i d e n t s i n a l l . I was aghast t o see the 
p o l i c e wading i n with truncheons a t the ready f o r no 
apparent reason. 
"We had by t h i s time walked down from the club to 
approximately 10-15 yards from the cl u b door. I was 
becoming more and more angry a t the behaviour of some 
of the p o l i c e . Tommy Wilson and Steven Vardy were both 
standing next to me, t e l l i n g me to keep calm. Tomity had 
hold of me and I t h i n k i t was h i s idea t h a t we re t u r n 
back t o the doorway of the clvib. Stephen Vardy was not 
even shouting a t the p o l i c e as I was." (statement of 
evidence) 
Tommy Wilson confirmed t h i s account i n h i s evidence, and took up the story. 
"Steven Vardy was doing e x a c t l y the same as me. He was 
being h e l p f u l and r e s p o n s i b l e , i n t r y i n g to t e l l 
Stewart t h a t he ought to keep out of trou b l e . I th i n k 
Steven t h i n k s he has been unlucky and we were j u s t 
s t a n d i n g t a l k i n g t o him. There was l o t s of shouting 
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going on around us, but Steven Vardy was c e r t a i n l y not 
shouting a t the p o l i c e . 
"The next t h i n g I knew was tha t Stephen was g e t t i n g l e d 
away. He was not s t r u g g l i n g , he j u s t walked away 
v o l u n t a r i l y . I immediately followed him to the p o l i c e 
van he was l e d to. I asked i f I could t a l k t o the 
o f f i c e r who had a r r e s t e d him, and I was allowed to. The 
door of the p o l i c e van was open. I s a i d t h a t I was a 
lodge o f f i c i a l and I saw Stephen and advised him to say 
nothing. I wrote down the number of the a r r e s t i n g 
o f f i c e r , number 523. I then went round the s i d e of the 
van knocking on the van and rep e a t i n g my advice to 
Stephen to say nothing. He looked f l a b b e r g a s t e d and 
ther e were t e a r s i n h i s eyes." (statement of evidence) 
R e a l i s i n g t h a t one of t h e i r members had been a r r e s t e d , the mechanics 
decided to take t h e i r coach to the p o l i c e s t a t i o n i n Bridge S t r e e t to f i n d 
out what had happened t o him, and to t r y and see him. Sho r t l y a f t e r 
a r r i v i n g "about t h r e e bus loads of p o l i c e a r r i v e d , and most of us were 
pushed out of the way" (statement of evidence, Dave Temple) . Tommy Parry 
t a k e s up the s t o r y of h i s own a r r e s t . 
"When we were w a i t i n g I witnessed a p o l i c e sergeant 
2001 walk over [and] push and k i c k Mr Dalton Davidson 
who was s i t t i n g on the kerbstone of the road 
approaching [the] gates to [the] s t a t i o n yard. Mr 
Davidson s a i d 'What was t h a t f o r ? I have asked t h a t 
policeman t h e r e and he s a i d i t was OK f o r me to s i t 
down.' I noted the number of t h i s policeman down 
(2112). The time now was 5.14pm." 
"About f i v e minutes a f t e r t h i s i n c i d e n t I was standing 
t a l k i n g t o a policeman who was standing i n s i d e the of 
the gates. T h i s policeman o r i g i n a t e d from the Newcastle 
area. I was standing r e s t i n g a g a i n s t the w a l l . I heard 
a policeman say 'Unlock the gates'. T h i s was done. A 
policeman s a i d t o me 'Come t h i s way'. I walked i n with 
them, I thought to go and see Mr Vardy. J u s t short of 
the door a policeman stepped i n f r o n t of me and s a i d ' I 
am a r r e s t i n g you f o r a s s a u l t i n g a p o l i c e o f f i c e r ' . " 
(Statement of evidence) 
Numerous statements given i n evidence supported the contention t h a t at the 
time of the a l l e g e d a s s a u l t Tommy could not p o s s i b l y have been involved i n 
any i n c i d e n t . The f e e l i n g was t h a t Tommy was a r r e s t e d because he had noted 
down the number of the p o l i c e o f f i c e r who had a s s a u l t e d Dalton Davidson a 
few minutes e a r l i e r . 
The s i g n i f i c a n c e of the Trades and Labour Club c l a s h was t h a t f o r most 
miners i t was the f i r s t time they saw the p o l i c e engaging i n s u s t a i n e d 
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bouts of g r a t u i t o u s v i o l e n c e . T a c t i c s which had become commonplace i n 
Nottingham (see C o u l t e r e t a l . , 1984, 77-104) were deployed against men 
from Durham and Murton f o r the f i r s t time. Years l a t e r the r e a c t i o n was 
s t i l l one of shock and outrage. To see policemen l a y i n g savagely about them 
i n an unprovoked a t t a c k on p e a c e f u l miners, and a r b i t r a r i l y a r r e s t i n g two 
men who the Murton mechanics knew to be innocent, was a traumatic 
experience. 
A 7.3 ORGREAVE, JUNK 18TH 1984. 
I f t h e r e was one s i n g l e event which f o r most people summed up the miners 
s t r i k e , i t was the mass p i c k e t at Orgreave on June 18th 1984. I t was Arthur 
S c a r g i l l ' s Waterloo. I t summed up the d i f f e r e n c e s between the s u c c e s s f u l 
1972 and '74 s t r i k e s , and 1984. For the miners, the t a c t i c s were the same. 
Sheer weight of nvimbers would overpower the f o r c e s of the s t a t e , as they 
had done a t S a l t l e y coke depot i n 1972. But the s i t u a t i o n i n 1984 bore no 
meaningful coit^sarison w i t h those heady days of the e a r l y 1970's. 
For those miners and mechanics from Murton who were there, i t l e f t an 
i n d e l i b l e mark. To understand t h i s isapact, i t i s ne c e s s a r y to go i n to the 
s t o r y of Orgreave i n some d e t a i l , because the accounts of people who were 
t h e r e d i f f e r so fundamentally from the v e r s i o n which the media has poured 
i n t o the c o l l e c t i v e consciousness of the nation t h a t f o r t h e i r experiences 
to be v a l i d a t e d r e q u i r e s re-exhuming the e n t i r e s t o r y . F o r t u n a t e l y t h i s i s 
a r e l a t i v e l y easy t a s k , because the n o t o r i e t y of Orgreave i s such that i t 
has been w e l l documented by both s i d e s . 
A 7 . 3 . i S e t t i n g the stage. 
Although the f i n a l and most famous Orgreave p i c k e t was on June 18th, t h i s 
was merely the culmination of p i c k e t i n g t h a t had been going on f o r 4 weeks. 
Despite the f a r g r e a t e r s i g n i f i c a n c e of the C E 6 B market to the NCB, the NUM 
decided e a r l y i n the s t r i k e to concentrate p i c k e t i n g e f f o r t s on the s t e e l 
s e c t o r . Although now only a s m a l l market, s t e e l had the advantage t h a t any 
cutback i n production would have an immediate iir5>act on other s e c t o r s of 
the econoiry, p a r t i c u l a r l y engineering and c a r s (Wilsher e t a l . . 1985, 84) . 
However, the much vaunted - and u n f a i l i n g l y d i s a p p o i n t i n g - " T r i p l e 
A l l i a n c e " of c o a l , s t e e l and t r a n s p o r t unions f a i l e d to d e l i v e r the 
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n e c e s s a r y s o l i d a r i t y . I n p a r t i c u l a r , the ISTC made i t c l e a r t h a t i t would 
not support the miners, because of the r i s k to t h e i r own members jobs. 
Attempts to l i m i t coke burn by n e g o t i a t i o n to t h a t r e q u i r e d to stop the 
b l a s t furnaces c r a c k i n g f a i l e d (see i b i d , 85-88: Adeney and Lloyd, 1986, 
138: C a l l i n i c o s and Simons, 1985 f o r d i f f e r i n g accounts). 
Sporadic and uneven p i c k e t i n g a t Orgreave began on May 23rd and culminated 
on June 18th. I t began when BSC r e a c t e d to the c o l l a p s e i n s t e e l production 
a t Scunthorpe and an e x p l o s i o n i n the "Queen Mary" b l a s t furnace, by 
d e c i d i n g to b r i n g i n s u p p l i e s of high q u a l i t y coke by l o r r y from Orgreave. 
P r i o r to t h i s d e c i s i o n , Scunthorpe had been producing under a f r a g i l e 
d i s p e n s a t i o n agreement, which was supposed to guarantee d e l i v e r y of 17500 
toones of c o a l from Y o r k s h i r e p i t s . But BSC claimed t h a t they r e c e i v e d 
nowhere near t h i s aitiount, and furthermore, the q u a l i t y of t h i s c o a l was 
very poor. I r o n and s t e e l production f e l l to j u s t 17% of normal by the end 
of A p r i l (Wilsher e t a l . , 1985, 89-90). BSC a l s o knew t h a t s i n c e the s t a r t 
of the s t r i k e 
"Orgreave had been locked up t i g h t , with a miners' 
p i c k e t i n s t a l l e d permanently on a nearby rai l w a y 
bridge, en s u r i n g t h a t no NUR or ASLEP man would take a 
t r a i n i n or out." ( i b i d , 91) 
So the stage was s e t f o r the use of mass l o r r y convoys to bypass the 
s u c c e s s f u l r a i l w a y p i c k e t i n g . 
A 7 . 3 . i i The P o l i c e and s t a t e s t r a t e o y . 
P o l i c i n g at Orgreave represented the conscious s t r a t e g y of the s t a t e f o r 
d e a l i n g with the miners' s t r i k e and e s p e c i a l l y the t h r e a t posed by mass 
p i c k e t s . As Bunyan showed, the t a c t i c s grew out of the s u c c e s s f u l p i c k e t i n g 
by the NtiM i n 1972. 
"Previous mass demonstrations over Vietnam and South 
A f r i c a i n the l a t e 60's were, i n the main, c o n t r o l l e d 
by f o r c e of numbers r a t h e r than by the use of f o r c e . We 
have w i t n e s s e d a r e t u r n not t o the p o l i c e backed by the 
army and m i l i t i a as i n the l a s t century, but of a 
r i o t - t r a i n e d , p a r a - m i l i t a r y f o r c e drawn from the ranks 
of o r d i n a r y p o l i c e o f f i c e r s . " (Bunyan, 1985, 293) 
The s u c c e s s i n 1972 of the miners' s t r i k e (culminating i n the famous 
S a l t l e y p i c k e t ) and the Dock s t r i k e , with the r e l e a s e of the " P e n t o n v i l l e 
f i v e " a f t e r massive demonstrations, l e d to the s e t t i n g up of the National 
S e c u r i t y Coiranission (NSC). B r i e f e d "with the immediate t a s k of drawing up 
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p l a n s t o defeat a prolonged s t r i k e and to combat ' f l y i n g p i c k e t s ' " ( i b i d , 
294), the review heralded fundamental changes i n p u b l i c order p o l i c i n g . 
"From t h i s [review] stemmed: the c r e a t i o n of S p e c i a l 
P a t r o l Groups i n a l l urban c e n t r e s ; the arming of 
s p e c i a l i s t p o l i c e u n i t s and a general i n c r e a s e i n guns 
t r a i n i n g ; the c r e a t i o n of P o l i c e Support U n i t s , 
i n i t i a l l y and o s t e n s i b l y f o r C i v i l Defence purposes; 
the removal from the Home O f f i c e of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
d e a l i n g with c i v i l emergencies ( d i s a s t e r s , s t r i k e , 
p u b l i c order) and i t s t r a n s f e r t o the C i v i l 
Contingencies U n i t i n the Cabinet O f f i c e ; the c r e a t i o n 
of the National Reporting Centre; the extension of the 
S p e c i a l Branch to a l l f o r c e s outside London and t h e i r 
remit expanded to i n c l u d e a wide d e f i n i t i o n of 
'su b v e r s i v e s ' ( t h i s only became p u b l i c i n December 
1984); the formulation of s t r a t e g i c and t a c t i c a l plans 
f o r the use of troops i n s t r i k e s under M i l i t a r y A i d to 
the C i v i l M i n i s t r i e s (MACM) and f o r d i s o r d e r s . M i l i t a r y 
A i d t o the C i v i l Power (MACP)." ( i b i d ) 
To t h i s l i s t we might add the r e d i r e c t i o n of MI5 away from i t s t r a d i t i o n a l 
obsession with the "Soviet t h r e a t " to the i n t e r n a l " t h r e a t " posed by 
"s u b v e r s i v e s " (Wright, 1987). 
I n s t e a d of r e l y i n g on the army t o maintain p u b l i c order i n times of tensi o n 
caused by i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n or p o l i t i c a l p r o t e s t , the s t a t e chose to c r e a t e 
a " T h i r d Force", drawn from the p o l i c e but f i l l i n g a r o l e between the 
p o l i c e and army. T h i s mobile p a r a - m i l i t a r y f o r c e was q u i c k l y i n a c t i o n . I n 
1973 the SPG shot dead two young P a k i s t a n i ' s , and i n 1974 they k i l l e d Kevin 
Gateley a t an a n t i - N a t i o n a l Front demonstration. At Grunwicks the SPG were 
repe a t e d l y used a g a i n s t p i c k e t s . I n 1979 B l a i r Peach was k i l l e d by the SPG 
as they went on the rampage a t another anti-NF demonstration (Bunyan, 
1985). David McNee, then Metropolitan P o l i c e Commissioner s a i d : 
" I f you keep o f f the s t r e e t s of London and behave 
y o u r s e l f you won't have the SPG to worry about" (quoted 
i n i b i d , 296) 
However, the 1980 and 1981 r i o t s - where the p o l i c e l o s t c o n t r o l of the 
inn e r c i t i e s f o r long periods - l e d t o a f u r t h e r r e v i s i o n of t a c t i c s ( i b i d , 
295-297). 
These new t a c t i c s were t r i e d out a t the Warrington dis p u t e between the NGA 
and Eddie Shah. 
"The NGA speaker van was a t t a c k e d and overturned by 
p o l i c e , and squads with f u l l r i o t gear, i n c l u d i n g the 
now f a m i l i a r NATO helmet and face . masks, repeatedly 
charged the p i c k e t s . The p o l i c e were seemingly more 
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i n t e r e s t e d i n e x a c t i n g p h y s i c a l punishment than i n 
making a r r e s t s . . . For the f i r s t time i n an i n d u s t r i a l 
d ispute p a r a - m i l i t a r y p o l i c i n g more ak i n to t h a t used 
i n Northern I r e l a n d had been used to a t t a c k s t r i k e r s . " 
( i b i d , 297, emphasis added) 
A s e c r e t p o l i c e review i n 1981 by an A s s o c i a t i o n of C h i e f P o l i c e O f f i c e r s 
(ACPO) working p a r t y l e d to the p r e p a r a t i o n of a s e c r e t manual of p o l i c e 
p r a c t i c e s i n 1982 ( i b i d , 301-2). S e c t i o n s of the manual were made p u b l i c at 
the Orgreave r i o t t r i a l . They i n c l u d e d the r e v e l a t i o n t h a t PSU's (po l i c e 
support u n i t s ) are t r a i n e d to go i n t o a crowd, not with the i n t e n t i o n of 
a r r e s t i n g them, but to " i n c a p a c i t a t e " them (Jackson and Wardle, 1986, 83). 
"The most f a m i l i a r i n s t r u c t i o n concerning miners' 
p i c k e t s i s t h a t where t h e r e are 20 o f f i c e r s with short 
s h i e l d s and batons they should ' run at the crowd i n 
p a i r s i n order to d i s p e r s e and/or i n c a p a c i t a t e ' . " 
(Bunyan, 1985, 302) 
" S i m i l a r l y another maneuvre t h a t i s proposed i s t h a t 
a l l the o f f i c e r s a t the scene should run forward to 
' d i s p e r s e the crowd and i n c a p a c i t a t e m i s s i l e throwers 
and r i n g l e a d e r s by s t r i k i n g i n a c o n t r o l l e d manner 
with batons about the arms and l e g s or t o r s o so as not 
to cause s e r i o u s i n j u r y ' . " ( E a s t e t a l . , 1985, 312) 
T h i s of course amounts to an o f f i c i a l i n s t r u c t i o n to a s s a u l t . The concept 
of i n c a p a c i t a t i n g someone i n a " c o n t r o l l e d manner" so as not to cause 
" s e r i o u s i n j u r y " would be laughable i f i t were not so h o r r i f i c . 
I t i s t h e r e f o r e q u i t e c l e a r t h a t the p o l i c e a r r i v e d at Orgreave with a 
s t r a t e g y and t a c t i c s which had been w e l l prepared. Repeatedly, i n the media 
and i n the c o u r t s , the p o l i c e j u s t i f i e d t h e i r a c t i o n s a t Orgreave by saying 
t h a t they siit^^ly responded to the overwhelming a s s a u l t by the miners. I n 
r e a l i t y , they executed a c a r e f u l l y engineered s t r a t e g y , using t a c t i c s 
developed over 10 y e a r s and honed i n e a r l i e r i n d u s t r i a l disputes. But why 
d i d the s t a t e choose s a t u r a t i o n p o l i c i n g and the c r i m i n a l law as t h e i r main 
s t r a t e g y f o r d e a l i n g with the d i s p u t e , r a t h e r than the c i v i l law? 
As M c l l r o y has pointed out, although p i c k e t s enjoyed c e r t a i n l i m i t e d 
immunities from c i v i l law between 1906 and 1980, they enjoyed v i r t u a l l y no 
p r o t e c t i o n from the c r i m i n a l law. There i s no l e g a l r i g h t to p i c k e t . 
"The only i n d i s p u t a b l y l a w f u l p i c k e t s are those who 
a t t e n d i n s m a l l nxrmbers and who keep out of everybody's 
way. Meanwhile, the workers they have come to persuade 
to j o i n them can sweep p a s t i n v e h i c l e s which the 
p i c k e t s have no r i g h t to stop." (Wedderburn, quoted i n 
Mcllroy, 1985, 102) 
Any atten^jt to h a l t c a r s or p e d e s t r i a n s c o u l d a t t r a c t c r i m i n a l prosecution. 
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I n 1980 and 1982 the government removed some of the most important c i v i l 
immunities f o r s t r i k e r s and t h e i r unions, concentrating on a c t i o n taken 
a g a i n s t so c a l l e d "secondary" eir^^loyers and workers. Henceforth p i c k e t s and 
t h e i r unions were l i a b l e f o r damages i f p i c k e t i n g any workplace other than 
t h e i r own. The p i c k e t i n g code of p r a c t i c e which accompanied these Acts 
s e v e r e l y r e s t r i c t e d the a c t i o n s of p i c k e t s , and i t was errphasised t h a t 
these g u i d e l i n e s should be taken i n t o account by the c r i m i n a l courts. 
(Mcllroy, 1985, 103). 
Given these developments, i t i s perhaps s u r p r i s i n g t h a t the s t a t e chose to 
r e l y on the c r i m i n a l r a t h e r than the c i v i l law to c o n t r o l the dispute. 
M c l l r o y e x p l a i n s t h a t : 
"There was the f e a r - j u s t i f i e d or not i n hindsight -
t h a t such an i n i t i a t i v e c ould change the bone of 
contention, focus the disp u t e on r e s i s t a n c e to 
i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s l e g i s l a t i o n , and u n i t e a union 
fragmenting over c l o s u r e s . " ( i b i d , 104) 
The s u c c e s s of s a t u r a t i o n p o l i c i n g under the c e n t r a l c o n t r o l of the 
Nat i o n a l Reporting Centre (NRC) (Bunyan, 1985, 298), meant t h a t there was 
l e s s need to r e l y on c i v i l a c t i o n , with the r i s k of widening the dispute 
(see a l s o E a s t e t a l . , 1985, 307). F a r b e t t e r , i f p o s s i b l e , to portray the 
s t r i k e as a s i i r ^ j l e "law 'n order" i s s u e . 
Precedents had a l r e a d y been s e t . 
"Previous court d e c i s i o n s meant t h a t t h e r e was, i n the 
end, no r i g h t to p i c k e t . . . Yet because trade u n i o n i s t s 
p e r c e i v e d approaching f e l l o w workers to be both r i g h t 
and necessary, s t r i k e r s would p i c k e t and, i f 
f r u s t r a t e d , would do so i n ever g r e a t e r numbers. As a 
consequence they would be breaking the c r i m i n a l law and 
could l e g i t i m a t e l y be answered by the growing presence 
and r e s t r a i n t of the p o l i c e . The workers' r e a c t i o n -
defence of what they saw as t h e i r r i g h t s - would then 
become, i n the eyes of the law and of law-abiding 
c i t i z e n s , g r a t u i t o u s and o f f e n s i v e v i o l e n c e . " (Mcllroy, 
1985, 105) 
A s p i r a l of v i o l e n c e was i n i t i a t e d as the p i c k e t s t r i e d to e x e r c i s e what 
they saw as t h e i r r i g h t s , and the p o l i c e a c t e d to enforce the c r i m i n a l law 
as i n t e r p r e t e d over the y e a r s ( i b i d , 106-7). 
"The l e g a l e d i f i c e now works to make e f f e c t i v e 
p i c k e t i n g c r i m i n a l and t h e r e f o r e a c t s as a d i r e c t agent 
of the employer i n i n d u s t r i a l d i s p u t e s . " ( i b i d , 106: 
en^ihasis i n o r i g i n a l ) 
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P r i o r to the mass Orgreave p i c k e t , most p i c k e t and p o l i c e a t t e n t i o n had 
been focussed on the Nottingham c o a l f i e l d . P o l i c e concentrated on 
preventing p i c k e t i n g of any type - a s t r a t e g y reaching i t s peak i n the 
D a r t f o r d tunnel road b l o c k s ( E a s t e t a l , 1985; 308-9: Mcllroy, 1985; 106). 
As M cllroy says, c i t i n g Orgreave i n p a r t i c u l a r , 
"The evidence accumulated of mass m i l i t a r y - s t y l e 
intended not to r e g u l a t e p i c k e t i n g , nor to guarantee 
p e a c e f u l p i c k e t i n g , but c l e a r l y aimed at stopping a l l 
p i c k e t i n g i s i i t p r e s s i v e . " (Mcllroy, 1985, 107: emphasis 
i n o r i g i n a l ) 
The p o l i c e s t r a t e g y made v i o l e n c e on the p i c k e t l i n e s i n e v i t a b l e . When 
smal l , p e a c e f u l p i c k e t s were met by p o l i c e o b s t r u c t i o n , when the p o l i c e 
blocked atteirpts to p i c k e t a t a l l (Nottingham's c h i e f constable estimated 
t h a t 164508 people were prevented from e n t e r i n g the county i n the f i r s t 
h a l f of the s t r i k e - Mcllroy, 1985, 106), and when l a r g e r p i c k e t s were met 
by snatch squad a r r e s t s , b e a t i n g s and short s h i e l d u n i t charges, i t was 
i n e v i t a b l e the p i c k e t s would respond w i t h b r i c k s . 
On top of t h i s , the savage war waged on the p i c k e t s and s t r i k e r s i n the 
Nottingham p i t v i l l a g e s i n the f i r s t few weeks of the s t r i k e should not be 
forgotten (Coulter e t a l . , 1984, 81-93 and 100-104: Beaton, 1985). Such 
l e v e l s of p o l i c e b r u t a l i t y , i n c l u d i n g kidnap and t o r t u r e , formed an 
e s s e n t i a l backdrop both t o p o l i c e t a c t i c s a t Orgreave, and to the miners 
response to them. 
P o l i c e t a c t i c s a t Orgreave on June 18th had been c l e a r l y s i g n posted i n the 
preceding mass p i c k e t s t h e r e (see C o u l t e r e t a l , , 1984, 93-100 fo r a 
thorough account of p o l i c e provocation and b r u t a l i t y on May 29th). On these 
o c c a s s i o n s the s t r a t e g y I o u t l i n e d above were put through there paces. On 
May 29th f o r exan^ile, a normal p i c k e t with a t r a d i t i o n a l push and shove was 
d r a m a t i c a l l y transformed when the p o l i c e i s s u e d the i n s t r u c t i o n "Take 
p r i s o n e r s ! " ( i b i d , 96-7). A f t e r s e v e r a l beatings and a r r e s t s , some p i c k e t s 
a t the back began to throw stones. The p o l i c e charged the p i c k e t s on 
horses, w i e l d i n g long batons, and were followed up by short s h i e l d u n i t s . 
A r r e s t s were extremely b r u t a l . Three charges were made, with no response 
from the p i c k e t s except t o run away. As C o u l t e r e t a l . say: 
"For the r e s t of the afternoon, from about two o'clock 
u n t i l four, they [the p o l i c e ] gave a v a r i e d 
demonstration of r i o t c o n t r o l t a c t i c s which were 
e v i d e n t l y w e l l r e h e a r s e d and which had next to nothing 
to do w i t h what the p i c k e t s were doing." ( i b i d , 97) 
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A 7 . 3 . i i i The miners a t Orgreave. 
Most miners a r r i v e d a t Orgreave to demonstrate t h e i r s o l i d a r i t y with the 
union. They d i d not come t o cause a r i o t . However, i n c i d e n t s such as t h a t 
a t the S h e f f i e l d Trades and Labour Club on A p r i l 17th, e a r l i e r mass p i c k e t s 
a t Orgreave (on May 29th, 31st and June 6 t h ) , and the p o l i c e a c t i o n s i n 
Nottinghamshire meant t h a t many were no longer s u r p r i s e d by p o l i c e 
v i o l e n c e . Some undoubtedly a r r i v e d with the i n t e n t i o n of throwing m i s s i l e s 
a t the p o l i c e i f , as expected, they would not be allowed to p i c k e t . But by 
f a r the m a j o r i t y were t h e r e s i n p l y to demonstrate a common purpose, to show 
t h e i r support f o r the n a t i o n a l union, and to t r y and stop the l o r r i e s going 
i n (although very few h e l d out a r e a l i s t i c hope f o r t h i s l a s t o b j e c t i v e ) . 
I f miners had come to Orgreave expecting and hoping to engage i n a r i o t , or 
indeed any v i o l e n t a c t s a g a i n s t the p o l i c e , they would not have a r r i v e d i n 
tee s h i r t s and t r a i n e r s , as they did . They would have brought p r o t e c t i v e 
c l o t h i n g , armed themselves w i t h iit^ilements to throw a t the p o l i c e , and to 
h i t them with. I n f a c t , i t was the p o l i c e who a r r i v e d i n p r o t e c t i v e 
c l o t h i n g , c a r r y i n g s h i e l d s , armed with clubs, dogs and horses. 
Miners were not prepared f o r the onslaught t h a t met them a t Orgreave. Over 
the previous t e n y e a r s i n which the s t a t e was preparing i t s t a c t i c s , 
p r a c t i c i n g new methods, deploying new equipment, the miners were going 
about t h e i r normal work. The union l e a d e r s h i p f a i l e d to develop any new 
t a c t i c s a f t e r the suc c e s s of 1972, and r e l i e d on the same methods twelve 
y e a r s l a t e r . Miners a r r i v e d hoping t h a t by sheer f o r c e of numbers they 
might stop the l o r r i e s going i n . T h i s t a c t i c followed the p o l i c e a c t i o n i n 
banning p i c k e t s from the p a r t i a l l y s u c c e s s f u l atteirpt to t r y to persuade 
the l o r r i e s from going i n (Jackson and Wardle, 1986, 29-30). 
T h i s then was the background to the Orgreave p i c k e t . Coir^srehensive 
p r e p a r a t i o n s by the s t a t e and the p o l i c e meant t h a t they a r r i v e d with a 
b a t t l e p l a n ready to be executed. The p i c k e t s a r r i v e d f o r a t r a d i t i o n a l 
p i c k e t and show of s o l i d a r i t y . As the f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n shows, contrary to 
the media and p o l i c e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the p i c k e t s never developed a 
c o l l e c t i v e o f f e n s i v e momentum (never mind s t r a t e g y ) . 
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A 7.3.iv June 18th 1984: Sequence of events 
June 18th 1984 was a s c o r c h i n g hot summers day. P i c k e t s began to a r r i v e 
e a r l y , answering Arthur S c a r g i l l ' s c a l l f o r a mass show of strength. Right 
from the s t a r t , t h i s was a d i f f e r e n t day. A f t e r weeks and weeks of being 
unable t o p i c k e t because of a s u f f o c a t i n g r i n g of road blocks around 
Nottinghamshire, ininers found p o l i c e a c t u a l l y d i r e c t i n g them to Orgreave. 
Road bl o c k s were s t i l l i n operation on June 18th, stopping miners from 
g e t t i n g to Nottinghamshire (Jackson and Wardle, 1986, 32), and d i r e c t i n g 
them from these road b l o c k s t o Orgreave ( i b i d ; see photograph between pages 
52-53). A Murton mechanic was unequivocal: " I mean, there's no doubt we 
were d i r e c t e d t h e r e you know,.. p o l i c e were d i r e c t i n g people to Orgreave. 
I t was w e l l planned." 
The o f f i c i a l p o l i c e response t o t h e s e reports i s t h a t with so many p i c k e t s 
i n v o l v e d , i t was b e t t e r t o have them a l l together i n one p l a c e . Suddenly 
the s t r a t e g y of p r e v e n t i n g p i c k e t i n g at a l l was abandoned. Many of those 
who were th e r e b e l i e v e they had been s e t up to be given a good beating. 
What happened at Orgreave i s d e s c r i b e d i n v i v i d d e t a i l i n Jackson and 
Wardle's con^jrehensive account (1986). T h e i r d e s c r i p t i o n makes use of the 
p o l i c e ' own video of events, which provides i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l e proof to back 
the p i c k e t s account of events t h a t day ( i b i d ; see e s p e c i a l l y 78-80, and the 
evidence of p e r j u r y by Antony Clements, the o f f i c e r i n charge of p o l i c i n g 
a t Orgreave contained i n pages 57-85). 
At about 8.10 s e v e r a l thousand p i c k e t s faced a w a l l of p o l i c e at l e a s t 10 
deep, f o r the r i t u a l shove as the l o r r i e s went i n . The s c a l e of the p o l i c e 
presence was f r i g h t e n i n g . One Murton p i c k e t d e s c r i b e d h i s impressions. 
"When we went t h e r e we thought, 'Oh, we're brave'. Take 
the p i c k e t s down t o the f r o n t l i k e , our l a d s , s t r a i g h t 
down to the f r o n t . Standing l i k e t h a t . . . the scjuash, 
h e l l you thought you were going to get k i l l e d ! I f you'd 
l o s t your f e e t you were f r i g h t e n e d f o r you were going 
down..." ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
The p o l i c e video shows a v e r y o c c a s s i o n a l m i s s i l e coming over at t h i s 
stage. Some m i s s i l e s h i t p i c k e t s r a t h e r than policemen. 
Then, without warning or provocation, the p o l i c e l i n e s p a r ted and horses 
charged out. A f t e r l a s h i n g about, they returned to t h e i r l i n e s . Minutes 
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l a t e r , the same t h i n g happened, only t h i s time the p o l i c e l i n e advanced up 
behind the mounted o f f i c e r s . When the horses returned to p o l i c e l i n e s they 
were met by c h e e r i n g and c l a p p i n g from the p o l i c e ranks. 
At 9.20 the l o r r i e s l e f t Orgreave. Again there was a shove. Around 9.30 the 
p o l i c e came out again. T h i s time the s h o r t s h i e l d u n i t s - PSU's - attacked 
the p i c k e t s . 
"They seemed l i t t l e i n t e r e s t e d i n 'taking p r i s o n e r s ' 
and r a t h e r more concerned with i n j u r i n g . I t made no 
d i f f e r e n c e i f p i c k e t s stood s t i l l , r a i s e d t h e i r hands 
or ran away; truncheons were used on arms and l e g s , 
trunks and shoulders, and p a r t i c u l a r l y on heads and 
f a c e s . Men l a y around unconscious or semi-conscious 
with v i c i o u s wounds on t h i e r bodies, more often than 
not w i t h bloody gashes on the backs of t h e i r heads. 
(Jackson and Wardle, 1986, 34) 
T h i s account f i t s w e l l w i t h the t a c t i c s a d v i s e d i n the s e c r e t p o l i c e manual 
quoted e a r l i e r . P i c k e t s t r y i n g to run away fac e d p o l i c e dogs i n the woods 
to the l e f t , and motinted p o l i c e to the r i g h t . D i r e c t l y behind was a steep 
r a i l w a y embankment, with the only r e a l i s t i c means of escape a narrow bridge 
over the r a i l w a y l i n e . 
A f t e r t h i s second p o l i c e operation t h e r e was a l u l l u n t i l around 11.30. 
Already i t was s c o r c h i n g l y hot, and many p i c k e t s l e f t the f i e l d i n front of 
the p o l i c e l i n e to patch up i n j u r i e s or seek refreshments i n the l a r g e ASDA 
s t o r e i n Orgreave v i l l a g e . When p i c k e t s returned to the f i e l d , i t had been 
transformed i n t o a l a r g e p i c n i c a r e a . A few hundred men were s i t t i n g and 
standing around - many s h i r t l e s s - d r i n k i n g and e a t i n g . I n f r o n t of them 
though, the s o l i d l i n e of h e a v i l y p r o t e c t e d policemen s t i l l s t r e t c h e d 
a c r o s s the road and the f i e l d . 
At around 11.30, the p o l i c e began to execute what was c l e a r l y a c a r e f u l l y 
planned s t r a t e g y . I n a t h r e e stage movement, they advanced up the f i e l d . 
There was no provocation. Most of the p i c k e t s were not there. Those t h a t 
were, and were unable t o escape, r e c e i v e d . savage beatings, and were 
a r r e s t e d . With nowhere t o run to, many p i c k e t s were stair^jeded over the edge 
of the steep c l i f f down on to the main r a i l w a y ; l i n e . 
From then on, the p o l i c e went on the rampage.; B e l a t e d l y , p i c k e t s began to 
respond. By the end of the day, some of those t h a t were l e f t threw whatever 
Appendix 7 (443) 
they c o u l d a t the p o l i c e l i n e . Up i n the v i l l a g e , i n the ASDA c a r park, the 
p o l i c e continued to hand out a b r u t a l form of summary j u s t i c e . 
A 7.3.V Murton p i c k e t s a t Orgreave. 
Fear was the dominant theme i n every i n t e r v i e w I mentioned the Orgreave 
p i c k e t . I n v a r i a b l y mention of Orgreave l e f t the i n t e r v i e w e e stumbling 
around f o r a d j e c t i v e s s u f f i c i e n t to sum up the depth of t h e i r horror and 
f e a r a t what happened. 
"That's a time I ' l l never forget t h a t . Never forget. 
Never ever. Scared. R e a l l y s c a r e d . " (mechanic) 
" I ' v e never seen nowt l i k e t h a t afore i n my l i f e , 
Orgreave l i k e . . . 'Cos nobody ever thought they'd do 
what they did, you know? Couldn't b e l i e v e i t . " 
(mechanic) 
" I ' v e never been so f r i g h t e n e d as Orgreave, when the 
coppers was running up the bank with the horses." 
(miner) 
" H o r r i f y i n g , u n r e a l . . . That should never happen 
anywhere, never mind England." (mechanic) 
T h i s i s one mechanics r e c o l l e c t i o n of t h a t day. 
" I t was one of those days, a b e a u t i f u l summers day. I t 
was mind. B e a u t i f u l . Lads walking around with f l a s k s i n 
t h e i r hand, p l i m s o l l s on, sho r t s on, s h i r t s l e e v e s . I t 
was a p i c n i c day, ( s t a r t e d o f f as) f o r most of them. 
They were going to g i v e a push here and there, and get 
a push back. I would say 80% of the people t h e r e knew 
they weren't going to t o get anywhere. They weren't 
going t o stop t h a t convoy going i n . They were hoping to 
stop i t j u s t on sheer presence of numbers... I t didn't 
work t h a t way. . . When you see them coming out with 
t h e i r s h i e l d s and t h e i r helmets - i t ' s a red hot day 
tha' knows - then you s t a r t r e a l i s i n g these l a d s mean 
bu s i n e s s here. 
"What s c a r e d me from me own point of view. . . was 
i r r e s p o n s i b l e people a t the back throwing rocks. That 
s c a r e d us. You not only had t h a t t r o u b l e i n f r o n t of 
you, but you had t h a t t r o u b l e behind you. And the 
people t h a t ' s doing a l l the throwing, probably the 
n e a r e s t they ever got to the p i c k e t l i n e was 100 yards 
away. That s c a r e d us." 
There was an ever p r e s e n t danger of being trampled i n the crush at the 
f r o n t of the p i c k e t l i n e . 
"You know f o r a f a c t t h a t nobody's going to help when 
you're down on the bottom. That s c a r e d us... The p o l i c e 
s t a r t e d to move forward a b i t , and then the horses, 
them s c a r e d us. When the y ' r e coming out j u s t w i e l d i n g 
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s t i c k s . They were p l a y i n g polo with mens heads, t h a t ' s 
a l l they were doing. That s c a r e d us. 
"Then they s t a r t e d the f i r s t charge up the h i l l on 
horseback. I mean, Geordie w i l l probably t e l l you the 
same s t o r y . When me and him was running I was saying 
'Dinna p a n i c , t h a t ' s the worst t h i n g ' . I remember 
s a y i n ' i t . 'Trot. J u s t keep moving along.' Then you 
hear c l i p p e t y clop, and you t u r n round and t h e r e ' s a 
horse from here t o t h a t c u r t a i n o f f you. An' he's 
h i t t i n g people a c r o s s the back of the head l i k e , 
s t anding up i n h i s s t i r r u p s . You f e e l l i k e r e l i e v i n g 
y o u r s e l f , you know? You panic. That's the f i r s t t h i n g 
you do. Doesn't matter who gets i n your way. F r i e n d or 
foe. Your mind i s n ' t c o n c e n t r a t i n g on t h a t . You j u s t 
want t o get out of the way. You want to get as many 
bodies inbetween as you can. That s c a r e s you." 
(i n t e r v i e w ) 
Another mechanic r e l i v e d h i s experiences two and a h a l f years l a t e r . As the 
p o l i c e l i n e d up, he: 
" j u s t saw masses of p o l i c e w i t h s h i e l d s ; long s h i e l d s , 
s h o r t s h i e l d s . Saw the horses up on the h i l l t o p on the 
r i g h t , saw the dogs i n the f i e l d , knew i t was a 
t e r r i b l e s i t u a t i o n . . . The timing [of the p o l i c e 
charges] was a l l the p o l i c e timing. They would come out 
and they'd have the short s h i e l d men behind them -
which you didn't s t a y long enough to see them, you 
buggered o f f . " 
During the l u l l a f t e r the 9.30 p o l i c e advance, he l e f t with another Murton 
mechanic to get some food and d r i n k a t the ASDA s t o r e . Then they headed 
back t o the f i e l d i n f r o n t of the p o l i c e l i n e s . 
"So we're s a u n t e r i n ' down the road, p a s t Arthur 
S c a r g i l l . ' A l r i g h t ? ' [we asked]. 'Ah, I'm f u c k i n ' s i c k 
o' t h i s ! ' And he doesn't swear normally... And we 
walked on down.., And then suddenly t h e r e was l i k e 
dust, the f i r s t t h i n g we saw. And l a d s runnin'. Well i t 
was r e a l l y q u i e t , t h e r e wasn't even t h a t many [ p i c k e t s ] 
down t h e r e (or didn't appear to b e ) . . . And they ran up 
towards us you know. And we're s t i l l s a u n t e r i n ' down... 
"And then we saw i t - I ' l l never f o r g e t i t - the blue! 
And i t was the r e f l e c t i o n from the helmets. And th e r e 
was masses of them. .. And t h e r e were the horses 
charging. Well t h a t was [ i t ] you know... We took o f f i n 
a l l p a r t s . . . I ran o f f the road, through the c o r n f i e l d , 
'round t h e bushes, onto the bridge. They s t i l l kept 
coming. Ran up the road. They stopped f o r a while. 
I n the break t h a t followed, as the p o l i c e regrouped having coit^jleted 
another phase, he began t o t r y and help some of the s e v e r e l y i n j u r e d 
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p i c k e t s . He went to a house to ask f o r help, and the e l d e r l y woman l i v i n g 
t h e r e re-emerged with h a l f a cotton sheet she'd t o r n from a bed, to use f o r 
bandaging. He was s t i l l i n t h i s woman's garden helping an i n j u r e d man with 
one or two others, when the p o l i c e charged again. 
"Then the p o l i c e moved again. Now I ' l l never know why, 
because as I say I was busy then. And the next t h i n g 1 
knew t h e r e was a l l these bloody horses, f l y i n g . I was 
convinced a t one time they were coming i n t o the garden 
l i k e , they were t h a t c l o s e . They j u s t went crazy 
through t h e r e ! . . They went t e a r i n g up. We saw the 
sna t c h squads, the short s h i e l d s - hundreds of them -
r a c i n g p a s t us." 
I t was so bad, t h a t he decided to take the i n j u r e d man i n t o the house. But 
the others wanted him to s t a y outside to keep a look out. 
"When the door shut I was standing t h e r e on t h i s step, 
and I was watching them, and they were c r a z y man. They 
r e a l l y were. There was a r i o t t h a t day, and i t was the 
p o l i c e who r i o t e d . They went c r a z y . " 
At t h i s p o i n t he t r i e d t o phone f o r an ambulance, but the ambulance s e r v i c e 
s a i d they couldn't get down t h a t road. So he went out to t r y and f i n d an 
ambulance which he could guide down. 
"Well I wasn't too keen, I ' l l be honest. I went out and 
I looked up, and the p o l i c e were coming back then. So I 
says, 'maybe i f I wait a second or two t h e y ' l l be away 
and I can get out without any bother' . And they d i d 
come back, on t h e i r h o r s e s. Laughing. And t h a t ' s what 
got you - they were e n j o y i n g i t . Laughing and joking 
and t h r e a t e n i n g . Being so bloody s u p e r i o r . 
"Then I got c a l l e d a c r o s s the road. There was a l a d 
l y i n g t h e r e , and he says, 'Can you come over and have a 
look a t him?'.. Went a c r o s s , and the r e was a l a d - must 
have been 50 p l u s . And he had a horse p r i n t - a hoof 
p r i n t - t h e r e [ j u s t under h i s r i b cage]. He'd e i t h e r 
been k i c k e d or trodden on. Well, ity f i r s t r e a c t i o n , I 
thought he was dead! His f a c e was grey. I couldn't hear 
him b r e a t h i n g . . . He looked d r e a d f u l . C e r t a i n l y 
unconscious." 
D e s p e r a t e l y he ret u r n e d to the house to t r y and phone again f o r an 
ambulance. Again he was t o l d t h a t they c o u l d only get as f a r as the 
supermarket a t the top of the road. So he went up the road to t r y and b r i n g 
an ambulance down. 
" [ I ] stopped a p o l i c e c a r . Never f o r g e t t h a t , 'cos what 
he was doing t h e r e I don't know - a normal p a t r o l c a r . 
I e x p l a i n e d : 'I'm w a i t i n g f o r an ambulance. Where the 
h e l l a r e they? Why can't they get down t h i s s t r e e t ? ' 
And he t o l d us t o 'Fuck o f f . " 
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F i n a l l y an ambulance d i d a r r i v e , coming from the opposite d i r e c t i o n , 
through the p o l i c e l i n e s , and he returned to the Murton mechanics coach. I 
asked what the f e e l i n g on the coach was. 
"Shock... R e a l l y i t was panic and shock. I remember my 
f i r s t d r i n k was 2 paracetamol and a p i n t ! That's how I 
f e l t . I was b u r s t i n g ! Tense! And I t h i n k most of the 
people were. They'd f e l t f e a r they'd never f e l t before 
i n t h e i r l i v e s . They'd seen things they hadn't seen -
obviously. There was an element of p a n i c t h e r e . " 
Other i n t e r v i e w s confirmed t h a t w h i l s t the d e t a i l s of these two accounts 
are s p e c i f i c , the g e n e r a l experiences, f e e l i n g s and r e a c t i o n s were 
c o l l e c t i v e . I n f a c t , as Dave Teitple suggested: 
I t ' s been my o b s e r v a t i o n ( s i n c e the s t r i k e ) t h a t 
i n d i v i d u a l reminiscences become ' s o c i a l i s e d ' . That i s 
to say, they merge with t h a t of others, and sometimes 
c a r r y the staitp of a p a r t i c u l a r l e a d e r s observations a t 
the time - i e 'There was a r i o t a t Orgreave, i t was a 
p o l i c e r i o t ' . (pers comm) 
Nowhere i s t h i s more apparent than with Orgreave. I t was such a major 
event, and such an overwhelming experience, t h a t as the same mechanic 
quoted above s a i d , " I t ' s p r a c t i c a l l y a l l we t a l k e d about f o r the next three 
months." D i s t o r t e d media coverage f u r t h e r enphasized the subsequent 
obsession with Orgreave (see Douglass, 1985; Carrpaign f o r Press and 
Broadcasting Freedom, 1985). T h i s media coverage was so t o t a l l y at odds 
wi t h t h e i r own experience t h a t t a l k i n g about the day became an a c t of 
s o l i d a r i t y i n i t s e l f . 
I n t h i s account t h e r e i s no attempt to put the p o l i c e view of the Orgreave 
p i c k e t . People wish i n g t o f a m i l i a r i s e themselves with the p o l i c e view 
should read the opening address by p r o s e c u t i n g counsel at the Orgreave 
t r i a l (reproduced i n f u l l i n Jackson and Wardle, 1986, 1-5), and the report 
from the C h i e f Constable f o r South Y o r k s h i r e (Wright, 1985). I t can a l s o be 
noted t h a t 95 men (none of them policemen) were charged with r i o t or 
unlawful asseinbly a r i s i n g out of events on June 18th (both of which c a r r y a 
maximum l i f e sentence) (Wright, 1985) . Of these, the p o l i c e o f f e r e d no 
evidence a g a i n s t 80, and the remaining 15 were found not g u i l t y a f t e r the 
p o l i c e withdrew from the case 48 days i n t o the t r i a l (Jackson and Wardle, 
1986, 122) . 
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A 7.3.vi Aftermath. 
Obviously stones were thrown a t the p o l i c e . T h i s account does not atteitpt 
the f u t i l e t a s k of t r y i n g to e s t a b l i s h who threw the f i r s t o f f e n s i v e blow 
on the p i c k e t l i n e . I n s t e a d , i t shows t h a t v i o l e n c e a t Orgreave was caused 
by the conscious s t r a t e g i e s of the s t a t e . The p o l i c e had a s t r a t e g y and 
t a c t i c s worked out before they a r r i v e d a t Orgreave. This s t r a t e g y had 
evolved over the y e a r s , and was designed not to prevent breaches of the 
law, but to ensure t h a t e f f e c t i v e p i c k e t i n g could not take p l a c e . I t r e l i e d 
on a p l i a n t media who accept o f f i c i a l v e r s i o n s of events such as Orgreave. 
And i t was based upon the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d use of v i o l e n c e sanctioned by 
the s t a t e . 
Miners a t Orgreave were not i n t e n t on a r i o t . Dave Ten^le r e c a l l s Arthur 
S c a r g i l l urging the p i c k e t s down the h i l l towards the p i c k e t l i n e . But even 
he couldn't persuade them t o f i g h t the p o l i c e . As one York s h i r e p i c k e t 
g r i t t i l y responded: "Fuck o f f Arthur. I t ' s f u c k i n g murder down there . " 
For a b r i e f p e r i o d a t the end of the day, the Murton p i c k e t s - l i k e many 
people who had been t h e r e - were capable of an extreme r e a c t i o n . As one 
Murton mechanic s a i d : 
"The atten^Jt a t r e t r i b u t i o n , i f i t had worked, would 
have been worse than the p o l i c e , because l a d s r e a l l y 
d i d l o s e t h e i r c o o l . " ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
Some wanted to go back the next day. But the p i c k e t was c a l l e d o f f . Mass 
p i c k e t i n g was never again used as an o f f e n s i v e s t r a t e g y during the s t r i k e . 
A 7.4 ASSESSMENT AND IMPACT OF PICKET LINE EXPERIENCES 
Although i t was d i s c u s s e d many times, the miners a t Murton never passed the 
t h r e s h o l d of embracing major planned a c t s of sabotage. As Beynon reports, 
throughout the summer of 1984 d i s c u s s i o n s among p i c k e t s i n Durham focussed 
on how t o make p i c k e t i n g more e f f e c t i v e . I t would have r e q u i r e d a ' m i l i t a r y 
operation', but "very few miners seemed prepared to take the r i s k s t h a t 
such a c o n f r o n t a t i o n would i n v o l v e " (Beynon, 1985b, 397) Blowing up power 
l i n e s f o r example was d i s c u s s e d i n Murton. But o f f e n s i v e s t r i k e s of t h i s 
k i n d were never attempted. 
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One of the key reasons was t h a t miners - u n l i k e i n n e r c i t y m i n o r i t i e s -
have been i n t e g r a t e d i n t o the s t a t e and i t s processes. 
"Miners h i s t o r i c a l l y , to an extent f a r beyond any other 
groups i n the working c l a s s , have progressed t h e i r 
i n t e r e s t s throught the s t a t e . . . I n 1984, the miners 
were i n d i s p u t e over the P l a n For Coal, made between 
the NUM, the NCB and the government. As a group the 
miners are not the dispossesed. G e n e r a l l y they 
experience none of the f e e l i n g s of being outside 
' p o l i t i c s ' and beyond the s t a t e which a f f e c t s the 
consciousness of the b l a c k communities and the urban 
poor. While on s t r i k e , however, the miners were t r e a t e d 
l i k e the b l a c k communities and the poor." (Beynon, 
1985b, 400) 
P o l i t i c a l l y , events a t Orgreave, and indeed the general l e v e l of c l a s s 
c o n f l i c t i n the f i r s t months of the s t r i k e , provoked considerable 
involvement. A s e r i e s of evening c l a s s e s were organised i n Murton by Dave 
Tertple on b e h a l f of the Workers Revolutionary Party. People were searching 
f o r an e x p l a n a t i o n of what they had experienced, and considerable p o l i t i c a l 
debate ensued. Dave r e c r u i t e d some miners, and one or two mechanics i n t o 
the WRP. The r a d i c a l i s a t i o n of the young miners was a key p o l i t i c a l 
development i n Murton. 
However, as Beynon p o i n t s out (Beynon 1985b), there was a strong t e n s i o n i n 
the r a d i c a l i s a t i o n of the p i c k e t s . W h i l s t f o r some "things w i l l never be 
the same again", t h e r e was a l s o a strong d e s i r e to r e t u r n to "normality". 
The s t r i k e was a defence of the s t a t u s quo - an attempt to preserve the 
communities and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p with the c o a l i n d u s t r y . T r a d i t i o n a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s and a t t i t u d e s are woven deeply i n t o the f a b r i c of the p i t 
v i l l a g e s , and i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t i n the aftermath of the s t r i k e 
v i l l a g e s l i k e Murton s e t t l e d down to gi v e every appearance of c a r r y i n g on 
as before. 
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APPENDIX F.TGHT: PROUD TO GO BACK: THE ANTI-STRIKE 
DIEHARDS 
APPENDIX 8: PROUD TO GO BACK; THE ANTI-STRIKE DIEHARDS 
T h i s appendix e l a b o r a t e s on the arguments contained i n s e c t i o n 6.4 of the 
t h e s i s , concerning the m i n o r i t y of a n t i - s t r i k e diehards. I interviewed two 
men i n d e t a i l , and f u l l e r r e p o r t s on these i n t e r v i e w s are contained below. 
They a r e followed by a t e n t a t i v e explanation of the reasons why the r i g h t 
wing ideology both s u b s c r i b e d to became so s t r o n g l y rooted i n t h e i r 
b e l i e f s . 
I n the f i r s t weeks and months of the s t r i k e , the government and NCB 
concentrated t h e i r e f f o r t s on keeping the Nottingham c o a l f i e l d working, and 
p r e s s i n g f o r a n a t i o n a l b a l l o t . T h i s helped to undermine the legit i m a c y of 
the s t r i k e i n two ways. F i r s t l y , i t made i t d i f f i c u l t f o r the union to 
argue t h a t i t was a t r u l y n a t i o n a l s t r i k e . Secondly, by p l a y i n g on rank and 
f i l e d e s i r e f o r a b a l l o t , the government began the process of undermining 
the moral, and then l e g a l foundation of the dispute. 
However, i n areas l i k e Durham where the s t r i k e was coiqsletely s o l i d , very 
few men even considered going back a t t h i s stage. Negotiations proceeded, 
i f r a t h e r s p o r a d i c a l l y , a t a n a t i o n a l l e v e l , u n t i l J u l y 19th (Wilsher e t 
a l . , 1985, 127-136). There was s t i l l a r e a l i s t i c p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the 
s t r i k e might end i n a neg o t i a t e d settlement. I n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , the 
enormity of breaki n g a major a l l out s t r i k e was too great to be 
contemplated. 
A 8.1 "BOB'S" STORY 
One man who thought d i f f e r e n t l y , even a t t h i s e a r l y stage, was Bob. Three 
months i n t o the s t r i k e , he was alr e a d y t h i n k i n g about going back to work. 
I n t h i s r e s p e c t he d i f f e r e d from other men who went back l a t e r on i n the 
s t r i k e , most of whom didn't c o n s i d e r going back u n t i l the end of the 
summer. As the Chairman of the UDM a t Murton s a i d , i t was such a g l o r i o u s 
summer once they 
"got the sun on t h e i r backs, they j u s t didn't want to 
go back t o work. Men didn't want to go back to work. 
T i l l men f i n a l l y decided they had had to go back, or 
the s t r i k e would never end." ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
Bob eirphasised the b e l i e f t h a t i f people l i k e h i m s e l f hadn't gone back, 
"the s t r i k e would s t i l l be on today". L a t e r on i n the s t r i k e , t h i s was a l s o 
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to be d e c i s i v e i n persuading a l o t of other miners to go back. But f o r the 
moment, the m a j o r i t y s t i l l b e l i e v e d t h a t i t would not be necessary to break 
the s t r i k e f o r i t t o end, and i t was t h e r e f o r e not considered. Meanwhile, 
Bob d i s c u s s e d with h i s mates the i d e a t h a t someone would have to go back, 
to break the deadlock. He remembered arguing: "Well, somebody^ s got to make 
a push". But f o r the time being, i t didn't seem a r e a l i s t i c p o s s i b i l i t y . 
Over the summer, w h i l e Bob t a l k e d with h i s mates about the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
going back, he managed t o f i n d a job f o r a few weeks doing demolition work. 
I t only p a i d £9 a day, and the work was hard and dangerous. But at l e a s t he 
was ab l e to get out f o r a couple of ni g h t s a week. Then, towards the end of 
the summer, h i s w i f e became i l l and had to go i n t o h o s p i t a l . I t was c l e a r 
Bob couldn't cope w i t h t h i s s i t u a t i o n . When h i s wif e came back, tension i n 
the house rose, and s h o r t l y afterwards - f e e l i n g overwhelmed by the 
p r e s s u r e of the s t r i k e and domestic problems - he l e f t . A f t e r two weeks 
s t a y i n g w i t h r e l a t i v e s i n Murton, and c o n s i d e r i n g h i s p o s i t i o n , he came 
back to h i s wife, and t o l d her he was going back to work. He was however 
i n s i s t e n t t h a t h i s w i f e had not put p r e s s u r e on him to go back. 
C l e a r l y t h e r e f o r e t h e r e were a number of reasons why Bob went back to work. 
These need to be s e p e r a t e d i n t o the reasons why he broke the s t r i k e , and 
the reasons why he went back when he d i d . Looking at the former. Bob made 
no apology f o r the f a c t t h a t he was a g a i n s t the s t r i k e from the s t a r t . 
Going back f u r t h e r , he voted a g a i n s t s t r i k e a c t i o n i n a l l three s t r i k e 
b a l l o t s i n 1982 and '83. He had a powerful d i s l i k e f o r Arthur S c a r g i l l . 
" I mean, I was a union man. [But] from the day Arthur 
S c a r g i l l took over, the c o a l mines have gone r i g h t 
d o w n h i l l . " ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
E a r l i e r s t i l l , he proclaimed h i s support f o r i n c e n t i v e schemes, against 
S c a r g i l l . 
At the s t a r t of the s t r i k e . Bob confirmed h i s r e p u t a t i o n as a r i g h t winger. 
Both r i g h t and l e f t remember h i s i n t e r v e n t i o n s a t union meetings at the 
s t a r t of the s t r i k e . A f t e r the f i r s t meeting (when the lodge voted not to 
s t r i k e ) , he remembered stan d i n g up a t the meeting the f o l l o w i n g week, and 
a s k i n g "what about the b a l l o t ? " . The young p r o - s t r i k e a c t i v i s t s gathered at 
the f r o n t of t h e h a l l h e c k l e d him v o c i f e r o u s l y , as they d i d anyone who 
t r i e d t o c r i t i c i s e the s t r i k e or c a l l f o r a b a l l o t . 
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He attended about four lodge meetings during the s t r i k e . At a l l of them he 
was met by c o n s i d e r a b l e v e r b a l abuse from the young a c t i v i s t s - " I was 
booed out". Nevertheless, he cl a i i n s t h a t he was supported by the majority 
a t those meetings. They were a f r a i d to express t h e i r support because of 
i n t i m i d a t i o n from the a c t i v i s t s . Bob i n s i s t e d t h a t i n t i m i d a t i o n wasn't only 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l . T h i s argument was supported by other r i g h t wingers and some 
on the l e f t , who concede t h a t the t h r e a t of being " v e n t i l a t e d " deterred 
many people from going back. 
However, up u n t i l the f i r s t people went back, the pr e s s u r e s must have been 
l a r g e l y p s y c h o l o g i c a l . Although Bob s a i d he only h a l f r e a l i s e d the extent 
t o which people would r e a c t , most people knew t h a t breaking the s t r i k e -
scabbing - would never be forgotten. They knew the kin d of s o c i a l i s o l a t i o n 
and v i c t i m i s a t i o n t h a t scabbing would a t t r a c t . I n Murton, a strong reminder 
was provided by the 1972 s t r i k e . Although the NUM branches supported the 
s t r i k e s o l i d l y , NACODS members c r o s s e d p i c k e t l i n e s . As one mechanic 
remembered, t h a t was 
"old s t y l e p i c k e t i n g . People t h a t went i n walked the 
gau n t l e t . No p o l i c e t h e r e , nowt. You know, s h i n 
k i c k i n g , a l l kinds. But th e r e was never nee bother as 
such." ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
Deputies who went through the l i n e were t r e a t e d with great h o s t i l i t y i n the 
v i l l a g e . They became p a r i a h s , o u t c a s t s i n the community. Some never f u l l y 
recovered from the p s y c h o l o g i c a l p r e s s u r e s . 
People l i k e Bob, who were b i t t e r l y a n t i - s t r i k e , were looking a l l the time 
f o r an opportunity t o go back. I n a way, they were psyching themselves up 
to go throught the p i c k e t l i n e s , and overcome the p s y c h o l o g i c a l pressure of 
becoming a "scab". Because even f o r men who were a g a i n s t the s t r i k e from 
the s t a r t , t h e r e was a c o n s i d e r a b l e b a r r i e r t o c r o s s t o go through the 
p i c k e t l i n e f o r the f i r s t time. 
Turning to look a t the reasons why Bob went back when he did, probably the 
most important f a c t o r was opportunity. At the beginning of November, i t had 
become p o s s i b l e t o go back to work. N a t i o n a l l y , the papers and t v were 
r e l e n t l e s s l y en^Jhasizing the t r i c k l e back to work t h a t had followed the 
NACODS settlement, and t h e breakdown of n e g o t i a t i o n s between the NUM and 
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the NCB. I n Durham, i t was c l e a r t h a t men were breaking the t o t a l 
s o l i d a r i t y of many of the p r e v i o u s l y strikebound p i t s ^ . 
Furthermore, the breakdown of ne g o t i a t i o n s convinced p o t e n t i a l returnees 
t h a t i f they didn't make a move, then the s t r i k e could drag on for many 
more months. There was s t i l l no end i n s i g h t . T h i s f a c t o r was mentioned by 
Bob, when he was asked why he didn't go back e a r l i e r : "Because I always 
thought i t was going to end next week... I f i t hadn't been f o r people l i k e 
me, we'd s t i l l be on s t r i k e now!" So at the beginning of November, i t had 
become c l e a r t h a t the s t r i k e wasn't about to end; t h a t i f the men didn't 
break i t , i t could go on i n d e f i n i t e l y ; and t h a t i t was now p h y s i c a l l y and 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y p o s s i b l e t o break the s t r i k e . 
A 8.2 "KEN'S" STORY 
When Ken went back with two of h i s mates i n l a t e November, they brought the 
number back a t Murton t o 27. Ken made made even more e x p l i c i t the 
iir^jortance of the f i r s t men back, and the momentum the media b u i l t up i n 
November. He t o l d how he was "looking a t the papers" to see i f there was 
anyone back a t Murton. A f t e r he saw a report i n the paper, he phoned the 
personnel manager, and was t o l d t h e r e were about s i x back. So he decided to 
go back. "As soon as they c o u l d get me through t h a t p i c k e t l i n e , I went 
back t o work." He'd t a l k e d about going back before with h i s two mates, and 
another man who backed out a t the l a s t moment. But they'd decided they 
couldn't go back i n s a f e t y . "Nobody's s t u p i d - no brave - enough to s t i c k 
t h e i r necks out l i k e t h a t . " I n J u l y , a f t e r the f i r s t l e t t e r from the 
manager a s k i n g men t o go back, he'd gone to the crossroads a t the top of 
the T e r r a c e (Woods T e r r a c e ) , and looked a t the p i c k e t l i n e . I t j u s t wasn't 
on. 
The h e a d l i n e s i n t h e Ne«rcast;le J o u r n a l f o r t h i s p e r i o d show the momentiim 
t h a t t h e media a t t r i b u t e d t o a tlx i y nuntoer of ret u r n e e s (the f i g u r e s 
i n c l u d e the Northumberland c o a l f i e l d ) . "NORIH STRIKE REVOLT GROWS", and 
"PICKET LXNE BATTLE AS MINERS GO BACK" (8-11-84). "COUNCILLOR JOINS 
REBELS", and "HOH 78 ARE BACK AT WORK" (9-11-84). MORE REBELS SET FOR 
RETURN" (12-11-84). 
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Ken's opposition to the s t r i k e was based on the b e l i e f t h a t i t had been 
wrongly c a l l e d . Without a b a l l o t i t l a c k e d l e g i t i m a c y . Before the s t r i k e he 
admitted he'd not got i n v o l v e d with the union. He c r i t i c i s e d h i s apathy 
then. 
" I wish now I ' d gone [to union meetings] and made my 
v o i c e heard... Before the s t r i k e I was probably very 
s e l f c entred." ( i n t e r v i e w ) 
But being f o r c e d not to work p o l i t i c i s e d him. L i k e Bob, he showed a l o t of 
the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a " r i g h t winger" before the s t r i k e . Working at bank 
meant he was low paid, and l i k e many s u r f a c e workers he worked masses of 
overtime. His y e a r s underground a t Elemore convinced him t h a t a properly 
administered i n c e n t i v e scheme was b e n e f i c i a l f o r workers and management 
(and not j u s t i n the c o a l i n d u s t r y e i t h e r ! ) . 
His f a m i l y backed up Ken's m i l i t a n t l y i n d i v i d u a l i s t stance. His wife and 
two of h i s daughters worked a t the same f a c t o r y making n a t u r a l casings f o r 
sausages from pigs i n t e s t i n e s ( " I t pays a wage a t the end of the week, and 
we don't go on s t r i k e . " ) His t h i r d daughter worked at a garments fa c t o r y , 
and h i s son worked a t Murton. I i n t e r v i e w e d a l l except h i s son. 
They a l l hated \inions. 
"No, I don't l i k e unions. Mind, sa y i n g t h a t , when 
unions f i r s t s t a r t e d they were the b e s t t h i n g s t h a t 
ever happened to men, and women. Because they were 
downtrodden. The unions got them b e t t e r wages... But 
they j u s t - how can I put i t ? - they got too c l e v e r . So 
what's going t o happen i s , i f they don't calm down -
t h i s i s j u s t my opinion mind - i f they don't calm down 
t h e r e ' s going t o be no unions. 'Cos they're a l l going 
to be banned... They're g e t t i n g above t h e i r s e l v e s . They 
cannot d i c a t a t e t o a boss." (wife) 
"Unions i s a l l out f o r themselves." (Daughter B) 
They a l l hated Arthur S c a r g i l l too. "He's not a man, he's a monster!" At 
the s t a r t of the s t r i k e . Ken's wi f e and daughters went to the Barbary Club 
i n Sunderland to ask S c a r g i l l why Murton was out on s t r i k e when they wanted 
a b a l l o t . They were pushed out of the road by S c a r g i l l ' s bodyguards, 
i n c l u d i n g members of Wearmouth lodge committee. They couldn't get near him. 
"That's how f r i g h t e n e d he was - of f i v e women!" 
" I d i d n ' t l i k e h i s bombastic a t t i t u d e r i g h t from the 
s t a r t . . . What he was going to do, and what he was not 
going t o do... He's j u s t the mouthpiece, he's not the 
union!.. I t ' s t h e men - the rank and f i l e - who are the 
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union. Unfortunately, the NUM, as with a l o t of other 
unions, they don't want to be bothered. So they l e t 
themselves be l e d . " 
The f a m i l y saw the s t r i k e as an i s s u e of i n d i v i d u a l freedom. 
" I b e l i e v e t h a t every man should do what he wants to 
do. T h i s i s supposed to be a f r e e country. Not to be 
d i c t a t e d . I mean, i f you want a d i c a t a t o r s h i p you go 
and l i v e behind the I r o n C u r t a i n , p l a c e s l i k e t h a t . " 
T h i s r e p l y m i r r o r e d Ken's own. There was no l e g a l r i g h t to stop a man going 
to work, he argued. 
On the question of p i t c l o s u r e s . Ken showed more doxibt than h i s family. 
I n t e r v i e w i n g him alone a few weeks before i n t e r v i e w i n g him with h i s family, 
he began by saying: 
"I'm what you might say f i n a n c i a l l y minded... I contend 
t h a t i f a p i t i s t o t a l l y uneconomic, I don't see why 
the taxpayer should s u b s i d i s e i t . " 
However, he conceded t h a t t h e r e i s a balance to be struck . Since a p i t 
c l o s u r e would c o s t the taxpayer some money, you "could probably run a p i t 
at a s m a l l l o s s , and s t i l l break even [ o v e r a l l ] . " 
Then he ran through some of the important c l o s u r e s i n Durham before the 
s t r i k e . At South Hetton he argued t h a t the men went back to work t h e i r o l d 
workings when they t r a n s f e r r e d to Murton so i t wasn't r e a l l y a cl o s u r e , 
B l a c k h a l l he thought c l o s e d because i t was too wet. He'd heard t h a t 
Houghton was exhausted. I n some c a s e s , the NUM's own engineer had agreed 
with c l o s u r e s . So w h i l s t he conceded t h a t i n p r i n c i p l e t h e i r might be cases 
where c l o s u r e might c o s t more than keeping a p i t open, i n p r a c t i c e t h i s was 
a v e r y r a r e occurrence. 
His f a m i l y were r a t h e r more i n f l e x i b l e than t h i s . 
"Nobody - I don't c a r e who i t i s - i s going to keep a 
p i t open what's running a t a l o s s . I f they were 
p r i v a t e , they'd have c l o s e d y e a r s before." 
" I mean, you couldn't have a bu s i n e s s of your own, and 
run i t a l o s s ! Where's the money coming from? I t ' s the 
same w i t h p i t s . Same wi t h shipyards. Same with 
anything. You can't l e t them run a t a l o s s l i k e t h a t . 
I f i t was p r i v a t e l y owned, as I say, they'd have been 
c l o s e d y e a r s ago... I mean, i t ' s only common sense. How 
long has the mine [Murton] been open? How much can you 
take out of the ground?" (wife) 
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Mrs Thatcher would be proud of the f a i t h t h i s working c l a s s family had i n 
the " i n v i s i b l e hand", and i t s omnipotent a u t h o r i t y . Understanding why they 
were so committed to the system, and so h o s t i l e to those who challenge i t , 
r e q u i r e s recourse to arguments which Nichols and Beynon developed i n t h e i r 
1977 book about workers a t a major chemical works i n southern England 
(Nichols and Beynon, 1977, 193-198). 
A 8.3 THE IDEOLOGY OF SACRIFICE 
I n t h i s work, N i c h o l s and Beynon t r y and e x p l a i n why workers who hate the 
mindless, r e p e t i t i v e , p h y s i c a l l y exhausting work they have to do, resent so 
s t r o n g l y people being on the dole. T h e i r explanation i s t h a t to workers 
"the i d e a of such men c o n s t i t u t e s an immense t h r e a t to the idelogy of 
s a c r i f i c e " , ( i b i d , 196; eirphasis i n o r i g i n a l ) which s u s t a i n s them through 
t h e i r u n f o r g i v i n g days of labour. These workers j u s t i f y t h e i r backbreaking 
work by the b e l i e f t h a t the s a c r i f i c e i s worth i t , f o r the l i f e that you 
buy with the rewards of labour. Not t h a t t h i s l i f e i s anything s p e c i a l , but 
a t l e a s t the s a c r i f i c e i s rewarded. But, as Beynon and Nichols suggest, 
" I f you pack bags a t 60 tons an hour, c a t c h them on 
your shoulders u n t i l they ache permanently, i t perhaps 
i s n ' t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t you o b j e c t to l a z i n e s s . " ( i b i d ) 
Seeing people g e t t i n g rewarded without making such a s a c r i f i c e , s t r i k e s a t 
the v e r y h e a r t of a workers s e l f j u s t i f i c a t i o n . 
The "ideology of s a c r i f i c e " a l s o l i e s behind those miners (and t h e i r 
f a m i l i e s ) who r e j e c t m i l i t a n c y i n favour of i n d i v i d u a l i s t s o l u t i o n s . One of 
the most c o n s i s t e n t themes among o l d e r miners who broke the s t r i k e - and 
one s t r o n g l y s u b s c r i b e d to by Bob and Ken - i s t h a t miners today don't know 
what r e a l work i s . They were h e a v i l y c r i t i c a l of the younger miners, who 
want to get p a i d f o r "doing nothing". For Bob, miners g e t t i n g p a i d the same 
as he was f o r t a k i n g i t easy - f o r example, t a k i n g a snap break f o r as long 
as p o s s i b l e when he never took one a t a l l - these miners were a t h r e a t to 
h i s world. He s t r o n g l y supported an i n c e n t i v e scheme because i t sor t e d out 
those t h a t r e a l l y worked from the l a z y ones. 
I n s t r u g g l i n g f o r i n d i v i d u a l advancement, he needed an ideology t h a t 
condemned those who were l e f t behind - those he was s t r u g g l i n g to r i s e 
above - as d e s e r v i n g what they got. An ideology such as t h a t h e l d by the 
" m i l i t a n t s " ; of s t r u g g l i n g together a g a i n s t a common enemy, of being a l l i n 
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i t together, and r e q u i r i n g i n d i v i d u a l s a c r i f i c e i n the p u r s u i t of common 
advantage - t h a t s t r u c k a t the very heart of h i s b e l i e f i n i n d i v i d u a l 
advancement. 
I n h i s only r e a l p r o t e s t a g a i n s t the present "system". Bob expressed 
b i t t e r n e s s t h a t i t wasn't p o s s i b l e f o r a working man to get ahead on the 
b a s i s of h i s m e r i t s . He commented c y n i c a l l y on the way th a t Lord Robens 
(former Chairman of the NCB) made m i l l i o n s , boosting h i s fortune with 
i n t e r m a r r i a g e s w i t h i n the c o a l i n d u s t r y . The working c l a s s man, he opined, 
has to work hard a l l h i s l i f e , and ye t he s t i l l gets no f u r t h e r forward. I f 
he's got the b r a i n s and a p p l i c a t i o n , he should be able to advance. And he 
quoted the case of a miner a t Murton who became an overman, but was unable 
to advance f u r t h e r because he hadn't had the r i g h t e d u c a t i o n a l background. 
Nevertheless - and perhaps s u r p r i s i n g l y - he confessed t h a t he didn't want 
to become an overman. " I couldn't have got a man the sack", he explained. 
He decided he wasn't r u t h l e s s enough to become a boss. Perhaps because of 
t h i s , he was p a r t i c u l a r l y b i t t e r about people who were overmen. They were 
the l a z y ones, who couldn't work themselves, and who got t h e i r p o s i t i o n s by 
c r a w l i n g to the bosses. 
Ken's philosophy c o n c e n t r a t e d on union p o l i t i c s . T h i s r e f l e c t e d h i s recent 
p o l i t i c i s a t i o n by the s t r i k e , con^jared t o Bob who was p o l i t i c a l l y i n v o l ved 
before the s t r i k e . S i n c e i t was the s t r i k e t h a t p o l i t i c i s e d him, i t was the 
i s s u e s of the s t r i k e about which Ken's p o l i t i c s revolved. B a s i c a l l y , he had 
absorbed most of the media arguments about trade union democracy. He 
o u t l i n e d the problem w i t h the union as being one where l e a d e r s get i n and 
then t e l l t h e i r members what to do. Unfortunately, the membership cannot be 
bothered to keep a check on the a c t i v i s t s who they e l e c t . This chimed with 
Ken's own experience, because he w i l l i n g l y c r i t i c i s e d h imself f o r having 
been one of those who hadn't cared. 
As a man who was - by h i s own account - doing "masses of overtime" (enough 
to doiable h i s standard wage), i t was not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t Ken adopted r i g h t 
wing i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of t r a d e unions. He too was making b i g s a c r i f i c e s . 
Depending on overtime f o r such a high proportion of h i s wages made him very 
v u l n e r a b l e , and dependant on management. Being dependant on an i n d i v i d u a l 
s o l u t i o n to low wages, he became used to pursuing i n d i v i d u a l s o l u t i o n s . Of 
course none of t h i s was i n e v i t a b l e . Some of the most m i l i t a n t p r o - s t r i k e 
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a c t i v i s t s i n the mechanics lodge were a l s o the most addicted to an extended 
working week. 
Which way i n d i v i d u a l s r e a c t e d given the p o t e n t i a l f o r i n d i v i d u a l i s m 
i n h e r e n t i n dependency on overtime and/or a committment to i n c e n t i v e 
schemes depended on f a c t o r s such as: t r a d i t i o n (the mechanics have a 
t r a d i t i o n of working overtime, so i t i s l e s s l i k e l y to be a d i s t i n g u i s h i n g 
f a c t o r between men), and p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s (which can e s t a b l i s h and 
r e i n f o r c e c o l l e c t i v e d i s c i p l i n e ) . How these f a c t o r s came together exerted a 
s t r o n g i n f l u e n c e on an i n d i v i d u a l s ideology, and how they reacted to the 
s t r i k e . 
A 8.4 CONCLUSION 
Both Bob and Ken, the two a n t i - s t r i k e diehards I i n t e r v i e w e d i n depth, had 
s t r o n g l y i n t e r n a l i s e d the government's arguments about the s t r i k e ' s 
i l l e g i t i m a c y . T h e i r i n d i v i d u a l i s m was t e n t a t i v e l y r e l a t e d to the "ideology 
of s a c r i f i c e " t h e s i s o u t l i n e d by Nichols and Beynon. 
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APPENDIX NINE: DECIDING WHETHER OR NOT TO GO BACK TO 
WORK 
APPENDIX 9: DECIDING WHETHER OR NOT TO GO BACK TO WORK 
Th i s appendix c o n t a i n s more d e t a i l e d r e p o r t s on four i n t e r v i e w s I d i d with 
miners who went back to work towards the end of the s t r i k e , or who came 
c l o s e to going back (see chapter s i x , s e c t i o n 6.5). Although these four 
c a s e s cannot c l a i m t o be a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e sairple, they do o f f e r i n s i g h t s 
i n t o the minds of miners who, by the end of the s t r i k e , had s i i r p l y reached 
the end of t h e i r t e t h e r . A l l four i n t e r v i e w s show the enormous 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l p r e s s u r e s which b u i l t up towards the end of such an 
exhausting s t r u g g l e . None of the i n t e r v i e w e e s wanted to go back, and they 
had a l l supported the g e n e r a l campaign a g a i n s t p i t c l o s u r e s . I n order to 
p r o t e c t anonymity, I have changed the names and some minor d e t a i l s i n the 
f o l l o w i n g accounts. 
A 9.1 "lAN'S" STORY. 
I n the New Year, many men who had p r e v i o u s l y not conteit^jlated r e t u r n i n g to 
work began to s e r i o u s l y c o n s i d e r i t . One was an o l d e r miner l i v i n g at 
Trimdon Grange - " I a n " . He p i c k e t e d l o c a l l y during the s t r i k e , but by the 
end, l i k e many men, h i s morale was a t rock bottom. By t h i s time the union 
had b e l a t e d l y woken up t o the f a c t t h a t the t r a v e l l e r s were most l i k e l y to 
break the s t r i k e , and meetings were organised i n the v i l l a g e s to t r y and 
counter the i s o l a t i o n and l o s s of morale which they were s u f f e r i n g . 
I a n remembered t h a t the f i r s t meeting wasn't u n t i l t h r e e or four weeks 
before the end of the s t r i k e . 
"And a l l they c o u l d say was; ' J u s t g i v e us a b i t of 
e x t r a time, b i t of e x t r a time'. Well, f a i r enough. A 
few of us wanted to go back to work, but I says 'bloody 
h e l l ' . I j u s t d i d n ' t fancy the bloody h a s s l e to t e l l 
the t r u t h . . . We knew the s t r i k e would come to an end." 
( i n t e r v i e w ) 
I n t r y i n g to a r t i c u l a t e why he didn't go back, he gave a confused s e t of 
r e p l i e s - g i v i n g a d i f f e r e n t emphasis each time the question came up. 
"To me i t wasn't worth the h a s s l e . I mean, i f you went 
back you s t i l l had t o work with them. I mean, I don't 
t h i n k I c o u l d l i v e w i t h myself." 
Was i t the " h a s s l e " or the s o c i a l p r e s s u r e not to be a scab t h a t h e l d him 
out? 
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His w i f e , although g e n e r a l l y supportive, began to ask towards the end when 
he was going to go back. He would r e p l y 'Ah, next week'. Then he'd drag i t 
out u n t i l Wednesday, by which time t h e r e was no point i n going back t h a t 
week. The power of the p i c k e t l i n e s was c r u c i a l too. He quoted a 
c o n v e r s a t i o n he had with a an o l d man i n Trimdon Grange who'd s a i d the 
miners should have gone back to work a long time ago. 
"So I s a y s : 'Why, would thou go through a p i c k e t l i n e ? ' 
'Oh, I ' d go through a p i c k e t l i n e . ' I says: 'Aye, thou 
go down to E a s i n g t o n or Murton and t r y the bogger! And 
see w h a t ' l l happen!' I says: "There's no bloody danger 
of me going through a p i c k e t l i n e ! We're on s t r i k e , and 
t h a t ' s a l l t h e r e i s t o i t ' ! " 
There was "no p o i n t " i n going a g a i n s t the union. 
" I s a y s : 'You're going back when the union says to, and 
t h a t ' s a l l t h e r e i s to i t / I I 
I a n a l s o s a i d t h a t i t wasn't the p h y s i c a l hardship t h a t made him question 
the s t r i k e . F i n a n c i a l l y he could j u s t about get by. 
" I t was more l i k e the mental aspect, put i t t h a t way. 
Were you doing r i g h t i f you went back to work, or were 
you doing r i g h t i f you stopped at home? I had a son who 
was only 15." 
I t was v e r y hard to see your k i d going without. Not being able to give them 
what you wanted. " I t was hard to t e l l k i d s you didn't have any money." 
I a n ' s account h i g h l i g h t s the enormous s t r e n g t h of l o y a l t y towards the NUM. 
A r i g h t wing miners committee member i n Murton agreed. For many older 
miners, l o y a l t y to the union kept them out. "They wouldn't c r o s s a p i c k e t 
l i n e f o r anybody." Yet i n the end, many of them did . I t i s d i f f i c u l t to 
t e l l t o what extent t h e s e men supported the s t r i k e . I n one sense they d i d . 
Only Bob and Ken of those I i n t e r v i e w e d accepted the government l i n e t h a t 
uneconomic p i t s should c l o s e (see appendix 8) . But many of them a l s o harked 
back t o the 1960's, and wondered why the union was k i c k i n g up such a f u s s 
now, when they'd l e t a l l the p i t s shut then. A r i g h t wing miners' o f f i c i a l 
a t Murton remembered t h a t a t the f i r s t tubulent meeting a t the s t a r t of the 
s t r i k e i n Murton, some men were shouting: 
"Who supported Durham are a when they were c l o s i n g the 
Durham are a down? Did Y o r k s h i r e come and support u s ? " 
Some people remembered the f a r more recent f a i l u r e to support Durham when 
p i t s c l o s e d , quoting South Hetton and E a s t Hetton as examples where the 
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Durham area was l e t down. The present UDM chairman at Murton - who used to 
be a b i g supporter of Arthur S c a r g i l l - commented 
"A l o t of Durham people i f you spoke the t r u t h thought 
t h a t A r t h u r S c a r g i l l b e t r a y e d us i n Durham because we 
had t h r e e p i t s c l o s e i n t h i s area the year before the 
s t r i k e , and t h e r e wasn't t h a t done about i t . " 
I a n f e l t the i n j u s t i c e of 60's c l o s u r e s too, and l i n k e d i t to a wider point 
about h i s f e e l i n g s f o r Murton. 
"We came out on s t r i k e , but having l i v e d through the 
1960's - worked i n the 1960's over here - when they 
were c l o s i n g 'em, t h e r e wasn't a word of p r o t e s t ! I 
used to say: 'Why, what the h e l l are we on s t r i k e f o r ? ' 
I mean, we weren't bothered whether Murton c l o s e d or 
kept open or not. I n f a c t , a l o t of us used to say, 
we're stopping on s t r i k e and hope they c l o s e the bloody 
p l a c e ! That was the outlook. But as I say, we stuck i t . 
And when you reckon up, t h e r e wasn't t h a t many scabs 
from around here. Not the Trimdons. Most stayed l o y a l . " 
For t h e s e o l d e r miners, whether or not they went back before the end 
depended on f a c t o r s s p e c i f i c to t h e i r s i t u a t i o n . They were a l l c l o s e to 
break i n g p o i n t a t the end. Whether or not they c r o s s e d the t h r e s h o l d before 
March 5th was due t o a range of f a c t o r s . I n Murton v i l l a g e very few did, 
because the community i t s e l f was s t i l l almost s o l i d . I n Trimdon Grange too, 
ve r y few had gone back. A t r a v e l l e r had two c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n t h i s respect: 
f i r s t l y whether or not h i s community was s t i l l s o l i d , and secondly whether 
or not h i s p i t was s o l i d . F o r example, i f he l i v e d i n F e r r y h i l l (where most 
people had gone back t o work) and worked a t Easington (which was s t i l l 
almost con5>letely s o l i d ) , then he was l e s s l i k e l y to c r o s s the t h r e s h o l d 
than another s t r i k e r l i v i n g a t F e r r y h i l l and working a t Tursdale workshops 
(where the s t r i k e had c o i r p l e t e l y crumbled) . 
Another iirportant f a c t o r towards the end was the a v a i l a b i l i t y of redundancy 
money. As debts mounted, massive s o c i a l s t r a i n s were created. Everyone i s 
agreed t h a t many people went back a t the end f o r the money, f u l l y intending 
to go s t r a i g h t out of the i n d u s t r y a f t e r the s t r i k e . 
A 9.2 "PETER'S" STORY 
An example of the p r e s s u r e s came from a mechanic l i v i n g and working i n 
Murton - "Peter". His w i f e - "Rosie" - b i t t e r l y opposed the s t r i k e . She 
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gave t h i s b r i e f but graphic summary of the s t r a i n c r e a t e d i n the family by 
the s t r i k e . 
"During the s t r i k e we didn't get on. I hated him! 
S i n g l y because he didn't have the guts to go down to 
the Welfare H a l l and speak h i s mind." (interview) 
F i n a n c i a l hardship i n c r e a s e d the p r e s s u r e as the s t r i k e went on. Rosie 
commented t h a t " i t was f r i g h t e n i n g . I wouldn't l i k e to go through i t 
again." 
Even i n t e r v i e w e d 18 months a f t e r the s t r i k e , the tensions were s t i l l 
e v i dent i n t h e i r d i f f e r i n g accounts of the s t r i k e . I t was c l e a r that f o r 
a l l h i s m i s g i v i n g s about the s t r i k e , P e t e r would s t i l l support the union 
a g a i n s t R o s i e ' s b i t t e r a t t a c k s . Witness t h i s exchange, s t a r t i n g with Peter. 
"For a l l the c r i t i c i s m of S c a r g i l l , he a t l e a s t stuck 
to h i s guns. He c a r r i e d through conference d e c i s i o n s , 
as he s a i d he would. I t j u s t happens h i s views were 
d i f f e r e n t to mine." 
Rosie'3 response. 
"You might not have been a S c a r g i l l i t e , but how many 
times d i d you defend him during the s t r i k e ? How many 
times would you not have anything s a i d a g a i n s t him i n 
here, during the s t r i k e ? Or was t h a t j u s t the union? 
Was i t because he was l e a d e r of the union and you 
didn't want anything bad s a i d a g a i n s t the union?" 
Again the tremendous l o y a l t y f e l t towards the union burns through these 
words. As h i s w i f e understood, even though P e t e r disagreed with the way the 
s t r i k e was c a l l e d , and w i t h the a c t i o n s of the "hooligans" on the p i c k e t 
l i n e s , he s t i l l couldn't bear to hear the union c r i t i c i s e d i n h i s home. 
But many mens' l o y a l t y snapped sometime i n February. A l l hope had gone. 
There was no end i n s i g h t . The s t r i k e might go on f o r months y e t . Going 
back seemed the only way to end i t . They f e l t they had given everything 
they could. F o r xnany men who went back towards the end, i t i s p o s s i b l e to 
t r a c e t h e i r d e c i s i o n t o one s m a l l t h i n g which convinced them t h a t the 
s t r i k e couldn't end u n l e s s they went back. Many more were on the brink of 
coming to t h a t same d e c i s i o n , but f o r d i f f e r e n t reasons t h e i r r e s i s t a n c e 
was a l i t t l e s t r o n g e r . 
A 9.3 "COLIN" FROM WEARMOUTH. 
An i n t e r v i e w w i t h two mechanics from Wearmouth c o l l i e r y - Kevin and C o l i n -
drew out the unbearable p r e s s u r e t h a t e v e n t u a l l y became too much. They were 
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I n c o n v e rsation with Jenny, some of the v a r i o u s c o n f l i c t i n g s t r e s s e s and 
p r e s s u r e s came out. 
"We went t o a meeting up here, me and me brother spoke 
at t h a t meeting. And everybody we spoke to, they wanted 
to go back to work. But i t was j u s t the f e a r of what 
would happen to them. .. Everybody was sc a r e d man." 
" I s i t a p s y c h o l o g i c a l f e a r i n t h a t what you're a f r a i d 
of i s men not t a l k i n g to you, or i s i t a f e a r of b r i c k s 
coming through your window?" ( i n t e r v i e w e r ) 
"Why, I would say b r i c k s coming through your window. 
Ee, I never thought about not t a l k i n g to us as a matter 
of f a c t ! I didn't t h i n k about t h a t a t the time. What we 
were f r i g h t e n e d of was b r i c k s coming through the 
windows and t h i n g s l i k e t h a t . " 
"Apart from t h a t - l i k e I say - i t [going through 
p i c k e t l i n e s ] was j u s t something you didn't b e l i e v e i n 
doing." (Jenny) 
"Oh aye, I didn't b e l i e v e i n i t . I honestly didn't 
b e l i e v e i n i t . " ( J e r r y ) 
"There was no way he wanted to go back i n one sense." 
(Jenny) 
" I didn't, no. Me brother was g e t t i n g at me f o r weeks 
and weeks, wasn't he?" ( J e r r y ) 
"Oh, he wanted t o go back. His wif e was g e t t i n g on to 
him a l l the time. I t h i n k a l o t of men who d i d go back, 
t h a t ' s a l l they went back f o r , t h e i r f a m i l i e s . And the 
f a m i l i e s were s u f f e r i n g . " (Jenny) 
" I ' d r a t h e r have f a c e d 20 Germans i n a trench. The gut 
f e e l i n g was t e r r i b l e . I ' l l never f o r g e t i t . I ' l l never 
ever f o r g e t t h a t f e e l i n g . I t was j u s t the thought t h a t 
I was going through t h a t l i n e . . . There was a l o t d i d 
get an awful gut f e e l i n g . But i t ' s l i k e I s a i d , i t was 
a d e c i s i o n I made, and I stood by i t at the time. 'Cos 
i t would never have f i n i s h e d ! You could see no end to 
i t ! " ( J e r r y ) 
"Would you have gone back i f you'd Jcnown i t was only 
going to be another week?" ( i n t e r v i e w e r ) 
"Probably not. No, I don't t h i n k I would have, to be 
honest." ( J e r r y ) 
"Did the f a c t t h a t your brother was keen t o go back, 
d i d t h a t have something to do with i t as w e l l ? " 
( i n t e r v i e w e r ) 
" I t h i n k i t d i d , aye." ( J e r r y ) 
" I t h i n k t h a t was the main t h i n g . John was going to go 
back, and t h e r e was no way he would l e t him go back and 
fac e t h a t on h i s own. I t h i n k t h a t ' s one of the reasons 
- to support [ h i s b r o t h e r ] . (Jenny) 
" I t was l i k e . " ( J e r r y ) 
A f t e r he went back he was ignored by many people who he knew. And i t r e a l l y 
h u r t . Jenny a r t i c u l a t e d h i s d i s t r e s s . 
" I mean t h e r e ' s no g e t t i n g away from i t . I inean, i t 
does hurt, when you've t a l k e d to people a l l your l i v e s , 
and a l l of a sudden they won't t a l k to you." 
"Oh aye, i t h u r t s . " 
Appendix 9 (465) 
" I mean, I know him. I know i t h u r t s . But t h e r e ' s no 
way those men would ever know. He would never ever l e t 
on to them. But I know i t does." (Jenny) 
She wishes now she'd made a g r e a t e r e f f o r t to persuade him not to go back, 
because then he might not have had to s u f f e r the pain he has. 
Asked i f he'd go through the l i n e again, he couldn't answer. Jenny t r i e d to 
e x p l a i n f o r him, s a y i n g he went back f o r h i s family, a t the point when 
S c a r g i l l s a i d t h e r e would be no more t a l k s . 
"His v e r y words were: 'He's not going to r u i n my l i f e 
f o r me. I'm going back to work.' Well, h i s brother had 
been wanting to go back to work f o r a few weeks hadn't 
he? And I t h i n k i t was t h a t and a l l . People were 
saying, we're going back to work. Then others were 
wanting t o go back. There was a few people round here 
t a l k i n g about going back." 
"But they never d i d . " ( J e r r y ) 
"And then t h e same ones wouldn't go back, and then 
wouldn't t a l k to those who when they went back, y e t 
they wanted to do i t themselves! You know i t ' s things 
l i k e t h a t which s t i c k r e a l l y . " (Jenny) 
A 9.5 CONCLUSION 
For many miners, the d i f f e r i n g balance of s o c i a l p r e s s u r e s on i n d i v i d u a l 
miners was c l e a r l y the d e c i s i v e f a c t o r i n determining when or whether the 
s c a l e s f i n a l l y t i p p e d towards going back to work. There was no fundamental 
i d e o l o g i c a l s p l i t between the m a j o r i t y of miners i n the "middle ground". I n 
the end i t was seemingly q u i t e t r i v i a l t h i n g s which pushed men back to 
work. Those t h a t didn't go back were perhaps p a r t of a stronger s o c i a l 
network, o f f e r i n g support and encouragement to s t a y on s t r i k e (see chapter 
s i x ) . 
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APPENDIX TEN: BRITISH COAL TREND STATEMENTS FOR NORTH 
EAST PITS. 1984/5-1988/9 
APPENDIX 10: BRITISH COAL TREND STATEMENTS FOR NORTH EAST PITS, 1984/5-88/9 
The f o l l o w i n g pages c o n t a i n B r i t i s h Coal's t r e n d statements f o r the North 
E a s t p i t s s i n c e the s t r i k e , with the exception of Westoe, which I was 
unable to obtain. 
The f i r s t t a b l e i s reproduced ( i n more l e g i b l e form) as t a b l e 7.15, and the 
t a b l e on Murton i s reproduced as t a b l e 7.14 (chapter seven). E s s e n t i a l l y 
the most s i g n i f i c a n t colxomns are those r e l a t i n g to manpower, OMS, net 
proceeds per tonne, o p e r a t i n g c o s t s per tonne, operating and bottom l i n e 
p r o f i t / l o s s , and o p e r a t i n g c o s t per giga j o u l e . Most of these are 
s e l f - e x p l a n a t o r y . 
OMS however r e f e r s t o "output per manshift", and i s measured fo r the 
c o a l f a c e and f o r t h e mine as a whole. Net proceeds per tonne r e f e r to the 
average irtputed v a l u e of each tonne of c o a l s o l d by the p i t . The f i g u r e 
v a r i e s according to c o a l q u a l i t y and the market i t i s s u p p l i e d to. Bottom 
l i n e p r o f i t / l o s s i n c l u d e s a l l overheads, i n c l u d i n g f o r example those 
a r i s i n g from ar e a a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Operating c o s t per g i g a j o u l e i s the cost 
of producing c o a l when i t s c a l o r i f i c value i s taken i n t o account. 
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